Rationing With Respect to Age During a Pandemic: A Comparative Analysis of State Pandemic Preparedness Plans.

BACKGROUND: Faced with possible shortages due to COVID-19, many states updated or rapidly developed crisis standards of care (CSCs) and other pandemic preparedness plans (PPPs) for rationing resources, particularly ventilators. RESEARCH QUESTION: How have US states incorporated the controversial standard of rationing by age and/or life-years into their pandemic preparedness plans? STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: This was an investigator-initiated, textual analysis conducted from April to June 2020, querying online resources and in-state contacts to identify PPPs published by each of the 50 states and for Washington, DC. Analysis included the most recent versions of CSC documents and official state PPPs containing triage guidance as of June 2020. Plans were categorized as rationing by (A) short-term survival (≤ 1 year), (B) 1 to 5 expected life-years, (C) total life-years, (D) "fair innings," that is, specific age cutoffs, or (O) other. The primary measure was any use of age and/or life-years. Plans were further categorized on the basis of whether age/life-years was a primary consideration. RESULTS: Thirty-five states promulgated PPPs addressing the rationing of critical care resources. Seven states considered short-term prognosis, seven considered whether a patient had 1 to 5 expected life-years, 13 rationed by total life-years, and one used the fair innings principle. Seven states provided only general ethical considerations. Seventeen of the 21 plans considering age/life-years made it a primary consideration. Several plans borrowed heavily from a few common sources, although use of terminology was inconsistent. Many documents were modified in light of controversy. INTERPRETATION: Guidance with respect to rationing by age and/or life-years varied widely. More than one-half of PPPs, many following a few common models, included age/life-years as an explicit rationing criterion; the majority of these made it a primary consideration. Terminology was often vague, and many plans evolved in response to pushback. These findings have ethical implications for the care of older adults and other vulnerable populations during a pandemic.

ICU Care in a Pandemic.

This letter to the editor responds to commentaries in the September-October 2021issue of the Hastings Center Report by Douglas B. White and Bernard Lo, by Govind Persad, and by Virginia A. Brown, which were themselves responding, in part, to the article "Life-Years and Rationing in the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Critical Analysis," by MaryKatherine Gaurke, Bernard Prusak, Kyeong Yun Jeong, Emily Scire, and Daniel P. Sulmasy.

Life-Years & Rationing in the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Critical Analysis.

Prominent bioethicists have promoted the preservation of life-years as a rationing strategy in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet the philosophical justification for maximizing life-years is underdeveloped and has a complex history that is not reflected in recent literature. In this article, we offer a critical investigation of the use of life-years, arguing that evidence of public support for the life-years approach is thin and that organ transplantation protocols (heavily cited in pandemic-response protocols) do not provide a precedent for seeking to save the most life-years. We point out that many state emergency-response plans ultimately rejected or severely attenuated the meaning of saving the most life-years, and we argue that philosophical arguments in support of rationing by life-years are remarkably wanting. We conclude by offering a fair alternative that adheres to the standard duties of beneficence, respect for persons, and justice.

Double effect, all over again: the case of Sister Margaret McBride.

As media reports have made widely known, in November 2009, the ethics committee of St. Joseph's Hospital in Phoenix, Arizona, permitted the abortion of an eleven-week-old fetus in order to save the life of its mother. This woman was suffering from acute pulmonary hypertension, which her doctors judged would prove fatal for both her and her previable child. The ethics committee believed abortion to be permitted in this case under the so-called principle of double effect, but Thomas J. Olmsted, the bishop of Phoenix, disagreed with the committee and pronounced its chair, Sister Margaret McBride, excommunicated latae sententiae, "by the very commission of the act." In this article, I take the much discussed Phoenix case as an occasion to subject the principle of double effect to another round of philosophical scrutiny. In particular, I examine the third condition of the principle in its textbook formulation, namely, that the evil effect in question may not be the means to the good effect. My argument, in brief, is that the textbook formulation of the principle does not withstand philosophical scrutiny. Nevertheless, in the end, I do not claim that we should then "do away" with the principle altogether. Instead, we do well to understand it within the context of casuistry, the tradition of moral reasoning from which it issued.

What are parents for? Reproductive ethics after the nonidentity problem.

Bioethicists often use the "nonidentity problem"--the idea that a child born with a disability would actually be a different child if she were born without the disability--to defend parents' rights to have whatever children they want. After all, a child is not harmed by being brought into the world with a disability; without the disability, she would not be brought into the world at all. But what happens if we turn the moral question around and ask, not about the benefits and harms to the child, but just about parental obligations? Will that lead to a different view of reproductive decisions?