The Development of Epistemic Vigilance and Epistemic Trust Across the Lifespan: Perspectives from Empirical Research on Self-Regulatory Social Learning. / Die Entwicklung von epistemischerWachsamkeit und epistemischem Vertrauen über die Lebensspanne: Perspektive aus der empirischen Forschung zum selbstregulierenden sozialen Lernen

The Development of Epistemic Vigilance and Epistemic Trust Across the Lifespan: Perspectives from Empirical Research on Self-Regulatory Social Learning This article examines what we know about the development of epistemic vigilance and epistemic trust between early infancy and adolescence.With this brief review, we intend to help put into perspective the hypotheses advanced by Fonagy and his colleagues within the socio-epistemic theory of psychopathology, according to which psychopathology reflects a closure to interpersonal communication resulting from unfavorable learning experiences in early development. Here, we will discuss how children become sensitive to overt interpersonal communication, and what cognitive skills underpin such sensitivity. Next, we shall discuss the empirical evidence that children in the second year of life already possess a rudimentary capacity for epistemic vigilance: they seem to evaluate the competence of different adult informants and appear to seek information and learn from adults based on such evaluations. Third, we will outline studies showing that in the third year of life children appear to increasingly trust ostensive communication, up to the point of becoming (at least apparently) less sensitive to the possibility of being misinformed or deceived. Finally, we will discuss how, between late childhood and adolescence, children first learn to distinguish lies, then irony, and increasingly engage in complex communication ecologies. Our review simultaneously supports the basic principles of the socio-epistemic theory of psychopathology and suggests that the theory needs further refinement of its ontogenetic predictions.

Examining gullibility with sentence verification judgments.

Three experiments were conducted to examine gullibility as measured by people's bias to respond with a True response when performing sentence verification judgment task. The experiments manipulated the location of unfamiliar concepts such that some sentences contained unfamiliar concepts in the subject while other sentences contained unfamiliar concepts in the predicate, hence measuring the bias to judge an idea to be true when one cannot make the decision relying on background knowledge. The results indicated: 1) a higher frequency of True response when an unfamiliar concept is located in the subject compared to when it is in the predicate; and 2) the frequency of True response was lower than chance level even when unfamiliar information is located in the subject. The results were discussed in relation to gullibility and how the verification judgment is processed as a plausibility judgment.

Children's susceptibility to online misinformation.

Children have a reputation for credulity that is undeserved; even preschoolers have proven adept at identifying implausible claims and unreliable informants. Still, the strategies children use to identify and reject dubious information are often superficial, which leaves them vulnerable to accepting such information if conveyed through seemingly authoritative channels or formatted in seemingly authentic ways. Indeed, children of all ages have difficulty differentiating legitimate websites and news stories from illegitimate ones, as they are misled by the inclusion of outwardly professional features such as graphs, statistics, and journalistic layout. Children may not be inherently credulous, but their skepticism toward dubious information is often shallow enough to be overridden by the deceptive trappings of online misinformation.

Intonational production as a window into children's early pragmatic competence: The case of the Norwegian polarity focus and two jo particles.

The use of the Norwegian intonation pattern Polarity Focus highlights the polarity of a contextually given thought and enables the speaker to signal whether she believes it to be a true or false description of some state of affairs. In this study, we investigate whether preschool children can produce this intonation pattern and what their productions reveal about the development of their early pragmatic abilities. We also explore their use of Polarity Focus in combination with two particles encoded by the linguistic form jo: a sentence-initial response particle, and a sentence-internal pragmatic particle. We used a semi-structured elicitation task consisting of four test conditions of increasing complexity to shed light on the developmental trajectory of the mastery of Polarity Focus. Our results show that already from the age of 2 children are proficient users of this intonation pattern, which occurs in three out of four conditions for this age group. As expected, only 4- and 5-year-olds produced Polarity Focus in the most complex test condition that required the attribution of a false belief. We further found production of sentence-initial response particle jo by all age groups, both in combination with Polarity Focus and alone. Production of the sentence-internal pragmatic particle jo, felicitously co-occurring with Polarity Focus, emerges around age 3. This study presents the first experimental evidence of Norwegian children's mastery of intonation as a communicative device in language production and their use of the two jo particles. We show how intonational production can be used as a window into children's early pragmatic competence: The mastery of the production of Polarity Focus can be seen as an early linguistic manifestation of the cognitive abilities for the attribution of thoughts and epistemic vigilance towards propositional content.

Counterintuitive Pseudoscience Propagates by Exploiting the Mind's Communication Evaluation Mechanisms.

Epidemiological models of culture posit that the prevalence of a belief depends in part on the fit between that belief and intuitions generated by the mind's reliably developing architecture. Application of such models to pseudoscience suggests that one route via which these beliefs gain widespread appeal stems from their compatibility with these intuitions. For example, anti-vaccination beliefs are readily adopted because they cohere with intuitions about the threat of contagion. However, other varieties of popular pseudoscience such as astrology and parapsychology contain content that violates intuitions held about objects and people. Here, we propose a pathway by which "counterintuitive pseudoscience" may spread and receive endorsement. Drawing on recent empirical evidence, we suggest that counterintuitive pseudoscience triggers the mind's communication evaluation mechanisms. These mechanisms are hypothesized to quarantine epistemically-suspect information including counterintuitive pseudoscientific concepts. As a consequence, these beliefs may not immediately update conflicting intuitions and may be largely restricted from influencing behavior. Nonetheless, counterintuitive pseudoscientific concepts, when in combination with intuitively appealing content, may differentially draw attention and memory. People may also be motivated to seek further information about these concepts, including by asking others, in an attempt to reconcile them with prior beliefs. This in turn promotes the re-transmission of these ideas. We discuss how, during this information-search, support for counterintuitive pseudoscience may come from deference to apparently authoritative sources, reasoned arguments, and the functional outcomes of these beliefs. Ultimately, these factors promote the cultural success of counterintuitive pseudoscience but explicit endorsement of these concepts may not entail tacit commitment.

Deriving Features of Religions in the Wild : How Communication and Threat-Detection May Predict Spirits, Gods, Witches, and Shamans.

Religions "in the wild" are the varied set of religious activities that occurred before the emergence of organized religions with doctrines, or that persist at the margins of those organized traditions. These religious activities mostly focus on misfortune; on how to remedy specific cases of illness, accidents, failures; and on how to prevent them. I present a general model to account for the cross-cultural recurrence of these particular themes. The model is based on (independently established) features of human psychology-namely, (a) epistemic vigilance, the set of systems whereby we evaluate the quality of information and of sources of information, and (b) threat-detection psychology, the set of evolved systems geared at detecting potential danger in the environment. Given these two sets of systems, the dynamics of communication will favor particular types of messages about misfortune. This makes it possible to predict recurrent features of religious systems, such as the focus on nonphysical agents, the focus on particular cases rather than general aspects of misfortune, and the emergence of specialists. The model could illuminate not just why such representations are culturally successful, but also why people are motivated to formulate them in the first place.

Social information use and social information waste.

Social information is immensely valuable. Yet we waste it. The information we get from observing other humans and from communicating with them is a cheap and reliable informational resource. It is considered the backbone of human cultural evolution. Theories and models focused on the evolution of social learning show the great adaptive benefits of evolving cognitive tools to process it. In spite of this, human adults in the experimental literature use social information quite inefficiently: they do not take it sufficiently into account. A comprehensive review of the literature on five experimental tasks documented 45 studies showing social information waste, and four studies showing social information being over-used. These studies cover 'egocentric discounting' phenomena as studied by social psychology, but also include experimental social learning studies. Social information waste means that human adults fail to give social information its optimal weight. Both proximal explanations and accounts derived from evolutionary theory leave crucial aspects of the phenomenon unaccounted for: egocentric discounting is a pervasive effect that no single unifying explanation fully captures. Cultural evolutionary theory's insistence on the power and benefits of social influence is to be balanced against this phenomenon. This article is part of the theme issue 'Foundations of cultural evolution'.

Distinct signatures of subjective confidence and objective accuracy in speech prosody.

Whether speech prosody truly and naturally reflects a speaker's subjective confidence, rather than other dimensions such as objective accuracy, is unclear. Here, using a new approach combing psychophysics with acoustic analysis and automatic classification of verbal reports, we tease apart the contributions of sensory evidence, accuracy, and subjective confidence to speech prosody. We find that subjective confidence and objective accuracy are distinctly reflected in the loudness, duration and intonation of verbal reports. Strikingly, we show that a speaker's accuracy is encoded in speech prosody beyond their own metacognitive awareness, and that it can be automatically decoded from this information alone with performances up to 60%. These findings demonstrate that confidence and accuracy have separable prosodic signatures that are manifested with different timings, and on different acoustic dimensions. Thus, both subjective mental states of confidence, and objective states related to competence, can be directly inferred from this natural behavior.

Epistemic Vigilance in Early Ontogeny: Children's Use of Nonverbal Behavior to Detect Deception.

This study examines the development of children's ability to modulate their trust in verbal testimony as a function of nonverbal behavior. Participants included 83 children (26 four-year-olds, 29 five-year-olds, and 28 six-year-olds) that were tasked with locating a toy hidden in one of two boxes. Before deciding the location, participants watched a video of an adult providing verbal and nonverbal cues about the location of the toy. We hypothesized that older children would display epistemic vigilance, trusting nonverbal information over verbal information when the two conflict. Consistent with our expectations, when sources were consistent, all children trusted the verbal testimony. By contrast, and as predicted, when they were inconsistent, only 6-year-olds distrusted verbal testimony and favored nonverbal cues; 4- and 5-year-olds continued to trust verbal testimony. Thus, 6-year-old children demonstrate an ability to modulate their trust in verbal testimony as a function of nonverbal information. Younger children's inability to do this is not due to their being unaware of non-verbal behavior; indeed, when nonverbal information was offered exclusively, children of all ages used it to find the object.

Learning from multiple informants: Children's response to epistemic bases for consensus judgments.

Consensus has both social and epistemic value. Children conform to consensus judgments in ways that suggest they are sensitive to the social value of consensus. Here we report two experiments providing evidence that 4-year-old children also are sensitive to the epistemic value of consensus. When multiple informants gave the same judgment concerning the hidden contents of a container, based on the observation of one of their members, children's own judgments tended to align with the consensus judgment over the judgment of a lone character, whose observation received no endorsements. This tendency was reduced, however, when children were shown that the group consensus lacked epistemic warrant. Together, the findings provide evidence that young children are sensitive to the epistemic basis of consensus reports.

Trait or testimony? Children's preferences for positive informants.

Research indicates that children often show a positivity bias, or a tendency to favor positive information over negative information, in assessments of informant credibility in social and nonsocial situations. The current study investigated whether young children prioritize positive informant traits (i.e., nice vs. mean informant) as compared with positive speech content (i.e., positive vs. negative evaluation) in conflicting assessments of a work product. A total of 123 4- to 8-year-olds heard stories about a nice informant who gave a negative evaluation of a painting and a mean informant who gave a positive evaluation of the painting. Participants were asked who they would endorse, who they would ask about a future painting, and their friendship preferences. Children endorsed and asked the mean informant who provided positive testimony, but they chose to befriend the nice informant who provided negative testimony. Endorsements of positive testimony increased with age. Findings are considered in the context of the broader literature on selective social learning and trait understanding.

Children's evaluation of verified and unverified claims.

Critical to children's learning is the ability to judiciously select what information to accept-to use as the basis for learning and inference-and what information to reject. This becomes especially difficult in a world increasingly inundated with information, where children must carefully reason about the process by which claims are made in order to acquire accurate knowledge. In two experiments, we investigated whether 3- to 7-year-old children (N = 120) understand that factual claims based on verified evidence are more acceptable than claims that have not been sufficiently verified. We found that even at preschool age, children evaluated verified claims as more acceptable than insufficiently verified claims, and that the extent to which they did so was related to their explicit understanding, as evident in their explanations of why those claims were more or less acceptable. These experiments lay the groundwork for an important line of research studying the roots and development of this foundational critical thinking skill.

Believing What You're Told: Politeness and Scalar Inferences.

The experimental pragmatics literature has extensively investigated the ways in which distinct contextual factors affect the computation of scalar inferences, whose most studied example is the one that allows "Some X-ed" to mean Not all X-ed. Recent studies from Bonnefon et al. (2009, 2011) investigate the effect of politeness on the interpretation of scalar utterances. They argue that when the scalar utterance is face-threatening ("Some people hated your speech") (i) the scalar inference is less likely to be derived, and (ii) the semantic interpretation of "some" (at least some) is arrived at slowly and effortfully. This paper re-evaluates the role of politeness in the computation of scalar inferences by drawing on the distinction between "comprehension" and "epistemic assessment" of communicated information. In two experiments, we test the hypothesis that, in these face-threatening contexts, scalar inferences are largely derived but are less likely to be accepted as true. In line with our predictions, we find that slowdowns in the face-threatening condition are attributable to longer reaction times at the (latter) epistemic assessment stage, but not at the comprehension stage.

Consider the source: Children link the accuracy of text-based sources to the accuracy of the author.

The present research investigated whether young children link the accuracy of text-based information to the accuracy of its author. Across three experiments, three- and four-year-olds (N = 231) received information about object labels from accurate and inaccurate sources who provided information both in text and verbally. Of primary interest was whether young children would selectively rely on information provided by more accurate sources, regardless of the form in which the information was communicated. Experiment 1 tested children's trust in text-based information (e.g., books) written by an author with a history of either accurate or inaccurate verbal testimony and found that children showed greater trust in books written by accurate authors. Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and extended them by showing that children's selective trust in more accurate text-based sources was not dependent on experience trusting or distrusting the author's verbal testimony. Experiment 3 investigated this understanding in reverse by testing children's trust in verbal testimony communicated by an individual who had authored either accurate or inaccurate text-based information. Experiment 3 revealed that children showed greater trust in individuals who had authored accurate rather than inaccurate books. Experiment 3 also demonstrated that children used the accuracy of text-based sources to make inferences about the mental states of the authors. Taken together, these results suggest children do indeed link the reliability of text-based sources to the reliability of the author. Statement of Contribution Existing knowledge Children use sources' prior accuracy to predict future accuracy in face-to-face verbal interactions. Children who are just learning to read show increased trust in text bases (vs. verbal) information. It is unknown whether children consider authors' prior accuracy when judging the accuracy of text-based information. New knowledge added by this article Preschool children track sources' accuracy across communication mediums - from verbal to text-based modalities and vice versa. Children link the reliability of text-based sources to the reliability of the author.

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory.

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

Cognitive Obstacles to Pro-Vaccination Beliefs.

Two frameworks--cultural attraction theory and epistemic vigilance--predict a cultural disadvantage for counter-intuitive beliefs. We review several cognitive mechanisms that conspire to render pro-vaccination beliefs counter-intuitive. Trust and argumentation can spread counter-intuitive beliefs, but only under some conditions. We discuss the hurdles that trust and argumentation face in the case of vaccination.

Early testimonial learning: monitoring speech acts and speakers.

Testimony provides children with a rich source of knowledge about the world and the people in it. However, testimony is not guaranteed to be veridical, and speakers vary greatly in both knowledge and intent. In this chapter, we argue that children encounter two primary types of conflicts when learning from speakers: conflicts of knowledge and conflicts of interest. We review recent research on children's selective trust in testimony and propose two distinct mechanisms supporting early epistemic vigilance in response to the conflicts associated with speakers. The first section of the chapter focuses on the mechanism of coherence checking, which occurs during the process of message comprehension and facilitates children's comparison of information communicated through testimony to their prior knowledge, alerting them to inaccurate, inconsistent, irrational, and implausible messages. The second section focuses on source-monitoring processes. When children lack relevant prior knowledge with which to evaluate testimonial messages, they monitor speakers themselves for evidence of competence and morality, attending to cues such as confidence, consensus, access to information, prosocial and antisocial behavior, and group membership.