Forming Evaluations of Moral Character: How Are Multiple Pieces of Information Prioritized and Integrated?

Evaluating other people's moral character is a crucial social cognitive task. However, the cognitive processes by which people seek out, prioritize, and integrate multiple pieces of character-relevant information have not been studied empirically. The first aim of this research was to examine which character traits are considered most important when forming an impression of a person's overall moral character. The second aim was to understand how differing levels of trait expression affect overall character judgments. Four preregistered studies and one supplemental study (total N = 720), using five different measures of importance and sampling undergraduates, online workers, and community members, found that our participants placed the most importance on the traits honest, helpful, compassionate, loyal, and responsible. Also, when integrating the information that they have learned, our participants seemed to engage in a simple averaging process in which all available, relevant information is combined in a linear fashion to form an overall evaluation of moral character. This research provides new insights into the cognitive processes by which evaluations of moral character are formed.

On being honest about dishonesty: The social costs of taking nuanced (but realistic) moral stances.

Despite the well-documented costs of word-deed misalignment, hypocrisy permeates our personal, professional, and political lives. Why? We explore one potential explanation: the costs of moral flexibility can outweigh the costs of hypocrisy, making hypocritical moral absolutism a preferred social strategy to admissions of moral nuance. We study this phenomenon in the context of honesty. Across six studies (total N = 3545), we find that communicators who take flexible honesty stances ("It is sometimes okay to lie") that align with their behavior are penalized more than hypocritical communicators who take absolute honesty stances ("It is never okay to lie") that they fail to uphold. Although few people take absolute stances against deception themselves, they are more trusting of communicators who take absolute honesty stances, relative to flexible honesty stances, because they perceive absolute stances as reliable signals of communicators' likelihood of engaging in future honesty, regardless of inconsistent behavior. Importantly, communicators-including U.S. government officials-also anticipate the costs of flexibility. This research deepens our understanding of the psychology of honesty and helps explain the persistence of hypocrisy in our social world. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Disgusting Democrats and Repulsive Republicans: Members of Political Outgroups Are Considered Physically Gross.

The status of disgust as a sociomoral emotion is debated. We conducted a stringent test of whether social stimuli (specifically, political outgroup members) can elicit physical disgust, as distinct from moral or metaphorical disgust. We employed stimuli (male faces) matched on baseline disgustingness, provided other ways for participants to express negativity toward outgroup members, and used concrete self-report measures of disgust, as well as a nonverbal measure (participants' facial expressions). Across three preregistered studies (total N = 915), we found that political outgroup members are judged to be "disgusting," although this effect is generally weaker for concrete self-report measures and absent for the nonverbal measure. This suggests that social stimuli are capable of eliciting genuine physical disgust, although it is not always outwardly expressed, and the strength of this result depends on the measures employed. We discuss implications of these results for research on sociomoral emotions and American politics.

Typologies of stress appraisal and problem-focused coping: associations with compliance with public health recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic.

BACKGROUND: Given prior research finding that young adults are less likely to engage in recommended public health behaviors (PHBs) than older adults, understanding who is and is not likely to engage in PHBs among young adults is crucial to mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on the Transactional Theory of Stress and Coping, this study examined how typologies of stress appraisal (SA) and problem-focused coping (PFC) among young adults were associated with compliance with public health recommendations during the pandemic. METHODS: An online sample of young adults in the United States, ages 18-35, was recruited during the early phase of the pandemic (April-May 2020). Participants reported their appraisals of how central, threatening, and uncontrollable the pandemic was, their tendencies to engage in instrumental, problem-focused coping strategies, and how frequently they engaged in three recommended PHBs (social distancing, mask wearing, and hand washing). RESULTS: Using latent class analysis, we identified three classes of individuals: Low-SA/Low-PFC, Low-SA/High-PFC, and High-SA/High-PFC. Demographics did not efficiently distinguish membership in the three classes. The former two classes reported less compliance with public health recommendations than did the latter class. Tests of measurement invariance for gender indicated trivial differences in the composition of class membership and relations to compliance. CONCLUSIONS: This research uncovered three qualitatively distinct classes of people who differed in their appraisal of the pandemic and their tendency to engage in PFC. Individuals who view the pandemic as central and threatening and engage in problem-focused coping were more likely than their peers to comply with guidelines recommending social distancing, mask wearing, and hand washing. These results contribute to our understanding of why people do and do not comply with public health guidelines and highlight the importance of attending to psychological variables in public health research. Understanding what drives poor compliance with public health recommendations can contribute to efforts promoting better compliance, and ultimately better health outcomes.

Typologies of coping in young adults in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic has created major upheavals in the lives of people worldwide. The virus has mostly affected elderly populations, but there may be corollary effects on young adults' psychosocial adjustment due to educational, economic, and occupational disruptions. Using latent class analysis, we examined unique typologies of coping in response to the pandemic among young adults. We used an expanded set of indicators including traditional measures of problem- and emotion-focused coping as well as measures of resilience and coping flexibility. We also examined whether class membership could be predicted by demographics, stress appraisal, and psychosocial characteristics including catastrophic thinking and impulsivity. The sample of 1,391 young adults (ages 18-35) was recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and snowball methods from late-April to early-May 2020. Six classes were identified: (1) Resilient Flexible Problem-Focused Copers, (2) Resilient Inflexible Problem-Focused Copers, (3) Non-Resilient Flexible Problem-Focused Venters, (4) Non-Resilient Flexible Problem-Focused Copers, (5) Non-Resilient Flexible Non-Copers, and (6) Non-Resilient Inflexible Non-Copers. Using Class 1 as the reference class, we found perceived centrality and uncontrollability of the pandemic as well as catastrophic thinking and impulsivity were significant predictors of class membership. The mean levels of stress appraisal and psychosocial characteristics varied significantly between the classes, reinforcing the structural validity of these classes. The findings suggest the importance of training young adults to develop resilience and flexibility as well as specific coping skills that can help offset the psychological effects of dramatic lifestyle changes that may result from pandemics or other health crises in the future.

Crowdsourcing hypothesis tests: Making transparent how design choices shape research results.

To what extent are research results influenced by subjective decisions that scientists make as they design studies? Fifteen research teams independently designed studies to answer five original research questions related to moral judgments, negotiations, and implicit cognition. Participants from 2 separate large samples (total N > 15,000) were then randomly assigned to complete 1 version of each study. Effect sizes varied dramatically across different sets of materials designed to test the same hypothesis: Materials from different teams rendered statistically significant effects in opposite directions for 4 of 5 hypotheses, with the narrowest range in estimates being d = -0.37 to + 0.26. Meta-analysis and a Bayesian perspective on the results revealed overall support for 2 hypotheses and a lack of support for 3 hypotheses. Overall, practically none of the variability in effect sizes was attributable to the skill of the research team in designing materials, whereas considerable variability was attributable to the hypothesis being tested. In a forecasting survey, predictions of other scientists were significantly correlated with study results, both across and within hypotheses. Crowdsourced testing of research hypotheses helps reveal the true consistency of empirical support for a scientific claim. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Folk beliefs about the relationships anger and disgust have with moral disapproval.

Theories that view emotions as being related in some way to moral judgments suggest that condemning moral emotions should, at a minimum, be understood by laypeople to coincide with judgments of moral disapproval. Seven studies (total N = 826) tested the extent to which anger and disgust align with this criterion. We observed that while anger is understood to be strongly related to moral disapproval of people's actions and character, disgust is not (Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 3), and that, in contexts where disgust expressions are thought to coincide somewhat with moral disapproval, part of the reason is that the expression is perceived as anger (Study 4). Expressions of sadness are also construed as communicating anger in such contexts (Study 5). We discuss our findings in terms of rethinking how we should consider disgust as a moral emotion.

Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough.

May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

An empirically-derived taxonomy of moral concepts.

We propose that methods from the study of category-based induction can be used to test the descriptive accuracy of theories of moral judgment. We had participants rate the likelihood that a person would engage in a variety of actions, given information about a previous behavior. From these likelihood ratings, we extracted a hierarchical, taxonomic model of how moral violations relate to each other (Study 1). We then tested the descriptive adequacy of this model against an alternative model inspired by Moral Foundations Theory, using classic tasks from induction research (Studies 2a and 2b), and using a measure of confirmation, which accounts for the baseline frequency of these violations (Study 3). Lastly, we conducted focused tests of combinations of violations where the models make differing predictions (Study 4). This research provides new insight into how people represent moral concepts, connecting classic methods from cognitive science with contemporary themes in moral psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Show Me the Money: A Systematic Exploration of Manipulations, Moderators, and Mechanisms of Priming Effects.

A major challenge for accumulating knowledge in psychology is the variation in methods and participant populations across studies in a single domain. We offer a systematic approach to addressing this challenge and implement it in the domain of money priming. In three preregistered experiments ( N = 4,649), participants were exposed to one of a number of money manipulations before completing self-report measures of money activation (Study 1); engaging in a behavioral-persistence task (Study 3); completing self-report measures of subjective wealth, self-sufficiency, and communion-agency (Studies 1-3); and completing demographic questions (Studies 1-3). Four of the five manipulations we tested activated the concept of money, but, contrary to what we expected based on the preponderance of the published literature, no manipulation consistently affected any dependent measure. Moderation by sociodemographic characteristics was sparse and inconsistent across studies. We discuss implications for theories of money priming and explain how our approach can complement recent efforts to build a reproducible, cumulative psychological science.

What's wrong with using steroids? Exploring whether and why people oppose the use of performance enhancing drugs.

The use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) elicits widespread normative opposition, yet little research has investigated what underlies these judgments. We examine this question comprehensively, across 13 studies. We first test the hypothesis that opposition to PED use cannot be fully accounted for by considerations of fairness. We then test the influence of 10 other potential drivers of opposition in an exploratory manner. We find that health risks for the user and rules and laws prohibiting use of anabolic steroids reliably affect normative judgments. Next, we test whether these patterns generalize to a different PED-cognitive-enhancement drugs. Finally, we sketch a framework for understanding these results, borrowing from Social Domain Theory (e.g., Turiel, 1983). We argue that PED use exemplifies a class of violations with properties of moral, conventional, and prudential offenses. This research sheds light on a widespread, but understudied, normative judgment, and illustrates the utility of exploratory methods. (PsycINFO Database Record

When It's Bad to Be Friendly and Smart: The Desirability of Sociability and Competence Depends on Morality.

Morality, sociability, and competence are distinct dimensions in person perception. We argue that a person's morality informs us about their likely intentions, whereas their competence and sociability inform us about the likelihood that they will fulfill those intentions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that whereas morality would be considered unconditionally positive, sociability and competence would be highly positive only in moral others, and would be less positive in immoral others. Using exploratory factor analyses, Studies 1a and 1b distinguished evaluations of morality and sociability. Studies 2 to 5 then showed that sociability and competence are evaluated positively contingent on morality-Study 2 demonstrated this phenomenon, while the remaining studies explained it (Study 3), generalized it (Studies 3-5), and ruled out an alternative explanation for it (Study 5). Study 6 showed that the positivity of morality traits is independent of other morality traits. These results support a functionalist account of these dimensions of person perception.

Does Incidental Disgust Amplify Moral Judgment? A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Evidence.

The role of emotion in moral judgment is currently a topic of much debate in moral psychology. One specific claim made by many researchers is that irrelevant feelings of disgust can amplify the severity of moral condemnation. Numerous researchers have found this effect, but there have also been several published failures to replicate it. Clarifying this issue would inform important theoretical debates among rival accounts of moral judgment. We meta-analyzed all available studies--published and unpublished--in which incidental disgust was manipulated prior to or concurrent with a moral judgment task (k = 50). We found evidence for a small amplification effect of disgust (d = 0.11), which is strongest for gustatory/olfactory modes of disgust induction. However, there is also some suggestion of publication bias in this literature, and when this is accounted for, the effect disappears entirely (d = -0.01). Moreover, prevalent confounds mean that the effect size that we estimate is best interpreted as an upper bound on the size of the amplification effect. On the basis of the results of this meta-analysis, we argue against strong claims about the causal role of affect in moral judgment and suggest a need for new, more rigorous research on this topic.

Are thoughtful people more utilitarian? CRT as a unique predictor of moral minimalism in the dilemmatic context.

Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow, deliberative thinking with the utilitarian disposition and fast, automatic thinking with the deontological disposition. However, evidence for the reflective utilitarian hypothesis-the hypothesized link between utilitarian judgment and individual differences in the capacity for rational reflection (gauged here by the Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT; Frederick, 2005]) has been inconsistent and difficult to interpret in light of several design flaws. In two studies aimed at addressing some of the flaws, we found robust evidence for a reflective minimalist hypothesis-high CRT performers' tendency to regard utility-optimizing acts as largely a matter of personal prerogative, permissible both to perform and to leave undone. This relationship between CRT and the "minimalist" orientation remained intact after controlling for age, sex, trait affect, social desirability, and educational attainment. No significant association was found between CRT and the strict utilitarian response pattern or CRT and the strict deontological response pattern, nor did we find any significant association between CRT and willingness to act in the utility-optimizing manner. However, we found an inverse association between empathic concern and a willingness to act in the utility-optimizing manner, but there was no comparable association between empathic concern and the deontological judgment pattern. Theoretical, methodological, and normative implications of the findings are discussed.

CAD or MAD? Anger (not disgust) as the predominant response to pathogen-free violations of the divinity code.

The CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) stipulates that, cross-culturally, people feel anger for violations of autonomy, contempt for violations of community, and disgust for violations of divinity. Although the disgust-divinity link has received some measure of empirical support, the results have been difficult to interpret in light of several conceptual and design flaws. Taking a revised methodological approach, including use of newly validated (Study 1), pathogen-free violations of the divinity code, we found (Study 2) little evidence of disgust-related phenomenology (nausea, gagging, loss of appetite) or action tendency (desire to move away), but much evidence of anger-linked desire to retaliate, as a major component of individuals' projected response to "pure" (pathogen-free) violations of the divinity code. Study 3 replicated these results using faces in lieu of words as a dependent measure. Concordant findings emerged from an archival study (Study 4) examining the aftermath of a real-life sacred violation-the burning of Korans by U.S. military personnel. Study 5 further corroborated these results using continuous measures based on everyday emotion terms and new variants of the divinity-pure scenarios featuring sacrilegious acts committed by a theologically irreverent member of one's own group rather than an ideologically opposed member of another group. Finally, a supplemental study found the anger-dominant attribution pattern to remain intact when the impious act being judged was the judge's own. Based on these and related results, we posit anger to be the principal emotional response to moral transgressions irrespective of the normative content involved.

Cruel nature: Harmfulness as an important, overlooked dimension in judgments of moral standing.

Entities that possess moral standing can be wronged and deserve our moral consideration. Past perspectives on the folk psychology of moral standing have focused exclusively on the role of "patiency" (the capacity to experience pain or pleasure) and "agency" (usually defined and operationalized in terms of intelligence or cognitive ability). We contend that harmfulness (i.e., having a harmful vs. benevolent disposition) is an equally if not more important determinant of moral standing. We provide support for this hypothesis across four studies using non-human animals as targets. We show that the effect of harmfulness on attributions of moral standing is independent from patiency and intelligence (Studies 1-2), that this effect pertains specifically to an animal's harmful disposition rather than its capacity to act upon this disposition (Study 3), and that it primarily reflects a parochial concern for human welfare in particular (Study 4). Our findings highlight an important, overlooked dimension in the psychology of moral standing that has implications for real-world decisions that affect non-human animals. Our findings also help clarify the conditions under which people perceive patiency and agency as related versus truly independent dimensions.

Valuing different human lives.

Do people think of the value of all human lives as equivalent irrespective of age? Affirmations of the equal value of all human lives are culturally prominent, yet much evidence points to the fact that the young are often prioritized over the old in life-and-death decision-making contexts. Studies 1-3 aimed to reconcile this tension by showing that although individuals are seen as more equal with respect to negative rights not to be harmed or killed (though not completely equal), they are seen as less equal with respect to positive rights to be aided or saved. Age exerts a large and systematic impact on decisions about who to save and about whose death is more tragic, suggesting that individuals are seen as possessing differing amounts of contingent value. These initial studies also yielded the novel finding that, although children are prioritized over adults, older children are often prioritized over younger children. Study 4 replicated this finding with a think-aloud methodology; the study showed that the preference for older children appears to be driven by their having had more invested in their lives, their better developed social relations, and their greater understanding of death. Studies 5a-5c demonstrated the independent causal effects of each of these variables on judgments of life's value. Finally, in Studies 6 and 7, mediation methods were used to show that older children's more meaningful social relations primarily explain the greater value of older than of younger children. These findings have implications for bioethics and medical policy.