Considerations for large building water quality after extended stagnation.

The unprecedented number of building closures related to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic is concerning because water stagnation will occur in many buildings that do not have water management plans in place. Stagnant water can have chemical and microbiological contaminants that pose potential health risks to occupants. Health officials, building owners, utilities, and other entities are rapidly developing guidance to address this issue, but the scope, applicability, and details included in the guidance vary widely. To provide a primer of large building water system preventative and remedial strategies, peer-reviewed, government, industry, and nonprofit literature relevant to water stagnation and decontamination practices for plumbing was synthesized. Preventative practices to help avoid the need for recommissioning (e.g., routine flushing) and specific actions, challenges, and limitations associated with recommissioning were identified and characterized. Considerations for worker and occupant safety were also indicated. The intended audience of this work includes organizations developing guidance.

Residential water heater cleaning and occurrence of Legionella in Flint, MI.

After the Federal emergency in Flint, MI was declared in early 2016 in response to elevated lead-in-water and incidence of Legionnaires' disease, concerns arose that contaminants in residential water heaters could continue to contribute to poor quality tap water. Here, a comprehensive field survey of residential water heaters (n = 30) and associated water quality was conducted and the subsequent effects of an aggressive manual water heater clean-out was determined, including draining the tank and removing sediments via brushing and flushing. Before cleaning, inorganics accumulated in the tank sediments did not serve as a source of metals measured at hot water outlets. After cleaning, hardness- (calcium, magnesium, silica) and corrosion-associated inorganics (lead, iron, copper, aluminum, zinc) decreased by 64% in samples from sediment cleanout drain valves. Culturable L. pneumophila was only detected in 1 home (3.3%) prior to cleaning and 2 homes (6.7%) after cleaning, thus quantitative polymerase chain reaction was used to quantify potential effects on unculturable strains despite the limitation of differentiating live and dead cells. After the cleaning protocol, Legionella spp. and L. pneumophila gene numbers decreased or remained non-detectable in 83% and 98% of samples, respectively. Homes with less than 0.4 mg/L influent free chlorine tended to have quantifiable Legionella spp. gene numbers in water entering the home and had elevated L. pneumophila and Legionella spp. gene numbers throughout the home plumbing. Also, Legionella spp. and L. pneumophila gene numbers were highest for water heaters set at or below ∼42 °C and significantly decreased >51 °C, consistent with Legionella's preferred temperature range. Examination of the only home that had culturable L. pneumophila both before and after the cleaning protocol revealed that the organism was culturable from several sample locations throughout the home, including in water representative of the water main. Notably, the home was located in close proximity to McLaren Hospital, where an outbreak of Legionnaires disease was reported, and the water heater had a setpoint within the Legionella growth range of 44.2 °C. Considering that other factors were more strongly associated with Legionella occurrence and water heater sediment was not detectably mobilizing to tap water, it was concluded that water heater cleaning had some benefits, but was not an overarching factor contributing to possible human health risks.

Point-of-use membrane filtration and hyperchlorination to prevent patient exposure to rapidly growing mycobacteria in the potable water supply of a skilled nursing facility.

BACKGROUND: Healthcare-associated outbreaks and pseudo-outbreaks of rapidly growing mycobacteria (RGM) are frequently associated with contaminated tap water. A pseudo-outbreak of Mycobacterium chelonae-M. abscessus in patients undergoing bronchoscopy was identified by 2 acute care hospitals. RGM was identified in bronchoscopy specimens of 28 patients, 25 of whom resided in the same skilled nursing facility (SNF). An investigation ruled out bronchoscopy procedures, specimen collection, and scope reprocessing at the hospitals as sources of transmission. OBJECTIVE: To identify the reservoir for RGM within the SNF and evaluate 2 water system treatments, hyperchlorination and point-of-use (POU) membrane filters, to reduce RGM. DESIGN: A comparative in situ study of 2 water system treatments to prevent RGM transmission. SETTING: An SNF specializing in care of patients requiring ventilator support. METHODS: RGM and heterotrophic plate count (HPC) bacteria were examined in facility water before and after hyperchlorination and in a subsequent 24-week assessment of filtered water by colony enumeration on Middlebrook and R2A media. RESULTS: Mycobacterium chelonae was consistently isolated from the SNF water supply. Hyperchlorination reduced RGM by 1.5 log(10) initially, but the population returned to original levels within 90 days. Concentration of HPC bacteria also decreased temporarily. RGM were reduced below detection level in filtered water, a 3-log(10) reduction. HPC bacteria were not recovered from newly installed filters, although low quantities were found in water from 2-week-old filters. CONCLUSION: POU membrane filters may be a feasible prevention measure for healthcare facilities to limit exposure of sensitive individuals to RGM in potable water systems.

Restaurant outbreak of Legionnaires' disease associated with a decorative fountain: an environmental and case-control study.

BACKGROUND: From June to November 2005, 18 cases of community-acquired Legionnaires' disease (LD) were reported in Rapid City South Dakota. We conducted epidemiologic and environmental investigations to identify the source of the outbreak. METHODS: We conducted a case-control study that included the first 13 cases and 52 controls randomly selected from emergency department records and matched on underlying illness. We collected information about activities of case-patients and controls during the 14 days before symptom onset. Environmental samples (n = 291) were cultured for Legionella. Clinical and environmental isolates were compared using monoclonal antibody subtyping and sequence based typing (SBT). RESULTS: Case-patients were significantly more likely than controls to have passed through several city areas that contained or were adjacent to areas with cooling towers positive for Legionella. Six of 11 case-patients (matched odds ratio (mOR) 32.7, 95% CI 4.7-infinity) reported eating in Restaurant A versus 0 controls. Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 was isolated from four clinical specimens: 3 were Benidorm type strains and 1 was a Denver type strain. Legionella were identified from several environmental sites including 24 (56%) of 43 cooling towers tested, but only one site, a small decorative fountain in Restaurant A, contained Benidorm, the outbreak strain. Clinical and environmental Benidorm isolates had identical SBT patterns. CONCLUSION: This is the first time that small fountain without obvious aerosol-generating capability has been implicated as the source of a LD outbreak. Removal of the fountain halted transmission.