Accelerating carbon neutrality could help China's energy system align with below 1.5 °C.

To support the achievement of the Paris Agreement's 1.5 °C global warming threshold, China aims to peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. However, the specific carbon neutrality pathway remains to be designed. By applying a refined Chinese version of Global Change Analysis Model, this study examines implications of four illustrative carbon neutrality scenarios for aligning China's energy system with below 1.5 °C by 2100. The results feature a trade-off between China's ambition to transform its energy system toward mid-century and its reliance on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) after carbon neutrality. From a full time perspective until 2100, accelerating carbon neutrality could help China's energy system align with below 1.5 °C. Compared to a 2060 carbon neutrality scenario, a 2050 carbon neutrality scenario reduces China's total mitigation costs between 2021 and 2100 by 1.04% of GDP, reduces reliance on CDR by 36%, and provides some additional co-benefits, such as reduced air pollutants. However, special attention needs to be paid to the fact that accelerating carbon neutrality poses greater challenges and costs to China in overcoming development inertia and restructuring its energy system over the next 30-40 years. Compared to a 2060 carbon neutrality scenario, a 2050 scenario increases China's mitigation costs by a factor of 1.13 between 2021 and 2050. This study suggests through quantitative evidence that China could accelerate emissions reductions and energy system transformation to achieve carbon neutrality, based on its national circumstances and capabilities and international support.

Projections of fire emissions and the consequent impacts on air quality under 1.5 °C and 2 °C global warming.

Fire is a major source of atmospheric aerosols and trace gases. Projection of future fire activities is challenging due to the joint impacts of climate, vegetation, and human activities. Here, we project global changes of fire-induced particulate matter smaller than 2.5 µm (PM2.5) and ozone (O3) under 1.5 °C/2 °C warming using a climate-chemistry-vegetation coupled model in combination with site-level and satellite-based observations. Compared to the present day, fire emissions of varied air pollutants increase by 10.0%-15.4% at the 1.5 °C warming period and 15.1%-22.5% at the 2 °C warming period, with the most significant enhancements in Amazon, southern Africa, and boreal Eurasia. The warmer climate promotes fuel dryness and the higher leaf area index increases fuel availability, leading to escalated fire flammability globally. However, moderate declines in fire emissions are predicted over the Sahel region, because the higher population density increases fire suppressions and consequently inhibits fire activities over central Africa. Following the changes in fire emissions, the population-weighted exposure to fire PM2.5 increases by 5.1% under 1.5 °C warming and 13.0% under 2 °C warming. Meanwhile, the exposure to fire O3 enhances by 10.2% and 16.0% in response to global warming of 1.5 °C and 2 °C, respectively. As a result, limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 °C can greatly reduce the risks of exposure to fire-induced air pollution compared to 2 °C.

Global wheat production with 1.5 and 2.0°C above pre-industrial warming.

Efforts to limit global warming to below 2°C in relation to the pre-industrial level are under way, in accordance with the 2015 Paris Agreement. However, most impact research on agriculture to date has focused on impacts of warming >2°C on mean crop yields, and many previous studies did not focus sufficiently on extreme events and yield interannual variability. Here, with the latest climate scenarios from the Half a degree Additional warming, Prognosis and Projected Impacts (HAPPI) project, we evaluated the impacts of the 2015 Paris Agreement range of global warming (1.5 and 2.0°C warming above the pre-industrial period) on global wheat production and local yield variability. A multi-crop and multi-climate model ensemble over a global network of sites developed by the Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP) for Wheat was used to represent major rainfed and irrigated wheat cropping systems. Results show that projected global wheat production will change by -2.3% to 7.0% under the 1.5°C scenario and -2.4% to 10.5% under the 2.0°C scenario, compared to a baseline of 1980-2010, when considering changes in local temperature, rainfall, and global atmospheric CO2 concentration, but no changes in management or wheat cultivars. The projected impact on wheat production varies spatially; a larger increase is projected for temperate high rainfall regions than for moderate hot low rainfall and irrigated regions. Grain yields in warmer regions are more likely to be reduced than in cooler regions. Despite mostly positive impacts on global average grain yields, the frequency of extremely low yields (bottom 5 percentile of baseline distribution) and yield inter-annual variability will increase under both warming scenarios for some of the hot growing locations, including locations from the second largest global wheat producer-India, which supplies more than 14% of global wheat. The projected global impact of warming <2°C on wheat production is therefore not evenly distributed and will affect regional food security across the globe as well as food prices and trade.

Uncertain impacts on economic growth when stabilizing global temperatures at 1.5°C or 2°C warming.

Empirical evidence suggests that variations in climate affect economic growth across countries over time. However, little is known about the relative impacts of climate change on economic outcomes when global mean surface temperature (GMST) is stabilized at 1.5°C or 2°C warming relative to pre-industrial levels. Here we use a new set of climate simulations under 1.5°C and 2°C warming from the 'Half a degree Additional warming, Prognosis and Projected Impacts' (HAPPI) project to assess changes in economic growth using empirical estimates of climate impacts in a global panel dataset. Panel estimation results that are robust to outliers and breaks suggest that within-year variability of monthly temperatures and precipitation has little effect on economic growth beyond global nonlinear temperature effects. While expected temperature changes under a GMST increase of 1.5°C lead to proportionally higher warming in the Northern Hemisphere, the projected impact on economic growth is larger in the Tropics and Southern Hemisphere. Accounting for econometric estimation and climate uncertainty, the projected impacts on economic growth of 1.5°C warming are close to indistinguishable from current climate conditions, while 2°C warming suggests statistically lower economic growth for a large set of countries (median projected annual growth up to 2% lower). Level projections of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita exhibit high uncertainties, with median projected global average GDP per capita approximately 5% lower at the end of the century under 2°C warming relative to 1.5°C. The correlation between climate-induced reductions in per capita GDP growth and national income levels is significant at the p < 0.001 level, with lower-income countries experiencing greater losses, which may increase economic inequality between countries and is relevant to discussions of loss and damage under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.This article is part of the theme issue 'The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels'.

Can 'loss and damage' carry the load?

Even assuming a heroic rush towards carbon reduction and adaptation, some regions of the world will be hammered hard by climate impacts. Thus, a global consensus now sees the need for a supplemental plan to deal with the kind of harms that cannot be avoided-what Parties call 'loss and damage'. For a loss-and-damage plan to work, it must be capable of carrying the load, the load being whatever minimal standards that morality and political consensus require. But if residual risk climbs too high, it will fall short of even the most basic expectations. The Paris Agreement calls for holding the rise in global average temperature to 'well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels', while working to limit the increase to 1.5°C. How much difference is in that half-degree? From the point of view of residual risk, quite a lot. According to a 2016 study published by the European Geosciences Union, a jump from 1.5°C to 2°C could produce outsize impacts, particularly in tropical latitudes. That difference could mark the line between a plan that is politically and morally defensible and one that is not. At the very least, the difference is enough to inform the design and expectations of any future plan.This article is part of the theme issue 'The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels'.

How much do direct livestock emissions actually contribute to global warming?

Agriculture directly contributes about 10%-12% of current global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, mostly from livestock. However, such percentage estimates are based on global warming potentials (GWPs), which do not measure the actual warming caused by emissions and ignore the fact that methane does not accumulate in the atmosphere in the same way as CO2 . Here, we employ a simple carbon cycle-climate model, historical estimates and future projections of livestock emissions to infer the fraction of actual warming that is attributable to direct livestock non-CO2 emissions now and in future, and to CO2 from pasture conversions, without relying on GWPs. We find that direct livestock non-CO2 emissions caused about 19% of the total modelled warming of 0.81°C from all anthropogenic sources in 2010. CO2 from pasture conversions contributed at least another 0.03°C, bringing the warming directly attributable to livestock to 23% of the total warming in 2010. The significance of direct livestock emissions to future warming depends strongly on global actions to reduce emissions from other sectors. Direct non-CO2 livestock emissions would contribute only about 5% of the warming in 2100 if emissions from other sectors increase unabated, but could constitute as much as 18% (0.27°C) of the warming in 2100 if global CO2 emissions from other sectors are reduced to near or below zero by 2100, consistent with the goal of limiting warming to well below 2°C. These estimates constitute a lower bound since indirect emissions linked to livestock feed production and supply chains were not included. Our estimates demonstrate that expanding the mitigation potential and realizing substantial reductions of direct livestock non-CO2 emissions through demand and supply side measures can make an important contribution to achieve the stringent mitigation goals set out in the Paris Agreement, including by increasing the carbon budget consistent with the 1.5°C goal.