When is a word in good company for learning?

Although identifying the referents of single words is often cited as a key challenge for getting word learning off the ground, it overlooks the fact that young learners consistently encounter words in the context of other words. How does this company help or hinder word learning? Prior investigations into early word learning from children's real-world language input have yielded conflicting results, with some influential findings suggesting an advantage for words that keep a diverse company of other words, and others suggesting the opposite. Here, we sought to triangulate the source of this conflict, comparing different measures of diversity and approaches to controlling for correlated effects of word frequency across multiple languages. The results were striking: while different diversity measures on their own yielded conflicting results, once nonlinear relationships with word frequency were controlled, we found convergent evidence that contextual consistency supports early word learning. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: The words children learn occur in a sea of other words. The company words keep ranges from highly variable to highly consistent and circumscribed. Prior findings conflict over whether variability versus consistency helps early word learning. Accounting for correlated effects of word frequency resolved the conflict across multiple languages. Results reveal convergent evidence that consistency helps early word learning.

Strong Prediction: Language Model Surprisal Explains Multiple N400 Effects.

Theoretical accounts of the N400 are divided as to whether the amplitude of the N400 response to a stimulus reflects the extent to which the stimulus was predicted, the extent to which the stimulus is semantically similar to its preceding context, or both. We use state-of-the-art machine learning tools to investigate which of these three accounts is best supported by the evidence. GPT-3, a neural language model trained to compute the conditional probability of any word based on the words that precede it, was used to operationalize contextual predictability. In particular, we used an information-theoretic construct known as surprisal (the negative logarithm of the conditional probability). Contextual semantic similarity was operationalized by using two high-quality co-occurrence-derived vector-based meaning representations for words: GloVe and fastText. The cosine between the vector representation of the sentence frame and final word was used to derive contextual cosine similarity estimates. A series of regression models were constructed, where these variables, along with cloze probability and plausibility ratings, were used to predict single trial N400 amplitudes recorded from healthy adults as they read sentences whose final word varied in its predictability, plausibility, and semantic relationship to the likeliest sentence completion. Statistical model comparison indicated GPT-3 surprisal provided the best account of N400 amplitude and suggested that apparently disparate N400 effects of expectancy, plausibility, and contextual semantic similarity can be reduced to variation in the predictability of words. The results are argued to support predictive coding in the human language network.

Ignoring the alternatives: The N400 is sensitive to stimulus preactivation alone.

The N400 component of the event-related brain potential is a neural signal of processing difficulty. In the language domain, it is widely believed to be sensitive to the degree to which a given word or its semantic features have been preactivated in the brain based on the preceding context. However, it has also been shown that the brain often preactivates many words in parallel. It is currently unknown whether the N400 is also affected by the preactivations of alternative words other than the stimulus that is actually presented. This leaves a weak link in the derivation chain-how can we use the N400 to understand the mechanisms of preactivation if we do not know what it indexes? This study directly addresses this gap. We estimate the extent to which all words in a lexicon are preactivated in a given context using the predictions of contemporary large language models. We then directly compare two competing possibilities: that the amplitude of the N400 is sensitive only to the extent to which the stimulus is preactivated, and that it is also sensitive to the preactivation states of the alternatives. We find evidence of the former. This result allows for better grounded inferences about the mechanisms underlying the N400, lexical preactivation in the brain, and language processing more generally.

Sentence-based mental simulations: Evidence from behavioral experiments using garden-path sentences.

Language comprehenders activate mental representations of sensorimotor experiences related to the content of utterances they process. However, it is still unclear whether these sensorimotor simulations are driven by associations with words or by a more complex process of meaning composition into larger linguistic expressions, such as sentences. In two experiments, we investigated whether comprehenders indeed create sentence-based simulations. Materials were constructed such that simulation effects could only emerge from sentence meaning and not from word-based associations alone. We additionally asked when during sentence processing these simulations are constructed, using a garden-path paradigm. Participants read either a garden-path sentence (e.g., "As Mary ate the egg was in the fridge") or a corresponding unambiguous control with the same meaning and words (e.g., "The egg was in the fridge as Mary ate"). Participants then judged whether a depicted entity was mentioned in the sentence or not. In both experiments, picture response times were faster when the picture was compatible (vs. incompatible) with the sentence-based interpretation of the target entity (e.g., both for garden-path and control sentence: an unpeeled egg), suggesting that participants created simulations based on the sentence content and only operating over the sentence as a whole.

Do gestures retain mental associations with their iconic origins, even after they become emblematic? An analysis of the middle-finger gesture among American English speakers.

What concepts and words do communicative gestures activate in the minds of people who view them? It's widely believed that many gestures grow from iconic origins-they look like what they mean-but also that at some point they may become emblematic-conventionalized as culturally agreed-upon symbols. How long do links between physical movements of the body and the things in the world they denote persist in the minds of gesture-users? A pair of experiments asks this question for the Middle-Finger, a cross-culturally recognized obscene gesture. The prevailing view is that the gesture originates in a phallic symbol. Yet it is now predominantly used as an emblematic gesture displaying contempt (among other things). It is currently unknown whether the iconic origins of gestures persist through the emblematic stage in the minds of gesture users. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that viewing the Middle-Finger primes thoughts about penises or the word penis. The results showed that the Middle-Finger induced no priming of penis compared with control, unlike another obscene penis-representing gesture (Finger-Bang), which did. This suggests that the Middle-Finger no longer activates thoughts of penises in the minds of contemporary American English speakers. Emblematic gestures with iconic origins may undergo historical change not just in the functions they serve but also in the effects they have on the minds of people who use them.

Do Metaphors Move From Mind to Mouth? Evidence From a New System of Linguistic Metaphors for Time.

Languages around the world use a recurring strategy to discuss abstract concepts: describe them metaphorically, borrowing language from more concrete domains. We "plan ahead" to the future, "count up" to higher numbers, and "warm" to new friends. Past work has found that these ways of talking have implications for how we think, so that shared systems of linguistic metaphors can produce shared conceptualizations. On the other hand, these systematic linguistic metaphors might not just be the cause but also the effect of shared, non-linguistic ways of thinking. Here, we present a case study of a variety of American English in which a shared, non-linguistic conceptualization of time has become crystallized as a new system of linguistic metaphors. Speakers of various languages, including English, conceptualize time as a lateral timeline, with the past leftward and the future rightward. Until now, this conceptualization has not been documented in the speech of any language. In two studies, we document how members of the U.S. military, but not U.S. civilians, talk about time using conventionalized lateral metaphors (e.g., "move the meeting right" to mean "move the meeting later"). We argue that, under the right cultural circumstances, implicit mental representations become conventionalized metaphors in language.

The spatial alignment of time: Differences in alignment of deictic and sequence time along the sagittal and lateral axes.

People use space in a variety of ways to structure their thoughts about time. The present report focuses on the different ways that space is employed when reasoning about deictic (past/future relationships) and sequence (earlier/later relationships) time. In the first study, we show that deictic and sequence time are aligned along the lateral axis in a manner consistent with previous work, with past and earlier events associated with left space and future and later events associated with right space. However, the alignment of time with space is different along the sagittal axis. Participants associated future events and earlier events-not later events-with the space in front of their body and past and later events with the space behind, consistent with the sagittal spatial terms (e.g., ahead, in front of) that we use to talk about deictic and sequence time. In the second study, we show that these associations between sequence time and sagittal space are sensitive to person-perspective. This suggests that the particular space-time associations observed in English speakers are influenced by a variety of different spatial properties, including spatial location and perspective.

Metaphor priming in sentence production: concrete pictures affect abstract language production.

People speak metaphorically about abstract concepts-for instance, a person can be "full of love" or "have a lot of love to give." Over the past decade, research has begun to focus on how metaphors are processed during language comprehension. Much of this work suggests that understanding a metaphorical expression involves activating brain and body systems involved in perception and motor control. However, no research to date has asked whether the same is true while speakers produce language. We address this gap using a sentence production task. Its results demonstrate that visually activating a concrete source domain can trigger the use of metaphorical language drawn from that same concrete domain, even in sentences that are thematically unrelated to the primes, a metaphorical priming effect. This effect suggests that conceptual metaphors play a part in language production. It also shows that activation in the perceptual system that is not part of an intended message can nevertheless influence sentence formulation.

Action verbs are processed differently in metaphorical and literal sentences depending on the semantic match of visual primes.

Language comprehension requires rapid and flexible access to information stored in long-term memory, likely influenced by activation of rich world knowledge and by brain systems that support the processing of sensorimotor content. We hypothesized that while literal language about biological motion might rely on neurocognitive representations of biological motion specific to the details of the actions described, metaphors rely on more generic representations of motion. In a priming and self-paced reading paradigm, participants saw video clips or images of (a) an intact point-light walker or (b) a scrambled control and read sentences containing literal or metaphoric uses of biological motion verbs either closely or distantly related to the depicted action (walking). We predicted that reading times for literal and metaphorical sentences would show differential sensitivity to the match between the verb and the visual prime. In Experiment 1, we observed interactions between the prime type (walker or scrambled video) and the verb type (close or distant match) for both literal and metaphorical sentences, but with strikingly different patterns. We found no difference in the verb region of literal sentences for Close-Match verbs after walker or scrambled motion primes, but Distant-Match verbs were read more quickly following walker primes. For metaphorical sentences, the results were roughly reversed, with Distant-Match verbs being read more slowly following a walker compared to scrambled motion. In Experiment 2, we observed a similar pattern following still image primes, though critical interactions emerged later in the sentence. We interpret these findings as evidence for shared recruitment of cognitive and neural mechanisms for processing visual and verbal biological motion information. Metaphoric language using biological motion verbs may recruit neurocognitive mechanisms similar to those used in processing literal language but be represented in a less-specific way.

Doing arithmetic by hand: hand movements during exact arithmetic reveal systematic, dynamic spatial processing.

Mathematics requires precise inferences about abstract objects inaccessible to perception. How is this possible? One proposal is that mathematical reasoning, while concerned with entirely abstract objects, nevertheless relies on neural resources specialized for interacting with the world-in other words, mathematics may be grounded in spatial or sensorimotor systems. Mental arithmetic, for instance, could involve shifts in spatial attention along a mental "number-line", the product of cultural artefacts and practices that systematically spatialize number and arithmetic. Here, we investigate this hypothesized spatial processing during exact, symbolic arithmetic (e.g., 4 + 3 = 7). Participants added and subtracted single-digit numbers and selected the exact solution from responses in the top corners of a computer monitor. While they made their selections using a computer mouse, we recorded the movement of their hand as indexed by the streaming x, y coordinates of the computer mouse cursor. As predicted, hand movements during addition and subtraction were systematically deflected toward the right and the left, respectively, as if calculation involved simultaneously simulating motion along a left-to-right mental number-line. This spatial-arithmetical bias, moreover, was distinct from-but correlated with-individuals' spatial-numerical biases (i.e., spatial-numerical association of response codes, SNARC, effect). These results are the first evidence that exact, symbolic arithmetic prompts systematic spatial processing associated with mental calculation. We discuss the possibility that mathematical calculation relies, in part, on an integrated system of spatial processes.

The case of the missing pronouns: does mentally simulated perspective play a functional role in the comprehension of person?

Language comprehenders can mentally simulate perceptual and motor features of scenes they hear or read about (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002). Recent research shows that these simulations adopt a particular perspective (Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004; Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, Augustyn, & Taylor, 2009). Moreover, features of utterances influence the perspective that comprehenders are led to adopt. For instance, language about you primes a participant visual perspective, while third person he and she prime an observer perspective. But what role does perspectival mental simulation play in the comprehension of person? On the one hand, the different perspectives adopted during language understanding could be necessary for successfully determining the meaning of an utterance. However, current empirical evidence is also compatible with the possibility that adopting a perspective in mental simulation is not essential to comprehending who did what to whom. If the latter is the case, then we should be able to find cases where language comprehenders understand who did what to whom without measurably performing mental simulation from a particular perspective. A candidate language that might display such a case is Japanese, where grammatical subject pronouns can be omitted when the subject is inferable from context. We replicated a previously used method for assessing perspectival mental simulation during language comprehension, but tailored it to Japanese. The results showed that when pronouns were present, like in English, sentences facilitated identification of an image matching the proposed perspective associated with the mentioned pronoun. This replicated the previous finding for English. But when the subject pronoun was omitted, so that the sentence did not explicitly mention the subject, there was no such effect. Nonetheless, native comprehenders of Japanese automatically and easily tracked who the subjects of the sentences with omitted subjects were. Together, these findings suggest that while grammatical person modulates visual perspective in mental simulation, visual perspective is not necessary for successful identification and representation of event participants.

Writing direction affects how people map space onto time.

What determines which spatial axis people use to represent time? We investigate effects of writing direction. English, like Mandarin Chinese in mainland China, is written left to right and then top to bottom. But in Taiwan, characters are written predominantly top to bottom and then right to left. Because being a fluent reader-writer entails thousands of hours of experience with eye and hand movement in the direction dictated by one's writing system, it could be that writing system direction affects the axis used to represent time in terms of space. In a behavioral experiment, we had native speakers of English, Mandarin Chinese from mainland China, and Mandarin Chinese from Taiwan place sets of cards in temporal order. These cards depicted stages of development of plants and animals, for instance: tadpole, froglet, frog. Results showed that English speakers always represented time as moving from left to right (LR). Mainland Chinese participants trended in the same direction, but a small portion laid the cards out from top to bottom. Taiwanese participants were just as likely to depict time as moving from LR as from top to bottom, with a large minority depicting it as moving from right to left. Native writing system affects how people represent time spatially.

Spatial and linguistic aspects of visual imagery in sentence comprehension.

There is mounting evidence that language comprehension involves the activation of mental imagery of the content of utterances (Barsalou, 1999; Bergen, Chang, & Narayan, 2004; Bergen, Narayan, & Feldman, 2003; Narayan, Bergen, & Weinberg, 2004; Richardson, Spivey, McRae, & Barsalou, 2003; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002). This imagery can have motor or perceptual content. Three main questions about the process remain under-explored, however. First, are lexical associations with perception or motion sufficient to yield mental simulation, or is the integration of lexical semantics into larger structures, like sentences, necessary? Second, what linguistic elements (e.g., verbs, nouns, etc.) trigger mental simulations? Third, how detailed are the visual simulations that are performed? A series of behavioral experiments address these questions, using a visual object categorization task to investigate whether up- or down-related language selectively interferes with visual processing in the same part of the visual field (following Richardson et al., 2003). The results demonstrate that either subject nouns or main verbs can trigger visual imagery, but only when used in literal sentences about real space-metaphorical language does not yield significant effects-which implies that it is the comprehension of the sentence as a whole and not simply lexical associations that yields imagery effects. These studies also show that the evoked imagery contains detail as to the part of the visual field where the described scene would take place.