Re-asserting the Specialness of Health Care.

Is health care "special"? That is, do we have moral reason to treat health care differently from how we treat other sorts of social goods? Intuitively, perhaps, we might think the proper response is "yes." However, to date, philosophers have often struggled to justify this idea-known as the "specialness thesis about health care" or STHC. In this article, I offer a new justification of STHC, one I take to be immune from objections that have undercut other defenses. Notably, unlike previous utility- and opportunity-based theories, I argue that we can find normative justification for STHC in what I term our special duty to assist those unable to help themselves. It is this duty, I argue, that ultimately gives us reason to treat health care differently from other sorts of goods (even other goods meeting health needs) and to distribute it independently of individuals' ability to pay.

Affordability and Non-Perfectionism in Moral Action.

One rationale policy-makers sometimes give for declining to fund a service or intervention is on the grounds that it would be 'unaffordable', which is to say, that the total cost of providing the service or intervention for all eligible recipients would exceed the budget limit. But does the mere fact that a service or intervention is unaffordable present a reason not to fund it? Thus far, the philosophical literature has remained largely silent on this issue. However, in this article, we consider this kind of thinking in depth. Albeit with certain important caveats, we argue that the use of affordability criteria in matters of public financing commits what Parfit might have called a 'mistake in moral mathematics'. First, it fails to abide by what we term a principle of 'non-perfectionism' in moral action: the mere fact that it is practically impossible for you to do all the good that you have reason to do does not present a reason not to do whatever good you can do. And second, when used as a means of arbitrating between which services to fund, affordability criteria can lead to a kind of 'numerical discrimination'. Various attendant issues around fairness and lotteries are also discussed.

Towards a More Particularist View of Rights' Stringency.

For all their various disagreements, one point upon which rights theorists often agree is that it is simply part of the nature of rights that they tend to override, outweigh or exclude competing considerations in moral reasoning, that they have 'peremptory force' (Raz in The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 192), making 'powerful demands' that can only be overridden in 'exceptional circumstances' (Miller, in Cruft, Liao, Renzo (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 240). In this article I challenge this thought. My aim here is not to prove that the traditional view of rights' stringency is necessarily false, nor even that we have no good reason to believe it is true. Rather, my aim is only to show that we have good reason to think that the foundation of the traditional position is less stable than we might have otherwise supposed and that an alternative conception of rights-one which takes the stringency of any given right as particular to the kind of right it is-is both viable and attractive. In short, to begin to move us towards a more 'particularist' conception of rights' standing in moral reasoning and judgement.

Tying oneself to the mast: One necessary cost to morally enhancing oneself biomedically.

In this article I seek to establish what, if anything, might be morally troubling about morally enhancing oneself through biomedical means. Building on arguments by Harris, while simultaneously acknowledging several valid counter-arguments that have been put forth by his critics, I argue that taking BMEs necessarily incurs at least one moral cost in the restrictions they impose on our freedom. This does not necessarily entail that the use of BMEs cannot be overall justified, nor that, in certain cases, their costs may not be forestalled. It does show, however, that their use is not morally neutral. There is a cost to such technologies and, as such, the onus will always be on their defenders to show that these costs can compensated for.

Self-tests for influenza: an empirical ethics investigation.

BACKGROUND: In this article we aim to assess the ethical desirability of self-test diagnostic kits for influenza, focusing in particular on the potential benefits and challenges posed by a new, mobile phone-based tool currently being developed by i-sense, an interdisciplinary research collaboration based (primarily) at University College London and funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. METHODS: Our study adopts an empirical ethics approach, supplementing an initial review into the ethical considerations posed by such technologies with qualitative data from three focus groups. RESULTS: Overall, we map a range of possible considerations both for and against the use of such technologies, synthesizing evidence from a range of secondary literature, as well as identifying several new considerations previously overlooked. CONCLUSIONS: We argue that no single consideration marks these technologies as either entirely permissible or impermissible but rather tools which have the potential to incur certain costs and benefits, and that context is important in determining these. In the latter stages of the article, we explain how developers of such technologies might seek to mitigate such costs and reflect on the possible limitations of the empirical ethics method brought out during the study. TRIAL REGISTRATION: Not applicable.

Public Reasoning and Health-Care Priority Setting: The Case of NICE.

Health systems that aim to secure universal patient access through a scheme of prepayments-whether through taxes, social insurance, or a combination of the two-need to make decisions on the scope of coverage that they guarantee: such tasks often falling to a priority-setting agency. This article analyzes the decision-making processes at one such agency in particular-the UK's National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)-and appraises their ethical justifiability. In particular, we consider the extent to which NICE's model can be justified on the basis of Rawls's conception of "reasonableness." This test shares certain features with the well-known Accountability for Reasonableness (AfR) model but also offers an alternative to it, being concerned with how far the values used by priority-setting agencies such as NICE meet substantive conditions of reasonableness irrespective of their procedural virtues. We find that while there are areas in which NICE's processes may be improved, NICE's overall approach to evaluating health technologies and setting priorities for health-care coverage is a reasonable one, making it an exemplar for other health-care systems facing similar coverage dilemmas. In so doing we offer both a framework for analysing the ethical justifiability of NICE's processes and one that might be used to evaluate others.

On Engster's care-justification of the specialness thesis about healthcare.

To say health is 'special' is to say that it has a moral significance that differentiates it from other goods (cars, say or radios) and, as a matter of justice, warrants distributing it separately. In this essay, I critique a new justification for the specialness thesis about healthcare (STHC) recently put forth by Engster. I argue that, regrettably, Engster's justification of STHC ultimately fails and fails on much the same grounds as have previous justifications of STHC. However, I also argue that Engster's argument still adds something valuable to the debate around STHC insofar as it reminds us that the moral significance of healthcare may be wider than simply its effect on the incidence of disability and disease: one further reason we may think healthcare is morally significant is because it concerns the treatment and care of those who are already unwell.

Reasonable disagreement and the generally unacceptable: a philosophical analysis of Making Fair Choices.

In this article we consider the conclusions and recommendations of the World Health Organisation's report Making Fair Choices from a philosophical perspective. In particular we reflect on the report's return to substantive claims about justice in the allocation of health care resources and its argument that certain trade-offs are 'generally unacceptable'.

Improving productive efficiency in hospitals: findings from a review of the international evidence.

At present, health systems across Europe face the same challenges: a changing demographic profile, a rise in multi-morbidity and long-term conditions, increasing health care costs, large public debts and other legacies of an economic downturn. In light of these concerns, this article provides an overview of the international evidence on how to improve productive efficiency in secondary care settings. Updating and expanding upon a recent review of the literature by Hurst and Williams (2012), we set out evidence on potential interventions in the policy environment, hospital management, and operational processes. We conclude with five key lessons for policy makers and practitioners on how to improve productive efficiency within hospital settings, and identify several gaps in the existing evidence base.

Structures and processes for priority-setting by health-care funders: a national survey of primary care trusts in England.

Although explicit priority-setting is advocated in the health services literature and supported by the policies of many governments, relatively little is known about the extent and ways in which this is carried out at local decision-making levels. Our objective was to undertake a survey of local resource allocaters in the English National Health Services in order to map and explore current priority-setting activity. A national survey was sent to Directors of Commissioning in English Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). The survey was designed to provide a picture of the types of priority-setting activities and techniques that are in place and offer some assessment of their perceived effectiveness. There is variation in the scale, aims and methods of priority-setting functions across PCTs. A perceived strength of priority-setting processes is in relation to the use of particular tools and/or development of formal processes that are felt to increase transparency. Perceived weaknesses tended to lie in the inability to sufficiently engage with a range of stakeholders. Although a number of formal priority-setting processes have been developed, there are a series of remaining challenges such as ensuring priority-setting goes beyond the margins and is embedded in budget management, and the development of disinvestment as well as investment strategies. Furthermore, if we are genuinely interested in a more explicit approach to priority-setting, then fostering a more inclusive and transparent process will be required.

Priority-setting and rationing in healthcare: evidence from the English experience.

In a context of ever increasing demand, the recent economic downturn has placed further pressure on decision-makers to effectively target healthcare resources. Over recent years there has been a push to develop more explicit evidence-based priority-setting processes, which aim to be transparent and inclusive in their approach and a number of analytical tools and sources of evidence have been developed and utilised at national and local levels. This paper reports findings from a qualitative research study which investigated local priority-setting activity across five English Primary Care Trusts, between March and November 2012. Findings demonstrate the dual aims of local decision-making processes: to improve the overall effectiveness of priority-setting (i.e. reaching 'correct' resource allocation decisions); and to increase the acceptability of priority-setting processes for those involved in both decision-making and implementation. Respondents considered priority-setting processes to be compartmentalised and peripheral to resource planning and allocation. Further progress was required with regard to disinvestment and service redesign with respondents noting difficulty in implementing decisions. While local priority-setters had begun to develop more explicit processes, public awareness and input remained limited. The leadership behaviours required to navigate the political complexities of working within and across organisations with differing incentives systems and cultures remained similarly underdeveloped.

Social value judgments in healthcare: a philosophical critique.

PURPOSE: The purpose of this paper is to consider some of the philosophical and bioethical issues raised by the creation of the draft social values framework developed to facilitate data collection and country-specific presentations at the inaugural workshop on "Social values and health priority setting" held in February 2011. DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: Conceptual analysis is used to analyse the term "social values", as employed in the framework, and its relationship to related ideas such as moral values. The structure of the framework (process and content values) is considered in light of current debate in philosophy and bioethics about the political and moral aims served by these kinds of values, and the extent to which they are either suited to, or sufficient for, the policy context. FINDINGS: There is much to be gained by engaging with the arguments presented in the philosophical literature in order to further refine the framework. The framework should remain neutral in respect of the importance of procedural values in different contexts and should be as inclusive as possible in respect of the principles it includes. Further development would be best served by taking a multidisciplinary approach. The framework could provide a valuable space in which future debates about procedural/substantive values can be considered. ORIGINALITY/VALUE: The paper brings philosophical and bioethics perspectives to bear on a new framework proposed for the analysis of social values in health priority setting. It identifies how such a practical, policy-focused framework might be informed by engagement with deeper, and often unresolved, questions or principle around resource allocation in health.