How do the carbon emission trading prices affect the financing decision of the supply chain considering carbon neutrality?

This paper considers a supply chain formed by a manufacturer with constrained capital and a retailer with sufficient capital. By using the Stackelberg game theory, we discuss the manufacturer's and retailer's optimization decisions for bank financing, zero-interest early payment financing, and in-house factoring financing under both normal and carbon neutrality scenarios. In the carbon neutrality scenario, numerical analysis shows that improving the efficiency of emission reduction drives manufacturers to switch from external to internal financing methods. The impact degree of green sensitivity on the supply chain's profit depends on the carbon emission trading prices. In the framework of green sensitivity of products and emission reduction efficiency, manufacturers' financing decisions are affected by carbon emission trading prices rather than by whether emissions exceed the standards or not. When the price is higher, internal financing is easier to obtain, whereas the space for external financing is constrained.

The impact of blockchain on optimal incentive contracts for online supply chain finance.

In China, supply chain finance is still in infancy. However, it is the problems of information sharing, trust transfer, and risk management that have been making it difficult to meet the financing needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in supply chain. The emerging blockchain technology, with its unique decentralization, traceability, and other characteristics, has found a digital solution for traditional supply chain finance. Although blockchain has attracted widespread attention and there are more general descriptions of blockchain application areas, there are few researches on the impact mechanisms of blockchain in-depth. Especially in the field of supply chain finance, there is little research on optimal incentive contract in online supply chain finance empowered by blockchain technology. Therefore, this paper explores the influence of blockchain technology maturity on participants, and thus finds the optimal incentive contract in online supply chain empowered by blockchain technology. Because of the mastery of blockchain technology, platforms believe they are well protected against risk and may behave irrationally. Therefore, this paper considers the overconfident behavior of blockchain supply chain finance platform in actual operation, and then applies the principal-agent model and incentive theory to design the incentive mechanism between platforms, banks, and central banks. Finally, numerical analyses show that overconfident behavior and the maturity of blockchain technology have an impact on the optimal decision for the whole supply chain.

Research on services decision-making in closed-loop supply chain dominated by a logistics provider.

Remanufacturing is an advanced form of recycling in circular economy. In order to promote the development of remanufacturing, the government gradually uses subsidy policies to regulate and intervene related enterprises. In this paper, we assume that a closed-loop supply chain consists of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) producing new products from raw materials, a remanufacturer producing re-manufactured products from used items directly collected from customers, and a logistics provider which sells and distributes two products as a monopolist in the given market. By constructing game model in which logistics provider is a leader and OEM and remanufacturer are the equal status followers, we solve chain members' optimal services decision-making under government subsidy. Finally, considering the government subsidy, we analyze the impact of remanufacturer service level and the logistics provider service scope on members' equilibrium decision-making. Analysis shows that government subsidy policies are always profitable for enterprises. The OEM and the logistics provider have the same choice. They would choose the subsidy policy for the service scope of the logistics supplier in order to improve the service level of new products and the service scope of the logistics supplier. The remanufacturer would believe that subsidizing the service level of remanufactured products is more effective in improving his own profits.