Addressing choice of law challenges in multi-state precision medicine research: experts' assessment of key factors.

Precision medicine research implicates numerous state laws that may affect participants' rights and protections and are not preempted by federal law. The choice of which state's laws apply, and under what circumstances, can have significant impact on research design and oversight. But neither of the traditional approaches to choice of law issues-contractual agreement or determination by a court after a dispute arises-fit the research context well. We hosted a series of workshops with choice of law experts and research law and ethics experts to identify factors that are most crucial to account for in a future choice of law precision medicine research framework. Our workshops focused on precision medicine 'places' and choice of law factors; there was consensus that 'place where the harm occurred' was relevant and best represented by where the participant resides and/or where the research/institution is located. Our experts identified factors that need to be accounted for in a future choice of law framework. They also identified potential approaches, including a federal law or model state law as ways of achieving more uniformity of protections and a comprehensive database of laws, which merit further consideration to provide IRBs and researchers the guidance they require.

Protecting Participants in Genomic Research: Understanding the "Web of Protections" Afforded by Federal and State Law.

Researchers now commonly collect biospecimens for genomic analysis together with information from mobile devices and electronic health records. This rich combination of data creates new opportunities for understanding and addressing important health issues, but also intensifies challenges to privacy and confidentiality. Here, we elucidate the "web" of legal protections for precision medicine research by integrating findings from qualitative interviews with structured legal research and applying them to realistic research scenarios involving various privacy threats.

Expedited partner therapy for sexually transmitted diseases: assessing the legal environment.

An emerging alternative to traditional partner management for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) is expedited partner therapy (EPT), which involves the delivery of medications or prescriptions to STD patients for their partners without the clinical assessment of the partners. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recently recommended EPT nationally in limited circumstances; however, its implementation may raise legal concerns. We analyzed laws relevant to the distribution of medications to persons with whom clinicians have not personally treated or established a relationship. We determined that three fourths of states or territories either expressly permit EPT or do not expressly prohibit the practice. We recommend (1) expressly endorsing EPT through laws, (2) creating exceptions to existing prescription requirements, (3) increasing professional board or association support for EPT, and (4) supporting third-party payments for partners' medications.

The HIPAA privacy rule and bioterrorism planning, prevention, and response.

Effective bioterrorism planning, prevention, and response require information sharing between various entities, ranging from public health authorities and health-care workers to national security and law enforcement officials. While the source of much information exchanged may be nonidentifiable, many entities legitimately need access to personally identifiable health information (or "protected health information" [PHI]) in planning for and responding to a bioterrorism event. The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows for essential exchanges of health data during a public health emergency while protecting against unnecessary disclosures of PHI. In the event of a bioterrorist attack, the Privacy Rule allows covered entities to disclose PHI without individual authorization in the following instances: (1) for treatment by health-care providers, (2) to avert a serious threat to health or safety, (3) to public health authorities for public health purposes, (4) to protect national security, (5) to law enforcement under certain conditions, and (6) for judicial or administrative proceedings. Despite these favorable disclosure provisions, some privacy challenges remain. The flow of PHI may be slowed by misunderstandings of the Privacy Rule's accounting requirement. In addition, in a bioterrorism scenario, nontraditional entities may find themselves acting as health-care providers, triggering Privacy Rule provisions. Finally, the potential for de facto disclosures of individuals' disease or exposure status increases where conspicuous treatment methods, isolation, or quarantine are implemented without additional measures to protect privacy. Understanding the Privacy Rule's impact on bioterrorism planning and response ensures that various entities can conduct their activities with needed information while still protecting individual privacy.