Lessons from aviation safety: pilot monitoring, the sterile flight deck rule, and aviation-style computerised checklists in the operating room.

Commercial aviation practices including the role of the pilot monitoring, the sterile flight deck rule, and computerised checklists have direct applicability to anaesthesia care. The pilot monitoring performs specific tasks that complement the pilot flying who is directly controlling the aircraft flight path. The anaesthesia care team, with two providers, can be organised in a manner that is analogous to the two-pilot flight deck. However, solo providers, such as solo pilots, can emulate the pilot monitoring role by reading checklists aloud, and utilise non-anaesthesia providers to fulfil some of the functions of pilot monitoring. The sterile flight deck rule states that flight crew members should not engage in any non-essential or distracting activity during critical phases of flight. The application of the sterile flight deck rule in anaesthesia practice entails deliberately minimising distractions during critical phases of anaesthesia care. Checklists are commonly used in the operating room, especially the World Health Organization surgical safety checklist. However, the use of aviation-style computerised checklists offers additional benefits. Here we discuss how these commercial aviation practices may be applied in the operating room.

Development of an aviation-style computerized checklist displayed on a tablet computer for improving handoff communication in the post-anesthesia care unit.

Critical patient care information is often omitted or misunderstood during handoffs, which can lead to inefficiencies, delays, and sometimes patient harm. We implemented an aviation-style post-anesthesia care unit (PACU) handoff checklist displayed on a tablet computer to improve PACU handoff communication. We developed an aviation-style computerized checklist system for use in procedural rooms and adapted it for tablet computers to facilitate the performance of PACU handoffs. We then compared the proportion of PACU handoff items communicated before and after the implementation of the PACU handoff checklist on a tablet computer. A trained observer recorded the proportion of PACU handoff information items communicated, any resistance during the performance of the checklist, the type of provider participating in the handoff, and the time required to perform the handoff. We also obtained these patient outcomes: PACU length of stay, respiratory events, post-operative nausea and vomiting, and pain. A total of 209 PACU handoffs were observed before and 210 after the implementation of the tablet-based PACU handoff checklist. The average proportion of PACU handoff items communicated increased from 49.3% (95% CI 47.7-51.0%) before checklist implementation to 72.0% (95% CI 69.2-74.9%) after checklist implementation (p < 0.001). A tablet-based aviation-style handoff checklist resulted in an increase in PACU handoff items communicated, but did not have an effect on patient outcomes.

Aviation-Style Computerized Surgical Safety Checklist Displayed on a Large Screen and Operated by the Anesthesia Provider Improves Checklist Performance.

BACKGROUND: Many hospitals have implemented surgical safety checklists based on the World Health Organization surgical safety checklist, which was associated with improved outcomes. However, the execution of the checklists is frequently incomplete. We reasoned that aviation-style computerized checklist displayed onto large, centrally located screen and operated by the anesthesia provider would improve the performance of surgical safety checklist. METHODS: We performed a prospective before and after observational study to evaluate the effect of a computerized surgical safety checklist system on checklist performance. We created checklist software and translated our 4-part surgical safety checklist from wall poster into an aviation-style computerized format displayed onto a large, centrally located screen and operated by the anesthesia provider. Direct observers recorded performance of the first part of the surgical safety checklist that was initiated before anesthetic induction, including completion of each checklist item, provider participation and distraction level, resistance to use of the checklist, and the time required for checklist completion before and after checklist system implementation. We compared trends of the proportions of cases with 100% surgical safety checklist completion over time between pre- and postintervention periods and assessed for a jump at the start of intervention using segmented logistic regression model while controlling for potential confounding variables. RESULTS: A total of 671 cases were observed before and 547 cases were observed after implementation of the computerized surgical safety checklist system. The proportion of cases in which all of the items of the surgical safety checklist were completed significantly increased from 2.1% to 86.3% after the computerized checklist system implementation (P < .001). Before computerized checklist system implementation, 488 of 671 (72.7%) cases had <75% of checklist items completed, whereas after a computerized checklist system implementation, only 3 of 547 (0.5%) cases had <75% of checklist items completed. CONCLUSIONS: The implementation of a computerized surgical safety checklist system resulted in an improvement in checklist performance.

Simulation-based trial of surgical-crisis checklists.

BACKGROUND: Operating-room crises (e.g., cardiac arrest and massive hemorrhage) are common events in large hospitals but can be rare for individual clinicians. Successful management is difficult and complex. We sought to evaluate a tool to improve adherence to evidence-based best practices during such events. METHODS: Operating-room teams from three institutions (one academic medical center and two community hospitals) participated in a series of surgical-crisis scenarios in a simulated operating room. Each team was randomly assigned to manage half the scenarios with a set of crisis checklists and the remaining scenarios from memory alone. The primary outcome measure was failure to adhere to critical processes of care. Participants were also surveyed regarding their perceptions of the usefulness and clinical relevance of the checklists. RESULTS: A total of 17 operating-room teams participated in 106 simulated surgical-crisis scenarios. Failure to adhere to lifesaving processes of care was less common during simulations when checklists were available (6% of steps missed when checklists were available vs. 23% when they were unavailable, P<0.001). The results were similar in a multivariate model that accounted for clustering within teams, with adjustment for institution, scenario, and learning and fatigue effects (adjusted relative risk, 0.28; 95% confidence interval, 0.18 to 0.42; P<0.001). Every team performed better when the crisis checklists were available than when they were not. A total of 97% of the participants reported that if one of these crises occurred while they were undergoing an operation, they would want the checklist used. CONCLUSIONS: In a high-fidelity simulation study, checklist use was associated with significant improvement in the management of operating-room crises. These findings suggest that checklists for use during operating-room crises have the potential to improve surgical care. (Funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.).

Crisis checklists for the operating room: development and pilot testing.

BACKGROUND: Because operating room crises are rare events, failure to adhere to critical management steps is common. We sought to develop and pilot a tool to improve adherence to lifesaving measures during operating room crises. STUDY DESIGN: We identified 12 of the most frequently occurring operating room crises and corresponding evidence-based metrics of essential care for each (46 total process measures). We developed checklists for each crisis based on a previously defined method, which included literature review, multidisciplinary expert consultation, and simulation. After development, 2 operating room teams (11 participants) were each exposed to 8 simulations with random assignment to checklist use or working from memory alone. Each team managed 4 simulations with a checklist available and 4 without. One of the primary outcomes measured through video review was failure to adhere to essential processes of care. Participants were surveyed for perceptions of checklist use and realism of the scenarios. RESULTS: Checklist use resulted in a 6-fold reduction in failure of adherence to critical steps in management for 8 scenarios with 2 pilot teams. These results held in multivariate analysis accounting for clustering within teams and adjusting for learning or fatigue effects (11 of 46 failures without the checklist vs 2 of 46 failures with the checklist; adjusted relative risk = 0.15, 95% CI, 0.04-0.60; p = 0.007). All participants rated the overall quality of the checklists and scenarios to be higher than average or excellent. CONCLUSIONS: Checklist use can improve safety and management in operating room crises. These findings warrant broader evaluation, including in clinical settings.

Perspectives in quality: designing the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist.

The World Health Organization's Patient Safety Programme created an initiative to improve the safety of surgery around the world. In order to accomplish this goal the programme team developed a checklist with items that could and, if at all possible, should be practised in all settings where surgery takes place. There is little guidance in the literature regarding methods for creating a medical checklist. The airline industry, however, has more than 70 years of experience in developing and using checklists. The authors of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist drew lessons from the aviation experience to create a safety tool that supports essential clinical practice. In order to inform the methodology for development of future checklists in health care, we review how we applied lessons learned from the aviation experience in checklist development to the development of the Surgical Safety Checklist and also discuss the differences that exist between aviation and medicine that impact the use of checklists in health care.