Thinking styles and decision making: A meta-analysis.

This meta-analysis examined whether tendencies to use reflective and intuitive thinking styles predicted decision performance (normatively correct responding) and decision experience (e.g., speed, enjoyment) on a range of decision-making tasks. A pooled sample of 17,704 participants (Mage = 25 years) from 89 samples produced small but significant weighted average effects for reflection on performance (r = .11) and experience (r = .14). Intuition was negatively associated with performance (r = -.09) but positively associated with experience (r = .06). Moderation analyses using 499 effect sizes revealed heterogeneity across task-theory match/mismatch, task type, description-based versus experience-based decisions, time pressure, age, and measure type. Effects of both thinking styles were strongest when the task matched the theoretical strengths of the thinking style (up to r = .29). Specific tasks that produced the largest thinking style effects (up to r = .35) were also consistent with system characteristics. Time pressure weakened the effects of reflection, but not intuition, on performance. Effect sizes for reflection on performance were largest for individuals aged either 12 to 18 years or 25+ (up to r = .18), and the effects of both reflection and intuition on experience were largest for adults aged 25+ (up to r = .27). Overall, our results indicate that associations between thinking styles and decision outcomes are context dependent. To improve decision performance and experience, decision architects and educators should carefully consider both individual differences in the decision maker and the nature of the decision task.

Heritability of preferred thinking styles and a genetic link to working memory capacity.

Genetic and environmental contributions to preferences for rational and experiential thinking were examined in 100 pairs of monozygotic and 73 pairs of same-sex dizygotic Australian twins. Univariate analyses for experiential thinking and working memory capacity (WMC) revealed genetic effects accounted for 44% and 39% of the variability respectively, with non-shared environmental effects accounting for the balance. For rational thinking, the univariate models produced ambiguous results about the relative roles of heritability and shared environment, but a subsequent Cholesky analysis suggested genetic effects accounted for 34%, with the balance, 66%, explained by the non-shared environment. The Cholesky analysis revealed that shared genetic effects accounted for 60%, and non-shared environment accounted for 40% of the relationship between preference for rational thinking and WMC.