Wrong-side thoracentesis: lessons learned from root cause analysis.

IMPORTANCE: Despite the recognized value of the Joint Commission's Universal Protocol and the implementation of time-outs, incorrect surgical procedures are still among the most common types of sentinel events and can have fatal consequences. OBJECTIVES: To examine a root cause analysis database for reported wrong-side thoracenteses and to determine the contributing factors associated with their occurrence. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: We searched the National Center for Patient Safety database for wrong-side thoracenteses performed in ambulatory clinics and hospital units other than the operating room reported from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2011. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Data extracted included patient factors, clinical features, team structure and function, adherence to bottom-line patient safety measures, complications, and outcomes. RESULTS: Fourteen cases of wrong-side thoracenteses are identified. Contributing factors included failure to perform a time-out (n=12), missing indication of laterality on the patient's consent form (n=10), absence of a site mark on the patient's skin within the sterile field (n=12), and absent verification of medical images (n=7). Complications included pneumothoraces (n=4), hemorrhage (n=3), and death directly attributable to the wrong-side thoracentesis (n=2). Teamwork and communication failure, unawareness of existing policy, and a deficit in training and education were the most common root causes of wrong-side thoracentesis. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: Prevention of wrong-site procedures and accompanying patient harm outside the operating room requires adherence to the Universal Protocol and time-outs, effective teamwork, training and education, mentoring, and patient assessment for early detection of complications. The time-outs provide protected time and place for error detection and recovery.

John M. Eisenberg Patient Safety Awards. System innovation: Veterans Health Administration National Center for Patient Safety.

BACKGROUND: In 1998 the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) created the National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) to lead the effort to reduce adverse events and close calls systemwide. NCPS's aim is to foster a culture of safety in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) by developing and providing patient safety programs and delivering standardized tools, methods, and initiatives to the 163 VA facilities. A NOVEL APPROACH: To create a system-oriented approach to patient safety, NCPS looked for models in fields such as aviation, nuclear power, human factors, and safety engineering. Core concepts included a non-punitive approach to patient safety activities that emphasizes systems-based learning, the active seeking out of close calls, which are viewed as opportunities for learning and investigation, and the use of interdisciplinary teams to investigate close calls and adverse events through a root cause analysis (RCA) process. Participation by VA facilities and networks was voluntary. NCPS has always aimed to develop a program that would be applicable both within the VA and beyond. KEY ACTION ITEMS AND RESULTS RELATED TO RCA: NCPS's full patient safety program was tested and implemented throughout the VA system from November 1999 to August 2000. Program components included an RCA system for use by caregivers at the front line, a system for the aggregate review of RCA results, information systems software, alerts and advisories, and cognitive acids. Following program implementation, NCPS saw a 900-fold increase in reporting of close calls of high-priority events, reflecting the level of commitment to the program by VHA leaders and staff.

The Veterans Affairs root cause analysis system in action.

BACKGROUND: The patient safety program in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began in 1998, when the National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) was established to lead the effort on a day-to-day basis. NCPS provides the structure, training, and tools, and VA facilities provide front-line expertise, feedback about the process, and root cause analysis (RCA) of adverse events and close calls. MONITORING THE PROCESS: Facility patient safety managers determine the disposition of adverse events and close calls occurring at their facilities. They use a safety assessment code (SAC) to prioritize the actual and potential severity and frequency of an event. BEFORE-AND-AFTER STUDY: Before the new RCA system was implemented in 2000, the VA used another adverse event reporting system, focused review (FR). A comparison of the two processes indicates that the RCA process has shifted analyses of adverse events toward a human factors engineering approach-entailing a search for system vulnerabilities rather than human errors and other less actionable root causes. CASE EXAMPLES: Two case examples--on hazards in the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) room and on a cardiac pacemaker malfunction--illustrate how the RCA system works in actual operation. The cases illustrate that broadly applicable, high-impact actions can result from a thorough RCA process. DISCUSSION: NCPS monitors the quality and completeness of RCAs through the immediate review and feedback process. Still to be investigated is the effectiveness of RCA actions addressing the hypothesized root causes and contributing factors of the close calls and adverse events.