Who am I? Beyond "I think, therefore I am".

Can we ever truly answer the question, "Who am I?" Moderated by Alex Voorhoeve (London School of Economics), neuro-philosopher Elie During (University of Paris, Ouest Nanterre), cognitive scientist David Jopling (York University, Canada), social psychologist Timothy Wilson (University of Virginia), and ethicist Frances Kamm (Harvard University) examine the difficulty of achieving genuine self-knowledge and how the pursuit of self-knowledge plays a role in shaping the self.

Understanding, justifying, and finding oneself.

This essay tries to explain some ways in which we can come to know about ourselves, in particular about what we think. It also tries to distinguish what we are and think from what we ought to be and think.

Is there a problem with enhancement?

This article examines arguments concerning enhancement of human persons recently presented by Michael Sandel (2004). In the first section, I briefly describe some of his arguments. In section two, I consider whether, as Sandel claims, the desire for mastery motivates enhancement and whether such a desire could be grounds for its impermissibility. Section three considers how Sandel draws the distinction between treatment and enhancement, and the relation to nature that he thinks each expresses. The fourth section examines Sandel's views about parent/child relations and also how enhancement would affect distributive justice and the duty to aid. In conclusion, I briefly offer an alternative suggestion as to why enhancement may be troubling and consider what we could safely enhance.

The choice between people: 'common sense' morality, and doctors.

KIE: Kamm is concerned with explaining how "common sense" morality might be used in deciding about the distribution of scarce medical resources. Drawing an analogy between redirection of possible harms or threats and the allocation of health resources, she first explores how an ordinary moral agent, not a physician, might act. Using what Kamm calls the principle of irrelevant utilities (PIU), a moral agent might decide between contestants for a particular good based on "sobjectivism" (Sob), the author's term for a combination of the objective and subjective points of view. Kamm explores decision making using three versions of Sob that weigh interests and rights, equivalences, and aggregation of costs (losses). She concludes that, while ordinary moral agents functioning as social agents may act according to objective aggregated costs, physicians should be concerned with equivalents and individuals when allocating resources.^ieng

Harming, not aiding, and positive rights.

KIE: Kamm considers the implications if the following two theses should prove true: killing and letting die are morally equivalent per se (Thesis E), as are harming and not aiding in cases where less than life is at stake (Thesis GE). She argues that each thesis has two versions, with one having broader implications than the other for deriving new rights or duties. These rights and duties are limited, however, by the need to apply the theses uniformly to cases that are equivalent in all respects. Kamm supports her arguments by exploring the notion of moral equivalence, discussing the methodology of testing for it, and broaching the subject of whether Theses E and GE are, in fact, true.^ieng