The impact of the heterogeneity of market participants on China's green certificate trading: A collective action perspective.

Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and tradable green certificate (TGC) systems are mandatory institutional change that promote the renewable energy development and improve the environment in China. Their implementation will cause collective action issues among market entities. Collective action of participating in TGC trading is crucial for transaction success and the effectiveness of system implementation. This paper takes the collective action of heterogeneous market entities participating in TGC trading as the starting point. This paper simulates the strategy selection and group behavior evolution of different market entities under multiple scenarios, and analyzes collective action's evolutionary path and equilibrium results under different group combination environments. It explores the success rate of TGC trading under different heterogeneous entities combinations through an evolutionary game model, revealing the reasons for low liquidity of China's TGC market. The results show that: (1) Heterogeneity is an important factor affecting the success of TGC collective action. (2) When TGC suppliers and demanders are egoists, collective actions appear in multiple equilibria. As egoists decrease, the probability of market entities participating in collective actions increases, and TGC transactions are more successful. (3) Altruists can shorten the time for collective action to achieve equilibrium and reduce the possibility of multiple equilibria. (4) TGC suppliers play a greater guiding role in the transaction. When TGC suppliers are altruists, the probability of TGC demanders participating in collective action tends to 1. Conversely, TGC transaction success rate is 50%.

An evolutionary game analysis of incentive of industrial parks, government support and enterprise innovation willingness in China.

Industrial parks are the important carriers to promote regional innovation and economic development. The policy preferences of the government, the support orientation of the industrial park and the innovation willingness of the enterprises in the park play a significant role in promoting the high-quality development of the industrial parks. In order to clarify the decision-making process of each subject, this paper constructs a triple evolutionary game model between the government, industrial park and enterprises in the park, Matlab software is used to conduct simulation research, and the strategy selection of each subject in the process of promoting high-quality development of the park is analyzed, as well as the influence of variables on the evolutionary game. Through numerical simulation, this study finds that the strategy choice of the government and the industrial park is influenced by the cost of innovation management for enterprises. In addition, the innovation willingness of enterprises is affected by the policy preference of the government and the support orientation of the industrial park, the excessive tax preference of the government will lead to negative innovation behaviors of the enterprises, the "inward incentives" support orientation of the industrial park can stimulate the enterprises' innovation willingness on "active innovation", the enterprises behavior of "active innovation" will strengthen the "inward incentives" support orientation of the industrial park in turn. The difference of the benefits and the costs between the two support orientations by the industrial park will lead to the equilibrium points stabilized at different strategy combinations. Based on these findings, countermeasures and suggestions are proposed in this study.

The effects of herding and dispersal behaviour on the evolution of cooperation on complete networks.

Evolutionary graph theory has considerably advanced the process of modelling the evolution of structured populations, which models the interactions between individuals as pairwise contests. In recent years, these classical evolution models have been extended to incorporate more realistic features, e.g. multiplayer games. A recent series of papers have developed a new evolutionary framework including structure, multiplayer interactions, evolutionary dynamics, and movement. However, so far, the developed models have mainly considered independent movement without coordinated behaviour. Although the theory underlying the framework has been developed and explored in various directions, several movement mechanisms have been produced which characterise coordinated movement, for example, herding. By embedding these newly constructed movement distributions, within the evolutionary setting of the framework, we demonstrate that certain levels of aggregation and dispersal benefit specific types of individuals. Moreover, by extending existing parameters within the framework, we are not only able to develop a general process of embedding any of the considered movement distributions into the evolutionary setting on complete graphs but also analytically produce the probability of fixation of a mutant on a complete N-sized network, for the multiplayer Public Goods and Hawk-Dove games. Also, by applying weak selection methods, we extended existing previous analyses on the pairwise Hawk-Dove Game to encompass the multiplayer version considered in this paper. By producing neutrality and equilibrium conditions, we show that hawks generally do worse in our models due to the multiplayer nature of the interactions.

Evolutionary game analysis of multi-agent cooperation strategy analysis in agricultural water conservancy PPP project under digitization background.

This study constructed a system dynamics (SD) evolutionary game model, from which we analyzed the conditions that need to be met by multi-agents to achieve cooperation in agricultural water conservancy (AWC) Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Simultaneously, this study used numerical simulation to depict the impact of initial participation willingness, reward, punishment, income, and other parameters of local governments, project enterprises, and farmers on the evolution strategy. The results firstly showed that the basic conditions for tripartite cooperation are to strengthen the rewards and punishments for project enterprises and improve the participation benefits of farmers. Secondly, it showed that increasing the rewards for farmers and improving the project dividend benefits can effectively motivate farmers to participate. Thirdly, it showed that enhancing the incentive subsidies and reputation benefits for project enterprise's participation, as well as strengthening the supervision of local government, boosts the motivation of project enterprises significantly. However, it is vital to ensure that the reward amounts are not too high to allow local government to play its guiding role efficiently. Lastly, the results indicated that digital technology can help reduce the participation cost of local government, project enterprises and farmers, and improve the external reputation benefits of each participant, thus forming a win-win situation for all three participants. Analyzing the cooperation strategies of the three parties in AWC PPP projects provides theoretical support and a decision-making basis for the efficient operation of AWC PPP projects under the digital background, and also provides practical policy recommendations for the high-quality development of AWC.

Joint prevention and control, cross-regional governance: An evolutionary game analysis of fiscal environmental protection expenditure strategies.

The ability to form a collaborative governance alliance is crucial to the in-depth promotion of pollution prevention and control. Starting from the perspective of regional development imbalance, this paper uses an evolutionary game model to explore how initial strategy choice, game order, financial and environmental protection expenditure efficiency, and total factor productivity affect the formation and stabilization of the cooperative alliance of "joint prevention and control, cross-regional governance". The study shows that strategic interactions between governments can lead to "cooperative" or "collusive" outcomes and that game order and initial strategy play a key role in the formation of these outcomes. In addition, changes in parameters such as fiscal and environmental expenditure efficiency and total factor productivity can greatly affect the evolutionary path and the speed of convergence. Particularly in less developed regions, fiscal and environmental spending efficiency plays a crucial role in promoting government "cooperation", which tends to be weakened by increases in total factor productivity. In contrast, economically developed regions tend to favor "cooperation" and "investment" strategies. This study provides valuable policy recommendations for enhancing interregional cooperation in environmental governance.

Research on the recycling decision of WEEE in rural China under dual supervision.

Against the backdrop of promoting green, low-carbon, and high-quality development, this paper aims to promote efficient recycling of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) in rural China. In this paper, considering the integrated development of urban and rural areas and the standardization of industrial recycling system, under the joint action of the extension of producer responsibility and "dual regulation" of supply and marketing cooperatives, the evolutionary game model and system dynamics model of three-level recycling network of farmers, supply and marketing cooperatives and retailers are established. The mechanism of the participants to promote the recycling of WEEE in rural areas is discussed and the strategic choices and interactive relationships of various entities in the evolutionary process were used to analyze through the evolutionary game method. Meanwhile, using the theory of system dynamics, the main influencing factors of different evolution stages and the dynamic change process of the system are analyzed. The results show that: (1) supply and marketing cooperatives, retailers, and farmers can initially tend to participate in and supervise the recycling of WEEE; however, (2) they can finally achieve strong supervision, actively undertake and participate in the recycling and stabilization stable strategy of rural WEEE depends on their benefits and cost of expenditure expenditures are reasonable. (3) The strategic choice of supply and marketing cooperatives has the most significant impact on the strategic choice of retailers and the strategic choice of retailers has the most significant impact on the strategic choice of farmers.

A novel model for rural household photovoltaic market trading: Utilizing cooperative alliances within a peer-to-peer framework.

In the face of diminishing traditional subsidy models and the constraints of grid-dependent transactions, this study explores trading models as a catalyst for rural electrification and sustainable development in China. Highlighting the emergence of rural photovoltaic (PV) prosumers, we propose trading models through cooperative alliances to facilitate market engagement within a peer-to-peer (P2P) framework. By applying the Shapley value for the equitable distribution of internal revenues, the study elucidates the complex interrelations between rural prosumers and the electrical grid, fostering a better understanding of their mutual interests. Further, we introduce a dynamic game-theoretic model to investigate the evolving market behaviors under diverse strategic influences among rural prosumer groups and the grid. Using numerical simulations based on real-world data from Shanghang County, Fujian Province, we analyze surplus and deficit electricity production scenarios within these alliances. The findings underscore the effectiveness of the cooperative alliance trading model in aligning individual, collective, and societal benefits. This comparative analysis of strategic outcomes validates the model's feasibility and role in advancing sustainable rural electrification strategies.

Investigating the impact of environmental feedback on the optional prisoner's dilemma for insights into cyclic dominance and evolution of cooperation.

This study incorporates environmental feedback into the optional prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors games to examine the mutual influence of eco-evolutionary outcomes and strategy dynamics. A novel game-theoretic model is developed that integrates the optional prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors games by incorporating an environmental state variable. By adjusting feedback parameters, chaos, oscillations and coexistence are observed that surpass the usual outcomes of social dilemmas when the environment transitions between depleted and replenished states. Defection is no longer advantageous in evolution; cooperation, abstention and cyclic dominance arise. The observed transitions align with natural economics, ecology and sociology phenomena. The inclusion of abstention options and environmental feedback has a significant impact on collective outcomes when compared with conventional games. This has important implications for studying adaptation and decision-making in situations with ecological constraints.

Optimizing environmental regulation policies for digital transformation in energy enterprises in China: An evolutionary game theory approach.

In response to the global consensus on achieving carbon reduction, China has introduced a series of policies aimed at accelerating the digital transformation of energy enterprises. However, these policies have revealed shortcomings such as deficiency in regulation methods and insufficient integration of regulation with technologies. This study applies evolutionary game theory (EGT) to evaluate the impacts of different environmental regulatory policies on the digital transformation and verifies the effectiveness of the theory in policy optimization. Utilizing modified real-world data, the study quantitatively examines the effects of alterations in various parameter combinations on players' strategic choices. The results indicate that: (1) increasing the regulatory intensity above 0.8, the carbon tax rate and penalties can promote the digital transformation, stimulating the low-carbon development in energy sector; (2) an interesting finding is that tax incentives such as carbon tax refund ratio can exacerbate enterprises' reliance on government compensation, thereby slowing down their transition process; (3) this study highlights the optimal service provision intensity for technological service providers (TSP) is 0.9, which can expedite system evolution towards the ideal state and foster the construction of a favorable digital regulatory environment. The study provides valuable references for optimizing regulatory policies and promoting digital transformation to realize the decarbonization goal.

Cocreation of social value: A tripartite game analysis with Chinese state-owned enterprises as an example.

In the context of the digital economy era, it is urgent for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to engage in social value cocreation activities. The government and consumers' roles in SOEs' social value cocreation system cannot be ignored. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the tripartite social value cocreation model involving the government, SOEs, and consumers. In this respect, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, SOEs, and consumers, and explores the influencing factors and evolutionary mechanism of the system overall. Matlab software is used to analyze the simulation data. The results reveal that the prerequisite for SOEs' successful social value cocreation is that consumers receive additional social value benefits greater than the level of improvement in social welfare. The allocation coefficient of consumers' additional social value benefits, the degree of the government's digital empowerment subsidy, and the level of the punishment for SOEs that violate the government's cocreation requirements will accelerate the achievement of equilibrium in the social value cocreation system, without affecting the final equilibrium result. By analyzing the strategic choices and interactive relationships among the government, SOEs, and consumers in social value cocreation in-depth, this study offers suggestions to promote the government, SOEs, and consumers' participation in social value cocreation. This research contributes to clarifying SOEs' social value cocreation model and has significant implications for promoting enterprises' high-quality development.

Navigating the personal carbon inclusion scheme: An evolutionary game theory approach to low-carbon behaviors among socio-economic groups.

In response to the challenges posed by climate change, China has launched the Personal Carbon Inclusion (PCI) scheme to encourage individuals to transition towards low-carbon lifestyles. This study investigates the behaviors of participants within the PCI scheme using a tripartite evolutionary game model, encompassing high-income and low-income individuals, as well as the PCI platform itself. The research analyzes participants' strategies, examines the evolutionary stability of different strategies, and assesses the robustness of equilibrium points within the game dynamics. Key findings reveal: (1) High-income participants tend to be less willing to adopt low-carbon behaviors compared to low-income participants. (2) The PCI platform displays limited proactive engagement in promoting low-carbon policies. (3) Factors, particularly the cost and pricing mechanisms of low-carbon actions, significantly impact the evolutionary progression of the system. Moreover, practical recommendations are provided to enhance the effectiveness of PCI schemes.

Research on platform data security governance strategy based on three-party evolutionary game.

With the implementation of the overall national security concept, data security governance rises to a new strategic height. In this paper, for the incomplete status quo of digital service platforms, third-party testing organizations and government regulators in the construction of digital security, an evolutionary game model based on the above three parties is constructed. The model examines the strategic decision-making process, behavioral influences, and evolutionary stability of the three players, and is simulated and analyzed using MATLAB. The results show that the evolutionary system will reach the ideal stable state E ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) , which corresponds to the combination of strategies: providing high-quality products, refusing to rent-seeking, and strict regulation. In order to guide the evolving system to reach the ideal stable state, this study puts forward some policy recommendations in terms of establishing a data security assessment mechanism, collaborative technology governance, and optimizing the governance architecture.

Emergence of cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's dilemma through Discriminatory and Samaritan AIs.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly embedded in our lives, their presence leads to interactions that shape our behaviour, decision-making and social interactions. Existing theoretical research on the emergence and stability of cooperation, particularly in the context of social dilemmas, has primarily focused on human-to-human interactions, overlooking the unique dynamics triggered by the presence of AI. Resorting to methods from evolutionary game theory, we study how different forms of AI can influence cooperation in a population of human-like agents playing the one-shot Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that Samaritan AI agents who help everyone unconditionally, including defectors, can promote higher levels of cooperation in humans than Discriminatory AI that only helps those considered worthy/cooperative, especially in slow-moving societies where change based on payoff difference is moderate (small intensities of selection). Only in fast-moving societies (high intensities of selection), Discriminatory AIs promote higher levels of cooperation than Samaritan AIs. Furthermore, when it is possible to identify whether a co-player is a human or an AI, we found that cooperation is enhanced when human-like agents disregard AI performance. Our findings provide novel insights into the design and implementation of context-dependent AI systems for addressing social dilemmas.

The tripartite evolutionary game of enterprises' green production strategy with government supervision and people participation.

Government supervision and people participation play vital roles in enterprises' green production strategy, but few studies have considered the strategy choices behind government supervision and people's participation. This study contended that whether an enterprise adopts the green production strategy is influenced not only by its responsible attitude facing social responsibility but also by the following two factors, the intensity of government supervision and whether people choose to participate in supervision or not when facing the enterprise adopting the green production strategy or not. We constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the behavioral evolution rules and evolutionary stability strategies of government supervision, people participation, and enterprises' green production. Then we employed numerical simulation to analyze how various factors influence the strategy selection of the government, people, and enterprises. The results show that if the utility values of government supervision and people participation are greater than 0, the enterprises will adopt the green production strategy. The system stability is affected by a synergistic relationship between participation cost, reputation benefit, and government subsidies, and an incremental relationship between enterprises' green production benefit, government subsidies, people's reported bonus, and enterprises' green production cost. This study provides a new theoretical perspective for research on government supervision, people participation, and enterprises' green production strategy, and the results provide important references for improving the enterprises' green production and urban environmental management.

Hypernetwork modeling and topology of high-order interactions for complex systems.

Interactions among the underlying agents of a complex system are not only limited to dyads but can also occur in larger groups. Currently, no generic model has been developed to capture high-order interactions (HOI), which, along with pairwise interactions, portray a detailed landscape of complex systems. Here, we integrate evolutionary game theory and behavioral ecology into a unified statistical mechanics framework, allowing all agents (modeled as nodes) and their bidirectional, signed, and weighted interactions at various orders (modeled as links or hyperlinks) to be coded into hypernetworks. Such hypernetworks can distinguish between how pairwise interactions modulate a third agent (active HOI) and how the altered state of each agent in turn governs interactions between other agents (passive HOI). The simultaneous occurrence of active and passive HOI can drive complex systems to evolve at multiple time and space scales. We apply the model to reconstruct a hypernetwork of hexa-species microbial communities, and by dissecting the topological architecture of the hypernetwork using GLMY homology theory, we find distinct roles of pairwise interactions and HOI in shaping community behavior and dynamics. The statistical relevance of the hypernetwork model is validated using a series of in vitro mono-, co-, and tricultural experiments based on three bacterial species.

Microbial markets: socio-economic perspective in studying microbial communities.

Studying microbial communities through a socio-economic lens, this paper draws parallels with human economic transactions and microbes' race for resources. Extending the 'Market Economy' concept of social science to microbial ecosystems, the paper aims to contribute to comprehending the collaborative and competitive dynamics among microorganisms. Created by a multidisciplinary team of an economist, microbiologists, and mathematicians, the paper also highlights the risks involved in employing a socio-economic perspective to explain the complexities of natural ecosystems. Navigating through microbial markets offers insights into the implications of these interactions while emphasizing the need for cautious interpretation within the broader ecological context. We hope that this paper will be a fruitful source of inspiration for future studies on microbial communities.

Convergence of reputations under indirect reciprocity.

Previous research has shown how indirect reciprocity can promote cooperation through evolutionary game theoretic models. Most work in this field assumes a separation of time-scales: individuals' reputations equilibrate at a fast time scale for given frequencies of strategies while the strategies change slowly according to the replicator dynamics. Much of the previous research has focused on the behaviour and stability of equilibria for the replicator dynamics. Here we focus on the underlying reputational dynamics that occur on a fast time scale. We describe reputational dynamics as systems of differential equations and conduct stability analyses on their equilibria. We prove that reputations converge to a unique equilibrium under a solitary observer model for each of the five standard norms and whether assessments are public or private. These results confirm a crucial but previously understudied assumption underlying the theory of indirect reciprocity for the most studied set of norms.

Evolutionary game analysis and efficiency test of water pollution control driven by emission trading: Evidence from Zhejiang Province, China.

Presently, China is actively endorsing the pilot initiative for the remunerative use and trading of emission. By examining the operation and efficacy of emission trading in the context of water pollution control, one can contribute to the advancement and refinement of this system, thereby facilitating the attainment of regional pollution reduction, carbon reduction, and high-quality development objectives. In pursuit of this objective, we develop a theoretical framework for the local government and sewage enterprises evolutionary game of water pollution control, which includes two scenarios without considering and considering emission trading for studying the influencing factors and evolution trajectory of the game subject's. Through the stability analysis, the game interactive mechanism, the difference in evolutionary trajectory, and the response logic of the decision-making body in different situations become clearly visible. Further, the system sensitivity factors are analyzed by solving the partial derivation of the area formula of the phase diagram. And the efficacy of the sewage trading system in water pollution control in Zhejiang Province is empirically examined at the micro level by adopting the trading data of the first pilot area of sewage trading in the country and the case of pollution control in Jinhua City. The research reveals the following conclusions: Under specific circumstances, emission trading can incentivize businesses and even industries to enhance pollution control measures as a whole. The performance and degree of sensitivity factors vary across gaming systems, with public reputation evaluation and central government inspection serving as positive constraints. The initial cost of paid use of emission permits, as a fixed cost component for firms to address pollution, has no effect on the enterprises' behavioral actions to satisfy emission regulations. The findings can furnish local governments with a theoretical foundation and decision support in order to optimize regulatory strategies and enhance pollution control policies.

A novel combination therapy for ER+ breast cancer suppresses drug resistance via an evolutionary double-bind.

Chemotherapy remains a commonly used and important treatment option for metastatic breast cancer. A majority of ER+ metastatic breast cancer patients ultimately develop resistance to chemotherapy, resulting in disease progression. We hypothesized that an "evolutionary double-bind", where treatment with one drug improves the response to a different agent, would improve the effectiveness and durability of responses to chemotherapy. This approach exploits vulnerabilities in acquired resistance mechanisms. Evolutionary models can be used in refractory cancer to identify alternative treatment strategies that capitalize on acquired vulnerabilities and resistance traits for improved outcomes. To develop and test these models, ER+ breast cancer cell lineages sensitive and resistant to chemotherapy are grown in spheroids with varied initial population frequencies to measure cross-sensitivity and efficacy of chemotherapy and add-on treatments such as disulfiram combination treatment. Different treatment schedules then assessed the best strategy for reducing the selection of resistant populations. We developed and parameterized a game-theoretic mathematical model from this in vitro experimental data, and used it to predict the existence of a double-bind where selection for resistance to chemotherapy induces sensitivity to disulfiram. The model predicts a dose-dependent re-sensitization (a double-bind) to chemotherapy for monotherapy disulfiram.

The cross-regional settlement methods in hospitals and the treatment-seeking behavior of patients with malignant tumors in China: an evolutionary game model.

Background: Cross-regional settlement management is a key indicator of national health insurance system maturity. Given the significant demand for cross-regional medical treatment among Chinese patients with malignant tumors and the territorially managed health insurance system, further research is necessary to explore the relationship between hospital settlement methods and treatment-seeking behaviors among these patients. This study introduces and validates an evolutionary game model that provides a theoretical foundation for direct settlement policies in cross-regional treatment. Methods: An evolutionary game model was constructed with patients and hospitals serving as strategic players within a dynamic system. This model integrates the patients' treatment utility, medical and nonmedical costs, and hospitals' financial and technological advancement benefits. Results: The evolutionary stability analysis revealed seven-game outcomes between hospitals and patients with malignant tumors. The numerical simulations suggest an evolutionary convergence toward strategy (1, 0), indicating a trend where patients with malignant tumors opt for cross-regional treatment, yet hospitals choose not to implement a direct settlement policy. Parameter sensitivity analysis showed that the parameters set in this study affected player behavioral choices and game equilibria. Conclusion: A strong demand for cross-regional medical treatment among Chinese patients with malignant tumors, and some hospitals require more incentives to implement cross-regional settlements. The key factors influencing the willingness of some patients with malignant tumors to resettle include the costs of in-area medical care, costs of cross-regional treatment without direct settlement, and the utility of cross-regional treatment. Technological advancement benefits and input costs influence some hospitals' motivation to adopt cross-regional settlements. Policy adjustments that effectively implement direct settlement policies can facilitate equilibrium, enhance the initiatives of some local health insurance management departments, improve the accessibility and efficiency of medical services, and reduce nonmedical expenses for patients.