State by state implementation of Zika virus testing guidance in the United States in 2017 and 2018.

In 2015 and 2016, outbreaks of the Zika virus began occurring in the Americas and the Caribbean. Following the introduction of this new threat, the United States' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued testing guidance for the nation's state public health laboratories. We collected and analyzed testing guidance for all fifty states and the District of Columbia for both 2017 and 2018. In both years, state testing guidance was consistent for men and non-pregnant women, but there was notable variation in guidance for pregnant women. In addition, there were changes between the two years as testing algorithms shifted toward guidance that recommended testing in more limited circumstances. States adopted large, or complete, portions of CDC testing guidance, but were not required to conform completely, 33% of states had identical guidance in 2017 and 49% in 2018. Some of these trends, such as specifying that testing be contingent on travel, or sexual contact with an individual who has recently traveled, to an area where the Zika virus was circulating, presents a potential deficiency in the United States surveillance capacity. Understanding variations in state testing guidance enables public health professionals to better understand ongoing surveillance. This analysis provides insight into the testing practices for the various states across the country. Better understanding of how states approach Zika testing, and how that testing changes over time, will increase the public health community's ability to interpret future Zika case counts.

A Public Health Systems View of Risk Communication About Zika.

OBJECTIVES: The spread of Zika virus throughout Latin America and parts of the United States in 2016 and 2017 presented a challenge to public health communicators. The objective of our study was to describe emergency risk communication practices during the 2016-2017 Zika outbreak to inform future infectious disease communication efforts. METHODS: We conducted semi-structured telephone interviews with 13 public health policy makers and practitioners, 10 public information officers, and 5 vector-control officials from May through August 2017. RESULTS: Within the public health macro-environment, extended outbreak timeframe, government trust, US residence status, and economic insecurity set the backdrop for Zika communication efforts. Limited resources, staffing, and partnerships negatively affected public health structural capacity for communication efforts. Public health communicators and practitioners used a range of processes and practices to engage in education and outreach, including fieldwork, community meetings, and contact with health care providers. Overall, public health agencies' primary goals were to prevent Zika infection, reduce transmission, and prevent adverse birth outcomes. CONCLUSIONS: Lessons learned from this disease response included understanding the macro-environment, developing partnerships across agencies and the community, and valuing diverse message platforms. These lessons can be used to improve communication approaches for health officials at the local, state, and federal levels during future infectious disease outbreaks.

Lessons from the domestic Ebola response: Improving health care system resilience to high consequence infectious diseases.

BACKGROUND: The domestic response to the West Africa Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic from 2014-2016 provides a unique opportunity to distill lessons learned about health sector planning and operations from those individuals directly involved. This research project aimed to identify and integrate these lessons into an actionable checklist that can improve health sector resilience to future high-consequence infectious disease (HCID) events. METHODS: Interviews (N = 73) were completed with individuals involved in the domestic EVD response in 4 cities (Atlanta, Dallas, New York, and Omaha), and included individuals who worked in academia, emergency management, government, health care, law, media, and public health during the response. Interviews were transcribed and analyzed qualitatively. Two focus groups were then conducted to expand on themes identified in the interviews. Using these themes, an evidence-informed checklist was developed and vetted for completeness and feasibility by an expert advisory group. RESULTS: Salient themes identified included health care facility issues-specifically identifying assessment and treatment hospitals, isolation and treatment unit layout, waste management, community relations, patient identification, patient isolation, limitations on treatment, laboratories, and research considerations-and health care workforce issues-specifically psychosocial impact, unit staffing, staff training, and proper personal protective equipment. CONCLUSIONS: The experiences of those involved in the domestic Ebola response provide critical lessons that can help strengthen resilience of health care systems and improve future responses to HCID events.

Federal Funding for Health Security in FY2018.

This article is the latest in an annual series analyzing federal funding for health security programs. It examines proposed funding in the President's Budget Request for FY2018 and provides updated amounts for FY2017 and actual funding for FY2010 through FY2016. The proposed FY2018 budget for health security-related programs represents a significant decrease in funding from prior years and previous administrations. In total, the President's proposed FY2018 budget includes $12.45 billion for health security-related programs, an estimated decrease in funding of $1.25 billion, or 9%, from the estimated $13.71 billion in FY2017 and an 11% decrease from the FY2016 actual funding level of $13.99 billion. Most FY2018 health security funding ($6.67 billion, 54%) would go to programs with multiple-hazard and preparedness goals and missions, representing a 14% decrease in this funding compared to FY2017. Radiological and nuclear security programs would receive 20% ($2.48 billion) of all health security funding, a slight decrease of 2% from the prior year. Biosecurity programs would be funded at $1.53 billion (12% of health security funding) in FY2018, a decrease of 6% compared to FY2017. Chemical security programs would represent 3% ($389.7 million) of all health security funding in FY2018, a 9% decrease from the prior year. Finally, 11% of health security funding ($1.39 billion) would be dedicated to pandemic influenza and emerging infectious diseases programs, the only category of funding to see an increase (3%) above FY2017.