Easy-fix attentional focus manipulation boosts the intuitive and deliberate use of base-rate information.

In addressing human reasoning biases, "easy-fix" attentional focus interventions have shown that we can prompt reasoners to align responses with logico-mathematical principles. The current study aimed to test the impact of such interventions on both intuitive and deliberate responses on base-rate items. Using a two-response paradigm, participants provided initial intuitive responses under time constraints and cognitive load, followed by deliberate responses. During the intervention, we used attentional focus manipulations with base-rate items that aimed to redirect participants' attention toward the "logical" base-rate cue (i.e., the logical intervention) or toward the "heuristic" descriptive cue (i.e., the heuristic intervention). The results indicate that the logical intervention led to improved alignment with logico-mathematical principles in both intuitive and deliberate responses, albeit with a modest effect size. Conversely, the heuristic intervention had no discernible impact on accuracy. This indicates that our attentional focus manipulation is more effective at getting reasoners to respect rather than to override base-rates.

Metacognition as a mediator of the relation between family SES and language and mathematical abilities in preschoolers.

The effect of family socioeconomic status (SES) on academic achievement in literacy and numeracy has been extensively studied with educational inequalities already witnessed in preschoolers. This is presumably explained by the effect of family SES on cognitive and socioemotional abilities associated with academic achievement. Metacognition which refers to knowledge and regulation skills involving reflexivity about one's own cognitive processes is one of these abilities. However, most of the studies investigating the association between metacognition and academic achievement have focused on school-aged students and studies with younger students are only emerging. Meanwhile, the association between family SES and metacognition abilities has surprisingly received little attention regardless of participants' age. The aim of this study was to explore the associations between family SES, metacognition, language and mathematical abilities in preschoolers aged 5 to 6. We provide the first evidence that the effect of family SES on preschoolers' language and mathematical abilities is mediated by the effect of family SES on their metacognitive abilities. The implications for future research, education and policies aiming at reducing educational inequalities are discussed.

The relationships between urbanicity, general cognitive ability, and susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion.

Previous studies have shown that, in samples of non-Western observers, susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion is stronger in urban than rural dwellers. While such relationship between illusion strength and urbanicity has often been ascribed to external factors (such as the visual impact of the environment), the present study explored the possibility that it is instead mediated by general cognitive ability, an internal factor. We recruited a sample of remote Namibians who varied in their level of urbanicity, and measured their susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion, their levels of education and literacy, and their general cognitive ability. The results showed that urbanicity was related to Ebbinghaus susceptibility, and that general cognitive ability, literacy and education did not mediate this effect, which is reassuring with regard to the findings of previous studies that did not control for these variables. However, we found robust relationships between urbanicity, on the one hand, and cognitive ability, education and literacy, on the other, which advocates for careful consideration of the impact of the latter variables in studies about the cognitive effects of urban environments.

Adieu Bias: Debiasing Intuitions Among French Speakers.

Recent debiasing studies have shown that a short, plain-English explanation of the correct solution strategy can improve reasoning performance. However, these studies have predominantly focused on English-speaking populations, who were tested with problem contents designed for an English-speaking test environment. Here we explore whether the key findings of previous debiasing studies can be extended to native French speakers living in continental Europe (France). We ran a training session with a battery of three reasoning tasks (i.e., base-rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and bat-and-ball) on 147 native French speakers. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants first gave an initial intuitive response, under time pressure and cognitive load, and then gave a final response after deliberation. Results showed a clear training effect, as early as the initial (intuitive) stage. Immediately after training, most participants solved the problems correctly, without the need for a deliberation process. The findings confirm that the intuitive debiasing training effect extends to native French speakers.

Debiasing thinking among non-WEIRD reasoners.

Human reasoning has been shown to be biased in a variety of situations. While most studies have focused on samples of WEIRD participants (from Western Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic societies), the sparse non-WEIRD data on the topic suggest an even stronger propensity for biased reasoning. This could be explained by a competence issue (people lack the ability to integrate logical knowledge into their reasoning) or a performance issue (people possess the logical knowledge but do not know it is relevant). We addressed this question using a debiasing paradigm with the base-rate task on a sample of non-industrialized people, the Himba of Namibia. After a short training, most participants were debiased, lending credence to the performance account. Debiasing was however to some extent boosted by schooling and living environment suggesting that competence also plays a role (in that more acquired knowledge allows for a higher training benefit). Results imply that debias interventions can be successfully employed to boost sound reasoning around the world.

Trend judgment as a perceptual building block of graphicacy and mathematics, across age, education, and culture.

Data plots are widely used in science, journalism and politics, since they efficiently allow to depict a large amount of information. Graphicacy, the ability to understand graphs, has thus become a fundamental cultural skill comparable to literacy or numeracy. Here, we introduce a measure of intuitive graphicacy that assesses the perceptual ability to detect a trend in noisy scatterplots ("does this graph go up or down?"). In 3943 educated participants, responses vary as a sigmoid function of the t-value that a statistician would compute to detect a significant trend. We find a minimum level of core intuitive graphicacy even in unschooled participants living in remote Namibian villages (N = 87) and 6-year-old 1st-graders who never read a graph (N = 27). The sigmoid slope that we propose as a proxy of intuitive graphicacy increases with education and tightly correlates with statistical and mathematical knowledge, showing that experience contributes to refining graphical intuitions. Our tool, publicly available online, allows to quickly evaluate and formally quantify a perceptual building block of graphicacy.

From bias to sound intuiting: Boosting correct intuitive reasoning.

Although human thinking is often biased by erroneous intuitions, recent de-bias studies suggest that people's performance can be boosted by short training interventions, where the correct answers to reasoning problems are explained. However, the nature of this training effect remains unclear. Does training help participants correct erroneous intuitions through deliberation? Or does it help them develop correct intuitions? We addressed this issue in three studies, by focusing on the well-known Bat-and-Ball problem. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants first gave an initial intuitive response, under time pressure and cognitive load, and then gave a final response after deliberation. Studies 1 and 2 showed that not only did training boost performance, it did so as early as the intuitive stage. After training, most participants solved the problems correctly from the outset and no longer needed to correct an initial incorrect answer through deliberation. Study 3 indicated that this sound intuiting sustained over at least two months. The findings confirm that a short training can boost sound reasoning at an intuitive stage. We discuss key theoretical and applied implications.