Nursing Homes Increasingly Rely On Staffing Agencies For Direct Care Nursing.

When nursing homes experience a shortage in directly employed nursing staff, they may rely on temporary workers from staffing agencies to fill this gap. This article examines trends in the use of staffing agencies among nursing homes during the prepandemic and COVID-19 pandemic era (2018-22). In 2018, 23 percent of nursing homes used agency nursing staff, accounting for about 3 percent of all direct care nursing hours worked. When used, agency staff were commonly present for ninety or fewer days in a year. By 2022, almost half of all nursing homes used agency staff, accounting for 11 percent of all direct care nursing staff hours. Agency staff were increasingly used to address chronic staffing shortages, with 13.8 percent of nursing homes having agency staff present every day. Agency staff were 50-60 percent more expensive per hour than directly employed nursing staff, and nursing homes that used agency staff often had lower five-star ratings. Policy makers need to consider postpandemic changes to the nursing home workforce as part of nursing home reform, as increased reliance on agency staff may reduce the financial resources available to increase nursing staff levels and improve the quality of care.

Beyond Nursing Staff Levels: The Association of Nursing Home Quality and the Five-Star Quality Rating System's New Staffing Measures.

Recently, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced staffing measures related to staffing variability and turnover in the Nursing Home (NH) Care Compare Five-Star Quality Rating System. While the consensus within the literature is that reduced variability and turnover are associated with higher NH quality of care and life, no existing studies have evaluated the relationship between CMS's newly introduced staffing measures and quality. This study uses regression analysis to estimate the relationship between 13 quality measures (used in Care Compare) and CMS's new staffing measures (i.e., weekend nursing staff levels, total nursing and registered nurse staff turnover, and administrator turnover) as well as a measure of daily staffing variation recently introduced in the literature called the coefficient of variation. Regressions analysis finds strong evidence of an association between quality and these staffing measures, though some measures (e.g., nursing staff turnover) are highly correlated and may be duplicative.

Understanding Nursing Home Spending And Staff Levels In The Context Of Recent Nursing Staff Recommendations.

To provide context for evaluating proposed nursing home staff regulations, we examined the proportion of facility revenues spent on nursing staff, as well as nursing staff levels in hours worked and paid per resident day, in 2019. Nationally, the median proportion of revenues spent on nursing staff was 33.9 percent, and median nursing staff levels were 3.67 hours worked and 4.08 hours paid per resident day. Facilities with higher shares of Medicaid residents spent a larger share of revenues on nursing staff but had lower staffing levels. States varied significantly with respect to median spending on nursing staff (26.8-44.0 percent of revenues) and median nursing staff levels (3.2-5.6 hours worked and 3.6-5.7 hours paid per resident day). These findings indicate that raising the proportion of revenues spent by nursing homes on nursing staff to a regulated minimum would not guarantee the achievement of adequate nursing staff levels unless it was paired with other regulatory mechanisms.

Assessing the impact of enforcement and compliance with minimum staffing standards on the quality of care in nursing homes: Evidence from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' staff star rating downgrade policy.

Policymakers have historically attempted to influence quality in nursing homes through the imposition of minimum staffing standards and through the public dissemination of quality on websites like Care Compare. One current Federal standard necessitates a registered nurse (RN) on duty for at least eight consecutive hours each day. In 2018, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services announced that they would incentivize compliance with this requirement by downgrading nursing homes with 7+ days without an RN present during the quarter by one star on their Care Compare staffing domain quality rating. This study evaluates the impact of this new enforcement mechanism. Using an intent-to-treat sample of nursing homes at risk for downgrade with difference-in-differences and event study models, it finds that the policy increased compliance and staffing levels. Using the policy to instrument for full compliance, it finds that the daily presence of an RN causally improves several quality dimensions.

How Do Primary Care Providers Respond to Reimbursement Cuts? Evidence From the Termination of the Primary Care Incentive Program.

The Primary Care Incentive Payment Program (PCIP) provided a 10% bonus payment for Evaluation and Management (E&M) visits for eligible primary care providers (PCPs) from 2011 to 2015. Using a 2012 to 2017 sample of continuously eligible PCPs (the treatment group) and ineligible specialists with historically similar provision of billed services (the control group), this study is the first to examine how PCPs responded to the program's termination. Using inverse probability of treatment weighted difference-in-differences models that control for inter-temporal changes in provider-specific beneficiary characteristics, individual provider fixed effects, and zip code by year fixed effects, it finds that providers responded to the removal of the 10% bonus payments by increasing their billing of bonus payment eligible E&M relative value units (RVUs) by 3.7%. This response is consistent with supplier-induced demand and suggests a 46% offsetting response consistent with actuarial assumptions by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services when assessing reimbursement reductions.

Geographic variation in Part B reimbursement and physician offsetting behavior: a physician matching approach.

Historically, Medicare has operated under the assumption that providers respond to reductions in reimbursement through increased provision of services in an effort to offset declining practice revenue; however, some recent empirical work examining fee reductions has found evidence of either small offsetting effects or reductions in the quantity supplied. Using a distance matching approach that matches practices to nearby practices that are subject to different reimbursement rates, we find overall evidence in support of Medicare's offsetting assumption collectively for all services and for evaluation and management services. We also find evidence consistent with a traditional volume response for imaging and testing services.

Primary care competition and quality of care: Empirical evidence from Medicare.

In this paper, we explore the effects of primary care physician (PCP) practice competition on five distinct quality metrics directly tied to screening, follow-up care, and prescribing behavior under Medicare Part B and D. Controlling for physician, practice, and area characteristics as well as zip code fixed effects, we find strong evidence that PCP practices in more concentrated areas provide lower quality of care. More specifically, PCPs in more concentrated areas are less likely to perform screening and follow-up care for high blood pressure, unhealthy bodyweight, and tobacco use. They are also less likely to document current medications. Furthermore, PCPs in more concentrated areas have a higher amount of opioid prescriptions as a fraction of total prescriptions.

Supplemental Insurance and Racial Health Disparities under Medicare Part B.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the impact of preferences, socioeconomic status (SES), and supplemental insurance (SI) on racial/ethnic disparities in the probability and use of services at physicians' offices, hospitals, and emergency departments among Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SUBJECTS: This study includes black and white beneficiaries from the 2009-2011 panel of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey who were enrolled in Medicare Part B. Logit and negative binomial multivariate regression analysis were used in conjunction with rank-and-replace methods to determine factors influencing utilization and black-white utilization disparities. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Among Part B beneficiaries, significant disparities exist for each studied service. Examining contributing factors, 12-19 percent of the black-white health-adjusted difference in the probability of use is explained by differences in SES, whereas differences in the distribution of SI accounts for 20 percent or more. For volume, SES is found to account for 2-11 percent of differences with SI making up another 9-10 percent. CONCLUSIONS: A substantial portion of the difference in black-white beneficiary use of outpatient services is due to SI. Policies aimed at increasing coverage are likely to increase the probability of visits with modest increases in volume.

Competitive Spillovers and Regulatory Exploitation by Skilled Nursing Facilities.

Typically, research on the effect of ownership has considered health care providers in isolation of competitive interaction from other firms. This analysis considers how the selection of Medicare reimbursement codes for skilled nursing facilities varies by ownership and is influenced by the competitive spillovers from market dominance of for-profit institutions. We find evidence that not-for-profits are less likely to code patients into the highest reimbursement categories. Further, as the market becomes dominated by for-profits, both for-profit and not-for-profits increase the share of patients in these high reimbursement categories.

Ownership Status and Length of Stay in Skilled Nursing Facilities: Does Endogeneity Matter?

In 1998, Medicare implemented the Prospective Payment System for post-acute care provided by skilled nursing facilities. This system paid a fixed price per day above the cost of care, creating an incentive to provide longer length of stays to increase revenues. In this paper, we examine whether there are systematic differences in length of stay for post-acute care patients between for-profit and not-for-profit skilled nursing facilities. Based on the financial incentives inherent in the reimbursement system, we develop a conceptual framework that argues for-profits will provide a greater number of days of care to increase profits relative to not-for-profits. We find significant differences in length of stay by ownership, but once patient selection into a facility is accounted for using two-staged residual inclusion, there is no statistical differences in length of stay between for-profit and not-for-profit facilities.

The Effects of Antipsychotic Quality Reporting on Antipsychotic and Psychoactive Medication Use.

OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study is to examine how nursing homes changed their use of antipsychotic and other psychoactive medications in response to Nursing Home Compare's initiation of publicly reporting antipsychotic use in July 2012. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SUBJECTS: The study includes all state recertification surveys (n = 40,415) for facilities six quarters prior and post the initiation of public reporting. Using a difference-in-difference framework, the change in use of antipsychotics and other psychoactive medications is compared for facilities subject to public reporting and facilities not subject to reporting. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The percentage of residents using antipsychotics, hypnotics, or any psychoactive medication is found to decline after public reporting. Facilities subject to reporting experienced an additional decline in antipsychotic use (-1.94 vs. -1.40 percentage points) but did not decline as much for hypnotics (-0.60 vs. -1.21 percentage points). Any psychoactive use did not vary with reporting status, and the use of antidepressants and anxiolytics did not change. CONCLUSION: Public reporting of an antipsychotic quality measure can be an effective policy tool for reducing the use of antipsychotic medications--though the effect many only exist in the short run.

Medicare Part B Intensity and Volume Offset.

Under Medicare Part B, adjustments to the fee schedule are made under the assumption that physicians and hospitals make up for fee reductions through increased service provision called 'volume offsetting'. While historically, researchers have found evidence of volume offsetting, more recent studies have called into question its magnitude and existence. This study is the first to propose and empirically evaluate an alternative hypothesis of offsetting, namely the alteration of billed or provided services as a means of 'intensity offsetting'. Evaluating both forms of offsetting, it finds strong evidence of intensity offsetting and little to no evidence of volume offsetting. Simulating a 10% reduction in the Medicare fee schedule, this study estimates that across different procedures between 22% and 59% of a fee reduction will be offset through alterations in service intensity.

Payment generosity and physician acceptance of Medicare and Medicaid patients.

Using 2008 physician survey data, we estimate the relationship between the generosity of fees paid to primary care physicians under Medicaid and Medicare and his/her willingness to accept new patients covered by Medicaid, Medicare, or both programs (i.e., dually enrolled patients). Findings reveal physicians are highly responsive to fee generosity under both programs. Also, their willingness to accept patients under either program is affected by the generosity of fees under the other program, i.e., there are significant spillover effects between Medicare and Medicare fee generosity. We also simulate how physicians in 2008 would have likely responded to Medicaid and Medicare payment reforms similar to those embodied in the 2010 Affordable Care Act, had they been permanently in place in 2008. Our findings suggest that "Medicaid Parity" for primary care physicians would have likely dramatically improved physician willingness to accept new Medicaid patients while only slightly reducing their willingness to accept new Medicare patients. Also, many more primary care physicians would have been willing to treat dually enrolled patients.

Medicare skilled nursing facility reimbursement and upcoding.

Post-acute care provided by skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) is reimbursed by Medicare under a prospective payment system using resource utilization groups (RUGs) that adjust payment intensity on the basis of predefined ranges of weekly therapy minutes provided and the functionality of the patient. Individual RUGs account for differences in the intensity of care provided, but there exists significant regional variation in the payments SNFs receive from Medicare due to the use of geographic adjustment factors. This paper is the first to use this geographic variation in the generosity of Medicare reimbursement to empirically test if SNFs respond to payment differences between RUG categories. The results are highly suggestive that SNFs upcode patients by providing additional therapy minutes to increase revenue, whereas we find no evidence of upcoding related to patient functionality scores. Simulating how different payment differentials affect RUG selection, we predict that reducing the financial incentive to upcode could result in significant savings to Medicare.

Pricing distortions in Medicare's physician fee schedule and patient satisfaction with care quality and access.

Medicare adjusts its payments to physicians for geographic differences in the cost of operating a medical practice, but the method it uses is imprecise. We measure the inaccuracy in its geographic adjustment factors and categorize beneficiaries by whether they live where Medicare's formula is favorable or unfavorable to physicians. Then, using the 2001-2003 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, we examine whether differences in physician payment generosity, that is, whether favorable or unfavorable, influence the satisfaction ratings Medicare seniors assign to their quality of care and access to services. We find strong evidence that they do. Many beneficiaries live in payment-unfavorable areas and receive a less satisfying quality of care and less satisfying access to services than beneficiaries who live where payments are favorable to physicians.

CPT fee differentials and visit upcoding under Medicare Part B.

Medicare Part B pays outpatient physicians according to the billed Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes, which differ in procedure and intensity. Since many performed services merely differ by intensity, physicians have an incentive to upcode services to increase profitability of a visit. Using nationally representative data from the 2001 to 2003 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, this paper explores the effect of Medicare Part B fee differentials on the upcoding of general office visits (i.e. for established patient visits with CPT codes of 99212-99215). It finds strong evidence that these fee differentials influence physician's coding choice for billing purposes across a variety of specialties. For general office visits, Medicare outlays attributable to upcoding may sum to as much as 15% of total expenditures for such visits. Medicare has much to gain financially by clarifying its classification rules. Until the distinctions between types of Medicare visits are redefined in a way that eliminates ambiguity, upcoding under Medicare Part B is likely to continue.

Medicare Part B reimbursement and the perceived quality of physician care.

The maximum amount physicians can charge Medicare patients for Part B services depends on Medicare reimbursement rates and on federal and state restrictions regarding balance billing. This study evaluates whether Part B payment rates, state restrictions on balance billing beyond the federal limit, and physician balance billing influence how beneficiaries rate the quality of their doctor's care. Using nationally representative data from the 2001 to 2003 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, this paper finds strong evidence that Medicare reimbursement rates, and state balance billing restrictions influence a wide range of perceived care quality measures. Lower Medicare reimbursement and restrictions on physicians' ability to balance bill significantly reduce the perceived quality of care under Part B.