Detection of the Omicron (B.1.1.529) variant of SARS-CoV-2 in aircraft wastewater.

On the 26th of November 2021, the World Health Organization (WHO) designated the newly detected B.1.1.529 lineage of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) the Omicron Variant of Concern (VOC). The genome of the Omicron VOC contains more than 50 mutations, many of which have been associated with increased transmissibility, differing disease severity, and potential to evade immune responses developed for previous VOCs such as Alpha and Delta. In the days since the designation of B.1.1.529 as a VOC, infections with the lineage have been reported in countries around the globe and many countries have implemented travel restrictions and increased border controls in response. We putatively detected the Omicron variant in an aircraft wastewater sample from a flight arriving to Darwin, Australia from Johannesburg, South Africa on the 25th of November 2021 via positive results on the CDC N1, CDC N2, and del(69-70) RT-qPCR assays per guidance from the WHO. The Australian Northern Territory Health Department detected one passenger onboard the flight who was infected with SARS-CoV-2, which was determined to be the Omicron VOC by sequencing of a nasopharyngeal swab sample. Subsequent sequencing of the aircraft wastewater sample using the ARTIC V3 protocol with Nanopore and ATOPlex confirmed the presence of the Omicron variant with a consensus genome that clustered with the B.1.1.529 BA.1 sub-lineage. Our detection and confirmation of a single onboard Omicron infection via aircraft wastewater further bolsters the important role that aircraft wastewater can play as an independent and unintrusive surveillance point for infectious diseases, particularly coronavirus disease 2019.

Characterization of a Western Pacific Zika Virus Strain in Australian Aedes aegypti.

Zika virus (ZIKV) is a globally emerging arbovirus responsible for widespread epidemics in the western Pacific, the Americas, and Asia. The virus predominately circulates in urban transmission cycles between Aedes aegypti and humans. Australia is considered at risk to outbreaks of ZIKV due to the presence of A. aegypti populations in northern areas of the state of Queensland. Furthermore, close proximity to epidemic regions has led to almost 50% of imported cases reported since 2012 originating in the Pacific region. We conducted the first vector competence experiments with A. aegypti from three Australian populations for a western Pacific strain of ZIKV. When exposed to bloodmeals containing between 105 and 108 tissue culture infectious dose (TCID)50/mL of virus, infection, dissemination, and transmission, rates were <10%. In comparison to using frozen virus stock, exposing mosquitoes to freshly cultured virus also did not increase infection or transmission rates. It was only when bloodmeal titers exceeded 108 TCID50/mL that infection rates approached 50% and transmission rates increased to >20%. However, this concentration of virus is considerably higher than levels previously reported in blood samples from viremic humans. The Australian A. aegypti tested appear to express a midgut barrier to ZIKV infection, as 50% of mosquitoes that became infected developed a disseminated infection, and 50% of those mosquitoes transmitted the virus. Overall, these results suggest that while Australian A. aegypti strains are able to transmit the western Pacific ZIKV strain, they are relatively inefficient vectors of the virus.

Assessment of Local Mosquito Species Incriminates Aedes aegypti as the Potential Vector of Zika Virus in Australia.

BACKGROUND: Within the last 10 years Zika virus (ZIKV) has caused unprecedented epidemics of human disease in the nations and territories of the western Pacific and South America, and continues to escalate in both endemic and non-endemic regions. We evaluated the vector competence of Australian mosquitoes for ZIKV to assess their potential role in virus transmission. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Mosquitoes were exposed to infectious blood meals containing the prototype African ZIKV strain. After 14 days incubation at 28°C and high relative humidity, infection, dissemination and transmission rates were assessed. Infection in Culex annulirostris and Cx. sitiens could not be detected. 8% of Cx. quinquefasciatus were infected, but the virus did not disseminate in this species. Despite having infection rates > 50%, Aedes notoscriptus and Ae. vigilax did not transmit ZIKV. In contrast, Ae. aegypti had infection and transmission rates of 57% and 27%, respectively. In susceptibility trials, the virus dose required to infect 50% (ID50) of Ae. aegypti was106.4 tissue culture infectious dose50 (TCID50)/mL. Additionally, a threshold viral load within the mosquito of at least 105.1 TCID50 equivalents/mL had to be reached before virus transmission occurred. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: We confirmed Ae. aegypti to be the most likely mosquito vector of ZIKV in Australia, although the restricted distribution of this species will limit the receptive zone to northern Queensland where this species occurs. Importantly, the role in ZIKV transmission of Culex and other Aedes spp. tested will be negligible. Despite being the implicated vector, the relatively high ID50 and need for a high titer disseminated infection in Ae. aegypti suggest that high mosquito population densities will be required to facilitate epidemic ZIKV transmission among the currently immunologically naïve human population in Australia.