Distrusting the Process: Electoral Trust, Operational Ideology, and Nonvoting Political Participation in the 2020 American Electorate.

This article explores the relationships between electoral trust, operational ideology, and nonvoting political participation (NVP) during the 2020 US presidential election cycle. We hypothesize that: (1) more liberal operational ideology is associated with more NVP, (2) less electoral trust is associated with more NVP, and (3) operational ideology moderates the negative relationship between electoral trust and NVP. Using data from the 2020 American National Election Study (N = 8,280), our contribution is threefold: We first add to previous research that indicated liberals engage in more NVP than conservatives. We then provide some of the first evidence to suggest that electoral trust-in this case, trust prior to the 2020 election-is negatively associated with NVP. Results further indicate that the negative relationship between electoral trust and NVP is strongest among those with conservative operational ideology, such that the more trust those with conservative operational ideology have in the election, the less they engage in NVP. Given that electoral trust is crucial for a well-functioning democracy, the implication is that elites with a strategic incentive to express contempt for the election process can have direct and downstream consequences on political participation.

Objective numeracy exacerbates framing effects from decision-making under political risk.

While Prospect Theory helps to explain decision-making under risk, studies often base frames on hypothetical events and fail to acknowledge that many individuals lack the ability and motivation to engage in complex thinking. We use an original survey of US adults (N = 2813) to test Prospect Theory in the context of the May 2023 debt ceiling negotiations in the US Congress and assess whether objective numeracy moderates framing effects. We hypothesize and find evidence to suggest that most respondents are risk-averse to potential gains and risk-accepting to potential losses; however, high numerates are more risk-averse and risk-accepting to gains and losses, respectively, than low numerates. We also find that need for cognition interacts with numeracy to moderate framing effects for prospective losses, such that higher need for cognition attenuates risk-acceptance among low numerates and exacerbates risk-acceptance among high numerates. Our results are robust to a range of other covariates and in models accounting for the interaction between political knowledge and need for cognition, indicating joint moderating effects from two knowledge domains similarly conditioned by the desire to engage in effortful thinking. Our findings demonstrate that those who can understand and use objective information may remain subjectively persuaded by certain policy frames.