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[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1302657.].
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Introduction: Models of attachment and information processing suggest that the attention infants allocate to social information might occur in a schema-driven processing manner according to their attachment pattern. A major source of social information for infants consists of facial expressions of emotion. We tested for differences in attention to facial expressions and emotional discrimination between infants classified as securely attached (B), insecure-avoidant (A), and insecure-resistant (C). Methods: Sixty-one 14-month-old infants participated in the Strange Situation Procedure and an experimental task of Visual Habituation and Visual Paired-Comparison Task (VPC). In the Habituation phase, a Low-Arousal Happy face (habituation face) was presented followed by a VPC task of 6 trials composed of two contrasting emotional faces always involving the same actress: the one used in habituation (trial old face) and a new one (trial new face) portraying changes in valence (Low-Arousal Angry face), arousal (High-Arousal Happy face), or valence + arousal (High-Arousal Angry face). Measures of fixation time (FT) and number of fixations (FC) were obtained for the habituation face, the trial old face, the trial new face, and the difference between the trial old face and the trial new face using an eye-tracking system. Results: We found a higher FT and FC for the trial new face when compared with the trial old face, regardless of the emotional condition (valence, arousal, valence + arousal contrasts), suggesting that 14-month-old infants were able to discriminate different emotional faces. However, this effect differed according to attachment pattern: resistant-attached infants (C) had significantly higher FT and FC for the new face than patterns B and A, indicating they may remain hypervigilant toward emotional change. On the contrary, avoidant infants (A) revealed significantly longer looking times to the trial old face, suggesting overall avoidance of novel expressions and thus less sensitivity to emotional change. Discussion: Overall, these findings corroborate that attachment is associated with infants' social information processing.
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As questões em torno da deficiência, da incapacidade e da funcionalidade tornaram-se, nas últimas décadas, importante foco de discussão e de elaboração conceitual, com a produção de um corpo de saberes que confere legitimidade científica a uma visão mais positiva e dignificante das condições de deficiência e de incapacidade. A premissa base dessa produção de conhecimento é a assunção da reciprocidade das relações indivíduo/meio, enquanto unidade nuclear de análise, onde a incapacidade é encarada, não como característica intrínseca da pessoa, mas como o resultado do desajustamento entre as funcionalidades do indivíduo e as solicitações dos cenários onde ele é chamado a participar. É nesta base que, neste artigo, nos propomos examinar as implicações que tais posicionamentos tiveram na desconstrução do construto de deficiência mental (mental retardation) e subsequente mudança para a designação incapacidade intelectual (intellectual disability), pela American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. Para atingir esse propósito discutiremos a evolução do conceito de deficiência mental, explorando o território conceitual que o instituiu e aquele que contribui para a sua desconstrução. Por último, a enunciação teórica deste artigo pretende contribuir para demonstrar a interdependência existente entre modos de pensamento e modos de ação, e que no caso da Educação Especial é corporizado na aceitação progressiva do paradigma da inclusão.
Issues concerning impairment, disability and functionality have become, in recent decades, an important focus of discussion and conceptual elaboration, with the production of a body of knowledge that gives scientific legitimacy to a more positive and dignifying vision about the conditions of disability and impairment. The basic premise of this knowledge production is the assumption of reciprocity of the relations' individual/environment, as the basic unit of analysis, conceiving disability not as an intrinsic characteristic of the person, but as the result of the mismatch between the functionalities of the individual and the demands of the settings where persons are called to participate. Hence, in this article, we propose to examine the implications that such views had in the deconstruction of the construct of mental retardation and subsequent changes to the designation intellectual disability, by the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. To accomplish this purpose we discuss the evolution of the concept of mental retardation, exploring the conceptual territory that established it and the one that contributes to its deconstruction. Finally, the theoretical standpoint of this paper aims to demonstrate the interdependence between modes of thinking and modes of action that, in the case of Special Education, is embodied in the gradual acceptance of the inclusion paradigm.