Quantitative risk assessment of radiocesium associated with Japanese foods imported into the United Kingdom.

Damage to a nuclear power station resulted in radioactive contamination of certain areas of Japan in 2011. Legislation was put in place in Europe to establish controls on the import of certain types of food and feed, including a limit of 100 radioactive decays (becquerel, Bq) per second of radiocesium per kg. This legislation was retained in the United Kingdom after leaving the EU and then reviewed in 2021. A quantitative risk assessment was developed to estimate the radiological risk to public health from consuming Japanese food imported into the United Kingdom should the maximum level on radiocesium be removed. Although Japanese monitoring data indicated occurrences when products exceeded the 100 Bq per kg limit, these were found to be rare; a total of 1485 occurrences (0.0013%) of all measured foodstuff samples (>1 million) within the scope of this assessment had radiocesium activity concentrations that exceeded 100 Bq per kg. Using the recorded occurrence and level of radiocesium measured, and the current pattern and volume of food imported from Japan, there was an estimated excess risk of fatal cancer of around one in a million per year, categorized as negligible compared to the baseline 2018-2020 UK cancer fatality rate of around 1 in 4. On the basis of the described assessment and the estimated small additional risk, Great Britain lifted import controls related to radioactivity present in food from Japan. A number of recommendations to address data gaps and approaches in this assessment are made, particularly how we can improve modeling UK dietary habits for specialist foods.

Recurrent seasonal outbreak of an emerging serotype of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC O55:H7 Stx2a) in the south west of England, July 2014 to September 2015.

The first documented British outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) O55:H7 began in the county of Dorset, England, in July 2014. Since then, there have been a total of 31 cases of which 13 presented with haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS). The outbreak strain had Shiga toxin (Stx) subtype 2a associated with an elevated risk of HUS. This strain had not previously been isolated from humans or animals in England. The only epidemiological link was living in or having close links to two areas in Dorset. Extensive investigations included testing of animals and household pets. Control measures included extended screening, iterative interviewing and exclusion of cases and high risk contacts. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) confirmed that all the cases were infected with similar strains. A specific source could not be identified. The combination of epidemiological investigation and WGS indicated, however, that this outbreak was possibly caused by recurrent introductions from a local endemic zoonotic source, that a highly similar endemic reservoir appears to exist in the Republic of Ireland but has not been identified elsewhere, and that a subset of cases was associated with human-to-human transmission in a nursery.