The Limitations of Social Science as the Arbiter of Blame: An Argument for Abandoning Retribution.

The U.S. criminal-justice system has consequentialist and retributivist goals: It considers what is best for society as well as how to punish people in a manner proportional to their crimes. In deciding on the degree of retribution that is called for, the system attempts to determine the blameworthiness-or culpability-of the people involved, weighing factors such as their ability to think rationality, their freedom from coercion, and whether their actions were out of character. These determinations hinge on social-scientific research that is not strong enough to justify such decisions. In this article, I challenge the social-scientific basis for determining culpability on three grounds: replicability, generalizability, and inferential strength. In light of the limitations of this research, I argue that the criminal-justice system should abandon its retributive goals and pursue a more consequentialist-and more reparative-form of justice.

Psychologists update their beliefs about effect sizes after replication studies.

Self-correction-a key feature distinguishing science from pseudoscience-requires that scientists update their beliefs in light of new evidence. However, people are often reluctant to change their beliefs. We examined belief updating in action by tracking research psychologists' beliefs in psychological effects before and after the completion of four large-scale replication projects. We found that psychologists did update their beliefs; they updated as much as they predicted they would, but not as much as our Bayesian model suggests they should if they trust the results. We found no evidence that psychologists became more critical of replications when it would have preserved their pre-existing beliefs. We also found no evidence that personal investment or lack of expertise discouraged belief updating, but people higher on intellectual humility updated their beliefs slightly more. Overall, our results suggest that replication studies can contribute to self-correction within psychology, but psychologists may underweight their evidentiary value.

Scientific progress is like doing a puzzle, not building a wall.

We contest the "building a wall" analogy of scientific progress. We argue that this analogy unfairly privileges original research (which is perceived as laying bricks and, therefore, constructive) over replication research (which is perceived as testing and removing bricks and, therefore, destructive). We propose an alternative analogy for scientific progress: solving a jigsaw puzzle.

The political reference point: How geography shapes political identity.

It is commonly assumed that how individuals identify on the political spectrum-whether liberal, conservative, or moderate-has a universal meaning when it comes to policy stances and voting behavior. But, does political identity mean the same thing from place to place? Using data collected from across the U.S. we find that even when people share the same political identity, those in "bluer" locations are more likely to support left-leaning policies and vote for Democratic candidates than those in "redder" locations. Because the meaning of political identity is inconsistent across locations, individuals who share the same political identity sometimes espouse opposing policy stances. Meanwhile, those with opposing identities sometimes endorse identical policy stances. Such findings suggest that researchers, campaigners, and pollsters must use caution when extrapolating policy preferences and voting behavior from political identity, and that animosity toward the other end of the political spectrum is sometimes misplaced.

Testing the Link Between Empathy and Lay Theories of Happiness.

Happiness is a topic that ignites both considerable interest and considerable disagreement. Thus far, however, there has been little attempt to characterize people's lay theories about happiness or explore their consequences. We examined whether individual differences in lay theories of happiness would predict empathy. In Studies 1a and 1b, we validated the Lay Theories of Happiness Scale (LTHS), which includes three dimensions: flexibility, controllability, and locus. In Study 2, higher dispositional empathy was predicted by the belief that happiness is flexible, controllable, and internal. In Studies 3 and 4, higher empathy toward a specific target was predicted by the belief that happiness is flexible, uncontrollable, and external. In conjunction, Studies 2, 3, and 4 provide evidence that trait and state empathy are separable and can have opposing relationships with people's lay theories. Overall, these findings highlight generalized beliefs that may guide empathic reactions to the unhappiness of others.

Is dissonance reduction a special case of fluid compensation? Evidence that dissonant cognitions cause compensatory affirmation and abstraction.

Cognitive dissonance theory shares much in common with other perspectives that address anomalies, uncertainty, and general expectancy violations. This has led some theorists to argue that these theories represent overlapping psychological processes. If responding to dissonance and uncertainty occurs through a common psychological process, one should expect that the behavioral outcomes of feeling uncertain would also apply to feelings of dissonance, and vice versa. One specific prediction from the meaning maintenance model would be that cognitive dissonance, like other expectancy violations, should lead to the affirmation of unrelated beliefs, or the abstraction of unrelated schemas when the dissonant event cannot be easily accommodated. This article presents 4 studies (N = 1124) demonstrating that the classic induced-compliance dissonance paradigm can lead not only to a change of attitudes (dissonance reduction), but also to (a) an increased reported belief in God (Study 2), (b) a desire to punish norm-violators (Study 1 and 3), (c) a motivation to detect patterns amid noise (Study 3), and (d) polarizing support of public policies among those already biased toward a particular side (Study 4). These results are congruent with theories that propose content-general fluid compensation following the experience of anomaly, a finding not predicted by dissonance theory. The results suggest that dissonance reduction behaviors may share psychological processes described by other theories addressing violations of expectations.

Right-frontal cortical asymmetry predicts increased proneness to nostalgia.

Nostalgia is often triggered by feelings-such as sadness, loneliness, or meaninglessness-that are typically associated with withdrawal motivation. Here, we examined whether a trait tendency to experience withdrawal motivation is associated with nostalgia proneness. Past work indicates that baseline right-frontal cortical asymmetry is a neural correlate of withdrawal-related motivation. We therefore hypothesized that higher baseline levels of right-frontal asymmetry would predict increased proneness to nostalgia. We assessed participants' baseline levels of frontal cortical activity using EEG. Results supported the hypothesis and demonstrated that the association between relative right-frontal asymmetry and increased nostalgia remained significant when controlling for the Big Five personality traits. Overall, these findings indicate that individuals with a stronger dispositional tendency to experience withdrawal-related motivation are more prone to nostalgia.

Errors in Moral Forecasting: Perceptions of Affect Shape the Gap Between Moral Behaviors and Moral Forecasts.

Research in moral decision making has shown that there may not be a one-to-one relationship between peoples' moral forecasts and behaviors. Although past work suggests that physiological arousal may account for part of the behavior-forecasting discrepancy, whether or not perceptions of affect play an important determinant remains unclear. Here, we investigate whether this discrepancy may arise because people fail to anticipate how they will feel in morally significant situations. In Study 1, forecasters predicted cheating significantly more on a test than participants in a behavior condition actually cheated. Importantly, forecasters who received false somatic feedback, indicative of high arousal, produced forecasts that aligned more closely with behaviors. In Study 2, forecasters who misattributed their arousal to an extraneous source forecasted cheating significantly more. In Study 3, higher dispositional emotional awareness was related to less forecasted cheating. These findings suggest that perceptions of affect play a key role in the behavior-forecasting dissociation.

RETRACTED: Fueling doubt and openness: experiencing the unconscious, constructed nature of perception induces uncertainty and openness to change.

This article has been retracted: please see Elsevier Policy on Article Withdrawal (http://www.elsevier.com/locate/withdrawalpolicy). The article has been retracted at the request of the Editor-in-Chief, Steven Sloman, following a request by the authors. The reason for the retraction is that the article includes fabricated or manipulated data.

Randomness increases self-reported anxiety and neurophysiological correlates of performance monitoring.

Several prominent theories spanning clinical, social and developmental psychology suggest that people are motivated to see the world as a sensible orderly place. These theories presuppose that randomness is aversive because it is associated with unpredictability. If this is the case, thinking that the world is random should lead to increased anxiety and heightened monitoring of one's actions and their consequences. Here, we conduct experimental tests of both of these ideas. Participants read one of three passages: (i) comprehensible order, (ii) incomprehensible order and (iii) randomness. In Study 1, we examined the effects of these passages on self-reported anxiety. In Study 2, we examined the effects of the same manipulation on the error-related negativity (ERN), an event-related brain potential associated with performance monitoring. We found that messages about randomness increased self-reported anxiety and ERN amplitude relative to comprehensible order, whereas incomprehensible order had intermediate effects. These results lend support to the theoretically important idea that randomness is unsettling because it implies that the world is unpredictable.

Right frontal cortical asymmetry predicts empathic reactions: support for a link between withdrawal motivation and empathy.

Depression, diminished positive affect, and exaggerated negative affect have all been linked to right frontal cortical asymmetry as measured by electroencephalography (EEG). Emerging evidence, however, suggests that right frontal EEG asymmetry might be linked to empathic responding. EEG was used to assess baseline asymmetries in frontal brain activity. Participants viewed images associated with a charity and then rated their sadness, personal distress, perspective-taking, and empathic concern towards the images. We found that baseline measures of right frontal asymmetry were a significant predictor of empathic concern, a relationship that was mediated by feelings of sadness. These results provide a more complex view of right frontal asymmetry and suggest that this pattern of brain activity might facilitate sensitivity towards the suffering of others.

Confronting Threats to Meaning: A New Framework for Understanding Responses to Unsettling Events.

We all have models of the world, and when these models fit with what goes on around us we have a sense of meaning. Unfortunately, we are often faced with situations that violate, or threaten, our models, and when this happens we attempt to resolve these inconsistencies to restore a sense of meaning. It is well documented that we often try to reduce threats in indirect ways-ways that, at first glance, seem to reduce the negative feelings without actually solving the problem. This article explores the possibility that threats can be interpreted in different ways depending on the person and context, and suggests that because of this, different threat reduction approaches can be adaptive in different situations. Specifically, it presents the hypothesis that concrete construal of threats should result in compensation efforts that are relatively direct, whereas abstract construals should expand the possibilities for compensation to include indirect strategies. It describes the existing evidence, where evidence is lacking, and potentially fruitful avenues of future exploration.

The voice of self-control: blocking the inner voice increases impulsive responding.

Philosophers and psychologists have long-debated the notion that the voice in our heads might help us to control our actions. Evidence from a number of lines of research suggests that verbal resources help us to focus attention, providing reason to believe that the inner voice might aid self-control via this capacity. In this study we explored the link between verbal resources and self-control by occupying the inner voice and then assessing behavioral indices of self-control. Participants completed regular and switching versions of the Go/No-Go task while doing verbal or spatial secondary tasks. Compared with the spatial task, doing the verbal task resulted in more impulsive responding, as indicated by a greater tendency to make a 'Go' response, a pattern that was accentuated in the switching version of the Go/No-Go. Our results suggest that the inner voice helps us to exert self-control by enhancing our ability to restrain our impulses.

Reflecting on God: religious primes can reduce neurophysiological response to errors.

The world is a vast and complex place that can sometimes generate feelings of uncertainty and distress for its inhabitants. Although religion is associated with a sense of meaning and order, it remains unclear whether religious belief can actually cause people to feel less anxiety and distress. To test the anxiolytic power of religion, we conducted two experiments focusing on the error-related negativity (ERN)-a neural signal that arises from the anterior cingulate cortex and is associated with defensive responses to errors. The results indicate that for believers, conscious and nonconscious religious primes cause a decrease in ERN amplitude. In contrast, priming nonbelievers with religious concepts causes an increase in ERN amplitude. Overall, examining basic neurophysiological processes reveals the power of religion to act as a buffer against anxious reactions to self-generated, generic errors-but only for individuals who believe.