Taxing reproduction: the full transfer cost of rearing children in Europe.

What are the intergenerational resource transfer contributions of parents and non-parents in Europe? Using National Transfer Accounts and National Time Transfer Accounts for 12 countries around 2010, we go beyond public transfers (net taxes) to also value two statistically much less visible transfers in the family realm: of market goods and of unpaid household labour (time). Non-parents contribute almost exclusively to public transfers. But parents additionally provide still larger private transfers: mothers mainly time, fathers mainly market goods. Estimating transfer stocks over the working life, the average parental/non-parental contribution ratio in Europe flips from 0.73 (public transfers alone) to 2.66 (all three transfers combined). The highest combined parental/non-parental contribution ratios are in Sweden and Finland. The metaphorical tax rates implicitly imposed thereby on rearing children in Europe are multiples of the value-added tax rates in place on consumption goods. Unveiling the sheer magnitude of these invisible transfer asymmetries carries multiple implications for policy debates. For instance, it raises the question whether ageing European societies unwittingly tax, rather than subsidise, their own reproduction. Family friendly policy models, such as the Nordic welfare states, do not mitigate this effect. They help parents work, but do not lower the implicit tax parents pay.

A game theoretic approach identifies conditions that foster vaccine-rich to vaccine-poor country donation of surplus vaccines.

Background: Scarcity in supply of COVID-19 vaccines and severe international inequality in their allocation present formidable challenges. These circumstances stress the importance of identifying the conditions under which self-interested vaccine-rich countries will voluntarily donate their surplus vaccines to vaccine-poor countries. Methods: We develop a game-theoretical approach to identify the vaccine donation strategy that is optimal for the vaccine-rich countries as a whole; and to determine whether the optimal strategy is stable (Nash equilibrium or self-enforcing agreement). We examine how the results depend on the following parameters: the fraction of the global unvaccinated population potentially covered if all vaccine-rich countries donate their entire surpluses; the expected emergence rate of variants of concern (VOC); and the relative cost of a new VOC outbreak that is unavoidable despite having surplus doses. Results: We show that full or partial donations of the surplus stock are optimal in certain parameter ranges. Notably, full surplus donation is optimal if the global amount of surplus vaccines is sufficiently large. Within a more restrictive parameter region, these optimal strategies are also stable. Conclusions: Our results imply that, under certain conditions, coordination between vaccine-rich countries can lead to significant surplus donations even by strictly self-interested countries. However, if the global amount that countries can donate is small, we expect no contribution from self-interested countries. The results provide guidance to policy makers in identifying the circumstances in which coordination efforts for vaccine donation are likely to be most effective.

Vaccine alliance building blocks: a conjoint experiment on popular support for international COVID-19 cooperation formats.

The design principles of institutions that visibly and significantly affect citizens' lives are likely to be politically salient. Popular support for these principles is in turn crucial for institutional viability and effectiveness. Transboundary pandemics are a case in point. Understanding citizens' preferences regarding the design of international alliances set up to mass-produce and distribute vaccines is likely to determine citizens' subsequent cooperation with vaccination campaigns. This study explores Germans' preferences for international COVID-19 vaccine alliance design principles. We conducted a conjoint experiment at a recurring cognitive moment in many pandemics' cycles, between the initial outbreak and a more devastating but still-unknown second wave, when infection rates were very low, yet no policy solutions had been developed. We analyzed preferences regarding four building blocks: (1) alliance composition (size; EU-centrism), (2) alliance distribution rules (joining cost; vaccine allocation), (3) vaccine nationalism (cost per German household; coverage in Germany) and (4) vaccine producer confidence (origin; type). Distribution rules, political ideology and personal perceptions of pandemic threat matter little. But a larger alliance size and dominant EU-country composition increase alliance support. And vaccine nationalism is key: support increases with both lower costs and larger coverage for own-nation citizens. Moreover, support goes down for Chinese and American producers and increases for Swiss and especially own-nation producers. In sum, a realist and technocratic outlook is warranted at the cognitive stage in pandemic cycles when no solutions have been found, yet the worst already seems to be over, as national self-interest reigns supreme in popular attitudes. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11077-021-09435-1.

Welfare states as lifecycle redistribution machines: Decomposing the roles of age and socio-economic status shows that European tax-and-benefit systems primarily redistribute across age groups.

Social scientists identify two core functions of modern welfare states as redistribution across (a) socio-economic status groups (Robin Hood) and (b) 'the lifecycle' (the piggy bank). But what is the relative importance of these functions? The answer has been elusive, as the piggy bank is metaphorical. The intra-personal time-travel of resources it implies is based on non-quid-pro-quo transfers. In practice, 'lifecycle redistribution' must operate through inter-age-group resource reallocation in cross-section. Since at any time different birth cohorts live together, 'resource-productive' working-aged people are taxed to finance consumption of 'resource-dependent' younger and older people. In a novel decomposition analysis, we study the joint distribution of socio-economic status, age, and respectively (a) all cash and in-kind transfers ('benefits'), (b) financing contributions ('taxes'), and (c) resulting 'net benefits,' on a sample of over 400,000 Europeans from 22 EU countries. European welfare states, often maligned as ineffective Robin Hood vehicles riddled with Matthew effects, are better characterized as inter-age redistribution machines performing a more important second task rather well: lifecycle consumption smoothing. Social policies serve multiple goals in Europe, but empirically they are neither primarily nor solely responsible for poverty relief and inequality reduction.