Attachment and Political Personality are Heritable and Distinct Systems, and Both Share Genetics with Interpersonal Trust and Altruism.

The attachment and caregiving domains maintain proximity and care-giving behavior between parents and offspring, in a way that has been argued to shape people's mental models of how relationships work, resulting in secure, anxious or avoidant interpersonal styles in adulthood. Several theorists have suggested that the attachment system is closely connected to orientations and behaviors in social and political domains, which should be grounded in the same set of familial experiences as are the different attachment styles. We use a sample of Norwegian twins (N = 1987) to assess the genetic and environmental relationship between attachment, trust, altruism, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and social dominance orientation (SDO). Results indicate no shared environmental overlap between attachment and ideology, nor even between the attachment styles or between the ideological traits, challenging conventional wisdom in developmental, social, and political psychology. Rather, evidence supports two functionally distinct systems, one for navigating intimate relationships (attachment) and one for navigating social hierarchies (RWA/SDO), with genetic overlap between traits within each system, and two distinct genetic linkages to trust and altruism. This is counter-posed to theoretical perspectives that link attachment, ideology, and interpersonal orientations through early relational experiences.

Loneliness trajectories over three decades are associated with conspiracist worldviews in midlife.

In the age of misinformation, conspiracy theories can have far-reaching consequences for individuals and society. Social and emotional experiences throughout the life course, such as loneliness, may be associated with a tendency to hold conspiracist worldviews. Here, we present results from a population-based sample of Norwegians followed for almost three decades, from adolescence into midlife (N = 2215). We examine participants' life trajectories of loneliness using latent growth curve modeling. We show that people reporting high levels of loneliness in adolescence, and those who experience increasing loneliness over the life course, are more likely to endorse conspiracy worldviews in midlife.

Between victory and peace: Unravelling the paradox of hope in intractable conflicts.

Previous research on group-based hope has predominantly focused on positive intergroup outcomes, such as peace and harmony. In this paper, we demonstrate that hope experienced towards group-centric political outcomes, such as a victory in a conflict and defeating the enemy, can be detrimental to peace. In Study 1, conducted among Israeli Jews, hope for victory over the Palestinians was uniquely associated with more support for extreme war policies, whereas hope for peace generally showed the opposite associations. In Study 2, we replicated these results among Muslim Pakistanis regarding the Pakistan-India dispute. Notably, in both Studies 1 and 2, only hope for victory significantly predicted personal violent extremist intentions. In Study 3, conducted with a representative sample of Israeli Jews, we found three latent profiles of hope: victory hopers, peace hopers, and dual hopers (hoping for both peace and victory). Finally, in preregistered Study 4, we longitudinally investigated how hopes for victory and peace changed from a relatively calm period in 2021 to the Israel-Hamas War of 2023, utilizing a Bivariate Latent Change Score analysis. Increases in hope for victory during the highly intense war explained the increase in support for violence. We discuss implications, limitations, and directions for future research.

The genetic underpinnings of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation explain political attitudes beyond Big Five personality.

OBJECTIVE: Political attitudes are predicted by the key ideological variables of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO), as well as some of the Big Five personality traits. Past research indicates that personality and ideological traits are correlated for genetic reasons. A question that has yet to be tested concerns whether the genetic variation underlying the ideological traits of RWA and SDO has distinct contributions to political attitudes, or if genetic variation in political attitudes is subsumed under the genetic variation underlying standard Big Five personality traits. METHOD: We use data from a sample of 1987 Norwegian twins to assess the genetic and environmental relationships between the Big Five personality traits, RWA, SDO, and their separate contributions to political policy attitudes. RESULTS: RWA and SDO exhibit very high genetic correlation (r = 0.78) with each other and some genetic overlap with the personality traits of openness and agreeableness. Importantly, they share a larger genetic substrate with political attitudes (e.g., deporting an ethnic minority) than do Big Five personality traits, a relationship that persists even when controlling for the genetic foundations underlying personality traits. CONCLUSION: Our results suggest that the genetic foundations of ideological traits and political attitudes are largely non-overlapping with the genetic foundations of Big Five personality traits.

Finding your roots: Do DNA ancestry tests increase racial (in)tolerance?

While it is often assumed that Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) ancestry results illuminate one's true racial or ethnic lineage, the consequence of this inference remains largely unknown. This leaves two conflictual hypotheses largely untested: Do DNA ancestry tests increase racial tolerance or, alternatively, racial intolerance? Two multiwave experiments aimed to test these hypotheses using either real or bogus DNA ancestry results in combination with random assignment and a tightly controlled repeated-measurements experimental design. Bayesian and inferential analyses on both general and student populations of majority-group members in the United States (i.e., White/European Americans) indicated no support for either hypothesis on measures including multiculturalism, essentialism, and outgroup bias, even when moderating factors such as the degree of unexpected ancestry and genetic knowledge were considered. Despite wide societal optimism as well as concern, receiving DNA ancestry results appears not to impact feelings and attitudes about other racial and ethnic groups. Implications for prospective test-takers and education are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The influence of musical parameters and subjective musical ratings on perceptions of culture.

Recent research suggests that music can affect evaluations of other groups and cultures. However, little is known about the objective and subjective musical parameters that influence these evaluations. We aimed to fill this gap through two studies. Study 1 collected responses from 52 American participants who listened to 30 folk-song melodies from different parts of the world. Linear mixed-effects models tested the influence of objective and subjective musical parameters of these melodies on evaluations of the cultures from which they originated. Musical parameters consistently predicted cultural evaluations. The most prominent musical parameter was musical velocity, a measure of number of pitch onsets, predicting more cultural warmth, competence and evolvedness and less cultural threat. Next, with a sample of 212 American participants, Study 2 used a within-subjects experiment to alter the tempo and dissonance for a subset of six melody excerpts from Study 1, testing for causal effects. Linear mixed-effects models revealed that both dissonance and slow tempo predicted more negative cultural evaluations. Together, both studies demonstrate how musical parameters can influence cultural perceptions. Avenues for future research are discussed.

The role of perceived minority-group status in the conspiracy beliefs of factual majority groups.

Research suggests that minority-group members sometimes are more susceptible to misinformation. Two complementary studies examined the influence of perceived minority status on susceptibility to misinformation and conspiracy beliefs. In study 1 (n = 2140), the perception of belonging to a minority group, rather than factually belonging to it, was most consistently related with an increased susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation across national samples from the USA, the UK, Germany and Poland. Specifically, perceiving that one belongs to a gender minority group particularly predicted susceptibility to misinformation when participants factually did not belong to it. In pre-registered study 2 (n = 1823), an experiment aiming to manipulate the minority perceptions of men failed to influence conspiracy beliefs in the predicted direction. However, pre-registered correlational analyses showed that men who view themselves as a gender minority were more prone to gender conspiracy beliefs and exhibited a heightened conspiracy mentality. This effect was correlationally mediated by increased feelings of system identity threat, collective narcissism, group relative deprivation and actively open-minded thinking. Especially, the perception of being a minority in terms of power and influence (as compared to numerically) was linked to these outcomes. We discuss limitations and practical implications for countering misinformation.

Cultural threat perceptions predict violent extremism via need for cognitive closure.

Understanding the psychological processes that drive violent extremism is a pressing global issue. Across six studies, we demonstrate that perceived cultural threats lead to violent extremism because they increase people's need for cognitive closure (NFC). In general population samples (from Denmark, Afghanistan, Pakistan, France, and an international sample) and a sample of former Mujahideen in Afghanistan, single-level and multilevel mediation analyses revealed that NFC mediated the association between perceived cultural threats and violent extremist outcomes. Further, in comparisons between the sample of former Afghan Mujahideen and the general population sample from Afghanistan following the known-group paradigm, the former Mujahideen scored significantly higher on cultural threat, NFC, and violent extremist outcomes. Moreover, the proposed model successfully differentiated former Afghan Mujahideen participants from the general Afghan participants. Next, two preregistered experiments provided causal support for the model. Experimentally manipulating the predictor (cultural threat) in Pakistan led to higher scores on the mediator (NFC) and dependent variables (violent extremist outcomes). Finally, an experiment conducted in France demonstrated the causal effect of the mediator (NFC) on violent extremist outcomes. Two internal meta-analyses using state-of-the-art methods (i.e., meta-analytic structural equation modeling and pooled indirect effects analyses) further demonstrated the robustness of our results across the different extremist outcomes, designs, populations, and settings. Cultural threat perceptions seem to drive violent extremism by eliciting a need for cognitive closure.

Self-esteem trajectories over three decades predict opposition to social equality in midlife.

Although life trajectories are frequently theorized to explain people's attitudes toward different social groups, few studies have been able to directly assess their importance with suitable data. Addressing this gap and focusing on the development of general and domain-specific self-esteem, we report results from a population-based sample of Norwegians (N = 2,215) followed over 28 years and five time points from adolescence to midlife. Growth curve models demonstrated that irrespective of self-esteem domain, low levels of self-esteem in adolescence as well as a depressed self-esteem development over the next three decades were related to more overall opposition to social equality as well as more opposition to gender equality and immigration in midlife. The results held when controlling for participants' baseline political orientations and other key covariates in adolescence. Our findings indicate that low self-esteem and a lack of positive self-esteem development can be detrimental to harmonious intergroup relations in ever-diversifying societies. We discuss how future psychological interventions aimed at enhancing self-esteem may promote support for a more inclusive society.

Resilience against radicalization and extremism in schools: Development of a psychometric scale.

Practitioners, policymakers, and researchers alike have argued that the school environment can be both a risk and resilience factor for radicalization and extremism among youth, but little research has tested this directly. Against this background and using a cultural and community psychological approach, we developed a scale to measure resilience against radicalization and extremism in schools focusing on factors that can strengthen social cohesion. A total of 334 school pupils from mostly urban areas in Norway were recruited for this research, of which 233 passed an attention check and were retained for analyses. Participants completed a larger set of items that were derived from theory and the experiences of practitioners and were intended to measure resilience to radicalization and extremism. Exploratory factor analysis identified three dimensions: (1) the perception that the school treats pupils equally no matter their social backgrounds, (2) the perception of the school and its employees as attentive and proactive in meeting pupils' anger resulting from social and political issues, and (3) the presence of mutual respect. In regression analyses, the equality dimension predicted lower extremist intentions and radicalization as well as four out of five extremism risk factors (i.e., lower anomie, symbolic and realistic threats, and relative deprivation). Mutual respect showed no significant effect, whereas school attentiveness positively predicted three risk factors as well as radicalism intentions and violent intentions, suggesting that such attentiveness may be a response to these issues. In sum, the findings indicate that resilience against extremism in schools may be nurtured especially by creating an egalitarian school environment. Our study provides the first scale assessing such resilience in schools, which can be further tested and developed in future research.

Measuring extremist archetypes: Scale development and validation.

Previous work has often disregarded the psychological heterogeneity of violent extremists. This research aimed to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the psychological diversity of violent extremists. Based on qualitative work, we developed and validated the Extremist Archetypes Scale, identifying five distinct archetype dimensions: "adventurer," "fellow traveler," "leader," "drifter" and "misfit." Study 1 identified five dimensions among White majority members (N = 307), four of which were related to extremist violent intentions and which dissociated in terms of sociopolitical ideologies and intergroup attitudes. Preregistered Study 2 (N = 308) confirmed the scale's five-factor solution in another sample of White majority members, replicated relationships with violent intentions, and demonstrated the dimensions' distinct personality correlates. As in Study 1, the archetype dimensions had positive associations with extremist violent intentions and tapped onto different psychological profiles in terms of major personality traits. Study 3 (N = 317) replicated these results in a sample of Muslim minority members. Measurement equivalence was established across gender, age, political orientation, and ethnicity (majority and minority).

The role of conspiracy beliefs for COVID-19 health responses: A meta-analysis.

While conspiracy theories about COVID-19 are proliferating, their impact on health-related responses during the present pandemic is not yet fully understood. We meta-analyzed correlational and longitudinal evidence from 53 studies (N = 78,625) conducted in 2020 and 2021. Conspiracy beliefs were weakly associated with more reluctance toward prevention measures both cross-sectionally and over time. They explained lower vaccination and social distancing responses but were unrelated to mask wearing and hygiene responses. Conspiracy beliefs showed an increasing association with prevention responses as the pandemic progressed and explained support for alternative treatments lacking scientific bases (e.g., chloroquine treatment, complementary medicine). Despite small and heterogenous effects, at a large scale, conspiracy beliefs are a non-negligible threat to public health.

Knowledge About Individuals' Interracial Friendships Is Systematically Associated With Mental Representations of Race, Traits, and Group Solidarity.

Individuals with other-race friends are perceived to identify less strongly with their racial in-group than are individuals with same-race friends. Using the reverse-correlation technique, we show that this effect goes beyond perceptions of social identification, influencing how people are mentally represented. In four studies with Black and White American participants, we demonstrate a "racial assimilation effect": Participants, independent of their own race, represented both Black and White targets with other-race friends as phenotypically more similar to the respective racial out-group. Representations of targets with racial out-group friends were subsequently rated as more likely to engage in social action supportive of the racial out-group. Out-group targets with other-race friends were represented more favorably than out-group targets with mostly same-race friends. White participants had particularly negative representations of in-group members with mostly Black friends. The present research suggests that individuals' social networks influence how their race and associated traits are mentally represented.

Psychological interventions countering misinformation in social media: A scoping review.

Introduction: The rise of social media users and the explosive growth in misinformation shared across social media platforms have become a serious threat to democratic discourse and public health. The mentioned implications have increased the demand for misinformation detection and intervention. To contribute to this challenge, we are presenting a systematic scoping review of psychological interventions countering misinformation in social media. The review was conducted to (i) identify and map evidence on psychological interventions countering misinformation, (ii) compare the viability of the interventions on social media, and (iii) provide guidelines for the development of effective interventions. Methods: A systematic search in three bibliographic databases (PubMed, Embase, and Scopus) and additional searches in Google Scholar and reference lists were conducted. Results: 3,561 records were identified, 75 of which met the eligibility criteria for the inclusion in the final review. The psychological interventions identified during the review can be classified into three categories distinguished by Kozyreva et al.: Boosting, Technocognition, and Nudging, and then into 15 types within these. Most of the studied interventions were not implemented and tested in a real social media environment but under strictly controlled settings or online crowdsourcing platforms. The presented feasibility assessment of implementation insights expressed qualitatively and with numerical scoring could guide the development of future interventions that can be successfully implemented on social media platforms. Discussion: The review provides the basis for further research on psychological interventions counteracting misinformation. Future research on interventions should aim to combine effective Technocognition and Nudging in the user experience of online services. Systematic review registration: [https://figshare.com/], identifier [https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.14649432.v2].

Revisiting the Integration Hypothesis: Correlational and Longitudinal Meta-Analyses Demonstrate the Limited Role of Acculturation for Cross-Cultural Adaptation.

When moving to a new country or living in that country as ethnic-minority-group members, individuals have to relate to different cultural spheres. Scholars and practitioners commonly agree that how people acculturate influences their psychological and sociocultural adaptation. Integration (or biculturalism), which involves engagement in both one's heritage culture and the dominant mainstream culture, is considered the most beneficial acculturation strategy. But how robust is the evidence for the role of acculturation in adaptation? Here, we present a reanalysis of a previous meta-analysis of mostly correlational studies (k = 83, N = 23,197) and a new meta-analysis of exclusively longitudinal studies (k = 19, N = 6,791). Results show that the correlational link between acculturation and adaptation is much weaker than previously assumed and that longitudinal evidence is minuscule at best. Our findings suggest that empirical support is still lacking for the most basic premises of acculturation theory.

The Nature of Islamophobia: A Test of a Tripartite View in Five Countries.

This article provides an examination of the structure of Islamophobia across cultures. Our novel measure-the Tripartite Islamophobia Scale (TIS)-embeds three theoretically and statistically grounded subcomponents of Islamophobia: anti-Muslim prejudice, anti-Islamic sentiment, and conspiracy beliefs. Across six samples (i.e., India, Poland, Germany, France, and the United States), preregistered analyses corroborated that these three subcomponents are statistically distinct. Measurement invariance analyses indicated full scalar invariance, suggesting that the tripartite understanding of Islamophobia is generalizable across cultural contexts. Furthermore, the subcomponents were partially dissociated in terms of the intergroup emotions they are predicted by as well as the intergroup outcomes they predict (e.g., dehumanization, ethnic persecution). For example, intergroup anger and disgust underpin Islamophobic attitudes, over and above the impact of fear. Finally, our results show that social dominance orientation (SDO) and ingroup identification moderate intergroup emotions and Islamophobia. We address both theoretical implications for the nature of Islamophobia and practical interventions to reduce it.

Blatant dehumanization in the mind's eye: Prevalent even among those who explicitly reject it?

Research suggests that some people, particularly those on the political right, tend to blatantly dehumanize low-status groups. However, these findings have largely relied on self-report measures, which are notoriously subject to social desirability concerns. To better understand just how widely blatant forms of intergroup dehumanization might extend, the present article leverages an unobtrusive, data-driven perceptual task to examine how U.S. respondents mentally represent "Americans" versus "Arabs" (a low-status group in the United States that is often explicitly targeted with blatant dehumanization). Data from 2 reverse-correlation experiments (original N = 108; preregistered replication N = 336) and 7 rating studies (N = 2,301) suggest that U.S. respondents' mental representations of Arabs are significantly more dehumanizing than their representations of Americans. Furthermore, analyses indicate that this phenomenon is not reducible to a general tendency for our sample to mentally represent Arabs more negatively than Americans. Finally, these findings reveal that blatantly dehumanizing representations of Arabs can be just as prevalent among individuals exhibiting low levels of explicit dehumanization (e.g., liberals) as among individuals exhibiting high levels of explicit dehumanization (e.g., conservatives)-a phenomenon into which exploratory analyses suggest liberals may have only limited awareness. Taken together, these results suggest that blatant dehumanization may be more widespread than previously recognized and that it can persist even in the minds of those who explicitly reject it. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

How Political and Social Trust Can Impact Social Distancing Practices During COVID-19 in Unexpected Ways.

In times of the coronavirus, complying with public health policies is essential to save lives. Understanding the factors that influence compliance with social distancing measures is therefore an urgent issue. The present research investigated the role of political and social trust for social distancing using a variety of methods. In Study 1 (N = 301), conducted with a sample from the United Kingdom in the midst of the virus outbreak (i.e., the first wave), neither political nor social trust had main associations with self-reported social distancing tendencies. However, both factors interacted such that social trust was associated with lower social distancing tendencies among participants with low levels of political trust. In Study 2, using an experimental longitudinal design and again conducted with a sample collected from the UK (N = 268) during the first wave of the pandemic, social distancing practices increased over time, independent of an experimental manipulation of political trust. Moreover, while the interaction between political and social trust from the first study could not be conceptually replicated, social trust was positively related to social distancing intentions. Moving from the individual to the country level and assessing actual behavior at both the first and second wave of the pandemic, in Study 3 (N = 65 countries), country-level political trust was related to less social distancing during the first wave. Social trust was related to a higher growth rate of infections. Against the background of these inconsistent findings, we discuss the potential positive and unexpected negative effects of social trust for social distancing.

Belief in COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories Reduces Social Distancing over Time.

BACKGROUND: Conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19 are widespread and have even been propagated by highly ranked state officials and politicians in the US. Health authorities have cautioned that such theories, although not questioning the existence of the pandemic, may increase the spread of the virus by reducing people's efforts to socially distance. METHODS: We test this proposition empirically using longitudinal survey data collected at five timepoints during the early outbreak of the virus in the US (N = 403). RESULTS: Multivariate growth curve analyses showed that, although conspiracy beliefs decreased and social distancing increased over time, people holding more conspiracy beliefs at the beginning of the pandemic showed the lowest increase in social distancing. Moreover, cross-lagged analyses demonstrated that people who reported more conspiracy beliefs at any wave tended to report less social distancing at the following wave. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings show that COVID-19 conspiracy theories pose a significant threat to public health as they may reduce adherence to social distancing measures.

Understanding violent extremism in the 21st century: the (re)emerging role of relative deprivation.

Recently, the world has experienced a wave of violent protest, and in particular Islamist and right-wing extremism have become increasing challenges for many societies. We argue that especially the experience of relative deprivation, that is the perception that oneself or one's group is undeservingly worse off than others, can explain various, contemporary forms of violent extremism, including (a) low-power groups' violent attempts to challenge the unequal status quo, (b) high-power groups' violent defense of their privileged position, and sometimes even (c) people's violent attempt to help out-groups in need. In light of recent research and growing social inequalities, we expect relative deprivation to be a key factor driving violent extremism across cultures and contexts in the 21st century.