Identity Selection and the Social Construction of Birthdays.

We argue that rather than being a wholly random event, birthdays are sometimes selected by parents. We further argue that such effects have changed over time and are the result of important psychological processes. Long ago, U.S. American parents greatly overclaimed holidays as their children's birthdays. These effects were larger for more important holidays, and they grew smaller as births moved to hospitals and became officially documented. These effects were exaggerated for ethnic groups that deeply valued specific holidays. Parents also overclaimed well-liked calendar days and avoided disliked calendar days as their children's birthdays. However, after birthday selection effects virtually disappeared in the 1950s and 1960s, they reappeared after the emergence of labor induction and planned cesarean birth. For example, there are many fewer modern U.S. births than would be expected on Christmas Day. In addition, modern parents appear to use birth medicalization to avoid undesirable birthdays (Friday the 13th). We argue that basking in reflect glory, ethnic identity processes, and superstitions such as magical thinking all play a role in birthday selection effects. Discussion focuses on the power of social identity in day-to-day judgment and decision-making.

Ideological asymmetries in conformity, desire for shared reality, and the spread of misinformation.

Ideological belief systems arise from epistemic, existential, and relational motives to reduce uncertainty, threat, and social discord. According to system justification theory, however, some ideologies-such as those that are conservative, religious, and legitimizing of the status quo-are especially appealing to people whose epistemic, existential, and relational motives are chronically or temporarily heightened. In this article, we focus on relational motivation, describing evidence that conservatives are more likely than liberals to: prioritize values of conformity and tradition; possess a strong desire to share reality with like-minded others; perceive within-group consensus when making political and non-political judgments; be influenced by implicit relational cues and sources who are perceived as similar to them; and maintain homogenous social networks and favor an 'echo chamber' environment that is conducive to the spread of misinformation.

O. J. Simpson as shared (and unshared) reality: the impact of consensually shared beliefs on interpersonal perceptions and task performance in different- and same-ethnicity dyads.

Shared reality theory postulates that interpersonal relationships are regulated by the degree to which people share experiences and beliefs (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). To assess consequences of shared (and unshared) reality for interpersonal relationships, we examined the effects of the 1990s Simpson trial on actual interpersonal interactions in same- and different-ethnicity dyads. In 3 experiments (conducted directly following, 5 years after, and 10 years after the trial), people who had been primed with Simpson participated in cooperative problem-solving tasks. Because the trial represented a dimension of belief discrepancy between Blacks and Whites but a dimension of shared beliefs within the two ethnic groups, shared reality theory predicts that activating memories of the trial would affect interpersonal interactions differently depending upon ethnic composition of dyads. As predicted, thoughts of Simpson caused decrements in quality of interpersonal perceptions and behaviors for different-ethnicity dyads but increases for same-ethnicity dyads. In addition, in a 4th study, we found that consensus predicted liking among partners in the previous 3 experiments and that these effects were significant in the expected direction for both same- and different-ethnicity pairs.

The contact hypothesis revisited: status bias in the reduction of implicit prejudice in the United States and Lebanon.

Although 50 years of research demonstrate that friendly intergroup contact reduces intergroup prejudice, the findings are based solely on self-reported, explicit prejudice. In two parallel experiments examining intergroup contact and prejudice-between Whites and Blacks in the United States (Experiment 1) and between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon (Experiment 2)-we examined whether intergroup status differences moderate contact effects on implicit prejudice, as well as explicit prejudice. Both experiments replicated the standard effect of contact on explicit prejudice. They also demonstrated that intergroup contact reduces implicit prejudice among low-status groups. In Experiment 1, the implicit prejudice of Blacks toward Whites (but not Whites toward Blacks) was reduced as a function of friendly contact. In Experiment 2, the implicit prejudice of Muslims toward Christians (but not Christians toward Muslims) was reduced as a function of friendly contact.

Self-stereotyping in the context of multiple social identities.

This research examines self-stereotyping in the context of multiple social identities and shows that self-stereotyping is a function of stereotyped expectancies held in particular relationships. Participants reported how others evaluated their math and verbal ability and how they viewed their own ability when their gender or ethnicity was salient. Asian American women (Experiment 1) and European Americans (Experiment 2) exhibited knowledge of stereotyped social expectancies and corresponding self-stereotyping associated with their more salient identity. African Americans (Experiment 3) exhibited some knowledge of stereotyped social expectancies but no corresponding self-stereotyping. Correlational evidence and a 4th experiment suggest that self-stereotyping is mediated by the degree to which close others are perceived to endorse stereotypes as applicable to the self.

Social tuning of automatic racial attitudes: the role of affiliative motivation.

Consistent with the affiliative social tuning hypothesis, this study showed that the desire to get along with another person shifted participants' automatic attitudes toward the ostensible attitudes of that person. In Experiment 1, the automatic racial attitudes of women but not men emulated those of an experimenter displaying race-egalitarian attitudes or attitudes neutral with respect to race. Mediational analysis revealed that the gender difference in social tuning was mediated by liking for the experimenter. In Experiment 2, the likability of the experimenter was manipulated. Individuals who interacted with a likable experimenter exhibited social tuning more so than did those who interacted with a rude experimenter. These findings suggest that affiliative motives may elicit malleability of automatic attitudes independent of manipulations of social group exemplars.

Social tuning of the self: consequences for the self-evaluations of stereotype targets.

These experiments examined how social interactions with individuals who ostensibly have stereotype-relevant views affect the self-evaluations of stereotype targets. Participants believed they were going to interact, or actually interacted, with a person who ostensibly had stereotype-consistent or stereotype-inconsistent views about their social group. Consistent with shared reality theory, participants' self-evaluations (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and behavior (Experiment 2) corresponded with the ostensible views of the other person when affiliative motivation was high. This occurred even when it was likely to be detrimental to participants' nonaffiliative outcomes (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that self-evaluative shift away from the ostensible views of another person was a function of social distance motives, also consistent with shared reality theory.