Conceptual anchoring dissociates implicit and explicit category learning.

Categorization researchers have long debated the possibility of multiple category-learning systems. The need persists for paradigms that dissociate explicit-declarative category-learning processes (featuring verbalizable category rules) from implicit-procedural processes (featuring stimulus-response associations lying beneath declarative cognition). The authors contribute a new paradigm, using perfectly matched exclusive-or (XOR) category tasks differing only in the availability or absence of easily verbalizable conceptual content. This manipulation transformed learning. The conceptual task alone was learned suddenly, by insightful rule discovery, producing explicit-declarative XOR knowledge. The perceptual task was learned more gradually, consistent with associative-learning processes, producing impoverished declarative knowledge. We also tested participants under regimens of immediate and deferred reinforcement. The conceptual task alone was learned through processes that survive the loss of trial-by-trial reinforcement. All results support the idea that humans have perceptual-associative processes for implicit learning, but also an overlain conceptual system that under the right circumstances constitutes a parallel explicit-declarative category-learning system. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Exploring Explicit Learning Strategies: A Dissociative Framework for Research.

To explain learning, comparative researchers invoke an associative construct by which immediate reinforcement strengthens animal's adaptive responses. In contrast, cognitive researchers freely acknowledge humans' explicit-learning capability to test and confirm hypotheses even lacking direct reinforcement. We describe a new dissociative framework that may stretch animals' learning toward the explicit pole of cognition. We discuss the neuroscience of reinforcement-based learning and suggest the possibility of disabling a dominant form of reinforcement-based discrimination learning. In that vacuum, researchers may have an opportunity to observe animals' explicit learning strategies (i.e., hypotheses, rules, task self-construals). We review initial research using this framework showing explicit learning by humans and perhaps by monkeys. Finally, we consider why complementary explicit and reinforcement-based learning systems might promote evolutionary and ecological fitness. Illuminating the evolution of parallel learning systems may also tell part of the story of the emergence of humans' extraordinary capacity for explicit-declarative cognition.

A Dissociative Framework for Understanding Same-Different Conceptualization.

Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been interested in humans' and animals' ability to respond to abstract relations. Cross-species research has used relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which participants try to find stimulus pairs that "match" because they express the same abstract relation (same or different). Researchers seek to understand the cognitive processes that underlie successful matching, and the cognitive constraints that create species differences in these tasks. Here we describe a dissociative framework drawn from cognitive neuroscience. It has strong potential to illuminate the area of same-different conceptualization. It has already influenced comparative research on categorization and metacognition. This dissociative framework also shows that species differences in same-different conceptualization have resonance with species differences in other comparative domains.

Launch! Self-agency as a discriminative cue for humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca Mulatta).

Self-agency is a crucial aspect of self-awareness. It is underresearched given the phenomenon's subjectivity and difficulty of study. It is particularly underresearched comparatively, given that animals cannot receive agency instructions or make agency declarations. Accordingly, we developed a distinctively new self-agency paradigm. Humans and rhesus macaques learned event categories differentiated by whether the participant's volitional response controlled a screen launch. They learned by trial and error after minimal instructions with no agency orientation (humans) or no instructions (monkeys). After learning, humans' verbalized category descriptions were coded for self-agency attributions. Across three experiments, humans' agency attributions qualitatively improved discrimination performance-participants not invoking self-agency rarely exceeded chance performance. It also produced a diagnostic latency profile: classification accuracy depended heavily on the temporal relationship between the button-press and the launch, but only for those invoking agency. In our last experiment, monkeys performed the launch task. Their performance and latency profiles mirrored that of humans. Thus, self-agency can be self-discovered as a frame organizing discrimination. And it may be used as a discrimination cue by some nonhuman animals as well. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) learn two-choice discriminations under displaced reinforcement.

To explain animal learning, researchers invoke a dominant associative construct. In contrast, researchers freely acknowledge humans' explicit-declarative learning capacity. Here, we stretched animals' learning performance toward the explicit pole of cognition. We tested four macaques (Macaca mulatta) in new discrimination-learning paradigms. Monkeys learned a series of two-choice discrimination tasks. But immediate reinforcement was denied. Instead, reinforcement was lagged-monkeys received feedback for trial N only after seeing and responding to the N + 1-trial stimulus. Theory suggests that lagged reinforcement will eliminate a dominant form of implicit discrimination learning. Yet monkeys still learned successfully. Thus, monkeys may have alternative learning algorithms usable when reinforcement is displaced and reinforcement learning undermined. This learning may, as in humans, take a more explicit form. This and related methods that disable associative learning-fostering a possible transition to explicit cognition-could have empirical utility and theoretical significance within comparative psychology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Dissociations between rule-based and information-integration categorization are not caused by differences in task difficulty.

In rule-based (RB) category-learning tasks, the optimal strategy is a simple explicit rule, whereas in information-integration (II) tasks, the optimal strategy is impossible to describe verbally. Many studies have reported qualitative dissociations between training and performance in RB and II tasks. Virtually all of these studies were testing predictions of the dual-systems model of category learning called COVIS. The most prominent alternative account to COVIS is that humans have one learning system that is used in all tasks, and that the observed dissociations occur because the II task is more difficult than the RB task. This article describes the first attempt to test this difficulty hypothesis against anything more than a single set of data. First, two novel predictions are derived that discriminate between the difficulty and multiple-systems hypotheses. Next, these predictions are tested against a wide variety of published categorization data. Overall, the results overwhelmingly reject the difficulty hypothesis and instead strongly favor the multiple-systems account of the many RB versus II dissociations.

Simultaneous versus prospective/retrospective uncertainty monitoring: The effect of response competition across cognitive levels.

Early animal-metacognition researchers singled out simultaneous metacognition paradigms for theoretical criticism, because these paradigms presented concretely rewarded perceptual responses and the metacognitive response simultaneously. This method potentially introduced associative cues into the situation that could confound the interpretation of the metacognitive response. Evaluating this possibility, we compared humans' metacognitive performances in simultaneous and nonsimultaneous (prospective, retrospective) paradigms that were otherwise identical. Results show that the metacognition response in these tasks is not prompted by associative cues arising from the simultaneous task format. To the contrary, the metacognitive response is used more robustly and accurately when it is removed from direct competition with the primary perceptual responses. Thus, early researchers were correct to judge that the nonsimultaneous paradigms tap metacognition more robustly and sensitively. However, this is probably true because the simultaneous paradigm mingles responses adjudicated on two different cognitive-processing levels. And, in that case, the metacognitive response can be outcompeted and suppressed by the salient presence of primary, concretely rewarded perceptual responses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Breaking the perceptual-conceptual barrier: Relational matching and working memory.

Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been interested in humans' and animals' ability to respond to abstract relations, as this ability may underlie important capacities like analogical reasoning. Cross-species research has used relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which participants try to find stimulus pairs that "match" because they both express the same abstract relation (same or different). Researchers seek to understand the cognitive processes that underlie successful matching performance. In the present RMTS paradigm, the abstract-relational cue was made redundant with a first-order perceptual cue. Then the perceptual cue faded, requiring participants to transition from a perceptual to a conceptual approach by realizing the task's abstract-relational affordance. We studied participants' ability to make this transition with and without a working-memory load. The concurrent load caused participants to fail to break the perceptual-conceptual barrier unless the load was abandoned. We conclude that finding the conceptual solution depends on reconstruing the task using cognitive processes that are especially reliant on working memory. Our data provide the closest existing look at this cognitive reorganization. They raise important theoretical issues for cross-species comparisons of relational cognition, especially regarding animals' limitations in this domain.

The Cognitive Architecture of Uncertainty.

The authors consider theory in the animal-metacognition literature. Theoretical interpretation was long dominated by associative descriptions, as illustrated in the 2009 special issue. We suggest that this approach risks a self-limiting understanding of animal mind, and an imprecise understanding of the cognitive requirements inherent in metacognition tasks. In fact, some tasks self-entail the need for higher-level decision-making processes, processes that-in humans-we would call explicit, declarative, and conscious. These points are illustrated using the inaugural study on dolphin metacognition. We urge researchers to turn more toward illuminating the cognitive architecture of capacities like metacognition, including illuminating the depth, and structure, the learning/memory systems, the cognitive levels, and the declarative awareness possibly present in animals' minds. The empirical development of this literature demonstrates that researchers are now prepared to do so. This study can produce strong synergies across the allied fields of biopsychology, comparative and cognitive psychology, and neuroscience.

Testing analogical rule transfer in pigeons (Columba livia).

Categorization is an essential cognitive process useful for transferring knowledge from previous experience to novel situations. The mechanisms by which trained categorization behavior extends to novel stimuli, especially in animals, are insufficiently understood. To understand how pigeons learn and transfer category membership, seven pigeons were trained to classify controlled, bi-dimensional stimuli in a two-alternative forced-choice task. Following either dimensional, rule-based (RB) or information integration (II) training, tests were conducted focusing on the "analogical" extension of the learned discrimination to novel regions of the stimulus space (Casale, Roeder, & Ashby, 2012). The pigeons' results mirrored those from human and non-human primates evaluated using the same analogical task structure, training and testing: the pigeons transferred their discriminative behavior to the new extended values following RB training, but not after II training. Further experiments evaluating rule-based models and association-based models suggested the pigeons use dimensions and associations to learn the task and mediate transfer to stimuli within the novel region of the parametric stimulus space.

I scan, therefore I decline: The time course of difficulty monitoring in humans (homo sapiens) and macaques (macaca mulatta).

The study of nonhumans' metacognitive judgments about trial difficulty has grown into an important comparative literature. However, the potential for associative-learning confounds in this area has left room for behaviorist interpretations that are strongly asserted and hotly debated. This article considers how researchers may be able to observe animals' strategic cognitive processes more clearly by creating temporally extended problems within which associative cues are not always immediately available. We asked humans and rhesus macaques to commit to completing spatially extended mazes or to decline completing them through a trial-decline response. The mazes could sometimes be completed successfully, but other times had a constriction that blocked completion. A deliberate, systematic scanning process could preevaluate a maze and determine the appropriate response. Latency analyses charted the time course of the evaluative process. Both humans and macaques appeared, from the pattern of their latencies, to scan the mazes through before committing to completing them. Thus monkeys, too, can base trial-decline responses on temporally extended evaluation processes, confirming that those responses have strategic cognitive-processing bases in addition to behavioral-reactive bases. The results also show the value of temporally and spatially extended problems to let researchers study the trajectory of animals' online cognitive processes. (PsycINFO Database Record

One-back reinforcement dissociates implicit-procedural and explicit-declarative category learning.

The debate over unitary/multiple category-learning utilities is reminiscent of debates about multiple memory systems and unitary/dual codes in knowledge representation. In categorization, researchers continue to seek paradigms to dissociate explicit learning processes (yielding verbalizable rules) from implicit learning processes (yielding stimulus-response associations that remain outside awareness). We introduce a new dissociation here. Participants learned matched category tasks with a multidimensional, information-integration solution or a one-dimensional, rule-based solution. They received reinforcement immediately (0-Back reinforcement) or after one intervening trial (1-Back reinforcement). Lagged reinforcement eliminated implicit, information-integration category learning but preserved explicit, rule-based learning. Moreover, information-integration learners facing lagged reinforcement spontaneously adopted explicit rule strategies that poorly suited their task. The results represent a strong process dissociation in categorization, broadening the range of empirical techniques for testing the multiple-process theoretical perspective. This and related methods that disable associative learning-fostering a transition to explicit-declarative cognition-could have broad utility in comparative, cognitive, and developmental science.

The transfer of category knowledge by macaques (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens).

Cognitive psychologists distinguish implicit, procedural category learning (stimulus-response associations learned outside declarative cognition) from explicit-declarative category learning (conscious category rules). These systems are dissociated by category learning tasks with either a multidimensional, information-integration (II) solution or a unidimensional, rule-based (RB) solution. In the present experiments, humans and two monkeys learned II and RB category tasks fostering implicit and explicit learning, respectively. Then they received occasional transfer trials-never directly reinforced-drawn from untrained regions of the stimulus space. We hypothesized that implicit-procedural category learning-allied to associative learning-would transfer weakly because it is yoked to the training stimuli. This result was confirmed for humans and monkeys. We hypothesized that explicit category learning-allied to abstract category rules-would transfer robustly. This result was confirmed only for humans. That is, humans displayed explicit category knowledge that transferred flawlessly. Monkeys did not. This result illuminates the distinctive abstractness, stimulus independence, and representational portability of humans' explicit category rules. (PsycINFO Database Record

Dissociable learning processes in comparative psychology.

Comparative and cognitive psychologists interpret performance in different ways. Animal researchers invoke a dominant construct of associative learning. Human researchers acknowledge humans' capacity for explicit-declarative cognition. This article offers a way to bridge a divide that defeats productive cross-talk. We show that animals often challenge the associative-learning construct, and that it does not work to try to stretch the associative-learning construct to encompass these performances. This approach thins and impoverishes that important construct. We describe an alternative approach that restrains the construct of associative learning by giving it a clear operational definition. We apply this approach in several comparative domains to show that different task variants change-in concert-the level of awareness, the declarative nature of knowledge, the dimensional breadth of knowledge, and the brain systems that organize learning. These changes reveal dissociable learning processes that a unitary associative construct cannot explain but a neural-systems framework can explain. These changes define the limit of associative learning and the threshold of explicit cognition. The neural-systems framework can broaden empirical horizons in comparative psychology. It can offer animal models of explicit cognition to cognitive researchers and neuroscientists. It can offer simple behavioral paradigms for exploring explicit cognition to developmental researchers. It can enliven the synergy between human and animal research, promising a productive future for both.

Tin and Lead Phosphanido Complexes: Reactivity with Chalcogens.

The reactivity of tin and lead phosphanido complexes with chalogens is reported. The addition of sulfur to [(BDI)MPCy2] (M = Sn, Pb; BDI = CH{(CH3)CN-2,6-iPr2C6H3}2) results in the formation of phosphinodithioates [(BDI)MSP(S)Cy2] regardless of the conditions; however, when selenium is added to [(BDI)MPCy2], a selenium insertion product, phosphinoselenoite [(BDI)MSePCy2], can be isolated. This compound readily reacts with additional selenium to form the phosphinodiselenoate complex [(BDI)MSeP(Se)Cy2]. In contrast, the addition of selenium to [(BDI)SnP(SiMe3)2] results in the formation of the heavy ether [(BDI)SnSeSiMe3]. Differences in the solution and solid-state molecular species of tin phosphinoselenoite and phosphinodiselenoate complexes were probed using multinuclear solution and solid-state NMR spectroscopy.

Ecology, Fitness, Evolution: New Perspectives on Categorization.

Categorization's great debate has weighed single-system exemplar theory against the possibility of alternative processing systems. We take an evolutionary perspective toward this debate to illuminate it in a new way. Animals are crucial behavioral ambassadors to this area. They reveal the roots of human categorization, the basic assumptions of vertebrates entering category tasks, and the surprising weakness of exemplar memory as a category-learning strategy. These results have joined neuroscience results to prompt important changes in categorization theory. Categorization's great debate is ending. Categorization is served by multiple systems of process and representation.

Categorization: The View from Animal Cognition.

Exemplar, prototype, and rule theory have organized much of the enormous literature on categorization. From this theoretical foundation have arisen the two primary debates in the literature-the prototype-exemplar debate and the single system-multiple systems debate. We review these theories and debates. Then, we examine the contribution that animal-cognition studies have made to them. Animals have been crucial behavioral ambassadors to the literature on categorization. They reveal the roots of human categorization, the basic assumptions of vertebrates entering category tasks, the surprising weakness of exemplar memory as a category-learning strategy. They show that a unitary exemplar theory of categorization is insufficient to explain human and animal categorization. They show that a multiple-systems theoretical account-encompassing exemplars, prototypes, and rules-will be required for a complete explanation. They show the value of a fitness perspective in understanding categorization, and the value of giving categorization an evolutionary depth and phylogenetic breadth. They raise important questions about the internal similarity structure of natural kinds and categories. They demonstrate strong continuities with humans in categorization, but discontinuities, too. Categorization's great debates are resolving themselves, and to these resolutions animals have made crucial contributions.

Primate cognition: attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, self-control, and metacognition as examples of cognitive control in nonhuman primates.

Primate Cognition is the study of cognitive processes, which represent internal mental processes involved in discriminations, decisions, and behaviors of humans and other primate species. Cognitive control involves executive and regulatory processes that allocate attention, manipulate and evaluate available information (and, when necessary, seek additional information), remember past experiences to plan future behaviors, and deal with distraction and impulsivity when they are threats to goal achievement. Areas of research that relate to cognitive control as it is assessed across species include executive attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, metacognition, and self-control. Executive attention refers to the ability to control what sensory stimuli one attends to and how one regulates responses to those stimuli, especially in cases of conflict. Episodic memory refers to memory for personally experienced, autobiographical events. Prospective memory refers to the formation and implementation of future-intended actions, such as remembering what needs to be done later. Metacognition consists of control and monitoring processes that allow individuals to assess what information they have and what information they still need, and then if necessary to seek information. Self-control is a regulatory process whereby individuals forego more immediate or easier to obtain rewards for more delayed or harder to obtain rewards that are objectively more valuable. The behavioral complexity shown by nonhuman primates when given tests to assess these capacities indicates psychological continuities with human cognitive control capacities. However, more research is needed to clarify the proper interpretation of these behaviors with regard to possible cognitive constructs that may underlie such behaviors. WIREs Cogn Sci 2016, 7:294-316. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1397 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Formal models in animal-metacognition research: the problem of interpreting animals' behavior.

Ongoing research explores whether animals have precursors to metacognition-that is, the capacity to monitor mental states or cognitive processes. Comparative psychologists have tested apes, monkeys, rats, pigeons, and a dolphin using perceptual, memory, foraging, and information-seeking paradigms. The consensus is that some species have a functional analog to human metacognition. Recently, though, associative modelers have used formal-mathematical models hoping to describe animals' "metacognitive" performances in associative-behaviorist ways. We evaluate these attempts to reify formal models as proof of particular explanations of animal cognition. These attempts misunderstand the content and proper application of models. They embody mistakes of scientific reasoning. They blur fundamental distinctions in understanding animal cognition. They impede theoretical development. In contrast, an energetic empirical enterprise is achieving strong success in describing the psychology underlying animals' metacognitive performances. We argue that this careful empirical work is the clear path to useful theoretical development. The issues raised here about formal modeling-in the domain of animal metacognition-potentially extend to biobehavioral research more broadly.

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) modulate their use of an uncertainty response depending on risk.

Metacognition refers to thinking about thinking, and there has been a great deal of interest in how this ability manifests across primates. Based on much of the work to date, a tentative division has been drawn with New World monkeys on 1 side and Old World monkeys and apes on the other. Specifically, Old World monkeys, apes, and humans often show patterns reflecting metacognition, but New World monkeys typically do not, or show less convincing behavioral patterns. However, recent data suggest that this difference may relate to other aspects of some experimental tasks. For example, 1 possibility is that risk tolerance affects how capuchin monkeys, a New World primate species, tend to perform. Specifically, it has recently been argued that on tasks in which there are 2 or 3 options, the "risk" of guessing is tolerable for capuchins because there is a high probability of being correct even if they "know they do not know" or feel something akin to uncertainty. The current study investigated this possibility by manipulating the degree of risk (2-choices vs. 6-choices) and found that capuchin monkeys used the uncertainty response more on 6-choice trials than on 2-choice trials. We also found that rate of reward does not appear to underlie these patterns of performance, and propose that the degree of risk is modulating capuchin monkeys' use of the uncertainty response. Thus, the apparent differences between New and Old World monkeys in metacognition may reflect differences in risk tolerance rather than access to metacognitive states.