The effectiveness of pay-for-performance contracts with non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan - results of a controlled interrupted time series analysis.

BACKGROUND: In many contexts, including fragile settings like Afghanistan, the coverage of basic health services is low. To address these challenges there has been considerable interest in working with NGOs and examining the effect of financial incentives on service providers. The Government of Afghanistan has used contracting with NGOs for more than 15 years and in 2019 introduced pay-for-performance (P4P) into the contracts. This study examines the impact of P4P on health service delivery in Afghanistan. METHODS: We conducted an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis with a non-randomized comparison group that employed segmented regression models and used independently verified health management information system (HMIS) data from 2015 to 2021. We compared 31 provinces with P4P contracts to 3 provinces where the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) continued to deliver services without P4P. We used data from annual health facility surveys to assess the quality of care. FINDINGS: Independent verification of the HMIS data found that consistency and accuracy was greater than 90% in the contracted provinces. The introduction of P4P increased the 10 P4P-compensated service delivery outcomes by a median of 22.1 percentage points (range 10.2 to 43.8) for the two-arm analysis and 19.9 percentage points (range: - 8.3 to 56.1) for the one-arm analysis. There was a small decrease in quality of care initially, but it was short-lived. We found few other unintended consequences. INTERPRETATION: P4P contracts with NGOs led to a substantial improvement in service delivery at lower cost despite a very difficult security situation. The promising results from this large-scale experience warrant more extensive application of P4P contracts in other fragile settings or wherever coverage remains low.

Decentralized facility financing versus performance-based payments in primary health care: a large-scale randomized controlled trial in Nigeria.

BACKGROUND: Health system financing presents a challenge in many developing countries. We assessed two reform packages, performance-based financing (PBF) and direct facility financing (DFF), against each other and business-as-usual for maternal and child healthcare (MCH) provision in Nigeria. METHODS: We sampled 571 facilities (269 in PBF; 302 in DFF) in 52 districts randomly assigned to PBF or DFF, and 215 facilities in 25 observable-matched control districts. PBF facilities received $2 ($1 for operating grants plus $1 for bonuses) for every $1 received by DFF facilities (operating grants alone). Both received autonomy, supervision, and enhanced community engagement, isolating the impact of additional performance-linked facility and health worker payments. Facilities and households with recent pregnancies in facility catchments were surveyed at baseline (2014) and endline (2017). Outcomes were Penta3 immunization, institutional deliveries, modern contraceptive prevalence rate (mCPR), four-plus antenatal care (ANC) visits, insecticide-treated mosquito net (ITN) use by under-fives, and directly observed quality of care (QOC). We estimated difference-in-differences with state fixed effects and clustered standard errors. RESULTS: PBF increased institutional deliveries by 10% points over DFF and 7% over business-as-usual (p<0.01). PBF and DFF were more effective than business-as-usual for Penta3 (p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively); PBF also for mCPR (p<0.05). Twenty-one of 26 QOC indicators improved in both PBF and DFF relative to business-as-usual (p<0.05). However, except for deliveries, PBF was as or less effective than DFF: Penta3 immunization and ITN use were each 6% less than DFF (p<0.1 for both) and QOC gains were also comparable. Utilization gains come from the middle of the rural wealth distribution (p<0.05). CONCLUSIONS: Our findings show that both PBF and DFF represent significant improvements over business-as-usual for service provision and quality of care. However, except for institutional delivery, PBF and DFF do not differ from each other despite PBF disbursing $2 for every dollar disbursed by DFF. These findings highlight the importance of direct facility financing and decentralization in improving PHC and suggest potential complementarities between the two approaches in strengthening MCH service delivery. TRIAL REGISTRATION: ClinicalTrials.gov NCT03890653 ; May 8, 2017. Retrospectively registered.

Improving health service delivery in conflict-affected settings: Lessons from a nationwide strategic purchasing mechanism in Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND: Due to ongoing insecurity, the government of Afghanistan delivers health care to the country's population by contracting out service delivery to non-governmental organization service providers (SPs). In 2018, major changes to SP contracts were introduced, resulting in a new pay-for-performance service delivery model. This model, called "Sehatmandi", pays SPs based on the volume of 11 key services they provide. METHODS: A narrative review of Sehatmandi's key features is presented, as well as lessons learned during implementation. Counterfactual comparisons of service delivery data for 10 payment-related service indicators are made. The first comparison is between the rate of change in the volume of services delivered from 2018 to 2019 (ie, the first year of Sehatmandi implementation) relative to the rate change from 2017 to 2018 (ie, prior to the program). The second comparison is between the rate of change in the volume of services delivered in provinces under the pay-for-performance mechanism relative to provinces which were not financed using pay-for-performance. Time trends in non-payment service indicators and service quality are also examined. RESULTS: The increase in service volume in Sehatmandi provinces from 2018 to 2019 was higher than the increase from 2017 to 2018 for 8 out of 10 indicators. The median increase in the rate of change was 10 percentage points. Similar results were obtained when comparing pay-for-performance provinces to those not financed using pay-for-performance. Improvements were also observed for services that were not directly compensated by the pay-for-performance approach. Payment for service volume was not associated with reduced service quality. The narrative review suggests that the pay-for-performance system has stimulated more effective oversight of SPs by the government of Afghanistan and has incentivized innovative service delivery strategies by SPs. Sehatmandi may benefit from re-structuring its financial incentives to stimulate improved service quality and accelerate delivery of lagging services. CONCLUSIONS: The available evidence - though subject to some limitations - suggests that the introduction of a pay-for-performance system was associated with an expanded volume of service delivery in Afghanistan. This approach may be beneficial in other conflict-affected countries.

Aid effectiveness in rebuilding the Afghan health system: a reflection.

The Paris Declaration defined five components of aid effectiveness: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. Afghanistan, which has received a high level of donor aid for health since 2002, has seen significant improvements in health indicators, expanded access to health services and an increased range of services. Do the impressive health outcomes in this fragile state mean that aid has been effectively utilised? The factors that contributed to the success of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH)-donor partnership include as follows: Ownership: a realistic role for the MOPH as the steward of the health sector that was clearly articulated to all stakeholders; Donor alignment: donor coordination and collaboration initiated by the MOPH; Joint decisions: participatory decision-making by the MOPH and donors, such as the major decision to use contracts with nongovernmental organisations for health service delivery; Managing for results: basing programmes on available evidence, supplementing that evidence where possible and performance monitoring of health-sector activities using multiple data sources; Reliable aid flows: the availability of sufficient donor funding for more than 10 years for MOPH priorities, such as the Basic Package of Health Services, and other programmes that boosted system development and capacity building; Human factors: these include a critical mass of individuals with the right experience and expertise being deployed at the right time and able to look beyond agency mandates and priorities to support sector reform and results. These factors, which made aid to Afghanistan effective, can be applied in other countries.

Contracting urban primary healthcare services in Bangladesh - effect on use, efficiency, equity and quality of care.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate a large, ongoing effort to improve urban primary health care (PHC) in Bangladesh through expansion of publicly funded urban health facilities and contracting with partner non-governmental organisations (NGOs). METHODS: A part of Chittagong was assigned to a contracted NGO while the other parts of the city were contracted to the local government. Performance was assessed by baseline and follow-on household surveys, an endline health facility survey and routinely collected data. RESULTS: The results of a health facility survey indicated that overall quality of care was better in the NGO area, and routinely collected data showed that the NGO provided many more services per capita. Based on household survey data, the NGO area of Chittagong was poorer and had lower coverage at baseline. There were significant improvements in both government and NGO-run areas. However, larger improvements were observed on some coverage indicators in the NGO area compared to the government area. Improvements in coverage among the poorest 50% of the population were greater in the NGO-run area. The cost per service delivered was 47% lower in the NGO area. CONCLUSIONS: Investments in urban PHC led to an improvement in the coverage of basic services. Contracting with an NGO had an additional effect in terms of improving coverage, equity, quality of care and efficiency. Increased investments in PHC facilities and contracting with NGOs may be effective in improving urban health services.

Contracting-in management to strengthen publicly financed primary health services--the experience of Punjab, Pakistan.

OBJECTIVES: In response to low utilization of primary health services in rural areas, the Government of Punjab contracted with a local non-governmental organization (NGO) to manage the basic health units in one district. METHODS: To evaluate the performance of the contractor, health facility surveys, household surveys, and routinely collected information were used to compare the experimental district (Rahim Yar Khan, RYK) with a contiguous and equally poor district (Bahawalpur, BWP). RESULTS: The evaluation found that contracting led to more than a 50% increase in out-patient visits in RYK compared to BWP. There was also increased satisfaction of the community with health services. Technical quality of care was equally poor in both districts and contracting also had little effect on the coverage of preventive services. The latter was likely the result of the NGO not being given managerial responsibility over vaccinators and other community health workers. CONCLUSIONS: Despite methodological limitations, this study found that contracting in management achieved important goals at the same cost to the Government, implying a large increase in efficiency. Contracting in management worked reasonably well in this context and has now been significantly expanded. The approach provides a plausible means for large-scale improvements of poorly performing primary health care systems.

Will more inputs improve the delivery of health services? Analysis of district vaccination coverage in Pakistan.

In order to determine whether physical resources or technical inputs can make a difference to the delivery of health services, we carried out a study that examined the large variation in district level vaccination coverage in Pakistan. Vaccination coverage was assessed by district-wise cluster surveys and the predictor variables were collected from census data and from a survey of 99 district health offices. Information was collected on basic supplies, physical infrastructure, management, training, socio-economic variables, and a variety of other indicators. Univariate and multivariate analyses were carried out. A model including female literacy rate, TV ownership, and provincial dummies explained 48% of the variation in DTP3 coverage. Very few of the other variables examined were significantly correlated to coverage. Possible explanatory variables like adequacy of syringe and vaccine supply, the number of vaccinators per capita, recent training of managers, frequency of supervision, availability of micro-plans, and turnover of managers were not correlated with coverage. While the Government of Pakistan has ensured that many physical resources and technical inputs have been provided to the district health offices, this does not appear able to explain the relatively low overall coverage or the variation between districts. Bolder initiatives and innovations are likely needed to improve delivery of basic health services.

Buying results? Contracting for health service delivery in developing countries.

To achieve the health-related Millennium Development Goals, the delivery of health services will need to improve. Contracting with non-state entities, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), has been proposed as a means for improving health care delivery, and the global experience with such contracts is reviewed here. The ten investigated examples indicate that contracting for the delivery of primary care can be very effective and that improvements can be rapid. These results were achieved in various settings and services. Many of the anticipated difficulties with contracting were either not observed in practice or did not compromise contracting's effectiveness. Seven of the nine cases with sufficient experience (greater than 3 years' elapsed experience) have been sustained and expanded. Provision of a package of basic services by contractors costs between roughly US3 dollars and US6 dollars per head per year in low-income countries. Contracting for health service delivery should be expanded and future efforts must include rigorous evaluations.

Impact of targeted programs on health systems: a case study of the polio eradication initiative.

The results of 2 large field studies on the impact of the polio eradication initiative on health systems and 3 supplementary reports were presented at a December 1999 meeting convened by the World Health Organization. All of these studies concluded that positive synergies exist between polio eradication and health systems but that these synergies have not been vigorously exploited. The eradication of polio has probably improved health systems worldwide by broadening distribution of vitamin A supplements, improving cooperation among enterovirus laboratories, and facilitating linkages between health workers and their communities. The results of these studies also show that eliminating polio did not cause a diminution of funding for immunization against other illnesses. Relatively little is known about the opportunity costs of polio eradication. Improved planning in disease eradication initiatives can minimize disruptions in the delivery of other services. Future initiatives should include indicators and baseline data for monitoring effects on health systems development.