Procreative Justice and genetic selection for skin colour.

Should nonprejudiced reproducers genetically select embryos for light skin under background conditions of racism and colourism, given that darker skin will be disadvantageous for their child? Many intuit that there are strong moral reasons not to select light skin in these contexts. I argue that existing procreative principles cannot adequately account for this judgement. Instead, I argue that a more compelling rationale for this intuition is that such selection completes an instance of race or colour injustice. Given this, I propose a new, complementary principle-Procreative Justice-which holds that reproducers have strong pro tanto moral reasons to avoid completing race and colour injustices via their selection choices. While these reasons may be overridden by competing considerations, they nonetheless continue to exert normative force.

Should We Genetically Select for the Beauty Norm of Fair Skin?

Fair skin is often regarded as a beauty ideal in many parts of the world. Genetic selection for non-disease traits may allow reproducers to select fair skin for the purposes of beauty, and may be justified under various procreative principles. In this paper I assess the ethics of genetic selection for fair skin as a beauty feature. In particular, I explore the discriminatory aspects and demands of such selection. Using race and colour hierarchies that many would find objectionable, I argue that selection for beauty that is underpinned by such hierarchies is not a trivial selection. Given this, I claim that we should not make such selections.

A Global Public Goods Approach to the Health of Migrants.

This paper explores a global public goods approach to the health of migrants. It suggests that this approach establishes that there are a number of health goods which must be provided to migrants not because these are theirs by right (although this may independently be the case), but because these goods are primary goods which fit the threefold criteria of global public goods. There are two key advantages to this approach: first, it is non-confrontational and non-oppositional, and second, it provides self-interested arguments to provide at least some health goods to migrants and thus appeals to those little moved by rights-based arguments.

Philosophical feminist bioethics: past, present, and future.

The end of the last century was a particularly vibrant period for feminist bioethics. Almost two decades on, we reflect on the legacy of the feminist critique of bioethics and investigate the extent to which it has been successful and what requires more attention yet. We do this by examining the past, present, and future: we draw out three feminist concerns that emerged in this period-abstraction, individualism, and power-and consider three feminist responses-relationality, particularity, and justice-and we finish with some thoughts about the future.