Should Doctor Robot possess moral empathy?

Critics of clinical artificial intelligence (AI) suggest that the technology is ethically harmful because it may lead to the dehumanization of the doctor-patient relationship (DPR) by eliminating moral empathy, which is viewed as a distinctively human trait. The benefits of clinical empathy-that is, moral empathy applied in the clinical context-are widely praised, but this praise is often unquestioning and lacks context. In this article, I will argue that criticisms of clinical AI based on appeals to empathy are misplaced. As psychological and philosophical research has shown, empathy leads to certain types of biased reasoning and choices. These biases of empathy consistently impact the DPR. Empathy may lead to partial judgments and asymmetric DPRs, as well as disparities in the treatment of patients, undermining respect for patient autonomy and equality. Engineers should consider the flaws of empathy when designing affective artificial systems in the future. The nature of sympathy and compassion (i.e., displaying emotional concern while maintaining some balanced distance) has been defended by some ethicists as more beneficial than perspective-taking in the clinical context. However, these claims do not seem to have impacted the AI debate. Thus, this article will also argue that if machines are programmed for affective behavior, they should also be given some ethical scaffolding.

Edvard Munch's crisis in 1908 and French medicine: His doctors, treatments, and sources of information.

In 1908, Norwegian artist Edvard Munch-already famous for The Scream and other paintings showing sickness, despair, and suffering-put himself under the care of Dr. Daniel Jacobson, a nerve doctor in Copenhagen. Jacobson had previously attended some of Jean-Martin Charcot's lectures in Paris, as had Knud Pontoppidan, his mentor. Munch, in turn, had long been showing signs and symptoms of an anxiety disorder and what might have been viewed as neurasthenia or hysteria. Now, he also seemed to be suffering from acute alcoholic toxicity. In this article, we explore Scandinavian psychiatry at the turn of the century; Jacobson and Pontoppidan's connections to Paris; and how some of Munch's treatments, most notably his electrotherapy sessions, related to therapeutics at La Salpêtrière. Additionally, various ways in which Munch learned about French medicine are examined. This material reveals how well-known and influential Charcot and his ideas about disorders of the brain and mind had become at the turn of the century, affecting not just the French physicians but also a world-famous artist and his nerve doctor in Scandinavia.

The electrified artist: Edvard Munch's demons, treatments, and sketch of an electrotherapy session (1908-1909).

In 1908-1909, Norwegian artist Edvard Munch (1863-1944), best remembered for The Scream (1893), spent eight months under Daniel Jacobson's care in a private nerve clinic in Copenhagen. Munch was suffering from alcohol abuse, and his signs and symptoms included auditory hallucinations, persecutory delusions, paresthesias, paralyses, violent mood swings, depression, loss of control, fatigue, and the loss of his basic ability to take care of himself. He was treated with rest, a fortifying diet, massages, baths, fresh air, limited exercise, and nonconvulsive electrotherapy. After he had settled in, Jacobson allowed Munch to draw, paint, and engage in photography. Munch responded with a portrait of Jacobson and a small but intriguing sketch of himself at one of his electrotherapy sessions. In this article, we examine the circumstances that brought Munch to Jacobson's clinic and his therapies, with particular attention to electrotherapies. In so doing, we hope to provide a more complete picture of Munch's crisis in 1908, his nerve doctor, the rationales for medical electricity and other treatments he endured, and Scandinavian psychiatry at this moment in time.

The Moralizing Effect: self-directed emotions and their impact on culpability attributions.

Introduction: A general trend in the psychological literature suggests that guilt contributes to morality more than shame does. Unlike shame-prone individuals, guilt-prone individuals internalize the causality of negative events, attribute responsibility in the first person, and engage in responsible behavior. However, it is not known how guilt- and shame-proneness interact with the attribution of responsibility to others. Methods: In two Web-based experiments, participants reported their attributions of moral culpability (i.e., responsibility, causality, punishment and decision-making) about morally ambiguous acts of killing in different conditions. In Study 1 the vignettes were presented in the 1st person, while in Study 2 in the 3rd person. To test proneness to guilt and shame, we utilized the GASP scale, which differentiates between the affective and behavioral components of each emotion. Statistical analyses were performed in Matlab and R. Results: We found that guilt- and shame-proneness were associated with the severity of attributions in both the first and the third person, but the effect was strong only in the guilt case (both subtypes) and shame-affect case, and not in the shame-behavior case. We call this the Moralizing Effect. Discussion: We wonder whether our finding that guilt-prone people tend to attribute a higher degree of culpability to others is really consistent with the view that guilt motivates people to choose the "moral paths in life". This echoes views about the harmful aspects of guilt, which have been expressed historically in philosophy, for example, by Friedrich Nietzsche.

The ecological benefits of being irrationally moral.

Trolley-like dilemmas are other cases of what Bermúdez refers to as (conscious) quasi-cyclical preferences. In these dilemmas, identical outcomes are obtained through morally non-identical actions. I will argue that morality is the context where descriptive invariance and ecological relevance may be crucially distinguished. Logically irrational moral choices in the short term may promote greater social benefits in the longer term.

Electroconvulsive Therapy Applications on Children in the 1940s: The Italian Case.

ABSTRACT: The existence of pediatric applications of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) in the 1940s in Italy has been neglected by international literature. However, 2 case reports by Ferdinando Accornero and Mario Anderson, both assistants of Ugo Cerletti at the Sapienza Clinic for Nervous and Mental Diseases, should be brought to the attention of historians of ECT. The work presented therein began in Rome in September 1940, approximately at the same time of the first reported ECT administration on a child in Bristol, United Kingdom. The 2 reports described applications on 19 children and adolescents during 3 different sessions (1940-1941, 1944-1947, and 1947-1949), with a 3-year-long interruption due to the circumstances of World War II. Unfortunately, this research appeared belatedly in 2 articles from 1948 and 1950, respectively, in an Italian journal with limited distribution, when more extensive research contributions on pediatric ECT had already received international exposure. The Italian reports may cast light on the progress made by the early generation of ECT researchers in the 1940s toward the refinement of ECT techniques and the subsequent identification of diagnostic indicators for ECT among children.

The electroshock triangle: disputes about the ECT apparatus prototype and its display in the 1960s.

In the early 1960s, a climate of public condemnation of electroconvulsive therapy was emerging in the USA and Europe. In spite of this, the electroshock apparatus prototype, introduced in Rome in 1938, was becoming hotly contended. This article explores the disputes around the display of the electroshock apparatus prototype in the summer of 1964 and sheds new light on the triangle of personalities that shaped its future: Karl and William Menninger, two key figures of American psychiatry in Topeka; their competitor, Adalberto Pazzini, the founder of the Sapienza Museum of the History of Medicine in Rome; and, between them, Lucio Bini, one of the original inventors of ECT, who died unexpectedly that summer.

[AGAINST PATERNALISTIC VIEWS ON NEUROENHANCEMENT: A LIBERTARIAN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT].

The term "enhancement" has come to represent a very precise form of improving individual skills. By means of pharmaceutics, surgery, and reproductive technology, all originally intended for clinical use, healthy individuals may improve their cognitive and emotional capacities for many reasons, such as to gain a competitive edge. In today's society, cognitive performance and mood assume a more relevant role than physical ability if one aspires to emerge above the average. In this paper, we present and discuss common views on "neuroenhancement," a term often used to describe the use of artificial means that interfer with brain function to improve cognitive skills. Most philosophical arguments and beliefs on the topic are based on some inappropriate distinctions and definitions which favour unfruitful alarmist attitudes and may obscure the complexity of the issue. In particular we point out that both radical prohibitionist and libertarian approaches are affected by paternalistic ideas which we refute. We also show that even though enhancement nowadays is occurring at an impressive rate, we cannot infer that it is a present-day phenomenon, because enhancement is a human disposition, shared between most species and has always existed. We argue against moralistic views on neuroenhancement and defend a reasoned libertarian perspective. We believe that case-by-case evolutionary-medical heuristics is the best approach to help individuals in their autonomous choices.

Scientific method, history, Darwinism and laicism: a Giovanni Jervis's intellectual biography.

Some authors marked a change of perspective from the early to the late Jervis's thought, in terms of a supposed turn towards conservatism. That laid him open to criticism from some Leftist Italian intellectuals. The aim of this paper is to show that conservatism never was a Jervis's thought feature. Mainly, subjects and methods leading the development of his philosophical views suggest a continuity between earlier writings and later ones. All over his thought, in fact, the idea of preeminence of scientific method and historical contextualization convinced him about naturalistic approaches to human behavior, which came to support his Darwinism and laicism in approaching socio-psychological and socio-political issues.