Elements of decisional dynamics: An agent-based approach applied to artificial financial market.

This paper introduces an original mathematical description for describing agents' decision-making process in the case of problems affected by both individual and collective behaviors in systems characterized by nonlinear, path dependent, and self-organizing interactions. An application to artificial financial markets is proposed by designing a multi-agent system based on the proposed formalization. In this application, agents' decision-making process is based on fuzzy logic rules and the price dynamics is purely deterministic according to the basic matching rules of a central order book. Finally, while putting most parameters under evolutionary control, the computational agent-based system is able to replicate several stylized facts of financial time series (distributions of stock returns showing a heavy tail with positive excess kurtosis, absence of autocorrelations in stock returns, and volatility clustering phenomenon).

Network characteristics emerging from agent interactions in balanced distributed system.

A distributed computing system behaves like a complex network, the interactions between nodes being essential information exchanges and migrations of jobs or services to execute. These actions are performed by software agents, which behave like the members of social networks, cooperating and competing to obtain knowledge and services. The load balancing consists in distributing the load evenly between system nodes. It aims at enhancing the resource usage. A load balancing strategy specifies scenarios for the cooperation. Its efficiency depends on quantity, accuracy, and distribution of available information. Nevertheless, the distribution of information on the nodes, together with the initial network structure, may create different logical network structures. In this paper, different load balancing strategies are tested on different network structures using a simulation. The four tested strategies are able to distribute evenly the load so that the system reaches a steady state (the mean response time of the jobs is constant), but it is shown that a given strategy indeed behaves differently according to structural parameters and information spreading. Such a study, devoted to distributed computing systems (DCSs), can be useful to understand and drive the behavior of other complex systems.

Local Nash equilibrium in social networks.

Nash equilibrium is widely present in various social disputes. As of now, in structured static populations, such as social networks, regular, and random graphs, the discussions on Nash equilibrium are quite limited. In a relatively stable static gaming network, a rational individual has to comprehensively consider all his/her opponents' strategies before they adopt a unified strategy. In this scenario, a new strategy equilibrium emerges in the system. We define this equilibrium as a local Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we present an explicit definition of the local Nash equilibrium for the two-strategy games in structured populations. Based on the definition, we investigate the condition that a system reaches the evolutionary stable state when the individuals play the Prisoner's dilemma and snow-drift game. The local Nash equilibrium provides a way to judge whether a gaming structured population reaches the evolutionary stable state on one hand. On the other hand, it can be used to predict whether cooperators can survive in a system long before the system reaches its evolutionary stable state for the Prisoner's dilemma game. Our work therefore provides a theoretical framework for understanding the evolutionary stable state in the gaming populations with static structures.

Fence-sitters protect cooperation in complex networks.

Evolutionary game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from science to engineering. In complex networks, because of the difficulty of formulating the replicator dynamics, most of the previous studies are confined to a numerical level. In this paper, we introduce a vectorial formulation to derive three classes of individuals' payoff analytically. The three classes are pure cooperators, pure defectors, and fence-sitters. Here, fence-sitters are the individuals who change their strategies at least once in the strategy evolutionary process. As a general approach, our vectorial formalization can be applied to all the two-strategy games. To clarify the function of the fence-sitters, we define a parameter, payoff memory, as the number of rounds that the individuals' payoffs are aggregated. We observe that the payoff memory can control the fence-sitters' effects and the level of cooperation efficiently. Our results indicate that the fence-sitters' role is nontrivial in the complex topologies, which protects cooperation in an indirect way. Our results may provide a better understanding of the composition of cooperators in a circumstance where the temptation to defect is larger.