Adversity and error-monitoring: Effects of emotional context.

This study tested whether self-reports of childhood adversity would predict altered error processing under emotional versus non-emotional task conditions. N = 99 undergraduates completed two selective attention tasks, a traditional color-word Stroop task and a modified task using emotional words, while EEG was recorded. Participants also completed self-report measures of adverse and positive childhood experiences, executive functioning, depression, current stress, and emotion regulation. Reports of adversity were robustly correlated with self-reported challenges in executive functioning, even when controlling for self-reported depression and stress, but adversity was not correlated with task performance. With regard to neural markers of error processing, adversity predicted an enhanced error-related negativity and blunted error-positivity, but only during the emotion-word blocks of the task. Moreover, error-related changes in alpha oscillations were predicted by adversity, in a pattern that suggested less error responsiveness in alpha patterns during the emotion block, compared to the color block, among participants with higher adversity. Overall, results indicate alterations in error monitoring associated with adversity, such that in an emotional context, initial error detection is enhanced and sustained error processing is blunted, even in the absence of overt performance changes.

Does early adversity predict executive functioning difficulties among undergraduates? Dissociations among self-report, performance, and EEG measures.

OBJECTIVE: The present research aimed to determine whether self-reports of early adversity predicted individual differences in self-reported and laboratory-measured executive functioning in college-aged samples. METHOD: Two studies with young adult samples (n = 231 and n = 61) measured endorsement of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs), self-reported executive functioning difficulties on the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF), and self-report measures of depression and emotion regulation. The second sample also completed laboratory performance tasks of working memory, inhibitory control, and selective attention while electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. RESULTS: In both samples, greater self-reported ACEs predicted greater reports of executive functioning difficulties on the BRIEF (rs = 0.378 and 0.322), relationships of medium effect size that remained significant when controlling for depression and emotion regulation variables. In the second sample, despite robust EEG/event-related potential (ERP) task findings in the group as a whole, neither lab task performance nor EEG/ERP measures were reliably correlated with individual differences in ACEs. CONCLUSIONS: We consider multiple alternative explanations for why early adversity predicted self-reported executive functioning difficulties but not lab task performance or neural measures in the same sample. These findings may reflect a propensity for negative self-evaluation among those with early adverse experiences, leading to inflated estimates of their own executive function problems. Alternatively, the findings may indicate that the lab tasks are insufficient in tapping aspects of executive functions that are relevant outside the lab context. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Effects of task context on EEG correlates of mind-wandering.

This study was designed to examine how mind-wandering and its neural correlates vary across tasks with different attentional demands, motivated by the context regulation hypothesis of mind-wandering. Participants (n = 59 undergraduates) completed the sustained attention to response task (SART) and the Stroop selective attention task in counterbalanced order while EEG was recorded. The tasks included experience-sampling probes to identify self-reported episodes of mind-wandering, along with retrospective reports. Participants reported more mind-wandering during the SART than the Stroop and during whichever task was presented second during the session, compared with first. Replicating previous findings, EEG data (n = 37 usable participants) indicated increased alpha oscillations during episodes of mind-wandering, compared with on-task episodes, for both the SART and Stroop tasks. ERP data, focused on the P2 component reflecting perceptual processing, found that mind-wandering was associated with increased P2 amplitudes during the Stroop task, counter to predictions from the perceptual decoupling theory. Overall, the study found that self-report and neural correlates of mind-wandering are sensitive to task context. This line of research can further the understanding of how mechanisms of mind-wandering are adapted to varied tasks and situations.

Effects of post-response arousal on cognitive control: Adaptive or maladaptive?

This study investigated whether detection of a performance mistake is followed by adaptive or detrimental effects on subsequent attention and performance. Using a Stroop task with spatial cueing, along with simultaneous EEG and pupillary measurements, we examined evidence bearing on two alternative hypotheses: maladaptive arousal and adaptive control. Error detection, indexed by the error-related negativity ERP component, was followed by pupil dilation and suppression of EEG oscillations in the alpha band, two indices of arousal that were associated with one another on a trial-by-trial basis. On the trials following errors, there was neural evidence of enhanced spatial cueing, manifested in greater hemispheric activation contralateral to the cued visual field. However, this post-error enhancement was not followed by changes in Stroop or spatial cueing effects in performance, nor by increased attentional cueing effects in ERP responses to targets. Rather, performance tended to be slower and less accurate following errors compared to correct trials, and higher post-response arousal, indexed by larger pupils, predicted next-trial slowing and decreased P2 amplitude to targets. Results favor the maladaptive arousal account of post-error cognitive control and offer only limited support for adaptive control.

Find the silver lining or ignore the cloud? Cognitive reappraisal versus visual attention training.

This study contrasted the efficacy of two strategies for emotion regulation, cognitive reappraisal (CR) and attentional control (AC), while using eye-tracking to examine gaze fixation patterns associated with each strategy. Participants (n = 98 undergraduates) viewed emotionally negative and neutral slides before and after one of three training conditions: CR training (verbal instructions to reframe interpretations of negative images), AC training (gaze-contingent feedback emphasizing fixation away from negative portions of images), or a no-training control condition. CR training led to the most beneficial consequences for self-reported emotion ratings; AC training improved emotion ratings more than the no-training control but not as much as CR. AC training led to significantly reduced time fixating gaze on negative content, whereas CR did not alter gaze fixations compared with the no-training control. Moreover, among the AC group, participants who looked away from negative content to a greater extent reported more beneficial change in emotional self-report, whereas that same pattern was not evident in the CR or no-training group. The findings add to evidence that CR training is more effective than distraction-related strategies and that CR does not necessitate gaze changes to be effective. Together, the findings contribute to furthering knowledge about distinct cognitive mechanisms involved in different strategies of emotion regulation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Simultaneous EEG and pupillary evidence for post-error arousal during a speeded performance task.

Arousal evoked by detecting a performance error may provide a mechanism by which error detection leads to either adaptive or maladaptive changes in attention and performance. By pairing EEG data acquisition with simultaneous measurements of pupil diameter, which is thought to reflect norepinephrinergic arousal, this study tested whether transient changes in EEG oscillations in the alpha frequency range (8-12 Hz) following performance mistakes may reflect error-evoked arousal. In the inter-trial interval following performance mistakes (approximately 8% of trials), pupil diameter increased and EEG alpha power decreased, compared to the inter-trial interval following correct responses. Moreover when trials were binned based on pupil diameter on a within-subjects basis, trials with greater pupil diameter were associated with lower EEG alpha power during the inter-trial interval. This pattern of association suggests that error-related alpha suppression, like pupil dilation, reflects arousal in response to error commission. Errors were also followed by worse next-trial performance, implying that error-evoked arousal may not always be beneficial for adaptive control.

The wandering mind oscillates: EEG alpha power is enhanced during moments of mind-wandering.

What is your brain doing while your mind is wandering? This study used a within-subjects experience-sampling design to test whether episodes of mind-wandering during a demanding cognitive task are associated with increases in EEG alpha power. Alpha refers to cyclic oscillations in EEG activity at 8-12 Hz, and has been previously correlated with internally rather than externally directed cognition. Participants completed a speeded performance task with more than 800 trials while EEG was recorded. Intermittent experience-sampling probes asked participants to indicate whether their mind was wandering or on-task. Participants reported mind-wandering in response to approximately half of the probes. EEG alpha power was significantly higher preceding probes to which participants reported mind-wandering, compared with probes to which participants reported being on task. These findings imply that dynamic changes in alpha power may prove a valuable tool in studying momentary fluctuations in mind-wandering.

Is attention enhanced following performance errors? Testing the adaptive control hypothesis.

The present study tested whether people adaptively sharpen attentional focus following performance mistakes, as predicted by current theories of cognitive control. Participants completed a reverse Stroop task in which target stimuli were preceded by an informative spatial cue. Cue validity and Stroop interference effects on performance were robust, but neither effect was altered by commission of an error on the prior trial, as predicted by the adaptive control model. Likewise, a prior error did not enhance cue-evoked spatial asymmetries in EEG, nor did it enhance validity effects on neural responses evoked by targets. Instead, errors were followed by poorer overall performance and generalized arousal, as measured by generally suppressed EEG alpha power in postresponse and cue-to-target intervals following errors compared to correct responses. Results support an alternative theory that post-error changes in neural activity and performance reflect arousal, orienting, or cognitive bottlenecking rather than adaptive control of attention.

Intertrial interval duration affects error monitoring.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of varying intertrial interval (ITI) durations on neural signals of error monitoring, given the importance of the ITI as a time window for engaging in self-evaluation and cognitive control. In a between-subjects design, 35 participants were assigned to one of three ITI durations (short: 768 ms; medium: 1,280 ms; long: 1,792 ms) in a standard Stroop task while EEG was recorded. Participants in the short-ITI group demonstrated lower performance accuracy, a reduced error-related negativity (even when correcting for frequency of errors), lower error-related alpha suppression during the ITI, and increased post-error slowing. Results indicate that fast-paced trial timing can be disruptive to self-monitoring, perhaps due to capacity limitations or bottlenecks in processing.

Mindfulness-of-breathing exercise modulates EEG alpha activity during cognitive performance.

The present study investigated whether engaging in a mindful breathing exercise would affect EEG oscillatory activity associated with self-monitoring processes, based on the notion that mindfulness enhances attentional awareness. Participants were assigned to either an audio exercise in mindful breathing or an audio control condition, and then completed a Stroop task while EEG was recorded. The primary EEG measure of interest was error-related alpha suppression (ERAS), an index of self-monitoring in which alpha power is reduced, suggesting mental engagement, following errors compared to correct responses. Participants in the mindful-breathing condition showed increased alpha power during the listening exercise and enhanced ERAS during the subsequent Stroop task. These results indicate enhanced error-monitoring among those in the mindful-breathing group.

Task motivation influences alpha suppression following errors.

The goal of the present research is to examine the influence of motivation on a novel error-related neural marker, error-related alpha suppression (ERAS). Participants completed an attentionally demanding flanker task under conditions that emphasized either speed or accuracy or under conditions that manipulated the monetary value of errors. Conditions in which errors had greater motivational value produced greater ERAS, that is, greater alpha suppression following errors compared to correct trials. A second study found that a manipulation of task difficulty did not affect ERAS. Together, the results confirm that ERAS is both a robust phenomenon and one that is sensitive to motivational factors.

Alpha suppression following performance errors is correlated with depression, affect, and coping behaviors.

This study tested the hypothesis that enhanced neural arousal in response to performance errors would predict poor affect and coping behaviors in everyday life. Participants were preselected as either low-depressed (LD) or high-depressed (HD) based on a screening questionnaire, and they then completed a laboratory Stroop task while EEG was recorded, followed by a 2-week period of daily reports of affect and coping behaviors. The EEG measure of arousal response to errors was the degree of error-related alpha suppression (ERAS) in the intertrial interval, that is the reduction in alpha power following errors compared with correct responses. ERAS was relatively heightened at frontal sites for the HD versus the LD group, and frontal ERAS predicted lower positive affect, higher negative affect, and less adaptive coping behaviors in the daily reports. Together, the results imply that heightened arousal following mistakes is associated with suboptimal emotion and coping with stressors.

Stress regulation and cognitive control: evidence relating cortisol reactivity and neural responses to errors.

In this study, we tested the relationship between error-related signals of cognitive control and cortisol reactivity, investigating the hypothesis of common systems for cognitive and emotional self-regulation. Eighty-three participants completed a Stroop task while electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. Three error-related indices were derived from the EEG: the error-related negativity (ERN), error positivity (Pe), and error-related alpha suppression (ERAS). Pre- and posttask salivary samples were assayed for cortisol, and cortisol change scores were correlated with the EEG variables. Better error-correct differentiation in the ERN predicted less cortisol increase during the task, whereas greater ERAS predicted greater cortisol increase during the task; the Pe was not correlated with cortisol changes. We concluded that an enhanced ERN, part of an adaptive cognitive control system, predicts successful stress regulation. In contrast, an enhanced ERAS response may reflect error-related arousal that is not adaptive. The results support the concept of overlapping systems for cognitive and emotional self-regulation.

Is "conflict adaptation" driven by conflict? Behavioral and EEG evidence for the underappreciated role of congruent trials.

Theories of cognitive control argue that response conflict in speeded performance tasks leads to adaptive changes, such that irrelevant information is better ignored on subsequent trials. This study tested whether trial-by-trial changes are driven primarily by conflict on incongruent trials or instead by congruent trials, in which irrelevant and relevant stimulus dimensions match. In a Stroop task including congruent, incongruent, and neutral trials, interference was greater following congruent compared to incongruent and neutral trials, which did not differ. During the intertrial interval, EEG alpha power, an inverse measure of cerebral activation, was significantly lower following congruent than neutral trials, whereas incongruent and neutral trials did not differ. These results imply that trial-by-trial changes in performance may not be driven solely by conflict, but rather by changes in attention triggered by congruent information.

Social deviance activates the brain's error-monitoring system.

Social psychologists have long noted the tendency for human behavior to conform to social group norms. This study examined whether feedback indicating that participants had deviated from group norms would elicit a neural signal previously shown to be elicited by errors and monetary losses. While electroencephalograms were recorded, participants (N = 30) rated the attractiveness of 120 faces and received feedback giving the purported average rating made by a group of peers. The feedback was manipulated so that group ratings either were the same as a participant's rating or deviated by 1, 2, or 3 points. Feedback indicating deviance from the group norm elicited a feedback-related negativity, a brainwave signal known to be elicited by objective performance errors and losses. The results imply that the brain treats deviance from social norms as an error.

Neural and behavioral measures of error-related cognitive control predict daily coping with stress.

This study tested the hypothesis that individual differences in cognitive control can predict individual differences in emotion regulation. Participants completed color-word and emotional Stroop tasks while an electroencephalogram was recorded, and then they reported daily stressful events, affect, and coping for 14 days. Greater posterror slowing in the emotional Stroop task predicted greater negative affect in response to stressors and less use of task-focused coping as daily stressors increased. Participants whose neural activity best distinguished errors from correct responses tended to show less stress reactivity in daily self-reports. Finally, depression levels predicted daily affect and coping independent of cognitive control variables. The results offer qualified support for an integrated conception of cognitive and emotional self-regulation.

Preverbal error-monitoring in stutterers and fluent speakers.

This study was designed to characterize the brain system that monitors speech in people who stutter and matched controls. We measured two electrophysiological peaks associated with action-monitoring: the error-related negativity (ERN) and the error positivity (Pe). Both the ERN and Pe were reliably observed after errors in a rhyming task and a nonverbal flanker task, replicating previous reports of a language-monitoring ERN and demonstrating that the Pe can also be elicited by phonological errors. In the rhyming task, stutterers showed a heightened ERN peak regardless of whether they actually committed an error. Similar results, though only marginally significant, were obtained from the flanker task. These results support the vicious cycle hypothesis, which posits that stuttering results from over-monitoring the speech plan. The elevation of the ERN in stutterers and the similarity of the results between the flanker and rhyming tasks implies that speech-monitoring may rely on the same neural substrate as action-monitoring.

Cognitive control in the intertrial interval: evidence from EEG alpha power.

This study used electroencephalogram (EEG) power spectrum analyses to characterize neural activity during the intertrial interval, a period during which online cognitive adjustments in response to errors or conflict are thought to occur. EEG alpha power was quantified as an inverse index of cerebral activity during the period between each response and the next stimulus in a Stroop task. Alpha power was significantly reduced following error responses compared to correct responses, indicating greater cerebral activity following errors. Reduced alpha power was also observed following Stroop conflict trials compared to no-conflict trials, suggesting that conflict engages processes of mental adjustment. Finally, hemispheric differences in alpha power during the intertrial interval supported the complementary roles of the left and right hemispheres in behavioral activation and inhibition.

Alpha power is influenced by performance errors.

Error commission evokes changes in event-related potentials, autonomic nervous system activity, and behavior, presumably reflecting the operation of a cognitive control network. Here we test the hypothesis that errors lead to increased cortical arousal, measurable as changes in electroencephalogram (EEG) alpha band power. Participants performed a Stroop task while EEG was recorded. Following correct responses, alpha power increased and then decreased in a quadratic pattern, implying transient mental disengagement during the intertrial interval. This trend was absent following errors, which elicited significantly less alpha power than correct trials. Moreover, post-error alpha power was a better predictor of individual differences in post-error slowing than the error-related negativity (ERN), whereas the ERN was a better predictor of post-error accuracy than alpha power. These findings imply that changes in cortical arousal play a unique role in modulating post-error behavior.

Perceived similarity and neural mirroring: evidence from vicarious error processing.

This study examined the effects of interpersonal similarity on vicarious error processing. We predicted that high similarity between self and other would predict increased neural responsiveness to the other's errors, based on the assumption that experience is more strongly shared when it involves similar others. Participants observed a confederate performing a flanker task while event-related brain potentials were recorded from the observer. Physiological data revealed two error-related potentials, the observational error-related negativity (oERN) and positivity (oPe). Self-reports of perceived similarity toward the confederate predicted both components. Participants reporting higher interpersonal similarity showed a larger oPe response to the other's errors, suggesting increased salience of errors committed by similar others. Unexpectedly, higher similarity also predicted a decreased oERN response. Divergent results for oERN and oPe may reflect the different functional roles of the two components. Together the results demonstrate that vicarious error monitoring is sensitive to social factors.