The reactive vaccination campaign against cholera emergency in camps for internally displaced persons, Borno, Nigeria, 2017: a two-stage cluster survey.

INTRODUCTION: In 2017, amidst insecurity and displacements posed by Boko Haram armed insurgency, cholera outbreak started in the Muna Garage camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Borno State, Nigeria. In response, the Borno Ministry of Health and partners determined to provide oral cholera vaccine (OCV) to about 1 million people in IDP camps and surrounding communities in six Local Government Areas (LGAs) including Maiduguri, Jere, Konduga, Mafa, Dikwa, and Monguno. As part of Monitoring and Evaluation, we described the coverage achieved, adverse events following immunisation (AEFI), non-vaccination reasons, vaccination decisions as well as campaign information sources. METHODS: We conducted two-stage probability cluster surveys with clusters selected without replacement according to probability-proportionate-to-population-size in the six LGAs targeted by the campaign. Individuals aged ≥1 years were the eligible study population. Data sources were household interviews with vaccine card verification and memory recall, if no card, as well as multiple choice questions with an open-ended option. RESULTS: Overall, 12 931 respondents participated in the survey. Overall, 90% (95% CI: 88 to 92) of the target population received at least one dose of OCV, range 87% (95% CI: 75 to 94) in Maiduguri to 94% (95% CI: 88 to 97) in Monguno. The weighted two-dose coverage was 73% (95% CI: 68 to 77) with a low of 68% (95% CI: 46 to 86) in Maiduguri to a high of 87% (95% CI: 74 to 95) in Dikwa. The coverage was lower during first round (76%, 95% CI: 71 to 80) than second round (87%, 95% CI: 84 to 89) and ranged from 72% (95% CI: 42 to 89) and 82% (95% CI: 82 to 91) in Maiduguri to 87% (95% CI: 75 to 95) and 94% (95% CI: 88 to 97) in Dikwa for the respective first and second rounds. Also, coverage was higher among females of age 5 to 14 and ≥15 years than males of same age groups. There were mild AEFI with the most common symptoms being fever, headache and diarrhoea occurring up to 48 hours after ingesting the vaccine. The most common actions taken after AEFI symptoms included 'did nothing' and 'self-medicated at home'. The top reason for taking vaccine was to protect from cholera while top reason for non-vaccination was travel/work. The main source of campaign information was a neighbour. An overwhelming majority (96%, 95% CI: 95% to 98%) felt the campaign team treated them with respect. While 43% (95% CI: 36% to 50%) asked no questions, 37% (95% CI: 31% to 44%) felt the team addressed all their concerns. CONCLUSION: The campaign achieved high coverage using door-to-door and fixed sites strategies amidst insecurity posed by Boko Haram. Additional studies are needed to improve how to reduce non-vaccination, especially for the first round. While OCV provides protection for a few years, additional actions will be needed to make investments in water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure.

The multi-sectorial emergency response to a cholera outbreak in Internally Displaced Persons camps in Borno State, Nigeria, 2017.

Introduction: In August 2017, a cholera outbreak started in Muna Garage Internally Displaced Persons camp, Borno state, Nigeria and >5000 cases occurred in six local government areas. This qualitative study evaluated perspectives about the emergency response to this outbreak. Methods: We conducted 39 key informant interviews and focus group discussions, and reviewed 21 documents with participants involved with surveillance, water, sanitation, hygiene, case management, oral cholera vaccine (OCV), communications, logistics and coordination. Qualitative data analysis used thematic techniques comprising key words in context, word repetition and key sector terms. Results: Authorities were alerted quickly, but outbreak declaration took 12 days due to a 10-day delay waiting for culture confirmation. Outbreak investigation revealed several potential transmission channels, but a leaking latrine around the index cases' house was not repaired for more than 7 days. Chlorine was initially not accepted by the community due to rumours that it would sterilise women. Key messages were in Hausa, although Kanuri was the primary local language; later this was corrected. Planning would have benefited using exercise drills to identify weaknesses, and inventory sharing to avoid stock outs. The response by the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency was perceived to be slow and an increased risk from a religious festival was not recognised. Case management was provided at treatment centres, but some partners were concerned that their work was not recognised asking, 'Who gets the glory and the data?' Nearly one million people received OCV and its distribution benefited from a robust infrastructure for polio vaccination. There was initial anxiety, rumour and reluctance about OCV, attributed by many to lack of formative research prior to vaccine implementation. Coordination was slow initially, but improved with activation of an emergency operations centre (EOC) that enabled implementation of incident management system to coordinate multisectoral activities and meetings held at 16:00 hours daily. The synergy between partners and government improved when each recognised the government's leadership role. Conclusion: Despite a timely alert of the outbreak, delayed laboratory confirmation slowed initial response. Initial responses to the outbreak were not well coordinated but improved with the EOC. Understanding behaviours and community norms through rapid formative research should improve the effectiveness of the emergency response to a cholera outbreak. OCV distribution was efficient and benefited from the polio vaccine infrastructure.