Predictions and errors are distinctly represented across V1 layers.

Popular accounts of mind and brain propose that the brain continuously forms predictions about future sensory inputs and combines predictions with inputs to determine what we perceive.1,2,3,4,5,6 Under "predictive processing" schemes, such integration is supported by the hierarchical organization of the cortex, whereby feedback connections communicate predictions from higher-level deep layers to agranular (superficial and deep) lower-level layers.7,8,9,10 Predictions are compared with input to compute the "prediction error," which is transmitted up the hierarchy from superficial layers of lower cortical regions to the middle layers of higher areas, to update higher-level predictions until errors are reconciled.11,12,13,14,15 In the primary visual cortex (V1), predictions have thereby been proposed to influence representations in deep layers while error signals may be computed in superficial layers. Despite the framework's popularity, there is little evidence for these functional distinctions because, to our knowledge, unexpected sensory events have not previously been presented in human laminar paradigms to contrast against expected events. To this end, this 7T fMRI study contrasted V1 responses to expected (75% likely) and unexpected (25%) Gabor orientations. Multivariate decoding analyses revealed an interaction between expectation and layer, such that expected events could be decoded with comparable accuracy across layers, while unexpected events could only be decoded in superficial laminae. Although these results are in line with these accounts that have been popular for decades, such distinctions have not previously been demonstrated in humans. We discuss how both prediction and error processes may operate together to shape our unitary perceptual experiences.

Expectation Cues and False Percepts Generate Stimulus-Specific Activity in Distinct Layers of the Early Visual Cortex.

Perception has been proposed to result from the integration of feedforward sensory signals with internally generated feedback signals. Feedback signals are believed to play an important role in driving false percepts, that is, seeing things that are not actually there. Feedforward and feedback influences on perception can be studied using layer-specific fMRI, which we used here to interrogate neural activity underlying high-confidence false percepts while healthy human participants (N = 25, male and female) performed a perceptual orientation discrimination task. Auditory cues implicitly signaled the most likely upcoming orientation (referred to here as expectations). These expectations induced orientation-specific templates in the deep and superficial layers of V2, without affecting perception. In contrast, the orientation of falsely perceived stimuli with high confidence was reflected in the middle input layers of V2, suggesting a feedforward signal contributing to false percepts. The prevalence of high-confidence false percepts was related to everyday hallucination severity in a separate online sample (N = 100), suggesting a possible link with abnormal perceptual experiences. These results reveal a potential feedforward mechanism underlying false percepts, reflected by spontaneous stimulus-like activity in the input layers of the visual cortex, independent of top-down signals reflecting cued orientations.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT False percepts have been suggested to arise through excessive feedback signals. However, feedforward contributions to false percepts have remained largely understudied. Laminar fMRI has been shown to be useful in distinguishing feedforward from feedback activity as it allows the imaging of different cortical layers. In the present study we demonstrate that although cued orientations are encoded in the feedback layers of the visual cortex, the content of the false percepts are encoded in the feedforward layers and did not rely on these cued orientations. This shows that false percepts can in principle emerge from random feedforward signals in the visual cortex, with possible implications for disorders hallmarked by hallucinations like schizophrenia and Parkinson's disease.

Action selection in early stages of psychosis: an active inference approach.

BACKGROUND: To interact successfully with their environment, humans need to build a model to make sense of noisy and ambiguous inputs. An inaccurate model, as suggested to be the case for people with psychosis, disturbs optimal action selection. Recent computational models, such as active inference, have emphasized the importance of action selection, treating it as a key part of the inferential process. Based on an active inference framework, we sought to evaluate previous knowledge and belief precision in an action-based task, given that alterations in these parameters have been linked to the development of psychotic symptoms. We further sought to determine whether task performance and modelling parameters would be suitable for classification of patients and controls. METHODS: Twenty-three individuals with an at-risk mental state, 26 patients with first-episode psychosis and 31 controls completed a probabilistic task in which action choice (go/no-go) was dissociated from outcome valence (gain or loss). We evaluated group differences in performance and active inference model parameters and performed receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analyses to assess group classification. RESULTS: We found reduced overall performance in patients with psychosis. Active inference modelling revealed that patients showed increased forgetting, reduced confidence in policy selection and less optimal general choice behaviour, with poorer action-state associations. Importantly, ROC analysis showed fair-to-good classification performance for all groups, when combining modelling parameters and performance measures. LIMITATIONS: The sample size is moderate. CONCLUSION: Active inference modelling of this task provides further explanation for dysfunctional mechanisms underlying decision-making in psychosis and may be relevant for future research on the development of biomarkers for early identification of psychosis.

A continuum hypothesis of psychotomimetic rapid antidepressants.

Ketamine, classical psychedelics and sleep deprivation are associated with rapid effects on depression. Interestingly, these interventions also have common psychotomimetic actions, mirroring aspects of psychosis such as an altered sense of self, perceptual distortions and distorted thinking. This raises the question whether these interventions might be acute antidepressants through the same mechanisms that underlie some of their psychotomimetic effects. That is, perhaps some symptoms of depression can be understood as occupying the opposite end of a spectrum where elements of psychosis can be found on the other side. This review aims at reviewing the evidence underlying a proposed continuum hypothesis of psychotomimetic rapid antidepressants, suggesting that a range of psychotomimetic interventions are also acute antidepressants as well as trying to explain these common features in a hierarchical predictive coding framework, where we hypothesise that these interventions share a common mechanism by increasing the flexibility of prior expectations. Neurobiological mechanisms at play and the role of different neuromodulatory systems affected by these interventions and their role in controlling the precision of prior expectations and new sensory evidence will be reviewed. The proposed hypothesis will also be discussed in relation to other existing theories of antidepressants. We also suggest a number of novel experiments to test the hypothesis and highlight research areas that could provide further insights, in the hope to better understand the acute antidepressant properties of these interventions.

Influence of prior beliefs on perception in early psychosis: Effects of illness stage and hierarchical level of belief.

Alterations in the balance between prior expectations and sensory evidence may account for faulty perceptions and inferences leading to psychosis. However, uncertainties remain about the nature of altered prior expectations and the degree to which they vary with the emergence of psychosis. We explored how expectations arising at two different levels-cognitive and perceptual-influenced processing of sensory information and whether relative influences of higher- and lower-level priors differed across people with prodromal symptoms and those with psychotic illness. In two complementary auditory perception experiments, 91 participants (30 with first-episode psychosis, 29 at clinical risk for psychosis, and 32 controls) were required to decipher a phoneme within ambiguous auditory input. Expectations were generated in two ways: an accompanying visual input of lip movements observed during auditory presentation or through written presentation of a phoneme provided prior to auditory presentation. We determined how these different types of information shaped auditory perceptual experience, how this was altered across the prodromal and established phases of psychosis, and how this relates to cingulate glutamate levels assessed by magnetic resonance spectroscopy. The psychosis group relied more on high-level cognitive priors compared to both healthy controls and those at clinical risk for psychosis and relied more on low-level perceptual priors than the clinical risk group. The risk group was marginally less reliant on low-level perceptual priors than controls. The results are consistent with previous theory that influences of prior expectations in perceptions in psychosis differ according to level of prior and illness phase. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Reinforcement learning as an intermediate phenotype in psychosis? Deficits sensitive to illness stage but not associated with polygenic risk of schizophrenia in the general population.

BACKGROUND: Schizophrenia is a complex disorder in which the causal relations between risk genes and observed clinical symptoms are not well understood and the explanatory gap is too wide to be clarified without considering an intermediary level. Thus, we aimed to test the hypothesis of a pathway from molecular polygenic influence to clinical presentation occurring via deficits in reinforcement learning. METHODS: We administered a reinforcement learning task (Go/NoGo) that measures reinforcement learning and the effect of Pavlovian bias on decision making. We modelled the behavioural data with a hierarchical Bayesian approach (hBayesDM) to decompose task performance into its underlying learning mechanisms. Study 1 included controls (n = 29, F|M = 0.81), At Risk Mental State for psychosis (ARMS, n = 23, F|M = 0.35) and FEP (First-episode psychosis, n = 26, F|M = 0.18). Study 2 included healthy adolescents (n = 735, F|M = 1.06), 390 of whom had their polygenic risk scores for schizophrenia (PRSs) calculated. RESULTS: Patients with FEP showed significant impairments in overriding Pavlovian conflict, a lower learning rate and a lower sensitivity to both reward and punishment. Less widespread deficits were observed in ARMS. PRSs did not significantly predict performance on the task in the general population, which only partially correlated with measures of psychopathology. CONCLUSIONS: Reinforcement learning deficits are observed in first episode psychosis and, to some extent, in those at clinical risk for psychosis, and were not predicted by molecular genetic risk for schizophrenia in healthy individuals. The study does not support the role of reinforcement learning as an intermediate phenotype in psychosis.