RESUMO
BACKGROUND: The COVID-19 pandemic presented a myriad of challenges for the health workforce around the world due to its escalating demand on service delivery. A motivated health workforce is critical to effectual emergency response and in some settings, incentivizing health workers motivates them and ensures continuity in the provision of health services. We describe health workforce experiences with incentives and dis-incentives during the COVID-19 response in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Senegal, Nigeria, and Uganda. METHODS: This is a multi-country qualitative research study involving four African countries namely: DRC, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda which assessed the workplace incentives instituted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Key informant interviews (n = 60) were conducted with staff at ministries of health, policy makers and health workers. Interviews were virtual using the telephone or Zoom. They were audio recorded, transcribed verbatim, and analyzed thematically. Themes were identified and quotes were used to support findings. RESULTS: Health worker incentives included (i) financial rewards in the form of allowances and salary increments. These motivated health workers, sustaining the health system and the health workers' efforts during the COVID-19 response across the four countries. (ii) Non-financial incentives related to COVID-19 management such as provision of medicines/supplies, on the job trainings, medical care for health workers, social welfare including meals, transportation and housing, recognition, health insurance, psychosocial support, and supervision. Improvised determination and distribution of both financial and non-financial incentives were common across the countries. Dis-incentives included the lack of personal protective equipment, lack of transportation to health facilities during lockdown, long working hours, harassment by security forces and perceived unfairness in access to and inadequacy of financial incentives. CONCLUSION: Although important for worker motivation, financial and non-financial incentives generated some dis-incentives because of the perceived unfairness in their provision. Financial and non-financial incentives deployed during health emergencies should preferably be pre-determined, equitably and transparently provided because when arbitrarily applied, these same financial and non-financial incentives can potentially become dis-incentives. Moreover, financial incentives are useful only as far as they are administered together with non-financial incentives such as supportive and well-resourced work environments. The potential negative impacts of interventions such as service delivery re-organization and lockdown within already weakened systems need to be anticipated and due precautions exercised to reduce dis-incentives during emergencies.
Assuntos
COVID-19 , Motivação , Humanos , COVID-19/epidemiologia , Mão de Obra em Saúde , Nigéria/epidemiologia , República Democrática do Congo/epidemiologia , Senegal , Uganda/epidemiologia , Pandemias , Emergências , Controle de Doenças TransmissíveisRESUMO
Background: African countries leveraged testing capacities to enhance public health action in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper describes experiences and lessons learned during the improvement of testing capacity throughout the COVID-19 response in Senegal, Uganda, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Methods: The four countries' testing strategies were studied using a mixed-methods approach. Desk research on COVID-19 testing strategies was conducted and complemented by interviewing key informants. The findings were synthesized to demonstrate learning outcomes across the four countries. Results: The four countries demonstrated severely limited testing capacities at the onset of the pandemic. These countries decentralized COVID-19 testing services by leveraging preexisting laboratory systems such as PCR and GeneXpert used for the diagnosis of tuberculosis (TB) to address this gap and the related inequities, engaging the private sector, establishing new laboratories, and using rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) to expand testing capacity and reduce the turnaround time (TAT). The use of digital platforms improved the TAT. Testing supplies were sourced through partners, although access to global markets was challenging. Case detection remains suboptimal due to high costs, restrictive testing strategies, testing access challenges, and misinformation, which hinder the demand for testing. The TAT for PCR remained a challenge, while RDT use was underreported, although Senegal manufactured RDTs locally. Key findings indicate that regionally coordinated procurement and manufacturing mechanisms are required, that testing modalities must be simplified for improved access, and that the risk-based testing strategy limits comprehensive understanding of the disease burden. Conclusion: Although testing capacities improved significantly during the pandemic, case detection and access to testing remained suboptimal. The four countries could benefit from further simplification of testing modalities and cost reduction. Local manufacturing and pooled procurement mechanisms for diagnostics are needed for optimal pandemic preparedness and response.