Not all information is informative: An exploration of educational content on recycled potable water knowledge and acceptance.

As drought and water shortages threaten access to safe water supplies globally, finding ways to increase public acceptance of recycled water has become increasingly important. Educational interventions have often been explored as a potential method to help overcome public distaste for recycled water. However, in past research, the effects of educational interventions have tended to be modest, leading to some skepticism over the ability of public information campaigns to truly increase acceptance. We propose that, at least in part, these modest effects of education may be driven by differences in the ability of some types of educational content to increase recycled water knowledge and subsequent acceptance (e.g., some content may be too complex for a lay audience or may be insufficient to adequately address the concerns that drive one's apprehension towards recycled water). Thus, we developed and tested an educational video split into four distinct areas of educational content related to potable water reuse: (1) need for recycled water, (2) approaches to implementing recycled water (e.g., through direct, indirect, or de-facto reuse), (3) purification technology, and (4) locations and testimonials of actual implementation. In two experiments (Ns = 711, 385), we found that content illustrating approaches to implementing recycled water and locations using it led to medium to large increases in knowledge and acceptance. These results imply that given limited time and resources, brief information about these topics may increase acceptance better than alternative information. Moreover, these results underscore a need to more carefully consider the content used in educational campaigns, as not all information is equally likely to produce desired effects.

Educational interventions and animal consumption: Results from lab and field studies.

Currently, there are many advocacy interventions aimed at reducing animal consumption. We report results from a lab (N = 267) and a field experiment (N = 208) exploring whether, and to what extent, some of those educational interventions are effective at shifting attitudes and behavior related to animal consumption. In the lab experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read a philosophical ethics paper, watch an animal advocacy video, read an advocacy pamphlet, or watch a control video. In the field experiment, we measured the impact of college classes with animal ethics content versus college classes without animal ethics content. Using a pretest, post-test matched control group design, humane educational interventions generally made people more knowledgeable about animals used as food and reduced justifications and speciesist attitudes supporting animal consumption. None of the interventions in either experiment had a direct, measurable impact on self-reported animal consumption. These results suggest that while some educational interventions can change beliefs and attitudes about animal consumption, those same interventions have small impacts on animal consumption.

Comparing effects of default nudges and informing on recycled water decisions.

Despite a serious need for sustainable alternative water supplies in many parts of the world, public opposition remains a barrier to implementing solutions such as safe wastewater recycling schemes. Here, we compared two strategies to increase acceptance of recycled water: default nudges and informing choices. Experiment 1 (N = 81) showed that defaults increased acceptance of recycled water. Experiment 2 (N = 142) replicated the effect but also indicated that weak educational interventions (simple infographics) interacted with confidence, such that those who switched from the default option had measurably higher confidence in their choice when given the infographic. Experiment 3 (N = 146) suggested that in a college undergraduate sample, strong educational interventions (educational videos) eliminated the effect of nudges on recycled water acceptance, increased acceptance, increased knowledge of recycled water, and also interacted with confidence in the same way observed in Experiment 2. Experiment 4 (N = 271) showed that strong educational interventions can also increase recycled water acceptance in an MTurk sample. Since both education and defaults may be effective, we suggest that future work would benefit from cost-benefit analyses between strategies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The free will and punishment scale: Efficient measurement and predictive validity across diverse and nationally representative adult samples.

Theoretically, attitudes about freedom and punishment can shape people's decisions and cause pernicious disagreements (e.g., political policies). Several scales measure free will beliefs, partially to help understand disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. We contribute to these efforts by directly comparing existing measures and by introducing a short measure of free will related attitudes. Studies 1, 2, and 3 (Ns = 221, 225, 244) factor analyzed all items in existing scales of free will and moral responsibility, resulting in two prominent factors: Beliefs in Free Will and Beliefs in Punishment. Study 4 (N = 269) presents evidence for the 2-factor structure from a nationally representative sample. Study 5 (N = 108) gives evidence of the utility of the Free Will and Punishment scale in predicting free will relevant beliefs and attitudes. As such, the Free Will and Punishment scale is likely useful when longer instruments are not practically possible.

Measuring objective knowledge of potable recycled water.

Reliable clean drinking water is becoming increasingly scarce. One potential additional source of drinking water is recycled water. However, public acceptance of potable recycled drinking water is low. One likely factor involved in the acceptance of recycled drinking water is objective knowledge about recycled water. In three studies (N = 229, 590, and 200), we developed a 34-item measure of objective knowledge of recycled drinking water. The objective knowledge measure was often a strong and unique predictor of intentions to accept and use recycled drinking water compared to other prominent factors including disgust and subjective knowledge of recycled water. Measuring knowledge of recycled drinking water holds the potential to estimate how and whether educational interventions aimed at increasing acceptance of recycled drinking water programs work.

The means/side-effect distinction in moral cognition: A meta-analysis.

Experimental research suggests that people draw a moral distinction between bad outcomes brought about as a means versus a side effect (or byproduct). Such findings have informed multiple psychological and philosophical debates about moral cognition, including its computational structure, its sensitivity to the famous Doctrine of Double Effect, its reliability, and its status as a universal and innate mental module akin to universal grammar. But some studies have failed to replicate the means/byproduct effect especially in the absence of other factors, such as personal contact. So we aimed to determine how robust the means/byproduct effect is by conducting a meta-analysis of both published and unpublished studies (k=101; 24,058 participants). We found that while there is an overall small difference between moral judgments of means and byproducts (standardized mean difference=0.87, 95% CI 0.67-1.06; standardized mean change=0.57, 95% CI 0.44-0.69; log odds ratio=1.59, 95% CI 1.15-2.02), the mean effect size is primarily moderated by whether the outcome is brought about by personal contact, which typically involves the use of personal force.

Financial Surrogate Decision Making: Lessons from Applied Experimental Philosophy.

An estimated 1 in 4 elderly Americans need a surrogate to make decisions at least once in their lives. With an aging population, that number is almost certainly going to increase. This paper focuses on financial surrogate decision making. To illustrate some of the empirical and moral implications associated with financial surrogate decision making, two experiments suggest that default choice settings can predictably influence some surrogate financial decision making. Experiment 1 suggested that when making hypothetical financial decisions, surrogates tended to stay with default settings (OR = 4.37, 95% CI 1.52, 12.48). Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding suggesting that in a different context (OR = 2.27, 95% CI 1.1, 4.65). Experiment 2 also suggested that those who were more numerate were less likely to be influenced by default settings than the less numerate, but only when the decision is whether to "opt in" (p = .05). These data highlight the importance of a recent debate about "nudging." Defaults are common methods to nudge people to make desirable choices while allowing the liberty to choose otherwise. Some of the ethics of using default settings to nudge surrogate decision makers are discussed.

Ethical Information Transparency and Sexually Transmitted Infections.

Shared decision making is intended to help protect patient autonomy while satisfying the demands of beneficence. In shared decision making, information is shared between health care professional and patient. The sharing of information presents new and practical problems about how much information to share and how transparent that information should be. Sharing information also allows for subtle paternalistic strategies to be employed to "nudge" the patient in a desired direction. These problems are illustrated in two experiments. Experiment 1 (N = 146) suggested that positively framed messages increased the strength of judgments about whether a patient with HIV should designate a surrogate compared to a negatively framed message. A simple decision aid did not reliably reduce this effect. Experiment 2 (N = 492) replicated these effects. In addition, Experiment 2 suggested that providing some additional information (e.g., about surrogate decision making accuracy) can reduce tendencies to think that one with AIDS should designate a surrogate. These results indicate that in some circumstances, nudges (e.g., framing) influence judgments in ways that non-nudging interventions (e.g., simple graphs) do not. While non-nudging interventions are generally preferable, careful thought is required for determining the relative benefits and costs associated with information transparency and persuasion.

Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will intuitions.

Five experiments suggested that everyday free will and moral responsibility judgments about some hypothetical thought examples differed from free will and moral responsibility judgments about the actual world. Experiment 1 (N=106) showed that free will intuitions about the actual world measured by the FAD-Plus poorly predicted free will intuitions about a hypothetical person performing a determined action (r=.13). Experiments 2-5 replicated this result and found the relations between actual free will judgments and free will judgments about hypothetical determined or fated actions (rs=.22-.35) were much smaller than the differences between them (ηp(2)=.2-.55). These results put some pressure on theoretical accounts of everyday intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility.

Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis.

Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism's relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a meta-analysis to estimate the impact of affect. Our meta-analysis indicates that beliefs in free will are largely robust to emotional reactions.

Pereboom and premises: asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will.

Sommers (2010) argues that experimental philosophers of free will have largely been asking the wrong question - the question whether philosophically naïve individuals think that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. The present studies begin to alleviate this concern by testing the intuitive plausibility of Pereboom's (2001) four case argument. The general pattern of responses from two experiments does not support Pereboom's predictions. Moreover, those who were high in the personality trait emotional stability tended to judge that manipulated agents were more free and morally responsible compared to individuals low in emotional stability.

Heuristics and life-sustaining treatments.

Surrogates' decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatments (LSTs) are pervasive. However, the factors influencing surrogates' decisions to initiate LSTs are relatively unknown. We present evidence from two experiments indicating that some surrogates' decisions about when to initiate LSTs can be predictably manipulated. Factors that influence surrogate decisions about LSTs include the patient's cognitive state, the patient's age, the percentage of doctors not recommending the initiation of LSTs, the percentage of patients in similar situations not wanting LSTs, and default treatment settings. These results suggest that some people may use heuristics when making these important life-and-death decisions. These findings may have important moral implications for improving surrogate decisions about LSTs and reconsidering paternalism.

Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: a test of the expertise defense.

Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate-as measured by a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge-does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed.

Frankfurt and the folk: an experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases.

An important disagreement in contemporary debates about free will hinges on whether an agent must have alternative possibilities to be morally responsible. Many assume that notions of alternative possibilities are ubiquitous and reflected in everyday intuitions about moral responsibility: if one lacks alternatives, then one cannot be morally responsible. We explore this issue empirically. In two studies, we find evidence that folk judgments about moral responsibility call into question two popular principles that require some form of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. Survey participants given scenarios involving agents that fail to satisfy these principles nonetheless found these agents to be (1) morally responsible, (2) blameworthy, (3) deserving of blame, and (4) at fault for morally bad actions and consequences. We defend our interpretation of this evidence against objections and explore some implications of these findings for the free will debate.

Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism.

Recently, there has been an increased interest in folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility from both philosophers and psychologists. We aim to extend our understanding of folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility using an individual differences approach. Building off previous research suggesting that there are systematic differences in folks' philosophically relevant intuitions, we present new data indicating that the personality trait extraversion predicts, to a significant extent, those who have compatibilist versus incompatibilist intuitions. We argue that identifying groups of people who have specific and diverse intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility offers the possibility for theoretical advancement in philosophy and psychology, and may in part explain why some perennial philosophical debates have proven intractable.