Science Communication as a Collective Intelligence Endeavor: A Manifesto and Examples for Implementation.

Effective science communication is challenging when scientific messages are informed by a continually updating evidence base and must often compete against misinformation. We argue that we need a new program of science communication as collective intelligence-a collaborative approach, supported by technology. This would have four key advantages over the typical model where scientists communicate as individuals: scientific messages would be informed by (a) a wider base of aggregated knowledge, (b) contributions from a diverse scientific community, (c) participatory input from stakeholders, and (d) better responsiveness to ongoing changes in the state of knowledge.

How Should the US Federal Government Oversee Clinicians' Relationships With Industry?

Many clinicians, including those who work in government, experience potential clashes between their professional responsibilities and personal interests that can create conflicts of interest (COIs). Some clinicians might assert that their personal stakes do not influence their professional actions, but data suggest otherwise. This commentary on a case suggests that COIs must be acknowledged with sincerity and managed such that they are eliminated or, at least, credibly mitigated. Moreover, policies and procedures that guide responses to clinicians' COIs must be in place before clinicians assume roles in government. Without external accountability and respect for the limits of self-regulation, clinicians' capacity to reliably promote the public interest without bias could be compromised.

When Science Becomes Embroiled in Conflict: Recognizing the Public's Need for Debate while Combating Conspiracies and Misinformation.

Most democracies seek input from scientists to inform policies. This can put scientists in a position of intense scrutiny. Here we focus on situations in which scientific evidence conflicts with people's worldviews, preferences, or vested interests. These conflicts frequently play out through systematic dissemination of disinformation or the spreading of conspiracy theories, which may undermine the public's trust in the work of scientists, muddy the waters of what constitutes truth, and may prevent policy from being informed by the best available evidence. However, there are also instances in which public opposition arises from legitimate value judgments and lived experiences. In this article, we analyze the differences between politically-motivated science denial on the one hand, and justifiable public opposition on the other. We conclude with a set of recommendations on tackling misinformation and understanding the public's lived experiences to preserve legitimate democratic debate of policy.

Ten considerations for effectively managing the COVID-19 transition.

Governments around the world have implemented measures to manage the transmission of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). While the majority of these measures are proving effective, they have a high social and economic cost, and response strategies are being adjusted. The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends that communities should have a voice, be informed and engaged, and participate in this transition phase. We propose ten considerations to support this principle: (1) implement a phased approach to a 'new normal'; (2) balance individual rights with the social good; (3) prioritise people at highest risk of negative consequences; (4) provide special support for healthcare workers and care staff; (5) build, strengthen and maintain trust; (6) enlist existing social norms and foster healthy new norms; (7) increase resilience and self-efficacy; (8) use clear and positive language; (9) anticipate and manage misinformation; and (10) engage with media outlets. The transition phase should also be informed by real-time data according to which governmental responses should be updated.

Mind the (information) gap: Strategic nondisclosure by marketers and interventions to increase consumer deliberation.

Marketers have a choice of what to tell consumers and consumers must consider what they are told or not told. Across 6 experiments, we show that consumers fail to differentiate between deliberate and nondeliberate missing information (strategic naiveté) and make generous inferences when they do notice missing information is deliberately withheld (charitability). We also show how marketers can take advantage of this by withholding information. We investigate both sides to (a) show the effects of interventions to encourage consumers to consider deliberate nondisclosure in a less naïve and charitable fashion, (b) demonstrate when marketers should disclose (or not) if consumers are naïve and charitable (i.e., breakeven points), and (c) explore the reasons marketers give for (non)disclosure and consumers' thoughts on why information is missing. Consumers respond differently to distinct but theoretically equivalent framings that increase the salience of nondisclosure. Only when nondisclosure was highly salient, and consumers could compare multiple profiles side by side did consumers believe the nondisclosed information to be the worst possible. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Insinuation Anxiety: Concern That Advice Rejection Will Signal Distrust After Conflict of Interest Disclosures.

When expert advisors have conflicts of interest, disclosure is a common regulatory response. In four experiments (three scenario experiments involving medical contexts, and one field experiment involving financial consequences for both parties), we show that disclosure of a financial or nonfinancial conflict of interest can have a perverse effect on the advisor-advisee relationship. Disclosure, perhaps naturally, decreases an advisee's trust in the advice. But disclosure can also lead to concern that failure to follow advice will be interpreted as a signal of distrust. That is, rejecting the advice could suggest that the advisee is insinuating that the advisor could be biased by the conflict of interest. We show that this insinuation anxiety persists whether the disclosure is voluntary or required by law and whether the disclosed conflict is big or small, but it diminishes when the disclosure is made by an external source rather than directly by the advisor.

A call for more science in forensic science.

Forensic science is critical to the administration of justice. The discipline of forensic science is remarkably complex and includes methodologies ranging from DNA analysis to chemical composition to pattern recognition. Many forensic practices developed under the auspices of law enforcement and were vetted primarily by the legal system rather than being subjected to scientific scrutiny and empirical testing. Beginning in the 1990s, exonerations based on DNA-related methods revealed problems with some forensic disciplines, leading to calls for major reforms. This process generated a National Academy of Science report in 2009 that was highly critical of many forensic practices and eventually led to the establishment of the National Commission for Forensic Science (NCFS) in 2013. The NCFS was a deliberative body that catalyzed communication between nonforensic scientists, forensic scientists, and other stakeholders in the legal community. In 2017, despite continuing problems with forensic science, the Department of Justice terminated the NCFS. Just when forensic science needs the most support, it is getting the least. We urge the larger scientific community to come to the aid of our forensic colleagues by advocating for urgently needed research, testing, and financial support.

The Effects of Public Disclosure of Industry Payments to Physicians on Patient Trust: A Randomized Experiment.

BACKGROUND: Financial ties between physicians and the pharmaceutical and medical device industry are common, but little is known about how patient trust is affected by these ties. OBJECTIVE: The purpose of this study was to evaluate how viewing online public disclosure of industry payments affects patients' trust ratings for physicians, the medical profession, and the pharmaceutical and medical device industry. DESIGN: This was a randomized experimental evaluation. PARTICIPANTS: There were 278 English-speaking participants over age 18 who had seen a healthcare provider in the previous 12 months who took part in the study. INTERVENTIONS: Participants searched for physicians on an online disclosure database, viewed payments from industry to the physicians, and assigned trust ratings. Participants were randomized to view physicians who received no payment ($0), low payment ($250-300), or high payment (>$13,000) from industry, or to a control arm in which they did not view the disclosure website. They also were asked to search for and then rate trust in their own physician. MAIN MEASURES: Primary outcomes were trust in individual physician, medical profession, and industry. These scales measure trust as a composite of honesty, fidelity, competence, and global trust. KEY RESULTS: Compared to physicians who received no payments, physicians who received payments over $13,000 received lower ratings for honesty [mean (SD): 3.36 (0.86) vs. 2.75 (0.95), p < 0.001] and fidelity [3.19 (0.65) vs. 2.89 (0.68), p = 0.01]. Among the 7.9% of participants who found their own physician on the website, ratings for honesty and fidelity decreased as the industry payment to the physician increased (honesty: Spearman's ρ = -0.52, p = 0.02; fidelity: Spearman's ρ = -0.55, p = 0.01). Viewing the disclosure website did not affect trust ratings for the medical profession or industry. CONCLUSIONS: Disclosure of industry payments to physicians affected perceptions of individual physician honesty and fidelity, but not perceptions of competence. Disclosure did not affect trust ratings for the medical profession or the pharmaceutical and medical device industry. ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT02179632 ( https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT02179632 ).

Association Between Academic Medical Center Pharmaceutical Detailing Policies and Physician Prescribing.

IMPORTANCE: In an effort to regulate physician conflicts of interest, some US academic medical centers (AMCs) enacted policies restricting pharmaceutical representative sales visits to physicians (known as detailing) between 2006 and 2012. Little is known about the effect of these policies on physician prescribing. OBJECTIVE: To analyze the association between detailing policies enacted at AMCs and physician prescribing of actively detailed and not detailed drugs. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: The study used a difference-in-differences multivariable regression analysis to compare changes in prescribing by physicians before and after implementation of detailing policies at AMCs in 5 states (California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York) that made up the intervention group with changes in prescribing by a matched control group of similar physicians not subject to a detailing policy. EXPOSURES: Academic medical center implementation of policies regulating pharmaceutical salesperson visits to attending physicians. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: The monthly within-drug class market share of prescriptions written by an individual physician for detailed and nondetailed drugs in 8 drug classes (lipid-lowering drugs, gastroesophageal reflux disease drugs, diabetes drugs, antihypertensive drugs, hypnotic drugs approved for the treatment of insomnia [sleep aids], attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder drugs, antidepressant drugs, and antipsychotic drugs) comparing the 10- to 36-month period before implementation of the detailing policies with the 12- to 36-month period after implementation, depending on data availability. RESULTS: The analysis included 16 121 483 prescriptions written between January 2006 and June 2012 by 2126 attending physicians at the 19 intervention group AMCs and by 24 593 matched control group physicians. The sample mean market share at the physician-drug-month level for detailed and nondetailed drugs prior to enactment of policies was 19.3% and 14.2%, respectively. Exposure to an AMC detailing policy was associated with a decrease in the market share of detailed drugs of 1.67 percentage points (95% CI, -2.18 to -1.18 percentage points; P < .001) and an increase in the market share of nondetailed drugs of 0.84 percentage points (95% CI, 0.54 to 1.14 percentage points; P < .001). Associations were statistically significant for 6 of 8 study drug classes for detailed drugs (lipid-lowering drugs, gastroesophageal reflux disease drugs, antihypertensive drugs, sleep aids, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder drugs, and antidepressant drugs) and for 9 of the 19 AMCs that implemented policies. Eleven of the 19 AMCs regulated salesperson gifts to physicians, restricted salesperson access to facilities, and incorporated explicit enforcement mechanisms. For 8 of these 11 AMCs, there was a significant change in prescribing. In contrast, there was a significant change at only 1 of 8 AMCs that did not enact policies in all 3 areas. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: Implementation of policies at AMCs that restricted pharmaceutical detailing between 2006 and 2012 was associated with modest but significant reductions in prescribing of detailed drugs across 6 of 8 major drug classes; however, changes were not seen in all of the AMCs that enacted policies.

Effect of physician disclosure of specialty bias on patient trust and treatment choice.

This paper explores the impact of disclosures of bias on advisees. Disclosure-informing advisees of a potential bias-is a popular solution for managing conflicts of interest. Prior research has focused almost exclusively on disclosures of financial conflicts of interest but little is known about how disclosures of other types of biases could impact advisees. In medicine, for example, physicians often recommend the treatment they specialize in; e.g., surgeons are more likely to recommend surgery than nonsurgeons. In recognition of this bias, some physicians inform patients about their specialty bias when other similarly effective treatment options exist. Using field data (recorded transcripts of surgeon-patient consultations) from Veteran Affairs hospitals and a randomized controlled laboratory experiment, we examine and find that disclosures of specialty bias increase patients' trust and their likelihood of choosing a treatment in accordance with the physicians' specialty. Physicians in the field also increased the strength of their recommendation to have the specialty treatment when they disclosed their bias or discussed the opportunity for the patient to seek a consultation with a physician from another specialty. These findings have important implications for handling advisor bias, shared advisor-advisee decision-making, and disclosure policies.

Nothing to declare: mandatory and voluntary disclosure leads advisors to avoid conflicts of interest.

Professionals face conflicts of interest when they have a personal interest in giving biased advice. Mandatory disclosure--informing consumers of the conflict--is a widely adopted strategy in numerous professions, such as medicine, finance, and accounting. Prior research has shown, however, that such disclosures have little impact on consumer behavior, and can backfire by leading advisors to give even more biased advice. We present results from three experiments with real monetary stakes. These results show that, although disclosure has generally been found to be ineffective for dealing with unavoidable conflicts of interest, it can be beneficial when providers have the ability to avoid conflicts. Mandatory and voluntary disclosure can deter advisors from accepting conflicts of interest so that they have nothing to disclose except the absence of conflicts. We propose that people are averse to being viewed as biased, and that policies designed to activate reputational and ethical concerns will motivate advisors to avoid conflicts of interest.

Physicians under the influence: social psychology and industry marketing strategies.

Pharmaceutical and medical device companies apply social psychology to influence physicians' prescribing behavior and decision making. Physicians fail to recognize their vulnerability to commercial influences due to self-serving bias, rationalization, and cognitive dissonance. Professionalism offers little protection; even the most conscious and genuine commitment to ethical behavior cannot eliminate unintentional, subconscious bias. Six principles of influence - reciprocation, commitment, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity - are key to the industry's routine marketing strategies, which rely on the illusion that the industry is a generous avuncular partner to physicians. In order to resist industry influence, physicians must accept that they are vulnerable to subconscious bias and have both the motivation and means to resist industry influence. A culture in which accepting industry gifts engenders shame rather than gratitude will reduce conflicts of interest. If greater academic prestige accrues to distant rather than close relationships with industry, then a new social norm may emerge that promotes patient care and scientific integrity. In addition to educating faculty and students about the social psychology underlying sophisticated but potentially manipulative marketing and about how to resist it, academic medical institutions should develop strong organizational policies to counteract the medical profession's improper dependence on industry.

Disclosing conflicts of interest in patient decision aids.

BACKGROUND: In 2005, the International Patient Decisions Aid Standards (IPDAS) Collaboration developed quality criteria for patient decisions aids; one of the quality dimensions dealt with disclosure of conflicts of interest (COIs). The purposes of this paper are to review newer evidence on dealing with COI in the development of patient decision aids and to readdress the theoretical justification and definition for this quality dimension. METHODS: The committee conducted a primary systematic literature review to seek published research addressing the question, "What is the evidence that disclosure of COIs in patient decision aids reduces biased decision making?" A secondary literature review included a systematic search for recent meta-analyses addressing COIs in other spheres of health care, including research and publication, medical education, and clinical care. RESULTS: No direct evidence was found addressing this quality dimension in the primary literature review. The secondary review yielded a comprehensive Institute of Medicine report, as well as four relevant meta-analyses addressing disclosure of COIs in health care. They revealed a broad consensus that disclosure of COIs is desirable in such areas as research publication, guideline development, medical education, and clinical care. CONCLUSIONS: The committee recommends the criteria that are currently used to operationally define the quality dimension "disclosing conflicts of interest" be changed as follows (changes in italics): Does the patient decision aid: • report prominently and in plain language the source of funding to develop or exclusively distribute the patient decision aid? • report prominently and in plain language whether funders, authors, or their affiliations, stand to gain or lose by choices patients make after using the patient decision aid? Furthermore, based on a consensus that simple disclosure is insufficient to protect users from potentially biased information, the committee recommends that the IPDAS Collaboration consider adding the following criterion when the IPDAS consensus process is next conducted: "Does the patient decision aid: • report that no funding to develop or exclusively distribute the patient decision aid has been received from commercial, for-profit entities that sell tests or treatments included as options in the patient decision aid?"