Do optimism and moralization predict vaccination? A five-wave longitudinal study.

OBJECTIVE: To examine if personal and comparative optimism, perceived effectiveness, and moralization of vaccination predict people's decision to get vaccinated. METHODS: We measured self-reported vaccination decisions in a five-wave longitudinal study (N ≍ 5,000/wave) in Belgium over a six months period (December 2020-May 2021) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Among the predictors were demographic factors, personal and comparative optimism for three aspects of COVID-19 (infection, severe disease, good outcome), perceived effectiveness of vaccination, and the extent to which vaccination is being viewed in prosocial terms (altruism, civic spirit) versus as instrumental in one's self-interest (common sense, concern about one's health). RESULTS: The actual availability of vaccines changed people's outlook on vaccination. Marked differences emerged in vaccination decision between linguistic-cultural regions (Flemish Region, Walloon Region, Brussels Capital Region). Personal and comparative optimism predicted vaccination decisions to different extents depending on participants' age and on whether the optimism was for infection, severe disease, or a good outcome. In older participants, vaccination decision was mostly predicted by personal optimism; in younger participants, it was mostly predicted by comparative optimism. Moralizing vaccination predicted a lower likelihood of a positive vaccination decision, that is, higher vaccine hesitancy or refusal, particularly in older participants. CONCLUSIONS: Assessments of risk perception serving to inform vaccination campaigns should differentiate between expectations concerning the risk of infection and expectations concerning the outcome of an infection. Public health messages should address comparative optimism, particularly when targeting younger populations. Contrary to popular belief, moralizing vaccination may reduce the willingness to get vaccinated. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Self-uniqueness beliefs and adherence to recommended precautions. A 5-wave longitudinal COVID-19 study.

RATIONALE: Research on health-related self-uniqueness beliefs suggested that these beliefs might predict adherence to precautions against COVID-19. OBJECTIVE: We examined if comparative optimism (believing that one is less at less than others), self-superiority (believing that one already adheres better to precautions than others), and egocentric impact perception (believing that adverse events affect oneself more than others) predicted intended adherence to precautions. METHOD: We measured self-reported intentions, optimism for self and others, perceived past adherence by self and others, and perceived impact of the measures and the disease on self and others in a 5-wave longitudinal study in December 2020-May 2021 (N ≈ 5000/wave). The sample was in key respects representative for the Belgian population. We used joint models to examine the relationship between self-uniqueness beliefs and intended adherence to the precautions. RESULTS: Believing that COVID-19 would affect one's own life more than average (egocentric impact perception) was associated with higher intentions to adhere to precautions, as was believing that the precautions affected one's life less than average (allocentric impact perception). Self-superiority concerning past adherence to precautions and comparative optimism concerning infection with COVID-19 were associated with higher intended adherence, regardless of whether their non-comparative counterparts (descriptive norm, i.e., perceived adherence to precautions by others, and personal optimism, respectively) were controlled for. Comparative optimism for severe disease and for good outcome were associated with lower intended adherence if personal optimism was not controlled for, but with higher intended adherence if it was controlled for. CONCLUSION: Self-uniqueness beliefs predict intended adherence to precautions against COVID-19, but do so in different directions.

Comparative Optimism, Self-Superiority, Egocentric Impact Perception and Health Information Seeking: A COVID-19 Study.

We examined perceived self-other differences (self-uniqueness) in appraisals of one's risk of an infectious disease (COVID-19), one's adherence to behavioural precautionary measures against the disease, and the impact of these measures on one's life. We also examined the relationship of self-uniqueness with information seeking and trust in sources of information about the disease. We administered an online survey to a community sample (N = 8696) of Dutch-speaking individuals, mainly in Belgium and The Netherlands, during the first lockdown (late April-Mid June 2020). As a group, participants reported that they were less likely to get infected or infect others or to suffer severe outcomes than average (unrealistic optimism) and that they adhered better than average to behavioural precautionary measures (illusory superiority). Except for participants below 25, who reported that they were affected more than average by these measures (egocentric impact bias), participants also generally reported that they were less affected than average (allocentric impact bias). Individual differences in self-uniqueness were associated with differences in the number of information sources being used and trust on these sources. Higher comparative optimism for infection, self-superiority, and allocentric impact perception were associated with information being sought from fewer sources; higher self-superiority and egocentric impact perception were associated with lower trust. We discuss implications for health communication.

Comparative optimism about infection and recovery from COVID-19; Implications for adherence with lockdown advice.

BACKGROUND: Comparative optimism, the belief that negative events are more likely to happen to others rather than to oneself, is well established in health risk research. It is unknown, however, whether comparative optimism also permeates people's health expectations and potentially behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic. OBJECTIVES: Data were collected through an international survey (N = 6485) exploring people's thoughts and psychosocial behaviours relating to COVID-19. This paper reports UK data on comparative optimism. In particular, we examine the belief that negative events surrounding risk and recovery from COVID-19 are perceived as more likely to happen to others rather than to oneself. METHODS: Using online snowball sampling through social media, anonymous UK survey data were collected from N = 645 adults during weeks 5-8 of the UK COVID-19 lockdown. The sample was normally distributed in terms of age and reflected the UK ethnic and disability profile. FINDINGS: Respondents demonstrated comparative optimism where they believed that as compared to others of the same age and gender, they were unlikely to experience a range of controllable (eg accidentally infect/ be infected) and uncontrollable (eg need hospitalization/ intensive care treatment if infected) COVID-19-related risks in the short term (P < .001). They were comparatively pessimistic (ie thinking they were more at risk than others for developing COVID-19-related infection or symptoms) when thinking about the next year. DISCUSSION: This is one of the first ever studies to report compelling comparative biases in UK adults' thinking about COVID-19.

When Praising Yourself Insults Others: Self-Superiority Claims Provoke Aggression.

We tested the prediction, derived from the hubris hypothesis, that bragging might serve as a verbal provocation and thus enhance aggression. Experiments 1 and 2 were vignette studies where participants could express hypothetical aggression; Experiment 3 was an actual decision task where participants could make aggressive and/or prosocial choices. Observers disliked an explicit braggart (who claimed to be "better than others") or a competence braggart as compared with an implicit braggart (who claimed to be "good") or a warmth braggart, respectively. Showing that explicit and competence bragging function as verbal provocations, observers responded more aggressively to the explicit and competence braggart than to the implicit and warmth braggart, respectively. They did so because they inferred that an explicit and a competence braggart viewed other people and them negatively, and therefore disliked the braggart. Rather than praising the self, braggarts are sometimes viewed as insulting others.

The hubris hypothesis: The downside of comparative optimism displays.

According to the hubris hypothesis, observers respond more unfavorably to individuals who express their positive self-views comparatively than to those who express their positive self-views non-comparatively, because observers infer that the former hold a more disparaging view of others and particularly of observers. Two experiments extended the hubris hypothesis in the domain of optimism. Observers attributed less warmth (but not less competence) to, and showed less interest in affiliating with, an individual displaying comparative optimism (the belief that one's future will be better than others' future) than with an individual displaying absolute optimism (the belief that one's future will be good). Observers responded differently to individuals displaying comparative versus absolute optimism, because they inferred that the former held a gloomier view of the observers' future. Consistent with previous research, observers still attributed more positive traits to a comparative or absolute optimist than to a comparative or absolute pessimist.

Less is more? Think again! A cognitive fluency-based more-less asymmetry in comparative communication.

Differences between groups, individuals, or objects can be framed in multiple ways. One can, for instance, say that men generally earn more than women or that women generally earn less than men. Showing that these logically equivalent expressions are not psychologically equivalent, we demonstrate a robust more-less asymmetry in the use of and responses to comparative statements. More specifically, we show that people use "more than" statements more often than "less than" statements (Study 1); like "more than" statements better (Studies 2 and 3), agree more with opinions expressed through "more than" statements (Studies 4 and 5), and are more likely to consider factual "more than" statements to be true (Study 6). Supporting a cognitive fluency explanation, a manipulation that makes people expect disfluency while processing "less than" statements reduces this otherwise robust more-less asymmetry (Study 7). By combining comparative framing effects with cognitive fluency, the present research brings together 2 research fields in social cognition, shedding new light on both.

Initial and noninitial name-letter preferences as obtained through repeated letter rating tasks continue to reflect (different aspects of) self-esteem.

We tested the usefulness of name-letter preference scores as indirect indicators of self-esteem by exploring whether multiple unsupervised self-administrations of letter rating tasks within a short period of time yield useful data. We also examined whether preferences for initials and noninitial name-letters tap different aspects of self-esteem. Participants from a community sample (N = 164; 58 men and 106 women, 17-67 years, Mage = 34.57, SD = 13.28) completed daily letter rating tasks and state self-esteem questionnaires for 7 consecutive days. They also completed a trait self-esteem questionnaire on the first measurement day as well as 6 months later. Preference scores for first-name initials were stronger but more unstable than preference scores for other name-letters. Preferences for first-name initials were primarily associated with directly measured state self-esteem whereas preferences for noninitials were primarily associated with directly measured trait self-esteem even if the latter was measured 6 months later. Thus, we showed that preferences for initials and noninitials are not simply interchangeable. Previous letter rating studies, which almost exclusively used initial preferences, should be interpreted in terms of state rather than trait self-esteem. In future studies, researchers should focus on the name-letter preference that reflects the aspect of self-esteem they wish to address.

The hubris hypothesis: you can self-enhance, but you'd better not show it.

We tested whether and why observers dislike individuals who convey self-superiority through blatant social comparison (the hubris hypothesis). Participants read self-superiority claims ("I am better than others"; Experiments 1-7), noncomparative positive claims ("I am good"; Experiments 1-2, 4), self-equality claims ("I am as good as others"; Experiments 3-4, 6), temporally comparative self-superiority claims ("I am better than I used to be"; Experiment 5), other-superiority claims ("S/he is better than others"; Experiment 6), and self-superiority claims accompanied by persistent disclaimers (Experiment 7). They judged the claim and the claimant (Experiments 1-7) and made inferences about the claimant's self-view and view of others (Experiments 4-7) as well as the claimant's probable view of them (Experiment 7). Self-superiority claims elicited unfavorable evaluations relative to all other claims. Evaluation unfavorability was accounted for by the perception that the claimant implied a negative view of others (Experiments 4-6) and particularly of the observer (Experiment 7). Supporting the hubris hypothesis, participants disliked individuals who communicated self-superiority beliefs in an explicitly comparative manner. Self-superiority beliefs may provoke undesirable interpersonal consequences when they are explicitly communicated to others but not when they are disguised as noncomparative positive self-claims or self-improvement claims.

Does mood really influence comparative optimism? Tracking an elusive effect.

Methodological limitations call into question prior evidence that positive moods are associated with greater comparative optimism. Experiments 1-4 tested if mood affects comparative optimism using a mood manipulation that minimized experimenter demand. While the procedure was successful in inducing mood, we found no evidence for a mood effect on comparative optimism. The absence of a mood effect was not due to participants correcting their judgments in response to a presumed mood bias (Experiments 2, 3 and 4) or to participants proactively regulating their mood (Experiments 3 and 4). Experiment 5 compared the mood manipulation of Experiments 1-4 with an autobiographical recall procedure. Although the two methods were equally effective in inducing mood, only autobiographical recall influenced participants' comparative optimism. Study 6 provides preliminary evidence that experimenter demand may be responsible for the effects of autobiographical recall on comparative judgments.

Comparative optimism in the spontaneous generation of future life-events.

We examined whether comparative optimism characterizes the events people generate when they describe their future. In contrast to previous studies in which participants estimated the likelihoods of experimenter-generated events, our participants freely listed important events they believed were possible in their future versus the average person's future. They also provided desirability ratings, controllability ratings, and likelihood estimates for these self-generated events. Participants listed more desirable and fewer undesirable events in their future than in the average person's future. These differences were stronger for controllable than uncontrollable events. Comparative optimism was also observed in participants' ratings of the likelihood of positive and negative events. Taken together, these findings suggest that a comparative optimism characterizes future expectations about spontaneously generated events as well as the pre-selected events sampled in previous studies.

The effect of category focus at encoding on category frequency estimation strategies.

We investigated whether category focus at encoding affects how people estimate category frequencies. Participants in three experiments viewed items of various categories. They estimated category frequencies after categorizing them into relevant versus irrelevant categories (Experiments 1-2) or after categorizing versus memorizing them (Experiment 3). Verbal protocols (Experiments 2A and 2B), response latencies (Experiments 2A and 2B), frequency estimate changes (Experiment 2B), and the relationships between objective and estimated category frequencies and instance recall (Experiments 1-3) showed that the participants mainly used availability to estimate category frequencies after memorizing instances (Experiment 3) or after categorizing them into irrelevant categories (Experiments 1-2). After categorizing items into relevant categories, the participants relied more often on stored category frequency information (Experiments 1-3).

The "extent of information desired"-scale in psychiatric in-patients: a behavioural approach.

OBJECTIVE: The purpose of this study was to investigate the "extent of information desired" (EID)-scale through a behavioural approach. METHODS: Standardised interviews consisting of the EID-scale and four (half) open questions were conducted in a convenience sample of psychiatric in-patients and information seeking behaviour was measured. At the same time, socially desirable behaviour was assessed by means of Marlowe-Crowne social desirability (MCSD). RESULTS: 39 patients were interviewed. The behavioural approach yielded mixed results, but there was no correlation between EID- and MCSD-scores. DISCUSSION: From the calculated correlations information seeking behaviour is perceived as socially undesirable, whereas EID-scores seem unaffected by social desirability. CONCLUSION: It is difficult to define independent variables which would reflect information seeking behaviour. The ones we used might have been confounded. We found a correlation between the EID-scale used and the information seeking behaviour, without a strong correlation with social desirability. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS: The EID-scale used may predict patients' desire for information within a well-defined clinical context. The step to validation requires more robustness of the research model and a better profiling of patients.

Desire for information about drugs: a survey of the need for information in psychiatric in-patients.

BACKGROUND: Promoting therapy adherence requires understanding various psychosocial parameters, including patients' need for information. Drug information adapted to patients' needs may empower them and increase their confidence in drug therapy. OBJECTIVES: To explore psychiatric in-patients' information preferences and to test the reliability of a Dutch version of the Intrinsic Desire for Information (IDI) scale in psychiatric institutions in Flanders. METHODS: Standardised interviews were conducted with psychiatric patients in 11 hospitals. The interview consisted of the IDI-scale and five open questions. Patient demographics collected were sex, age, number of medicines taken, diagnosis, number of admissions during the past year, marital status, education level and occupation. RESULTS: 279 patient interviews were completed. A factor analysis on the original 12-item scale yielded 3 factors. An abbreviated scale was derived from the first factor (F1). This 6-item scale measured 'extent of information desired:' (EID) and consisted of six items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.73). A second factor (F2) measured 'information provider preference' (IPP) (alpha = 0.56) and a third factor (F3) measured 'inhibited information desire' (IID) (alpha = 0.69). EID was associated with number of medicines taken, duration of hospitalisation and marital status. CONCLUSION: The internal reliability of the EID-factor appears to be reproducible in the specific setting of psychiatric hospitals. It may be useful to help healthcare professionals develop pharmaceutical care towards psychiatric patients. Validation of the scale remains to be completed. Information need in psychiatric in-patients measured by the EID-score was comparable to the need measured in general hospitals during earlier research in England. Targeted information services seem to be desirable to enhance therapy adherence and quality of life in psychiatric patients.