Developmental Roots of Human Self-consciousness.

Human consciousness is considered in the perspective of early development. Infants and young children remind us that at its core, the problem of consciousness is primarily a problem of identity, in particular a problem of self-identity with others in mind. It is about how we feel and construe ourselves as an entity among other entities. It is about becoming co-conscious: Aware of oneself through the evaluative eyes of others. This development unfolds in the first 18 months of life, following major steps that are described, and arguably considered as a human trademark.

Primordial feeling of possession in development.

Boyer's minimalist model of human ownership psychology overlooks important cues that children provide in their development leading them from pre-conceptual to conceptual (symbolic) expressions of the basic feeling experience of control over things, qua ownership in the most basic psychological sense. Appeal for innate core knowledge and evolutionary logic blows out the light of this rich and unique ontogenetic progression.

The Evolution of Developmental Theories Since Piaget: A Metaview.

History counts and cannot be overlooked. As a case in point, the origins of major theoretical tensions in the field of developmental psychology are traced back to Piaget (1896-1980), who paved the way to major discoveries regarding the origins and development of cognition. His theory framed much of the new ideas on early cognitive development that emerged in the 1970s, in the footsteps of the 1960s' cognitive revolution. Here, I retrace major conceptual changes since Piaget and provide a metaview on empirical findings that may have triggered the call for such changes. Nine theoretical views and intuitions are identified, all in strong reaction to some or all of the four cornerstone assumptions of Piaget's developmental account (i.e., action realism, domain generality, stages, and late representation). As a result, new and more extreme stances are now taken in the nature-versus-nurture debate. These stances rest on profoundly different, often clashing theoretical intuitions that keep shaping developmental research since Piaget.

Altruism and hyperaltruism in children of three cultures.

Children's inclination to prioritize others' welfare over their own (hyperaltruism) was investigated from a developmental and cross-cultural perspective. The distribution of rewarding or aversive items to self and another child was probed in 3- to 14-year-old children (final sample: N = 158; 87 girls) from urban China (n = 51; Mage = 9.1 years, SD = 1.81; 27 girls), urban United States (n = 55; Mage = 8.89 years, SD = 2.18; 30 girls), and rural Samoa (n = 52; Mage = 8.6 years, SD = 2.61; 30 girls). In two counterbalanced conditions, the children were first asked to split either rewards (stickers or treats) or potentially harmful insects (biting bugs) with another child. In a third condition, children were asked to choose various levels of hypothetical pain to be inflicted on either themselves or another child in exchange for commensurate rewards. Results indicated that in conditions where children distributed rewards, older children were more egalitarian (i.e., gave an equal number of candies to self and other) compared with younger children. However, in conditions where they needed to allocate potential harm, older children displayed more altruism (taking more harm onto themselves so that others could be spared). These results varied by culture, where Chinese children showed more altruism, U.S. children were more egalitarian, and Samoan children showed no clear patterns of either egalitarianism or altruism. The results show that although there are some universal trends toward egalitarian and altruistic ways of sharing, significant group differences exist.

Progression of COVID-19 in a Patient on Anti-CD20 Antibody Treatment: Case Report and Literature Review.

Accumulating evidence suggests that anti-CD20 treatments are associated with a more severe course of COVID-19. We present the case of a 72-year-old woman treated with the B-cell-depleting anti-CD20 antibody rituximab for seropositive rheumatoid arthritis with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection causing a clinical relapse more than 4 weeks after the first manifestation. Persistently positive reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) results along with a drop in cycling threshold (Ct) values, in addition to recovery of identical viral genotype by whole genome sequencing (WGS) during the disease course, argued against reinfection. No seroconversion was noted, as expected on anti-CD20 treatment. Several other case reports have highlighted potentially fatal courses of COVID-19 associated with B-cell-depleting treatments.

Children's cost-benefit assessment of lies across three cultures.

We examined 4- to 11-year-old children's evaluation of six types of lies arranged along a cost-benefit assessment scale factoring both the lie teller and the lie recipient. Children were from three distinct cultural environments: rural Samoa (n = 99), urban China (n = 49), and urban United States (n = 109). Following the simple script of six different stories involving a lie teller and a lie recipient, children were asked to evaluate the character who lied and whether it deserved reward or punishment using a child-friendly Likert scale. From the age when children produce both antisocial and prosocial lies, our results show that their evaluation of lies rests on a cost-benefit analysis of both the lie teller and the lie recipient. Such analysis varies depending on age, type of lie, and the child's cultural environment. In general, Samoan children tended to rate lies more negatively, and they were less differential in their evaluation of the different types of lies compared with both Chinese and U.S. children. We interpret these results as reflecting the differences across cultures in explicit moral teaching and children's relative experience in resource allocation.

Clinical pointers from developing self-awareness.

Seven typical developmental steps are described as cardinal changes leading children from implicit embodied self-awareness at birth, self-consciousness by 2 years, and the adoption of an ethical stance toward others by the preschool years (3-5y). This development may be a useful benchmark for clinicians. In this review, some clinical pointers are outlined in relation to each developmental step, but with a particular focus on the testing of self-awareness in children with developmental disorders, including autism spectrum disorder, cerebral palsy, and intellectual disability. WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS: There are seven major steps in early self and social awareness. Clinical pointers related to each of the seven steps are provided.

The Uncanny Valley Phenomenon and the Temporal Dynamics of Face Animacy Perception.

Human replicas highly resembling people tend to elicit eerie sensations-a phenomenon known as the uncanny valley. To test whether this effect is attributable to people's ascription of mind to (i.e., mind perception hypothesis) or subtraction of mind from androids (i.e., dehumanization hypothesis), in Study 1, we examined the effect of face exposure time on the perceived animacy of human, android, and mechanical-looking robot faces. In Study 2, in addition to exposure time, we also manipulated the spatial frequency of faces, by preserving either their fine (high spatial frequency) or coarse (low spatial frequency) information, to examine its effect on faces' perceived animacy and uncanniness. We found that perceived animacy decreased as a function of exposure time only in android but not in human or mechanical-looking robot faces (Study 1). In addition, the manipulation of spatial frequency eliminated the decrease in android faces' perceived animacy and reduced their perceived uncanniness (Study 2). These findings link perceived uncanniness in androids to the temporal dynamics of face animacy perception. We discuss these findings in relation to the dehumanization hypothesis and alternative hypotheses of the uncanny valley phenomenon.

Self-Unity as Ground Zero of Learning and Development.

Contrary to the suggestion that we are born in a state of confusion and primordial state of a-dualism with the environment, infancy research of the past 40 years shows that from the outset, infants are objective perceivers guided by rich evolved survival values of approach and avoidance in relation to specific resources in the environment such as faces, food, or smell. This starting-state competence drives and organizes their behavior. Evidence-based ascription of self-unity at birth is discussed. Selected findings are presented suggesting that self-unity is a primordial human experience, the main organizer of behavior from the outset. Self-unity is the necessary ground zero enabling the rapid learning and development taking place early in human life.

Sensitivity to the evaluation of others emerges by 24 months.

Although the human proclivity to engage in impression management and care for reputation is ubiquitous, the question of its developmental outset remains open. In 4 studies, we demonstrate that the sensitivity to the evaluation of others (i.e., evaluative audience perception) is manifest by 24 months. In a first study, 14- to 24-month-old children (N = 49) were tested in situations in which the attention of an audience was systematically manipulated. Results showed that when the experimenter was inattentive, as opposed to attentive, children were more likely to explore an attractive toy. A second study (N = 31) explored whether same-aged children would consider not only the attention of the experimenter but also the values the experimenter expressed for two different outcomes when exploring a toy. We found that children reproduced outcomes that were positively valued by the experimenter significantly more when the experimenter was attentive but were more likely to reproduce negatively valued outcomes when the experimenter was inattentive. A third control study (N = 30) showed that the significant effect of Study 2 disappeared in the absence of different values. Lastly, Study 4 (N = 34) replicated and extended the phenomenon by showing toddler's propensity to modify their behavior in the presence of 2 different experimenters, depending on both the experimenter's evaluation of an outcome and their attention. Overall, these data provide the first convergent demonstration of evaluative audience perception in young children that precedes the full-fledged normative, mentalizing, and strong conformity psychology documented in 4- to 5-year-old children. (PsycINFO Database Record

Innate valuation, existential framing, and one head for multiple moral hats.

We support John Doris's criticism of "reflectivism" but identify three shortcomings: (1) his neglect of humans' evolved predispositions and tendencies, (2) his failure to appreciate that identity and responsibility arise first from parsing our world ontologically, in a process we call "existential framing," and (3) a potentially alarming implication of his "dialogic" model of identity formation: if identity is negotiated across diverse social situations, why isn't dissociative identity disorder more common?

Origins of social fusion.

Do instances of extreme self-sacrifice represent a valid paradigm to capture what makes typical individuals fuse with others? Probably not, because they can be viewed as aberrant phenomena. To understand the origins and mechanisms of human social fusion, one should first look at the development of babies and young children. Typical development represents the best alternative to Whitehouse's extreme model of social fusion.

Strong and strategic conformity understanding by 3- and 5-year-old children.

'Strong conformity' corresponds to the public endorsement of majority opinions that are in blatant contradiction to one's own correct perceptual judgements of the situation. We tested strong conformity inference by 3- and 5-year-old children using a third-person perspective paradigm. Results show that at neither age, children spontaneously expect that an ostracized third-party individual who wants to affiliate with the majority group will show strong conformity. However, when questioned as to what the ostracized individual should do to befriend others, from 5 years of age children explicitly demonstrate that they construe strong conformity as a strategic means of social affiliation. Additional data suggest that strong and strategic conformity understanding from an observer's third-person perspective is linked to the passing of the language-mediated false belief theory of mind task, an index of children's emerging 'meta' ability to construe the mental state of others. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? 'Strong conformity' corresponds to the public endorsement of majority opinions that are in blatant contradiction to one's own correct perceptual judgements of the situation. Asch's (1956, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 70, 1) classic demonstration of strong conformity with adults has been replicated with preschool children: 3- to 4-year-olds manifest signs of strong conformity by reversing about thirty to forty per cent of the time their correct perceptual judgements to fit with contradictory statements held unanimously by other individuals (Corriveau & Harris, 2010, Developmental Psychology, 46, 437; Corriveau et al., 2013, Journal of Cognition and Culture, 13, 367; Haun & Tomasello, 2011, Child Development, 82, 1759). As for adults, strong conformity does not obliterate children's own private, accurate knowledge of the situation. It is in essence a public expression to fit the group and alleviate social dissonance. What does this study add? In three experiments, we explored the developmental emergence in the preschool years of strong conformity inference from a third-person perspective. Results show that by 5 years of age, and not earlier, children begin to construe strong conformity as a strategy that someone should use to gain social affiliation, even though they do not anticipate that a third-party individual would necessarily resort to such strategy. Additional data suggest that strong and strategic conformity understanding from an observer's third-person perspective is linked to the passing of the language-mediated false belief theory of mind task.

Sources of implicit and explicit intergroup race bias among African-American children and young adults.

Implicit intergroup bias emerges early in development, are typically pro-ingroup, and remain stable across the lifespan. Such findings have been interpreted in terms of an automatic ingroup bias similar to what is observed with minimal groups paradigms. These studies are typically conducted with groups of high cultural standing (e.g., Caucasians in North America and Europe). Research conducted among culturally lower status groups (e.g., African-Americans, Latino-Americans) reveals a notable absence of an implicit ingroup bias. Understanding the environmental factors that contribute to the absence of an implicit ingroup bias among people from culturally lower status groups is critical for advancing theories of implicit intergroup cognition. The present study aimed to elucidate the factors that shape racial group bias among African-American children and young adults by examining their relationship with age, school composition (predominantly Black schools or racially mixed schools), parental racial attitudes and socialization messages among African-American children (N = 86) and young adults (N = 130). Age, school-type and parents' racial socialization messages were all found to be related to the strength of pro-Black (ingroup) bias. We also found that relationships between implicit and explicit bias and frequency of parents' racial socialization messages depended on the type of school participants attended. Our results highlight the importance of considering environmental factors in shaping the magnitude and direction of implicit and explicit race bias among African-Americans rather than treating them as a monolithic group.

Human Perception of Animacy in Light of the Uncanny Valley Phenomenon.

The uncanny valley hypothesis by Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori posits a nonlinear relation between human replicas' human likeness and the emotional responses they elicit. In three studies, we corroborated the uncanny valley hypothesis, using the uncanny phenomenon as a vehicle to shed a new light on human animacy perception. In Study 1, 62 participants rated emotional responses and human likeness of 89 artificial and human faces. In Study 2, another 62 participants conducted a visual looming task with the same 89 faces allowing for the measurement of perceived threat. Results support the uncanny valley hypothesis, suggesting that the uncanny feeling may serve a function to wary humans of the potential danger of entities crossing the animate-inanimate boundary. In Study 3, 36 participants sorted faces as either real or unreal as quickly as possible in a reaction time sorting task allowing for the measurement of categorical uncertainty associated with animacy perception. Faces associated with longer sorting reaction times were also those associated with the highest ratings of negative emotions, suggesting that categorical uncertainty in animacy detection is related to the uncanny feeling. Results are discussed in light of human animacy perception and new directions for future research are suggested.

Variations in judgments of intentional action and moral evaluation across eight cultures.

Individuals tend to judge bad side effects as more intentional than good side effects (the Knobe or side-effect effect). Here, we assessed how widespread these findings are by testing eleven adult cohorts of eight highly contrasted cultures on their attributions of intentional action as well as ratings of blame and praise. We found limited generalizability of the original side-effect effect, and even a reversal of the effect in two rural, traditional cultures (Samoa and Vanuatu) where participants were more likely to judge the good side effect as intentional. Three follow-up experiments indicate that this reversal of the side-effect effect is not due to semantics and may be linked to the perception of the status of the protagonist. These results highlight the importance of factoring cultural context in our understanding of moral cognition.

Similarities and Differences in Maternal Responsiveness in Three Societies: Evidence From Fiji, Kenya, and the United States.

The first relationship between an infant and her caregiver, typically the mother, lays the foundation for cognitive, social, and emotional development. Maternal responsiveness and affect mirroring have been studied extensively in Western societies yet very few studies have systematically examined these caregiving features in non-Western settings. Sixty-six mother-infant dyads (7 months, SD = 3.1) were observed in a small-scale, rural island society in Fiji, a village in Kenya, and an urban center in the United States. Mothers responded similarly to infant bids overall, but differences were found across societies in the ways mothers selectively respond to affective displays. This has implications for understanding early emotion socialization as well as understanding variation in infant social ecologies across the globe.

Empathy ≠ sharing: Perspectives from phenomenology and developmental psychology.

We argue that important insights regarding the topic of sharing can be gathered from phenomenology and developmental psychology; insights that in part challenge widespread ideas about what sharing is and where it can be found. To be more specific, we first exemplify how the notion of sharing is being employed in recent discussions of empathy, and then argue that this use of the notion tends to be seriously confused. It typically conflates similarity and sharing and, more generally speaking, fails to recognize that sharing proper involves reciprocity. As part of this critical analysis, we draw on sophisticated analyses of the distinction between empathy and emotional sharing that can be found in early phenomenology. Next, we turn to developmental psychology. Sharing is not simply one thing, but a complex and many-layered phenomenon. By tracing its early developmental trajectory from infancy and beyond, we show how careful psychological observations can help us develop a more sophisticated understanding of sharing than the one currently employed in many discussions in the realm of neuroscience. In our conclusion, we return to the issue of empathy and argue that although empathy does not involve or entail sharing, empathy understood as a basic sensitivity to and understanding of others (rather than as a special prosocial concern for others) might be a precondition for sharing.

Ownership reasoning in children across cultures.

To what extent do early intuitions about ownership depend on cultural and socio-economic circumstances? We investigated the question by testing reasoning about third party ownership conflicts in various groups of three- and five-year-old children (N=176), growing up in seven highly contrasted social, economic, and cultural circumstances (urban rich, poor, very poor, rural poor, and traditional) spanning three continents. Each child was presented with a series of scripts involving two identical dolls fighting over an object of possession. The child had to decide who of the two dolls should own the object. Each script enacted various potential reasons for attributing ownership: creation, familiarity, first contact, equity, plus a control/neutral condition with no suggested reasons. Results show that across cultures, children are significantly more consistent and decisive in attributing ownership when one of the protagonists created the object. Development between three and five years is more or less pronounced depending on culture. The propensity to split the object in equal halves whenever possible was generally higher at certain locations (i.e., China) and quasi-inexistent in others (i.e., Vanuatu and street children of Recife). Overall, creation reasons appear to be more primordial and stable across cultures than familiarity, relative wealth or first contact. This trend does not correlate with the passing of false belief theory of mind.

Ego function of morality and developing tensions that are "within".

We applaud Baumard et al.'s mutualistic account of morality but detect circularity in their articulation of how morality emerged. Contra the authors, we propose that mutualism might account for a sensitivity to convention (the ways things are done within a group) rather than for a sense of fairness. An ontogenetic perspective better captures the complexity of what it means to be moral.