Eliminating ontology contradictions based on the Myerson value.

Ontologies play a pivotal role in knowledge representation across various artificial intelligence domains, serving as foundational frameworks for organizing data and concepts. However, the construction and evolution of ontologies frequently lead to logical contradictions that undermine their utility and accuracy. Typically, these contradictions are addressed using an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) model, which traditionally treats all formulas with equal importance, thereby neglecting the distinct impacts of individual formulas within minimal conflict sets. To advance this method, we integrate cooperative game theory to compute the Shapley value for each formula, reflecting its marginal contribution towards resolving logical contradictions. We further construct a graph-based representation of the ontology, enabling the extension of Shapley values to Myerson values. Subsequently, we introduce a Myerson-weighted ILP model that employs a lexicographic approach to eliminate logical contradictions in ontologies. The model ensures the minimum number of formula deletions, subsequently applying Myerson values to guide the prioritization of deletions. Our comparative analysis across 18 ontologies confirms that our approach not only preserves more graph edges than traditional ILP models but also quantifies formula contributions and establishes deletion priorities, presenting a novel approach to ILP-based contradiction resolution.

Effect of homophily on coupled behavior-disease dynamics near a tipping point.

Understanding the interplay between social activities and disease dynamics is crucial for effective public health interventions. Recent studies using coupled behavior-disease models assumed homogeneous populations. However, heterogeneity in population, such as different social groups, cannot be ignored. In this study, we divided the population into social media users and non-users, and investigated the impact of homophily (the tendency for individuals to associate with others similar to themselves) and online events on disease dynamics. Our results reveal that homophily hinders the adoption of vaccinating strategies, hastening the approach to a tipping point after which the population converges to an endemic equilibrium with no vaccine uptake. Furthermore, we find that online events can significantly influence disease dynamics, with early discussions on social media platforms serving as an early warning signal of potential disease outbreaks. Our model provides insights into the mechanisms underlying these phenomena and underscores the importance of considering homophily in disease modeling and public health strategies.

Research on Division of Labor Decision and System Stability of Swarm Robots Based on Mutual Information.

In rational decision-making processes, the information interaction among individual robots is a critical factor influencing system stability. We establish a game-theoretic model based on mutual information to address division of labor decision-making and stability issues arising from differential information interaction among swarm robots. Firstly, a mutual information model is employed to measure the information interaction among robots and analyze its influence on the behavior of individual robots. Secondly, employing the Cournot model and the Stackelberg model, we model the diverse decision-making behaviors of swarm robots influenced by discrepancies in mutual information. The intricate decision dynamics exhibited by the system under the disparity mutual information values during the game process, along with the stability of Nash equilibrium points, are analyzed. Finally, dynamic complexity simulations of the game models are simulated under the disparity mutual information values: (1) When ν1 of the game model varies within a certain range, the Nash equilibrium point loses stability and enters a chaotic state. (2) As I(X;Y) increases, the decision-making pattern of robots transitions gradually from the Cournot game to the Stackelberg game. Concurrently, the sensitivity of swarm robotics systems to changes in decision parameter decreases, reducing the likelihood of the system entering a chaotic state.

An evolutionary differential game for regulating the role of monoclonal antibodies in treating signalling pathways in oesophageal cancer.

This work presents a new framework for a competitive evolutionary game between monoclonal antibodies and signalling pathways in oesophageal cancer. The framework is based on a novel dynamical model that takes into account the dynamic progression of signalling pathways, resistance mechanisms and monoclonal antibody therapies. This game involves a scenario in which signalling pathways and monoclonal antibodies are the players competing against each other, where monoclonal antibodies use Brentuximab and Pembrolizumab dosages as strategies to counter the evolutionary resistance strategy implemented by the signalling pathways. Their interactions are described by the dynamical model, which serves as the game's playground. The analysis and computation of two game-theoretic strategies, Stackelberg and Nash equilibria, are conducted within this framework to ascertain the most favourable outcome for the patient. By comparing Stackelberg equilibria with Nash equilibria, numerical experiments show that the Stackelberg equilibria are superior for treating signalling pathways and are critical for the success of monoclonal antibodies in improving oesophageal cancer patient outcomes.

A knowledge curse: how knowledge can reduce human welfare.

Greater knowledge is always an advantage for a rational individual. However, this article shows that for a group of rational individuals greater knowledge can backfire, leading to a worse outcome for all. Surprisingly, this can happen even when new knowledge does not mean the discovery of a new action but simply provides a deeper understanding of the interaction at stake. More specifically, enhanced knowledge about the current state of nature may hinder cooperation among purely self-interested individuals. The paper describes this paradoxical possibility-a 'knowledge curse'-and analyses the evolutionary process that occurs if, initially, only a few people have access to the greater knowledge. It concludes with a tentative comment on ways to avert this potential knowledge backlash.

Risk assessment of karst water inrush in tunnel engineering based on improved game theory and uncertainty measure theory.

The sudden inrush of water poses a serious threat to the safety of workers during tunnel construction in the karst region of southwest China. To mitigate this risk, a model is proposed to assess the risk of water surge through a tunnel by combining improved game theory with uncertainty measure theory. Eight indicators of risk were extracted based on the solubility of rock, its geological structure, capacity for surface catchment, and hydrogeological factors, and were incorporated into the proposed model. The subjective weights of these indicators were obtained using the analytic hierarchy process, while their objective weights were calculated through the entropy weighting method and the criteria importance through intercriteria correlation method. An improved game theory-based method of combinatorial weighting was then used to construct the corresponding weight vectors. Single-indicator measurement functions and multi-indicator measurement matrices were utilized to classify and evaluate the indicators of the risk of a surge in water level based on a confidence criterion. The proposed method was applied to five typical karst sections of the Yanjin Tunnel of the Chongqing-Kunming High-speed Railway Project, and the method was validated by comparing the recorded and estimated inflow volume ranges during the project's construction, showing consistency with the actual evaluation results. This proposed model thus offers a practical tool for assessing the risk of water inrush in karst tunnels.

Game-theoretic analysis of governance and corruption in China's pharmaceutical industry.

Introduction: With the rapid development of China's pharmaceutical industry, issues of corruption and regulatory effectiveness have become increasingly prominent, posing critical challenges to public health safety and the industry's sustainable development. Methods: This paper adopts a bounded rationality perspective and employs a game-theoretic evolutionary approach to establish a tripartite evolutionary game model involving pharmaceutical companies, third-party auditing organizations, and health insurance regulatory agencies. It analyzes the stable strategies of the parties involved and the sensitivity of key parameters within this tripartite game system. Results: The study reveals that adherence to health insurance regulations by pharmaceutical companies, refusal of bribes by third-party auditing organizations, and the implementation of lenient regulations by health insurance agencies can form an effective governance equilibrium. This equilibrium state contributes to reducing corruption in the pharmaceutical industry, balancing the interests of all parties, and promoting healthy industry development. Discussion: Pharmaceutical companies must balance compliance costs against the risks of non-compliance benefits while maximizing profits; third-party auditing organizations need to choose between fulfilling their duties and accepting bribes, considering their economic benefits and professional reputation; health insurance regulatory agencies adjust their strategies between strict and lenient regulation to maximize social welfare. The paper suggests enhancing policy support, strengthening compliance supervision, improving audit independence, and adjusting regulatory strategies to optimize governance in the pharmaceutical industry. Additionally, the research highlights the role of collaborative efforts among the three parties in achieving sustainable governance. Furthermore, the study conducts a numerical simulation analysis to demonstrate the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary stability of the system, providing practical insights into the implementation of regulatory policies. This research offers new insights for policy formulation and governance in China's pharmaceutical sector, providing significant reference value for guiding the industry's sustainable development.

An Attacker-Defender Game Model with Constrained Strategies.

Recently, research interest in the field of infrastructure attack and defense scenarios has increased. Numerous methods have been proposed for studying strategy interactions that combine complex network theory and game theory. However, the unavoidable effect of constrained strategies in complex situations has not been considered in previous studies. This study introduces a novel approach to analyzing these interactions by including the effects of constrained strategies, a factor often neglected in traditional analyses. First, we introduce the rule of constraints on strategies, which depends on the average distance between selected nodes. As the average distance increases, the probability of choosing the corresponding strategy decreases. Second, we establish an attacker-defender game model with constrained strategies based on the above rule and using information theory to evaluate the uncertainty of these strategies. Finally, we present a method for solving this problem and conduct experiments based on a target network. The results highlight the unique characteristics of the Nash equilibrium when setting constraints, as these constraints influence decision makers' Nash equilibria. When considering the constrained strategies, both the attacker and the defender tend to select strategies with lower average distances. The effect of the constraints on their strategies becomes less apparent as the number of attackable or defendable nodes increases. This research advances the field by introducing a novel framework for examining strategic interactions in infrastructure defense and attack scenarios. By incorporating strategy constraints, our work offers a new perspective on the critical area of infrastructure security.

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of structured populations in periodically fluctuating environments: a G function approach.

Understanding the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of populations is critical for both basic and applied purposes in a variety of biological contexts. Although several modeling frameworks have been developed to simulate eco-evolutionary dynamics, many fewer address how to model structured populations. In a prior paper, we put forth the first modeling approach to simulate eco-evolutionary dynamics in structured populations under the G function modeling framework. However, this approach does not allow for accurate simulation under fluctuating environmental conditions. To address this limitation, we draw on the study of periodic differential equations to propose a modified approach that uses a different definition of fitness more suitable for fluctuating environments. We illustrate this method with a simple toy model of life history trade-offs. The generality of this approach allows it to be used in a variety of biological contexts.

Modelling the dynamic vaccination game with evolutionary feedback: exploring pairwise interactions and vaccine strategies.

A novel approach rooted in co-evolutionary game theory has been introduced to investigate how the interaction between human decision-making and the dynamics of the epidemic environment can shape vaccine acceptance during disease outbreaks. This innovative framework combines two key game concepts: the cooperation-defection game and the cost-benefit vaccination game. By doing so, it enables us to delve into the various factors that influence the success of a vaccination campaign amid an outbreak. Within this framework, individuals engage in a thorough evaluation of the risks, benefits and incentives associated with either cooperating by getting vaccinated or defecting by refusing the vaccine. Additionally, it involves a careful analysis of the costs and benefits linked to vaccine acceptance. The outcomes of this study stress the importance of two main factors: the effectiveness of the vaccine and the prevalence of a cooperative culture within society. This insight into the strategic interactions between individuals and their decisions about vaccination holds significant implications for public health policymakers. It equips to boost vaccination coverage and address vaccine hesitancy within society ultimately contributing to better public health outcomes during epidemic outbreaks.

Study on stability evaluation of goaf based on AHP and EWM-taking the northern new district of Liaoyuan city as an example.

Throughout the history of coal mining in all countries of the world, large areas of goaf have been left behind, and sudden collapses and surface subsidence of large areas of goaf may occur, especially for mining areas with long mining cycles. The northern new district of the Liaoyuan mining area has been subjected to nearly half a century of mining activities, accompanied by a gradual accumulation of disasters, which have occurred frequently in recent years. In order to assess the stability of the goaf in the study area, this paper proposes a hybrid decision-making multi-factor integrated evaluation method. The distribution of underground goafs was determined using geophysical exploration techniques (seismic survey and transient electromagnetic method) and geological drilling exploration. First, an evaluation index system was established based on the specifications of the goaf, the ecological and geological environment, and the mining conditions; the system included 14 indicators. Two weight calculation methods, AHP-EWM, were employed to determine the comprehensive weight of each indicator by combining subjective and objective weights on the basis of improved game theory. Subsequently, the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method was utilised to complete the stability rating of each block in the study area, and MapGIS and ArcGIS were employed to complete the drawing of the stability zoning map of the northern new district goaf. The study area was divided into three zones of stability, basic stability and instability, according to the critical value. These zones accounted for 23.03%, 36.45% and 40.52% of the total area of the study area, respectively. The comprehensive on-site investigation revealed a decrease in the size and number of collapse pits and the rate of damage to the houses from the unstable zone to the stable zone. This indicates that the results of the division are consistent with the actual situation. The classification results are consistent with the actual ground disaster situation, thus verifying the rationality and validity of the evaluation method. The results indicate that the stability of the study area is generally at the lower middle level.

Cost Optimisation of Individual-Based Institutional Reward Incentives for Promoting Cooperation in Finite Populations.

In this paper, we study the problem of cost optimisation of individual-based institutional incentives (reward, punishment, and hybrid) for guaranteeing a certain minimal level of cooperative behaviour in a well-mixed, finite population. In this scheme, the individuals in the population interact via cooperation dilemmas (Donation Game or Public Goods Game) in which institutional reward is carried out only if cooperation is not abundant enough (i.e., the number of cooperators is below a threshold 1 ≤ t ≤ N - 1 , where N is the population size); and similarly, institutional punishment is carried out only when defection is too abundant. We study analytically the cases t = 1 for the reward incentive under the small mutation limit assumption and two different initial states, showing that the cost function is always non-decreasing. We derive the neutral drift and strong selection limits when the intensity of selection tends to zero and infinity, respectively. We numerically investigate the problem for other values of t and for population dynamics with arbitrary mutation rates.

Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations.

Models of indirect reciprocity study how social norms promote cooperation. In these models, cooperative individuals build up a positive reputation, which in turn helps them in their future interactions. The exact reputational benefits of cooperation depend on the norm in place, which may change over time. Previous research focused on the stability of social norms. Much less is known about how social norms initially evolve when competing with many others. A comprehensive evolutionary analysis, however, has been difficult. Even among the comparably simple space of so-called third-order norms, there are thousands of possibilities, each one inducing its own reputation dynamics. To address this challenge, we use large-scale computer simulations. We study the reputation dynamics of each third-order norm and all evolutionary transitions between them. In contrast to established work with only a handful of norms, we find that cooperation is hard to maintain in well-mixed populations. However, within group-structured populations, cooperation can emerge. The most successful norm in our simulations is particularly simple. It regards cooperation as universally positive, and defection as usually negative-unless defection takes the form of justified punishment. This research sheds light on the complex interplay of social norms, their induced reputation dynamics, and population structure.

Theoretical analyses for the evolution of biogenic volatile organic compounds (BVOC) emission strategy.

Plants emit biogenic volatile organic compounds (BVOCs) as signaling molecules, playing a crucial role in inducing resistance against herbivores. Neighboring plants that eavesdrop on BVOC signals can also increase defenses against herbivores or alter growth patterns to respond to potential risks of herbivore damage. Despite the significance of BVOC emissions, the evolutionary rationales behind their release and the factors contributing to the diversity in such emissions remain poorly understood. To unravel the conditions for the evolution of BVOC emission, we developed a spatially explicit model that formalizes the evolutionary dynamics of BVOC emission and non-emission strategies. Our model considered two effects of BVOC signaling that impact the fitness of plants: intra-individual communication, which mitigates herbivore damage through the plant's own BVOC signaling incurring emission costs, and inter-individual communication, which alters the influence of herbivory based on BVOC signals from other individuals without incurring emission costs. Employing two mathematical models-the lattice model and the random distribution model-we investigated how intra-individual communication, inter-individual communication, and spatial structure influenced the evolution of BVOC emission strategies. Our analysis revealed that the increase in intra-individual communication promotes the evolution of the BVOC emission strategy. In contrast, the increase in inter-individual communication effect favors cheaters who benefit from the BVOCs released from neighboring plants without bearing the costs associated with BVOC emission. Our analysis also demonstrated that the narrower the spatial scale of BVOC signaling, the higher the likelihood of BVOC evolution. This research sheds light on the intricate dynamics governing the evolution of BVOC emissions and their implications for plant-plant communication.

Analysis of production decision-making evolution of steel enterprises under carbon border adjustment mechanism.

This work explored the changes in production decision-making trends of Chinese steel enterprises under the influence of the carbon border adjustment mechanism. First, using evolutionary game theory, the interactive mechanism of complex production strategies among steel enterprises considering the carbon border adjustment mechanism was studied, including the impact of government subsidy coefficients, additional profits and carbon tax prices on enterprise decision-making. Second, the influence of key parameters on the dynamic evolutionary process was analysed. On this basis, the empirical simulation method was used to verify the game model and the main conclusions. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters was determined using Matlab software. The results showed that additional profits from green investment, government subsidy coefficients, input-output values and carbon tax prices had a higher impact on the evolution of enterprise production strategies. The results of this study provide a decision-making basis for the selection of future production methods for steel enterprises.

Coastal erosion and flooding risk assessment based on grid scale: A case study of six coastal metropolitan areas.

Coastal areas, situated at the critical juncture of sea-land interaction, are confronted with significant challenges from coastal erosion and flooding. It is imperative to evaluate these risks and offer scientific guidance to foster regional sustainable development. This article developed a coastal risk assessment model based on grid scale, integrating both coastal exposure and socio-ecological environment. Fourteen indicators were selected, aiming to offer a systematic approach for estimating and comparing disaster risks in coastal areas. This risk assessment model was applied to Shanghai, New York, Sydney, San Francisco, Randstad, and Tokyo metropolitan areas. The results indicate: (1) Accounting for the protective role of habitat types like mangroves and the distance attenuation effect offered a more precise representation of hazard situation; (2) The integration of the Game Theory weighting method with both subjective Analytic Hierarchy Process and objective CRITIC weighting enhanced the scientific validity and rationality of the results by minimizing deviations between subjective and objective weights; (3) Shanghai exhibited the highest average hazard and vulnerability, San Francisco had the lowest average hazard and Sydney had the lowest average vulnerability; In terms of comprehensive risk, Shanghai possessed the highest average risk, while Sydney presented the lowest. The proposed model framework is designed to swiftly identify high-risk zones, providing detailed information references for local governments to devise efficacious risk management and prevention strategies.

Influential individuals can promote prosocial practices in heterogeneous societies: a mathematical and agent-based model.

In this paper, we examine how different governance types impact prosocial behaviors in a heterogenous society. We construct a general theoretical framework to examine a game-theoretic model to assess the ease of achieving a cooperative outcome. We then build a dynamic agent-based model to examine three distinct governance types in a heterogenous population: monitoring one's neighbors, despotic leadership, and influencing one's neighbors to adapt strategies that lead to better fitness. In our research, we find that while despotic leadership may lead towards high prosociality and high returns it does not exceed the effects of a local individual who can exert positive influence in the community. This may suggest that greater individual gains can be had by cooperating and that global hierarchical leadership may not be essential as long as influential individuals exert their influence for public good and not for public ill.

Enhanced Network Intrusion Detection System for Internet of Things Security Using Multimodal Big Data Representation with Transfer Learning and Game Theory.

Internet of Things (IoT) applications and resources are highly vulnerable to flood attacks, including Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks overwhelm the targeted device with numerous network packets, making its resources inaccessible to authorized users. Such attacks may comprise attack references, attack types, sub-categories, host information, malicious scripts, etc. These details assist security professionals in identifying weaknesses, tailoring defense measures, and responding rapidly to possible threats, thereby improving the overall security posture of IoT devices. Developing an intelligent Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is highly complex due to its numerous network features. This study presents an improved IDS for IoT security that employs multimodal big data representation and transfer learning. First, the Packet Capture (PCAP) files are crawled to retrieve the necessary attacks and bytes. Second, Spark-based big data optimization algorithms handle huge volumes of data. Second, a transfer learning approach such as word2vec retrieves semantically-based observed features. Third, an algorithm is developed to convert network bytes into images, and texture features are extracted by configuring an attention-based Residual Network (ResNet). Finally, the trained text and texture features are combined and used as multimodal features to classify various attacks. The proposed method is thoroughly evaluated on three widely used IoT-based datasets: CIC-IoT 2022, CIC-IoT 2023, and Edge-IIoT. The proposed method achieves excellent classification performance, with an accuracy of 98.2%. In addition, we present a game theory-based process to validate the proposed approach formally.

The evolution of social behaviors and risk preferences in settings with uncertainty.

Humans update their social behavior in response to past experiences and changing environments. Behavioral decisions are further complicated by uncertainty in the outcome of social interactions. Faced with uncertainty, some individuals exhibit risk aversion while others seek risk. Attitudes toward risk may depend on socioeconomic status; and individuals may update their risk preferences over time, which will feedback on their social behavior. Here, we study how uncertainty and risk preferences shape the evolution of social behaviors. We extend the game-theoretic framework for behavioral evolution to incorporate uncertainty about payoffs and variation in how individuals respond to this uncertainty. We find that different attitudes toward risk can substantially alter behavior and long-term outcomes, as individuals seek to optimize their rewards from social interactions. In a standard setting without risk, for example, defection always overtakes a well-mixed population engaged in the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, whereas risk aversion can reverse the direction of evolution, promoting cooperation over defection. When individuals update their risk preferences along with their strategic behaviors, a population can oscillate between periods dominated by risk-averse cooperators and periods of risk-seeking defectors. Our analysis provides a systematic account of how risk preferences modulate, and even coevolve with, behavior in an uncertain social world.

Analyzing the use of non-pharmaceutical personal protective measures through self-interest and social optimum for the control of an emerging disease.

Non-pharmaceutical personal protective (NPP) measures such as face masks use, and hand and respiratory hygiene can be effective measures for mitigating the spread of aerosol/airborne diseases, such as COVID-19, in the absence of vaccination or treatment. However, the usage of such measures is constrained by their inherent perceived cost and effectiveness for reducing transmission risk. To understand the complex interaction of disease dynamics and individuals decision whether to adopt NPP or not, we incorporate evolutionary game theory into an epidemic model such as COVID-19. To compare how self-interested NPP use differs from social optimum, we also investigated optional control from a central planner's perspective. We use Pontryagin's maximum principle to identify the population-level NPP uptake that minimizes disease incidence by incurring the minimum costs. The evolutionary behavior model shows that NPP uptake increases at lower perceived costs of NPP, higher transmission risk, shorter duration of NPP use, higher effectiveness of NPP, and shorter duration of disease-induced immunity. Though social optimum NPP usage is generally more effective in reducing disease incidence than self-interested usage, our analysis identifies conditions under which both strategies get closer. Our model provides new insights for public health in mitigating a disease outbreak through NPP.