Recent advances in the neuroscience of spontaneous and off-task thought: implications for mental health.

People spend a remarkable 30-50% of awake life thinking about something other than what they are currently doing. These experiences of being "off-task" can be described as spontaneous thought when mental dynamics are relatively flexible. Here we review recent neuroscience developments in this area and consider implications for mental wellbeing and illness. We provide updated overviews of the roles of the default mode network and large-scale network dynamics, and we discuss emerging candidate mechanisms involving hippocampal memory (sharp-wave ripples, replay) and neuromodulatory (noradrenergic and serotonergic) systems. We explore how distinct brain states can be associated with or give rise to adaptive and maladaptive forms of thought linked to distinguishable mental health outcomes. We conclude by outlining new directions in the neuroscience of spontaneous and off-task thought that may clarify mechanisms, lead to personalized biomarkers, and facilitate therapy developments toward the goals of better understanding and improving mental health.

Investigating the appraisal structure of spontaneous thoughts: evidence for differences among unexpected thought, involuntary autobiographical memories, and ruminative thought.

Involuntary thinking occurs when mental states arise without intention. Such thoughts can take different forms, such as involuntary autobiographical memories (IAM), ruminative thoughts, and unexpected thoughts-all of which are popular areas of study, albeit in somewhat disparate literatures. Despite these mental states sharing a common thread of feeling involuntary in nature, it is nevertheless unclear what separates them phenomenologically. We conducted a set of exploratory and confirmatory experiments to elucidate the appraisal dimensions behind these forms of involuntary thought, with a particular interest in understanding the phenomenology behind unexpected thoughts that are predicted to violate expectations of both timing and content. Across two experiments, we found that unexpected thoughts had unique appraisal structures compared to the other two forms of involuntary thought: they were less identifiably cued, more surprising in content and timing, and offered new information (i.e., insight). We discuss how these distinctions support recent theories regarding the nature of unexpected thought and its relation to other forms of involuntary thinking, namely IAM and ruminative thought, which are the more commonly studied forms of involuntary thinking.

Prefrontal contributions to the stability and variability of thought and conscious experience.

The human prefrontal cortex is a structurally and functionally heterogenous brain region, including multiple subregions that have been linked to different large-scale brain networks. It contributes to a broad range of mental phenomena, from goal-directed thought and executive functions to mind-wandering and psychedelic experience. Here we review what is known about the functions of different prefrontal subregions and their affiliations with large-scale brain networks to examine how they may differentially contribute to the diversity of mental phenomena associated with prefrontal function. An important dimension that distinguishes across different kinds of conscious experience is the stability or variability of mental states across time. This dimension is a central feature of two recently introduced theoretical frameworks-the dynamic framework of thought (DFT) and the relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS) model-that treat neurocognitive dynamics as central to understanding and distinguishing between different mental phenomena. Here, we bring these two frameworks together to provide a synthesis of how prefrontal subregions may differentially contribute to the stability and variability of thought and conscious experience. We close by considering future directions for this work.

The think aloud paradigm reveals differences in the content, dynamics and conceptual scope of resting state thought in trait brooding.

Although central to well-being, functional and dysfunctional thoughts arise and unfold over time in ways that remain poorly understood. To shed light on these mechanisms, we adapted a "think aloud" paradigm to quantify the content and dynamics of individuals' thoughts at rest. Across two studies, external raters hand coded the content of each thought and computed dynamic metrics spanning duration, transition probabilities between affective states, and conceptual similarity over time. Study 1 highlighted the paradigm's high ecological validity and revealed a narrowing of conceptual scope following more negative content. Study 2 replicated Study 1's findings and examined individual difference predictors of trait brooding, a maladaptive form of rumination. Across individuals, increased trait brooding was linked to thoughts rated as more negative, past-oriented and self-focused. Longer negative and shorter positive thoughts were also apparent as brooding increased, as well as a tendency to shift away from positive conceptual states, and a stronger narrowing of conceptual scope following negative thoughts. Importantly, content and dynamics explained independent variance, accounting for a third of the variance in brooding. These results uncover a real-time cognitive signature of rumination and highlight the predictive and ecological validity of the think aloud paradigm applied to resting state cognition.

More than off-task: Increased freely-moving thought in ADHD.

Off-task thought has been found to occur at high rates and is related to impairment in ADHD. However, off-task thought is heterogenous and it remains unclear which specific dimensions of off-task thought are more prevalent in this disorder. It is therefore important to dissociate different aspects of off-task thought in order to better understand the mechanisms underlying impairment. The current study focused on the dimension of constrained (focused) to freely moving off-task thought. Self-report and neurophysiological measures during a computerized attention tasks provided convergent evidence that individuals with ADHD not only have more off-task thought than those without, but also engaged in a greater proportion of freely moving off-task thought than non-ADHD controls. Overall, this work demonstrated differences in both the quantity and type of off-task thought in adults with ADHD. It provides novel insight into both the phenomenology of off-task thought, as well as potential mechanisms underlying impairment in ADHD.

How task-unrelated and freely moving thought relate to affect: Evidence for dissociable patterns in everyday life.

Much of our knowledge about the correlates of mind-wandering comes from assessing task-unrelated thought. Less is known about the correlates of freely moving thought, a dimension that assesses the degree to which thoughts arise and unfold with low levels of guidance or constraints. Task-unrelated thought is consistently associated with more negative affective valence compared with being on task; however, it is unclear whether freely moving thought shares the same relationship with affect. We conducted two ecological momentary assessment studies in the context of everyday life and found that the two dimensions have different affective correlates. In Study 1, task-unrelated thought was associated with less positive concurrent valence than being on-task. However, freely moving thought was associated with more positive concurrent valence and was predictive of more positive valence at a subsequent timepoint. Freely moving thought, but not task-unrelated thought, also positively predicted concurrent arousal. Computational sentiment analyses of participants' thought descriptions offered convergent evidence of differential relationships between the two thought dimensions and affect. Study 2 used different measurement scales to assess whether (a) the pattern of findings replicated and (b) if the effects were robust to changes in measurement. The main findings were replicated: task-unrelated thought was negatively associated with concurrent valence, whereas freely moving thought was positively associated with concurrent valence. However, freely moving thought did not predict subsequent valence and was not related to concurrent arousal. The most robust findings related to concurrent valence. Although mind-wandering has acquired a relatively negative reputation to date, our findings suggest that there might be positive aspects that remain unexplored. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Out of the blue: understanding abrupt and wayward transitions in thought using probability and predictive processing.

Thoughts that appear to come to us 'out of the blue' or 'out of nowhere' are a familiar aspect of mental experience. Such thoughts tend to elicit feelings of surprise and spontaneity. Although we are beginning to understand the neural processes that underlie the arising of such thoughts, little is known about what accounts for their peculiar phenomenology. Here, we focus on one central aspect of this phenomenology-the experience of surprise at their occurrence, as it relates to internal probabilistic predictions regarding mental states. We introduce a distinction between two phenomenologically different types of transitions in thought content: (i) abrupt transitions, which occur at surprising times but lead to unsurprising thought content, and (ii) wayward transitions, which occur at surprising times and also lead to surprising thought content. We examine these two types of transitions using a novel approach that combines probabilistic and predictive processing concepts and principles. We employ two different probability metrics-transition and occurrence probability-to characterize and differentiate between abrupt and wayward transitions. We close by discussing some potentially beneficial ways in which these two kinds of transitions in thought content may contribute to mental function, and how they may be implemented at the neural level. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

Updating the dynamic framework of thought: Creativity and psychedelics.

Contemporary investigations regard creativity as a dynamic form of cognition that involves movement between the dissociable stages of creative generation and creative evaluation. Our recently proposed Dynamic Framework of Thought (Christoff et al., 2016) offered a conceptualization of these stages in terms of an interplay between sources of constraint and variability on thought. This initial conceptualization, however, has yet to be fully explicated and given targeted discussion. Here, we refine this framework's account of creativity by highlighting the dynamic nature of creative thought, both within and between the stages of creative generation and evaluation. In particular, we emphasize that creative generation in particular is best regarded as a product of multiple, varying mental states, rather than being a singular mental state in and of itself. We also propose that the psychedelic state is a mental state with high potential for facilitating creative generation and update the Dynamic Framework of Thought to incorporate this state. This paper seeks to highlight the dynamic nature of the neurocognitive processes underlying creative thinking and to draw attention to the potential utility of psychedelic substances as experimental tools in the neuroscience of creativity.

Linking brain network reconfiguration and intelligence: Are we there yet?

Recent applications of dynamic network analyses to functional neuroimaging data have revealed relationships between a number of cognition conditions and the dynamic reconfiguration of brain networks. Here we critically review such applications of network neuroscience to intelligence. After providing an overview of network neuroscience, we center our discussion around the recently proposed Network Neuroscience Theory of Intelligence (Barbey, 2017). We evaluate and review existing empirical support for the theses made by this theory and argue that while studies strongly suggest their plausibility, evidence to date has largely been indirect. We propose avenues for future research to directly evaluate these theses by overcoming the methodological and analytical shortcomings of previous studies. In doing so, our goal is to stimulate future empirical investigations and present valuable ways forward in the network neuroscience of intelligence.

Mind-wandering rates fluctuate across the day: evidence from an experience-sampling study.

Previous research has demonstrated reliable fluctuations in attentional processes during the course of the day. Everyday life experience sampling, during which participants respond to "probes" delivered at random intervals throughout the day on their mobile devices, is an effective tool for capturing such diurnal fluctuations in a naturalistic way. The existence of diurnal fluctuations in the case of mind-wandering, however, has not been examined to date. We did so in two studies. In the first study, we employed everyday experience sampling to obtain self-reports from 146 university students who rated the degree of free movement in their thoughts multiple times per day over five days. These time course data were analyzed using multilevel modelling. Freely moving thought was found to fluctuate reliably over the course of the day, with lower ratings reported in the early morning and afternoon and higher ratings around midday and evening. In the second study, we replicated these effects with a reanalysis of data from a past everyday experience-sampling study. We also demonstrated differences in parameter values for the models representing freely moving thought and two common conceptualizations of mind-wandering: task-unrelated thought and stimulus-independent thought. Taken together, the present results establish and replicate a complex pattern of change over the course of the day in how freely thought moves, while also providing further evidence that freedom of movement is dissociable from other dimensions of thought such as its task-relatedness and stimulus-dependence. Future research should focus on probing possible mechanisms behind circadian fluctuations of thought dynamics.

Finding Consistency in Boredom by Appreciating its Instability.

Boredom has recently piqued cognitive neuroscientific interest, but remains a challenge to scientific investigation in this field. We propose that to advance this research, we should (i) seek greater consistency of operationalization and measurement across studies and participants; and (ii) appreciate the temporal instability of boredom and its ensuing dynamics.

The neural basis of motivational influences on cognitive control.

Cognitive control mechanisms support the deliberate regulation of thought and behavior based on current goals. Recent work suggests that motivational incentives improve cognitive control and has begun to elucidate critical neural substrates. We conducted a quantitative meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of motivated cognitive control using activation likelihood estimation (ALE) and Neurosynth to delineate the brain regions that are consistently activated across studies. The analysis included studies that investigated changes in brain activation during cognitive control tasks when reward incentives were present versus absent. The ALE analysis revealed consistent recruitment in regions associated with the frontoparietal control network including the inferior frontal sulcus and intraparietal sulcus, as well as regions associated with the salience network including the anterior insula and anterior mid-cingulate cortex. As a complementary analysis, we performed a large-scale exploratory meta-analysis using Neurosynth to identify regions that are recruited in studies using of the terms cognitive control and incentive. This analysis replicated the ALE results and also identified the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, caudate nucleus, nucleus accumbens, medial thalamus, inferior frontal junction, premotor cortex, and hippocampus. Finally, we separately compared recruitment during cue and target periods, which tap into proactive engagement of rule-outcome associations, and the mobilization of appropriate viscero-motor states to execute a response, respectively. We found that largely distinct sets of brain regions are recruited during cue and target periods. Altogether, these findings suggest that flexible interactions between frontoparietal, salience, and dopaminergic midbrain-striatal networks may allow control demands to be precisely tailored based on expected value.

Affective neuroscience of self-generated thought.

Despite increasing scientific interest in self-generated thought-mental content largely independent of the immediate environment-there has yet to be any comprehensive synthesis of the subjective experience and neural correlates of affect in these forms of thinking. Here, we aim to develop an integrated affective neuroscience encompassing many forms of self-generated thought-normal and pathological, moderate and excessive, in waking and in sleep. In synthesizing existing literature on this topic, we reveal consistent findings pertaining to the prevalence, valence, and variability of emotion in self-generated thought, and highlight how these factors might interact with self-generated thought to influence general well-being. We integrate these psychological findings with recent neuroimaging research, bringing attention to the neural correlates of affect in self-generated thought. We show that affect in self-generated thought is prevalent, positively biased, highly variable (both within and across individuals), and consistently recruits many brain areas implicated in emotional processing, including the orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, insula, and medial prefrontal cortex. Many factors modulate these typical psychological and neural patterns, however; the emerging affective neuroscience of self-generated thought must endeavor to link brain function and subjective experience in both everyday self-generated thought as well as its dysfunctions in mental illness.

Heterogeneity within the frontoparietal control network and its relationship to the default and dorsal attention networks.

The frontoparietal control network (FPCN) plays a central role in executive control. It has been predominantly viewed as a unitary domain general system. Here, we examined patterns of FPCN functional connectivity (FC) across multiple conditions of varying cognitive demands, to test for FPCN heterogeneity. We identified two distinct subsystems within the FPCN based on hierarchical clustering and machine learning classification analyses of within-FPCN FC patterns. These two FPCN subsystems exhibited distinct patterns of FC with the default network (DN) and the dorsal attention network (DAN). FPCNA exhibited stronger connectivity with the DN than the DAN, whereas FPCNB exhibited the opposite pattern. This twofold FPCN differentiation was observed across four independent datasets, across nine different conditions (rest and eight tasks), at the level of individual-participant data, as well as in meta-analytic coactivation patterns. Notably, the extent of FPCN differentiation varied across conditions, suggesting flexible adaptation to task demands. Finally, we used meta-analytic tools to identify several functional domains associated with the DN and DAN that differentially predict activation in the FPCN subsystems. These findings reveal a flexible and heterogeneous FPCN organization that may in part emerge from separable DN and DAN processing streams. We propose that FPCNA may be preferentially involved in the regulation of introspective processes, whereas FPCNB may be preferentially involved in the regulation of visuospatial perceptual attention.

The knowns and unknowns of boredom: a review of the literature.

Despite the ubiquitous nature of boredom, the definition, function, and correlates of boredom are still poorly understood. In this review, we summarize the "known" (consistent evidence) and "unknown" (inconsistent evidence) correlates of boredom. We show that boredom is consistently related to negative affect, task-unrelated thought, over-estimation of elapsed time, reduced agency, as well as to over- and under-stimulation. Activation of the default mode network was consistent across the few available fMRI studies, while the recruitment of other brain areas such as the hippocampus and anterior insular cortex, was a notable but less consistent correlate of boredom. Other less consistent correlates of boredom are also reviewed, such as the level of arousal and the mental attributions given to fluctuations of attention. Finally, we identify two critical factors that may contribute to current inconsistencies in the literature and may hamper further progress in the field. First, there is relatively little consistency in the way in which boredom has been operationalized across studies to date, with operationalizations of boredom ranging from negative affect paired with under-stimulation, over-stimulation, to negative affect paired with a lack of goal-directed actions. Second, preliminary evidence suggests the existence of distinct types of boredom (e.g., searching vs. apathetic) that may have different and sometimes even opposing correlates. Adopting a more precise and consistent way of operationalizing boredom, and arriving at an empirically validated taxonomy of different types of boredom, could serve to overcome the current roadblocks to facilitate further progress in our scientific understanding of boredom.

Is an off-task mind a freely-moving mind? Examining the relationship between different dimensions of thought.

Mind wandering is frequently defined as task-unrelated or perceptually decoupled thought. However, these definitions may not capture the dynamic features of a wandering mind, such as its tendency to 'move freely'. Here we test the relationship between three theoretically dissociable dimensions of thought: freedom of movement in thought, task-relatedness, and perceptual decoupling (i.e., lack of awareness of surroundings). Using everyday life experience sampling, thought probes were randomly delivered to participants' phones for ten days. Results revealed weak intra-individual correlations between freedom of movement in thought and task-unrelatedness, as well as perceptual decoupling. Within our dataset, over 40% of thoughts would have been misclassified under the assumption that off-task thought is inherently freely moving. Overall, freedom of movement appears to be an independent dimension of thought that is not captured by the two most common measures of mind wandering. Future work focusing on the dynamics of thought may be crucial for improving our understanding of the wandering mind.

Emotion and the prefrontal cortex: An integrative review.

The prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a critical role in the generation and regulation of emotion. However, we lack an integrative framework for understanding how different emotion-related functions are organized across the entire expanse of the PFC, as prior reviews have generally focused on specific emotional processes (e.g., decision making) or specific anatomical regions (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex). Additionally, psychological theories and neuroscientific investigations have proceeded largely independently because of the lack of a common framework. Here, we provide a comprehensive review of functional neuroimaging, electrophysiological, lesion, and structural connectivity studies on the emotion-related functions of 8 subregions spanning the entire PFC. We introduce the appraisal-by-content model, which provides a new framework for integrating the diverse range of empirical findings. Within this framework, appraisal serves as a unifying principle for understanding the PFC's role in emotion, while relative content-specialization serves as a differentiating principle for understanding the role of each subregion. A synthesis of data from affective, social, and cognitive neuroscience studies suggests that different PFC subregions are preferentially involved in assigning value to specific types of inputs: exteroceptive sensations, episodic memories and imagined future events, viscero-sensory signals, viscero-motor signals, actions, others' mental states (e.g., intentions), self-related information, and ongoing emotions. We discuss the implications of this integrative framework for understanding emotion regulation, value-based decision making, emotional salience, and refining theoretical models of emotion. This framework provides a unified understanding of how emotional processes are organized across PFC subregions and generates new hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying adaptive and maladaptive emotional functioning. (PsycINFO Database Record

Interactions between the default network and dorsal attention network vary across default subsystems, time, and cognitive states.

Anticorrelation between the default network (DN) and dorsal attention network (DAN) is thought to be an intrinsic aspect of functional brain organization reflecting competing functions. However, the effect size of functional connectivity (FC) between the DN and DAN has yet to be established. Furthermore, the stability of anticorrelations across distinct DN subsystems, different contexts, and time, remains unexplored. In study 1 we summarize effect sizes of DN-DAN FC from 20 studies, and in study 2 we probe the variability of DN-DAN interactions across six different cognitive states in a new data set. We show that: (i) the DN and DAN have an independent rather than anticorrelated relationship when global signal regression is not used (median effect size across studies: r=-.06; 95% CI: -.15 to .08); (ii) the DAN exhibits weak negative FC with the DN Core subsystem but is uncorrelated with the dorsomedial prefrontal and medial temporal lobe subsystems; (iii) DN-DAN interactions vary significantly across different cognitive states; (iv) DN-DAN FC fluctuates across time between periods of anticorrelation and periods of positive correlation; and (v) changes across time in the strength of DN-DAN coupling are coordinated with interactions involving the frontoparietal control network (FPCN). Overall, the observed weak effect sizes related to DN-DAN anticorrelation suggest the need to re-conceptualize the nature of interactions between these networks. Furthermore, our findings demonstrate that DN-DAN interactions are not stable, but rather, exhibit substantial variability across time and context, and are coordinated with broader network dynamics involving the FPCN.

Mind-wandering as spontaneous thought: a dynamic framework.

Most research on mind-wandering has characterized it as a mental state with contents that are task unrelated or stimulus independent. However, the dynamics of mind-wandering - how mental states change over time - have remained largely neglected. Here, we introduce a dynamic framework for understanding mind-wandering and its relationship to the recruitment of large-scale brain networks. We propose that mind-wandering is best understood as a member of a family of spontaneous-thought phenomena that also includes creative thought and dreaming. This dynamic framework can shed new light on mental disorders that are marked by alterations in spontaneous thought, including depression, anxiety and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.