The impact of generative artificial intelligence on socioeconomic inequalities and policy making.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to both exacerbate and ameliorate existing socioeconomic inequalities. In this article, we provide a state-of-the-art interdisciplinary overview of the potential impacts of generative AI on (mis)information and three information-intensive domains: work, education, and healthcare. Our goal is to highlight how generative AI could worsen existing inequalities while illuminating how AI may help mitigate pervasive social problems. In the information domain, generative AI can democratize content creation and access but may dramatically expand the production and proliferation of misinformation. In the workplace, it can boost productivity and create new jobs, but the benefits will likely be distributed unevenly. In education, it offers personalized learning, but may widen the digital divide. In healthcare, it might improve diagnostics and accessibility, but could deepen pre-existing inequalities. In each section, we cover a specific topic, evaluate existing research, identify critical gaps, and recommend research directions, including explicit trade-offs that complicate the derivation of a priori hypotheses. We conclude with a section highlighting the role of policymaking to maximize generative AI's potential to reduce inequalities while mitigating its harmful effects. We discuss strengths and weaknesses of existing policy frameworks in the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, observing that each fails to fully confront the socioeconomic challenges we have identified. We propose several concrete policies that could promote shared prosperity through the advancement of generative AI. This article emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary collaborations to understand and address the complex challenges of generative AI.

Toolbox of individual-level interventions against online misinformation.

The spread of misinformation through media and social networks threatens many aspects of society, including public health and the state of democracies. One approach to mitigating the effect of misinformation focuses on individual-level interventions, equipping policymakers and the public with essential tools to curb the spread and influence of falsehoods. Here we introduce a toolbox of individual-level interventions for reducing harm from online misinformation. Comprising an up-to-date account of interventions featured in 81 scientific papers from across the globe, the toolbox provides both a conceptual overview of nine main types of interventions, including their target, scope and examples, and a summary of the empirical evidence supporting the interventions, including the methods and experimental paradigms used to test them. The nine types of interventions covered are accuracy prompts, debunking and rebuttals, friction, inoculation, lateral reading and verification strategies, media-literacy tips, social norms, source-credibility labels, and warning and fact-checking labels.

"Inoculation" to Resist Misinformation.

This JAMA Insights in the Communicating Medicine series explores the concept of "prebunking," a psychological inoculation technique that could help prevent the spread of misinformation.

A broader view of misinformation reveals potential for intervention.

Misleading claims from credible sources can be more damaging than blatant falsehoods.

On the Efficacy of Accuracy Prompts Across Partisan Lines: An Adversarial Collaboration.

The spread of misinformation is a pressing societal challenge. Prior work shows that shifting attention to accuracy increases the quality of people's news-sharing decisions. However, researchers disagree on whether accuracy-prompt interventions work for U.S. Republicans/conservatives and whether partisanship moderates the effect. In this preregistered adversarial collaboration, we tested this question using a multiverse meta-analysis (k = 21; N = 27,828). In all 70 models, accuracy prompts improved sharing discernment among Republicans/conservatives. We observed significant partisan moderation for single-headline "evaluation" treatments (a critical test for one research team) such that the effect was stronger among Democrats than Republicans. However, this moderation was not consistently robust across different operationalizations of ideology/partisanship, exclusion criteria, or treatment type. Overall, we observed significant partisan moderation in 50% of specifications (all of which were considered critical for the other team). We discuss the conditions under which moderation is observed and offer interpretations.

The persuasive effects of social cues and source effects on misinformation susceptibility.

Although misinformation exposure takes place within a social context, significant conclusions have been drawn about misinformation susceptibility through studies that largely examine judgements in a social vacuum. Bridging the gap between social influence research and the cognitive science of misinformation, we examine the mechanisms through which social context impacts misinformation susceptibility across 5 experiments (N = 20,477). We find that social cues only impact individual judgements when they influence perceptions of wider social consensus, and that source similarity only biases news consumers when the source is high in credibility. Specifically, high and low engagement cues ('likes') reduced misinformation susceptibility relative to a control, and endorsement cues increased susceptibility, but discrediting cues had no impact. Furthermore, political ingroup sources increased susceptibility if the source was high in credibility, but political outgroup sources had no effect relative to a control. This work highlights the importance of studying cognitive processes within a social context, as judgements of (mis)information change when embedded in the social world. These findings further underscore the need for multifaceted interventions that take account of the social context in which false information is processed to effectively mitigate the impact of misinformation on the public.

The Misinformation Susceptibility Test (MIST): A psychometrically validated measure of news veracity discernment.

Interest in the psychology of misinformation has exploded in recent years. Despite ample research, to date there is no validated framework to measure misinformation susceptibility. Therefore, we introduce Verification done, a nuanced interpretation schema and assessment tool that simultaneously considers Veracity discernment, and its distinct, measurable abilities (real/fake news detection), and biases (distrust/naïvité-negative/positive judgment bias). We then conduct three studies with seven independent samples (Ntotal = 8504) to show how to develop, validate, and apply the Misinformation Susceptibility Test (MIST). In Study 1 (N = 409) we use a neural network language model to generate items, and use three psychometric methods-factor analysis, item response theory, and exploratory graph analysis-to create the MIST-20 (20 items; completion time < 2 minutes), the MIST-16 (16 items; < 2 minutes), and the MIST-8 (8 items; < 1 minute). In Study 2 (N = 7674) we confirm the internal and predictive validity of the MIST in five national quota samples (US, UK), across 2 years, from three different sampling platforms-Respondi, CloudResearch, and Prolific. We also explore the MIST's nomological net and generate age-, region-, and country-specific norm tables. In Study 3 (N = 421) we demonstrate how the MIST-in conjunction with Verification done-can provide novel insights on existing psychological interventions, thereby advancing theory development. Finally, we outline the versatile implementations of the MIST as a screening tool, covariate, and intervention evaluation framework. As all methods are transparently reported and detailed, this work will allow other researchers to create similar scales or adapt them for any population of interest.

A synthesis of evidence for policy from behavioural science during COVID-19.

Scientific evidence regularly guides policy decisions1, with behavioural science increasingly part of this process2. In April 2020, an influential paper3 proposed 19 policy recommendations ('claims') detailing how evidence from behavioural science could contribute to efforts to reduce impacts and end the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we assess 747 pandemic-related research articles that empirically investigated those claims. We report the scale of evidence and whether evidence supports them to indicate applicability for policymaking. Two independent teams, involving 72 reviewers, found evidence for 18 of 19 claims, with both teams finding evidence supporting 16 (89%) of those 18 claims. The strongest evidence supported claims that anticipated culture, polarization and misinformation would be associated with policy effectiveness. Claims suggesting trusted leaders and positive social norms increased adherence to behavioural interventions also had strong empirical support, as did appealing to social consensus or bipartisan agreement. Targeted language in messaging yielded mixed effects and there were no effects for highlighting individual benefits or protecting others. No available evidence existed to assess any distinct differences in effects between using the terms 'physical distancing' and 'social distancing'. Analysis of 463 papers containing data showed generally large samples; 418 involved human participants with a mean of 16,848 (median of 1,699). That statistical power underscored improved suitability of behavioural science research for informing policy decisions. Furthermore, by implementing a standardized approach to evidence selection and synthesis, we amplify broader implications for advancing scientific evidence in policy formulation and prioritization.

Correction: 'Technique-based inoculation against real-world misinformation' (2023), by Roozenbeek et al.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1098/rsos.211719.][This corrects the article DOI: 10.1098/rsos.211719.].

Misinformation and the epistemic integrity of democracy.

Democracy relies on a shared body of knowledge among citizens, for example trust in elections and reliable knowledge to inform policy-relevant debate. We review the evidence for widespread disinformation campaigns that are undermining this shared knowledge. We establish a common pattern by which science and scientists are discredited and how the most recent frontier in those attacks involves researchers in misinformation itself. We list several ways in which psychology can contribute to countermeasures.

The effects of communicating uncertainty around statistics, on public trust.

Uncertainty around statistics is inevitable. However, communicators of uncertain statistics, particularly in high-stakes and potentially political circumstances, may be concerned that presenting uncertainties could undermine the perceived trustworthiness of the information or its source. In a large survey experiment (Study 1; N = 10 519), we report that communicating uncertainty around present COVID-19 statistics in the form of a numeric range (versus no uncertainty) may lead to slightly lower perceived trustworthiness of the number presented but has no impact on perceived trustworthiness of the source of the information. We also show that this minimal impact of numeric uncertainty on trustworthiness is also present when communicating future, projected COVID-19 statistics (Study 2; N = 2,309). Conversely, we find statements about the mere existence of uncertainty, without quantification, can reduce both perceived trustworthiness of the numbers and of their source. Our findings add to others suggesting that communicators can be transparent about statistical uncertainty without undermining their credibility as a source but should endeavour to provide a quantification, such as a numeric range, where possible.

The role of perceived minority-group status in the conspiracy beliefs of factual majority groups.

Research suggests that minority-group members sometimes are more susceptible to misinformation. Two complementary studies examined the influence of perceived minority status on susceptibility to misinformation and conspiracy beliefs. In study 1 (n = 2140), the perception of belonging to a minority group, rather than factually belonging to it, was most consistently related with an increased susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation across national samples from the USA, the UK, Germany and Poland. Specifically, perceiving that one belongs to a gender minority group particularly predicted susceptibility to misinformation when participants factually did not belong to it. In pre-registered study 2 (n = 1823), an experiment aiming to manipulate the minority perceptions of men failed to influence conspiracy beliefs in the predicted direction. However, pre-registered correlational analyses showed that men who view themselves as a gender minority were more prone to gender conspiracy beliefs and exhibited a heightened conspiracy mentality. This effect was correlationally mediated by increased feelings of system identity threat, collective narcissism, group relative deprivation and actively open-minded thinking. Especially, the perception of being a minority in terms of power and influence (as compared to numerically) was linked to these outcomes. We discuss limitations and practical implications for countering misinformation.

How to "inoculate" against multimodal misinformation: A conceptual replication of Roozenbeek and van der Linden (2020).

Building misinformation resilience at scale continues to pose a challenge. Gamified "inoculation" interventions have shown promise in improving people's ability to recognize manipulation techniques commonly used in misinformation, but so far few interventions exist that tackle multimodal misinformation (e.g., videos, images). We developed a game called Cat Park, in which players learn about five manipulation techniques (trolling, emotional manipulation, amplification, polarization, and conspiracism), and how misinformation can spread through images. To test the game's efficacy, we conducted a conceptual replication (N = 380) of Roozenbeek and van der Linden's 2020 study about Harmony Square, with the same study design, item set, and hypotheses. Like the original study, we find that people who play Cat Park find misinformation significantly less reliable post-gameplay (d = 0.95, p < 0.001) compared to a control group, and are significantly less willing to share misinformation with people in their network (d = 0.54, p < 0.001). These effects are robust across different covariates. However, unlike the original study, Cat Park players do not become significantly more confident in their ability to identify misinformation (p = 0.204, d = - 0.13). We did not find that the game increases people's self-reported motivation and confidence to counter misinformation online.

Social Psychological Perspectives on Political Polarization: Insights and Implications for Climate Change.

Political polarization is a barrier to enacting policy solutions to global issues. Social psychology has a rich history of studying polarization, and there is an important opportunity to define and refine its contributions to the present political realities. We do so in the context of one of the most pressing modern issues: climate change. We synthesize the literature on political polarization and its applications to climate change, and we propose lines of further research and intervention design. We focus on polarization in the United States, examining other countries when literature was available. The polarization literature emphasizes two types of mechanisms of political polarization: (1) individual-level psychological processes related to political ideology and (2) group-level psychological processes related to partisan identification. Interventions that address group-level processes can be more effective than those that address individual-level processes. Accordingly, we emphasize the promise of interventions leveraging superordinate identities, correcting misperceived norms, and having trusted leaders communicate about climate change. Behavioral interventions like these that are grounded in scientific research are one of our most promising tools to achieve the behavioral wedge that we need to address climate change and to make progress on other policy issues.

Accuracy and social motivations shape judgements of (mis)information.

The extent to which belief in (mis)information reflects lack of knowledge versus a lack of motivation to be accurate is unclear. Here, across four experiments (n = 3,364), we motivated US participants to be accurate by providing financial incentives for correct responses about the veracity of true and false political news headlines. Financial incentives improved accuracy and reduced partisan bias in judgements of headlines by about 30%, primarily by increasing the perceived accuracy of true news from the opposing party (d = 0.47). Incentivizing people to identify news that would be liked by their political allies, however, decreased accuracy. Replicating prior work, conservatives were less accurate at discerning true from false headlines than liberals, yet incentives closed the gap in accuracy between conservatives and liberals by 52%. A non-financial accuracy motivation intervention was also effective, suggesting that motivation-based interventions are scalable. Altogether, these results suggest that a substantial portion of people's judgements of the accuracy of news reflects motivational factors.

Field interventions for climate change mitigation behaviors: A second-order meta-analysis.

Behavioral change is essential to mitigate climate change. To advance current knowledge, we synthesize research on interventions aiming to promote climate change mitigation behaviors in field settings. In a preregistered second-order meta-analysis, we assess the overall effect of 10 meta-analyses, incorporating a total of 430 primary studies. In addition, we assess subgroup analyses for six types of interventions, five behaviors, and three publication bias adjustments. Results showed that climate change mitigation interventions were generally effective (dunadjusted = 0.31, 95% CI [0.30, 0.32]). A follow-up analysis using only unique primary studies, adjusted for publication bias, provides a more conservative overall estimate (d = 0.18, 95% CI [0.13, 0.24]). This translates into a mean treatment effect of 7 percentage points. Furthermore, in a subsample of adequately powered large-scale interventions (n > 9,000, k = 32), the effect was adjusted downward to approximately 2 percentage points. This discrepancy might be because large-scale interventions often target nonvoluntary participants by less direct techniques (e.g., "home energy reports") while small-scale interventions often target voluntary participants by more direct techniques (e.g., face-to-face interactions). Subgroup analyses showed that interventions based on social comparisons or financial incentives were the most effective, while education or feedback was the least effective. These results provide a comprehensive state-of-the-art summary of climate change mitigation interventions, guiding both future research and practice.

Let the algorithm speak: How to use neural networks for automatic item generation in psychological scale development.

Measurement is at the heart of scientific research. As many-perhaps most-psychological constructs cannot be directly observed, there is a steady demand for reliable self-report scales to assess latent constructs. However, scale development is a tedious process that requires researchers to produce good items in large quantities. In this tutorial, we introduce, explain, and apply the Psychometric Item Generator (PIG), an open-source, free-to-use, self-sufficient natural language processing algorithm that produces large-scale, human-like, customized text output within a few mouse clicks. The PIG is based on the GPT-2, a powerful generative language model, and runs on Google Colaboratory-an interactive virtual notebook environment that executes code on state-of-the-art virtual machines at no cost. Across two demonstrations and a preregistered five-pronged empirical validation with two Canadian samples (NSample 1 = 501, NSample 2 = 773), we show that the PIG is equally well-suited to generate large pools of face-valid items for novel constructs (i.e., wanderlust) and create parsimonious short scales of existing constructs (i.e., Big Five personality traits) that yield strong performances when tested in the wild and benchmarked against current gold standards for assessment. The PIG does not require any prior coding skills or access to computational resources and can easily be tailored to any desired context by simply switching out short linguistic prompts in a single line of code. In short, we present an effective, novel machine learning solution to an old psychological challenge. As such, the PIG will not require you to learn a new language-but instead, speak yours. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).