Repressed Memories (of Sexual Abuse Against Minors) and Statutes of Limitations in Europe: Status Quo and Possible Alternatives.

One of the most heated debates in psychological science concerns the concept of repressed memory. We discuss how the debate on repressed memories continues to surface in legal settings, sometimes even to suggest avenues of legal reform. In the past years, several European countries have extended or abolished the statute of limitations for the prosecution of sexual crimes. Such statutes force legal actions (e.g., prosecution of sexual abuse) to be applied within a certain period of time. One of the reasons for the changes in statutes of limitations concerns the idea of repressed memory. We argue that from a psychological standpoint, these law reforms can be detrimental, particularly when they are done to endorse unfounded psychological theories. The validity of testimonies is compromised many years after the alleged facts, and abolishing the statute of limitations increases the chance that even more (false) recovered memories of abuse might enter the courtroom. We propose solutions to these changes such as establishing an independent expert committee evaluating claims of sexual abuse.

External and internal influences yield similar memory effects: the role of deception and suggestion.

In legal cases, testimonies can become contaminated because of an amalgam of external and internal influences on memory. It is well-established that external influences (e.g., suggestive interviews) can hurt memory. However, less focus has been placed on the impact of internal influences (e.g., lying) on memory. In the current review, we show that the available evidence suggests that both external and internal influences exert similar effects on memory. That is, we review studies showing that suggesting non-occurrences and suggesting non-experiences can lead to omission errors and false memories, respectively. Likewise, these memory effects are also observed when focusing on internal influences. That is, false denials, feigning amnesia and fabrication have been shown to affect memory in terms of forgetting (i.e., omissions) and false memories (i.e., commissions). Also, we show that both external and internal influences can lead to changes in the belief that an event occurred. We argue that in legal cases, triers of fact should concentrate on whether both types of influences might have affected testimonial accuracy in witnesses, victims, and suspects.

A scientometric and descriptive review on the debate about repressed memories and traumatic forgetting.

Recent work suggests that the debate surrounding repressed memory and traumatic forgetting continues today. To further investigate this debate, we performed preregistered scientometric analyses on publications on the debate about repressed memory to provide information about its bibliometric evolution. Furthermore, we reviewed these publications to highlight the different positions taken by scholars on this debate. We reviewed 434 publications extracted from Scopus and Web of Science from 1969 to 2022. Our scientometric analyses permitted us to visualize the development of the publications on repressed memories and identify the terminology used to label this phenomenon. We identified three waves of publications (i.e., 1994-2000; 2003-2009; 2012-2021) showing that there is a recent peak of scholarly attention into this topic. 40% of scholars supported the phenomenon of repressed memory while 29% did not. Moreover, although in the last wave of publications, 35% of articles included critical arguments against the existence of repressed memory, a sizable number of publications (21%) supported ideas in favour of repressed memory. Finally, we observed that the term dissociative amnesia is another expression used to refer to the phenomenon. Our results provide additional evidence that the debate on repressed memories (and dissociative amnesia) is far from being over.

Factors affecting the forced confabulation effect: a meta-analysis of laboratory studies.

During police investigations, interviewees are sometimes forced to confabulate a response to questions for which they don't know the answer. In this registered report, we conducted a three-level meta-analysis to examine whether forcing people to confabulate an answer to these questions can lead to false memories for the confabulated details and/or events (i.e., forced confabulation effect). Results showed that forced confabulation indeed led to the production of false memories. Qualitative reviews of studies suggested that the forced confabulation effect is enhanced after receiving confirmatory feedback. Moreover, we found evidence that longer delays between the forced confabulation phase and the final memory task are necessary to observe the forced confabulation effect for entire events. However, caution is needed when interpreting the forced confabulation effect. Specifically, our moderator analyses revealed that voluntarily produced confabulation led to more false memories than forced confabulation. Also, our exploratory analysis indicated that the forced confabulation effect was mainly observed in within-subject designs. Taken together, our meta-analysis supports the notion that forcing participants to confabulate can lead them to later report such confabulations as part of the truth. Nonetheless, caution is warranted because this effect might be due to the introduction of misinformation through asking unanswerable questions.

#StudentsToo. prevalence of sexual assault reports among students of three European universities and their actions post-assault.

OBJECTIVE: Previous research has indicated high rates of sexual assault (SA) among US students (> 25%). Yet this type of investigation has been less frequent at European universities. METHODS: We conducted an investigation at three universities, two Dutch universities (N = 95 and N = 305) and one university in Belgium (N = 307). Students were asked to estimate the prevalence of SA, and to report about their personal experience. We defined SA as any situation in which students were inappropriately touched, forced to a sexual act without their consent, or were (sexually) verbally intimidated. RESULTS: 56% of students (Location 1: n = 54/95; Location 2: n = 172/305; Location 3: n = 172/307) across all three samples reported experiencing SA. The disclosed assaults were mostly unwanted sexual contact (i.e., groping) by male strangers aged 18-35 years. One-third of the sample reported to have done nothing post-assault, and among those who took actions, the majority disclosed the assault to friends, but rarely to family members. Also, 3-5% of students (Location 1: n = 3; Location 2: n = 11; Location 3: n = 11) (falsely) denied the assault. Seeking justice and needing support were important motivators of action, whereas psychological factors (i.e., memory distrust) were antagonists of this. Finally, besides psychological factors, fear of interpersonal consequences (e.g., being labelled as a "drama queen") was a strong influence to either deny or try to forget the assault. CONCLUSION: SA appears to be frequent among European students and further investigation including other European universities is warranted.

Oversimplifications and Misrepresentations in the Repressed Memory Debate: A Reply to Ross.

Ross argued that false memory researchers misunderstand the concepts of repression and dissociation, as well as the writings of Freud. In this commentary, we show that Ross is wrong. He oversimplifies and misrepresents the literature on repressed and false memory. We rebut Ross by showing the fallacies underlying his arguments. For example, we adduce evidence showing that the notions of dissociation or repression are unnecessary to explain how people may forget and then remember childhood sexual abuse, stressing that abuse survivors may reinterpret childhood events later in life. Also, Ross overlooks previous critiques concerning dissociation. Finally, we will demonstrate that Ross misrepresents work by Freud and Loftus in the area of repressed and false memory. His article confuses, not clarifies, an already heated debate on the existence of repressed memory.

Can false denials turn fact into fiction? The effect of false denials on memory for self-performed actions.

We examined the mnemonic effects of falsely denying a self-performed action. Specifically, participants (N = 30) performed, imagined, or received no instruction about 24 action statements (e.g., "cross your arms"). Next, their memory for whether they had performed, imagined, or did nothing (i.e., received no instructions) with these actions was tested. Subsequently, participants were instructed to repeatedly deny an action they had performed (false denial) and to repeatedly claim to have performed an action they had only imagined (false admission). In a final sorting memory task, 54% (n = 16) of participants erroneously indicated, after false admissions, that they had performed the imagined action. None of the participants indicated that they had only imagined an action after false denials, showing that it might be difficult to forget a performed action, even after repeatedly denying it. The current experiment sets the stage for future research to investigate why it seems to be difficult to forget performed actions.

False memory and COVID-19: How people fall for fake news about COVID-19 in digital contexts.

People are often exposed to fake news. Such an exposure to misleading information might lead to false memory creation. We examined whether people can form false memories for COVID-19-related fake news. Furthermore, we investigated which individual factors might predict false memory formation for fake news. In two experiments, we provided participants with two pieces of COVID-19-related fake news along with a non-probative photograph. In Experiment 1, 41% (n = 66/161) of our sample reported at least one false memory for COVID-19-related fake news. In Experiment 2, even a higher percentage emerged (54.9%; n = 185/337). Moreover, in Experiment 2, participants with conspiracy beliefs were more likely to report false memories for fake news than those without such beliefs, irrespective of the conspiratorial nature of the materials. Finally, while well-being was found to be positively associated with both true and false memories (Experiment 1), only analytical thinking was negatively linked to the vulnerability to form false memories for COVID-19-related fake news (Experiment 2). Overall, our data demonstrated that false memories can occur following exposure to fake news about COVID-19, and that governmental and social media interventions are needed to increase individuals' discriminability between true and false COVID-19-related news.

False denials increase false memories for trauma-related discussions.

False denials are sometimes used to cope with traumatic experiences. We examined whether false denials can affect true and false memory production for a traumatic event and conversations surrounding the trauma. One hundred and twenty-six participants watched a trauma analogue video of a car crash before being randomly asked in a discussion with the experimenter to (1) respond honestly or (2) falsely deny that certain details happened in the video. After one week, all participants received misinformation about the discussion with the experimenter and the car crash. Finally, all participants were instructed to respond truthfully in a source memory task. Participants who falsely denied information during the first session were statistically significantly more prone than honest participants to omit details they denied and to report misinformation about what was discussed in the first session. Our work suggests that false denials of a traumatic experience might lead to both forgetting and increased false memory levels for earlier conversations about the event.

A court ruled case on therapy-induced false memories.

We report on a unique Italian criminal case in which a court ruled that a therapist implanted false memories of abuse in a young girl. Using therapeutic excerpts, we show that the therapist used a multitude of problematic interventions that are all linked to false memory creation. Specifically, an analysis of the therapeutic excerpts showed that across many sessions, the therapist asked highly suggestive questions to the girl, implying that she was abused by her father. In addition, the girl underwent EMDR techniques that have been associated with memory undermining effects. Our analyses showed that although before treatment the girl did not have any recollection of being abused by her father, she gradually started to remember the abuse and identified the father as her abuser during the therapeutic sessions. Our case report clearly shows the danger of suggestive pressure in a therapeutic context causing patients to form false memories of abuse and supports the need to prevent the therapeutic practice of suggestive techniques.

Simulating denial increases false memory rates for abuse unrelated information.

Victims of abuse might deny their traumatic experiences. We studied mnemonic effects of simulating false denial of a child sexual abuse narrative. Participants (N = 127) read and empathized with the main character of this narrative. Next, half were instructed to falsely deny abuse-related information while others responded honestly in an interview. One week later, participants received misinformation for the narrative and interview. In a final source memory task, participants' memory for the narrative and interview was tested. Participants who falsely denied abuse-related information endorsed more abuse-unrelated misinformation about the event than honest participants. Abuse-related false memory rates did not statistically differ between the groups, and false denials were not related to omission errors about (1) the interview and (2) narrative. Hence, victim's memory for abuse-related information related to their experience might not be affected by a false denial, and inconsistencies surrounding the abuse-unrelated information are more likely to take place.

Believing in dissociative amnesia relates to claiming it: a survey of people's experiences and beliefs about dissociative amnesia.

Dissociative amnesia is one of the most controversial categories in the field of psychiatry and clinical psychology. Self-reports of dissociative amnesia in the general population, and beliefs about this topic, have so far not been subjected to empirical scrutiny. Here, we surveyed a sample from the general population (N = 1017), revealing that about a tenth (n = 102) claimed to have experienced dissociative amnesia. Some claims pertained to amnesia for traumatic autobiographical experiences (e.g., sexual assault), while other claims reflected memory loss for experiences that can be regarded as non-traumatic or non-stressful (e.g., dissociative amnesia for an anniversary). Importantly, many participants believed in the existence of dissociative amnesia, and those who claimed dissociative amnesia indicated even more belief in this phenomenon than the rest of the sample. Finally, many participants indicated to have at least once claimed to have feigned memory loss in their life, and that they experienced some form of forgetting when trying to retrieve events for which they lied upon. Overall, our findings suggest that claiming dissociative amnesia goes hand in hand with believing in dissociative amnesia.

Do liars really remember what they lied upon? The impact of fabrication on memory.

The present experiment aimed to examine how fabrication can affect memory. In particular, we examined whether different types of fabrication can lead to different mnemonic effects. A sample of 159 participants watched a video of a robbery and subsequently answered some questions about it. Participants were divided into three conditions: one group was instructed to tell the truth (i.e., truth-telling group), while the other two groups were instructed to lie either by partially distorting details (i.e., distortion group) or by completely making up wrong details of the event seen in the video (i.e., fabrication group). Two days later, participants completed a final memory test where they honestly answered recognition and recall questions concerning: (i) memory for the video and (ii) memory for having discussed details during the interview. Results showed that different types of fabrication affect liars' memory differently. Fabricators reported an undermining of memory for the event, whereas those who partially distorted details reported a higher impairment for the interview. Our findings showed that the effects of lying on liars' memory might be determined by the cognitive resources required to lie.

The role of executive functions in the effects of lying on memory.

Recent studies have demonstrated that lying can affect memory and that such memory effects are based on the cognitive load required in performing the lie. The present study aimed to verify whether the impact of two deceptive strategies (i.e., false denials and fabrication) depends on individuals' cognitive resources in terms of Executive Functions (i.e., EF: Shifting, Inhibition, and Updating). A sample of 147 participants watched a video of a robbery and then were instructed to either fabricate (i.e., fabrication condition), deny (i.e. false denial condition), or tell the truth (i.e., truth-telling condition) to some questions about the crime. Two days later, all participants had to provide an honest account on a final memory test where they indicated their memory for having discussed details (i.e., fabricated, denied, or told the truth) and their memory for the video. Finally, their EF resources were also assessed. Our findings demonstrated that individual differences in EFs played a role in how the event was recalled and on the effects of lying on memory. That is, memory for the event after having lied depended especially on individuals' Shifting resources. We also found that the two deceptive strategies differentially affected individuals' memory for the interview and for the event: Denying affected memory for the interview while fabricating affected memory for the event. Our findings can inform legal professionals on the possibility to assess individuals' EF as an indicator of witnesses' credibility.

Adopting a fictitious autobiography: fabrication inflation or deflation?

In the present experiment, we examined whether adopting a fictitious biography would make participants believe in this autobiography. Participants were split up into two conditions: forced confabulation condition and control condition. The forced confabulation condition received a snippet with the fake biography and had to adopt it through several methods (i.e., method acting, journaling, and convincing experimenters in an interview) over an extended period of time. The control condition was told that they partook in an experiment about personal childhood memories. Before, during and after lying participants completed four Life Event Inventories (LEI). Results revealed that after coming forward with the truth participants did not increase nor decrease their belief for the lied about events. Additionally, even after a one-year delay, we found no evidence for either effect. Our findings suggest that more extreme forms of fabrication do not make people believe in their lies.

The impact of false denials on forgetting and false memory.

People sometimes falsely deny having experienced an event. In the current experiments, we examined the effect of false denials on forgetting and false memory formation. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with emotionally-negative and neutral associatively related word lists known to engender false memories. After encoding, half of the participants had to falsely deny having seen the words while the other half had to tell the truth. During a final memory test (recall or source monitoring task), participants who falsely denied forgot that they discussed certain words with an experimenter. Furthermore, the act of falsely denying reduced the formation of false memories. These results were partially replicated in Experiment 2 where participants also had to re-learn several words and received a second memory task. This latter design feature diminished the effect of false denials on false memory creation. Our experiments suggest that false denials not only have negative consequences (forgetting), but can have positive ones too (reduction in false memories).

Retrieval-Induced Forgetting in the Feigning Amnesia for a Crime Paradigm.

Previous studies demonstrated that, when asked to honestly provide information about a mock crime, former feigners performed worse than those who were requested to confess to this event. Thus, feigning amnesia for a mock crime undermined genuine memory for the same experience. In the present study, we examined whether retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) underlies this memory-undermining effect. After watching a mock crime, participants had to feign amnesia or confess to having committed that crime. Feigners were given retrieval practice instructions (i.e., retrieval-practice group) or no further instructions (i.e., control group). Immediately and 1 day later, all participants had to genuinely report what they remembered about the crime. Although simulators in the retrieval-practice group recalled the largest amount of information as a positive consequence of retrieval, the ratio for crucial crime-related details was lower than that exhibited by both simulators who were given no instructions and confessors. These findings suggest that RIF might play a role in forgetting critical information in claims of crime-related amnesia. Theoretical and practical implications will be discussed.

Feigning Amnesia Moderately Impairs Memory for a Mock Crime Video.

Previous studies showed that feigning amnesia for a crime impairs actual memory for the target event. Lack of rehearsal has been proposed as an explanation for this memory-undermining effect of feigning. The aim of the present study was to replicate and extend previous research adopting a mock crime video instead of a narrative story. We showed participants a video of a violent crime. Next, they were requested to imagine that they had committed this offense and to either feign amnesia or confess the crime. A third condition was included: Participants in the delayed test-only control condition did not receive any instruction. On subsequent recall tests, participants in all three conditions were instructed to report as much information as possible about the offense. On the free recall test, feigning amnesia impaired memory for the video clip, but participants who were asked to feign crime-related amnesia outperformed controls. However, no differences between simulators and confessors were found on both correct cued recollection or on distortion and commission rates. We also explored whether inner speech might modulate memory for the crime. Inner speech traits were not found to be related to the simulating amnesia effect. Theoretical and practical implications of our results are discussed.

Can implicit measures detect source information in crime-related amnesia?

Participants who are asked to simulate amnesia for a mock crime have a weaker memory for this event when they have to give up their role as a feigner, than those who are not asked to feign memory loss. According to the source monitoring framework (SMF), this memory-undermining effect of simulating amnesia for a crime would be due to misattribution of the right source of information. However, we know that the content of self-generated information (e.g., feigned version of the crime) might be preserved and recognised over time as a result of elaborative cognitive processing. In the present study, we aimed to contrast these two explanations. We showed participants a mock crime video and we instructed them to either feign amnesia (simulators) or confess the mock crime (confessors). Next, a free recall memory test was administered. After one week, participants were asked to perform a personalised source monitoring task using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT). As predicted, we found that simulators were able to discriminate the content of their self-generated feigned story of the crime from the original version. Moreover, simulators were quicker than confessors at the aIAT task. Practical and theoretical implications of our results are discussed.

Fifty Shades of Unsaid: Women's Explicit and Implicit Attitudes Towards Sexual Morality.

The movie Fifty Shades of Grey has created a great deal of controversy which has reignited the debate on unusual and alternative sexual practices such as bondage. Erotophobic individuals have negative affect towards the type of sexual libertinism conveyed by the movie, while erotophilic persons have a positive attitude and emotional feelings towards this kind of sexual emancipation. Using the Implicit Association Test, this study aimed to explore the extent to which there is a difference in women's attitudes towards sexual morality on an explicit and implicit level. Our findings found that erotophobic and erotophilic women differed only on an explicit level of sex guilt and moral evaluation, while no difference in the implicit measure was found.