Meaningfulness and attachment: what dreams, psychosis and psychedelic states tell us about our need for connection.

The human need to find meaning in life and the human need for connection may be two sides of the same coin, a coin forged in the developmental crucible of attachment. Our need for meaningfulness can be traced to our developmental need for connection in the attachment relationship. The free energy principle dictates that in order to resist a natural tendency towards disorder self-organizing systems must generate models that predict the hidden causes of phenomenal experience. In other words, they must make sense of things. In both an evolutionary and ontogenetic sense, the narrative self develops as a model that makes sense of experience. However, the self-model skews the interpretation of experience towards that which is predictable, or already "known." One may say it causes us to "take things personally." Meaning is felt more acutely when defenses are compromised, when the narrative self is offline. This enables meaning-making that is less egocentrically motivated. Dreams, psychosis, and psychedelic states offer glimpses of how we make sense of things absent a coherent narrative self. This has implications for the way we understand such states, and lays bare the powerful reach of attachment in shaping what we experience as meaningful.

Neuromodulation of safety and surprise in the early stages of infant development: affective homeostatic regulation in bodily and mental functions.

Developing a sense of internal safety and security depends mainly on others: numerous neuromodulators play a significant role in the homeostatic process, regulating the importance of proximity to a caregiver and experiencing feelings that enable us to regulate our interdependence with our conspecifics since birth. This array of neurofunctional structures have been called the SEPARATION DISTRESS system (now more commonly known as the PANIC/ GRIEF system). This emotional system is mainly involved in the production of depressive symptoms. The disruption of this essential emotional balance leads to the onset of feelings of panic followed by depression. We will focus on the neuropeptides that play a crucial role in social approach behavior in mammals, which enhance prosocial behavior and facilitate the consolidation of social bonds. We propose that most prosocial behaviors are regulated through the specific neuromodulators acting on salient intersubjective stimuli, reflecting an increased sense of inner confidence (safety) in social relationships. This review considers the neurofunctional link between the feelings that may ultimately be at the base of a sense of inner safety and the central neuromodulatory systems. This link may shed light on the clinical implications for the development of early mother-infant bonding and the depressive clinical consequences when this bond is disrupted, such as in post-partum depression, depressive feelings connected to, addiction, neurofunctional disorders, and psychological trauma.

The free energy principle induces intracellular compartmentalization.

Living systems at all scales are compartmentalized into interacting subsystems. This paper reviews a mechanism that drives compartmentalization in generic systems at any scale. It first discusses three symmetries of generic physical interactions in a quantum-theoretic description. It then shows that if one of these, a permutation symmetry on the inter-system boundary, is spontaneously broken, the symmetry breaking is amplified by the Free Energy Principle (FEP). It thus shows how compartmentalization generically results from permutation symmetry breaking under the FEP. It finally notes that the FEP asymptotically restores the broken symmetry, showing that the FEP can be regarded as a theory of fluctuations away from a permutation-symmetric boundary, and hence from an entangled joint state of the interacting systems.

The Universal Optimism of the Self-Evidencing Mind.

Karl Friston's free-energy principle casts agents as self-evidencing through active inference. This implies that decision-making, planning and information-seeking are, in a generic sense, 'wishful'. We take an interdisciplinary perspective on this perplexing aspect of the free-energy principle and unpack the epistemological implications of wishful thinking under the free-energy principle. We use this epistemic framing to discuss the emergence of biases for self-evidencing agents. In particular, we argue that this elucidates an optimism bias as a foundational tenet of self-evidencing. We allude to a historical precursor to some of these themes, interestingly found in Machiavelli's oeuvre, to contextualise the universal optimism of the free-energy principle.

Natural language syntax complies with the free-energy principle.

Natural language syntax yields an unbounded array of hierarchically structured expressions. We claim that these are used in the service of active inference in accord with the free-energy principle (FEP). While conceptual advances alongside modelling and simulation work have attempted to connect speech segmentation and linguistic communication with the FEP, we extend this program to the underlying computations responsible for generating syntactic objects. We argue that recently proposed principles of economy in language design-such as "minimal search" criteria from theoretical syntax-adhere to the FEP. This affords a greater degree of explanatory power to the FEP-with respect to higher language functions-and offers linguistics a grounding in first principles with respect to computability. While we mostly focus on building new principled conceptual relations between syntax and the FEP, we also show through a sample of preliminary examples how both tree-geometric depth and a Kolmogorov complexity estimate (recruiting a Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm) can be used to accurately predict legal operations on syntactic workspaces, directly in line with formulations of variational free energy minimization. This is used to motivate a general principle of language design that we term Turing-Chomsky Compression (TCC). We use TCC to align concerns of linguists with the normative account of self-organization furnished by the FEP, by marshalling evidence from theoretical linguistics and psycholinguistics to ground core principles of efficient syntactic computation within active inference.

Giftedness and atypical sexual differentiation: enhanced perceptual functioning through estrogen deficiency instead of androgen excess.

Syndromic autism spectrum conditions (ASC), such as Klinefelter syndrome, also manifest hypogonadism. Compared to the popular Extreme Male Brain theory, the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning model explains the connection between ASC, savant traits, and giftedness more seamlessly, and their co-emergence with atypical sexual differentiation. Overexcitability of primary sensory inputs generates a relative enhancement of local to global processing of stimuli, hindering the abstraction of communication signals, in contrast to the extraordinary local information processing skills in some individuals. Weaker inhibitory function through gamma-aminobutyric acid type A (GABAA) receptors and the atypicality of synapse formation lead to this difference, and the formation of unique neural circuits that process external information. Additionally, deficiency in monitoring inner sensory information leads to alexithymia (inability to distinguish one's own emotions), which can be caused by hypoactivity of estrogen and oxytocin in the interoceptive neural circuits, comprising the anterior insular and cingulate gyri. These areas are also part of the Salience Network, which switches between the Central Executive Network for external tasks and the Default Mode Network for self-referential mind wandering. Exploring the possibility that estrogen deficiency since early development interrupts GABA shift, causing sensory processing atypicality, it helps to evaluate the co-occurrence of ASC with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, dyslexia, and schizophrenia based on phenotypic and physiological bases. It also provides clues for understanding the common underpinnings of these neurodevelopmental disorders and gifted populations.

When the interoceptive and conceptual clash: The case of oppositional phenomenal self-modelling in Tourette syndrome.

Tourette syndrome (TS) has been associated with a rich set of symptoms that are said to be uncomfortable, unwilled, and effortful to manage. Furthermore, tics, the canonical characteristic of TS, are multifaceted, and their onset and maintenance is complex. A formal account that integrates these features of TS symptomatology within a plausible theoretical framework is currently absent from the field. In this paper, we assess the explanatory power of hierarchical generative modelling in accounting for TS symptomatology from the perspective of active inference. We propose a fourfold analysis of sensory, motor, and cognitive phenomena associated with TS. In Section 1, we characterise tics as a form of action aimed at sensory attenuation. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of epistemic ticcing and describe such behaviour as the search for evidence that there is an agent (i.e., self) at the heart of the generative hierarchy. In Section 3, we characterise both epistemic (sensation-free) and nonepistemic (sensational) tics as habitual behaviour. Finally, in Section 4, we propose that ticcing behaviour involves an inevitable conflict between distinguishable aspects of selfhood; namely, between the minimal phenomenal sense of self-which is putatively underwritten by interoceptive inference-and the explicit preferences that constitute the individual's conceptual sense of self. In sum, we aim to provide an empirically informed analysis of TS symptomatology under active inference, revealing a continuity between covert and overt features of the condition.

Markov Blankets and Mirror Symmetries-Free Energy Minimization and Mesocortical Anatomy.

A theoretical account of development in mesocortical anatomy is derived from the free energy principle, operating in a neural field with both Hebbian and anti-Hebbian neural plasticity. An elementary structural unit is proposed, in which synaptic connections at mesoscale are arranged in paired patterns with mirror symmetry. Exchanges of synaptic flux in each pattern form coupled spatial eigenmodes, and the line of mirror reflection between the paired patterns operates as a Markov blanket, so that prediction errors in exchanges between the pairs are minimized. The theoretical analysis is then compared to the outcomes from a biological model of neocortical development, in which neuron precursors are selected by apoptosis for cell body and synaptic connections maximizing synchrony and also minimizing axonal length. It is shown that this model results in patterns of connection with the anticipated mirror symmetries, at micro-, meso- and inter-arial scales, among lateral connections, and in cortical depth. This explains the spatial organization and functional significance of neuron response preferences, and is compatible with the structural form of both columnar and noncolumnar cortex. Multi-way interactions of mirrored representations can provide a preliminary anatomically realistic model of cortical information processing.

'Snakes and ladders' in paleoanthropology: From cognitive surprise to skillfulness a million years ago.

A paradigmatic account may suffice to explain behavioral evolution in early Homo. We propose a parsimonious account that (1) could explain a particular, frequently-encountered, archeological outcome of behavior in early Homo - namely, the fashioning of a Paleolithic stone 'handaxe' - from a biological theoretic perspective informed by the free energy principle (FEP); and that (2) regards instances of the outcome as postdictive or retrodictive, circumstantial corroboration. Our proposal considers humankind evolving as a self-organizing biological ecosystem at a geological time-scale. We offer a narrative treatment of this self-organization in terms of the FEP. Specifically, we indicate how 'cognitive surprises' could underwrite an evolving propensity in early Homo to express sporadic unorthodox or anomalous behavior. This co-evolutionary propensity has left us a legacy of Paleolithic artifacts that is reminiscent of a 'snakes and ladders' board game of appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular archeological traces of Paleolithic behavior. When detected in the Early and Middle Pleistocene record, anthropologists and archeologists often imagine evidence of unusual or novel behavior in terms of early humankind ascending the rungs of a figurative phylogenetic 'ladder' - as if these corresponded to progressive evolution of cognitive abilities that enabled incremental achievements of increasingly innovative technical prowess, culminating in the cognitive ascendancy of Homo sapiens. The conjecture overlooks a plausible likelihood that behavior by an individual who was atypical among her conspecifics could have been disregarded in a community of Hominina (for definition see Appendix 1) that failed to recognize, imagine, or articulate potential advantages of adopting hitherto unorthodox behavior. Such failure, as well as diverse fortuitous demographic accidents, would cause exceptional personal behavior to be ignored and hence unremembered. It could disappear by a pitfall, down a 'snake', as it were, in the figurative evolutionary board game; thereby causing a discontinuity in the evolution of human behavior that presents like an evolutionary puzzle. The puzzle discomforts some paleoanthropologists trained in the natural and life sciences. They often dismiss it, explaining it away with such self-justifying conjectures as that, maybe, separate paleospecies of Homo differentially possessed different cognitive abilities, which, supposedly, could account for the presence or absence in the Pleistocene archeological record of traces of this or that behavioral outcome or skill. We argue that an alternative perspective - that inherits from the FEP and an individual's 'active inference' about its surroundings and of its own responses - affords a prosaic, deflationary, and parsimonious way to account for appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular behavioral outcomes and skills of early humankind.

The police hunch: the Bayesian brain, active inference, and the free energy principle in action.

In the realm of law enforcement, the "police hunch" has long been a mysterious but crucial aspect of decision-making. Drawing on the developing framework of Active Inference from cognitive science, this theoretical article examines the genesis, mechanics, and implications of the police hunch. It argues that hunches - often vital in high-stakes situations - should not be described as mere intuitions, but as intricate products of our mind's generative models. These models, shaped by observations of the social world and assimilated and enacted through active inference, seek to reduce surprise and make hunches an indispensable tool for officers, in exactly the same way that hypotheses are indispensable for scientists. However, the predictive validity of hunches is influenced by a range of factors, including experience and bias, thus warranting critical examination of their reliability. This article not only explores the formation of police hunches but also provides practical insights for officers and researchers on how to harness the power of active inference to fully understand policing decisions and subsequently explore new avenues for future research.

Principled Limitations on Self-Representation for Generic Physical Systems.

The ideas of self-observation and self-representation, and the concomitant idea of self-control, pervade both the cognitive and life sciences, arising in domains as diverse as immunology and robotics. Here, we ask in a very general way whether, and to what extent, these ideas make sense. Using a generic model of physical interactions, we prove a theorem and several corollaries that severely restrict applicable notions of self-observation, self-representation, and self-control. We show, in particular, that adding observational, representational, or control capabilities to a meta-level component of a system cannot, even in principle, lead to a complete meta-level representation of the system as a whole. We conclude that self-representation can at best be heuristic, and that self models cannot, in general, be empirically tested by the systems that implement them.

The utilitarian brain: Moving beyond the Free Energy Principle.

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) is a normative computational framework for iterative reduction of prediction error and uncertainty through perception-intervention cycles that has been presented as a potential unifying theory of all brain functions (Friston, 2006). Any theory hoping to unify the brain sciences must be able to explain the mechanisms of decision-making, an important cognitive faculty, without the addition of independent, irreducible notions. This challenge has been accepted by several proponents of the FEP (Friston, 2010; Gershman, 2019). We evaluate attempts to reduce decision-making to the FEP, using Lucas' (2005) meta-theory of the brain's contextual constraints as a guidepost. We find reductive variants of the FEP for decision-making unable to explain behavior in certain types of diagnostic, predictive, and multi-armed bandit tasks. We trace the shortcomings to the core theory's lack of an adequate notion of subjective preference or "utility", a concept central to decision-making and grounded in the brain's biological reality. We argue that any attempts to fully reduce utility to the FEP would require unrealistic assumptions, making the principle an unlikely candidate for unifying brain science. We suggest that researchers instead attempt to identify contexts in which either informational or independent reward constraints predominate, delimiting the FEP's area of applicability. To encourage this type of research, we propose a two-factor formal framework that can subsume any FEP model and allows experimenters to compare the contributions of informational versus reward constraints to behavior.

The Free Energy of Nucleosomal DNA Based on the Landau Model and Topology.

The free energy of nucleosomal DNA plays a key role in the formation of nucleosomes in eukaryotes. Some work on the free energy of nucleosomal DNA have been carried out in experiments. However, the relationships between the free energy of nucleosomal DNA and its conformation, especially its topology, remain unclear in theory. By combining the Landau theory, the Hopfion model and experimental data, we find that the free energy of nucleosomal DNA is at the lower level. With the help of the energy minimum principle, we conclude that nucleosomal DNA stays in a stable state. Moreover, we discover that small perturbations on nucleosomal DNA have little effect on its free energy. This implies that nucleosomal DNA has a certain redundancy in order to stay stable. This explains why nucleosomal DNA will not change significantly due to small perturbations.

The tendency of the schematic structure to maintain stability can be interpreted as mental inertia.

This paper incorporates schematic concepts related to mental inertia and provides an avenue for interpreting psychology using the principles of classical mechanics. Schemas find wide application in diverse fields, ranging from ergonomics to psychotherapy. Nonetheless, it is crucial to incorporate schemas themselves into a more unified and comprehensive theoretical framework. Drawing upon the free energy principle (FEP) and the second law of thermodynamics, it is evident that humans possess a natural inclination to construct and maintain consistent cognitive structures. This characteristic contributes to the stability of schemas within a defined range. The particular scope of the model is closely intertwined with its structure, leading to variations among individuals in diverse environments. The coherence of the schema within a defined range can be perceived as the magnitude of mental inertia. This psychological analogy emphasizes the importance of considering the influences exerted by the external environment and their effects on mental inertia when predicting the human mind and behavior.

Conceptual foundations of physiological regulation incorporating the free energy principle and self-organized criticality.

Bettinger, J. S., K. J. Friston. Conceptual Foundations of Physiological Regulation incorporating the Free Energy Principle & Self-Organized Criticality. NEUROSCI BIOBEHAV REV 23(x) 144-XXX, 2022. Since the late nineteen-nineties, the concept of homeostasis has been contextualized within a broader class of "allostatic" dynamics characterized by a wider-berth of causal factors including social, psychological and environmental entailments; the fundamental nature of integrated brain-body dynamics; plus the role of anticipatory, top-down constraints supplied by intrinsic regulatory models. Many of these evidentiary factors are integral in original descriptions of homeostasis; subsequently integrated; and/or cite more-general operating principles of self-organization. As a result, the concept of allostasis may be generalized to a larger category of variational systems in biology, engineering and physics in terms of advances in complex systems, statistical mechanics and dynamics involving heterogenous (hierarchical/heterarchical, modular) systems like brain-networks and the internal milieu. This paper offers a three-part treatment. 1) interpret "allostasis" to emphasize a variational and relational foundation of physiological stability; 2) adapt the role of allostasis as "stability through change" to include a "return to stability" and 3) reframe the model of homeostasis with a conceptual model of criticality that licenses the upgrade to variational dynamics.

Active Inference With Empathy Mechanism for Socially Behaved Artificial Agents in Diverse Situations.

This article proposes a method for an artificial agent to behave in a social manner. Although defining proper social behavior is difficult because it differs from situation to situation, the agent following the proposed method adaptively behaves appropriately in each situation by empathizing with the surrounding others. The proposed method is achieved by incorporating empathy into active inference. We evaluated the proposed method regarding control of autonomous mobile robots in diverse situations. From the evaluation results, an agent controlled by the proposed method could behave more adaptively socially than an agent controlled by the standard active inference in the diverse situations. In the case of two agents, the agent controlled with the proposed method behaved in a social way that reduced the other agent's travel distance by 13.7% and increased the margin between the agents by 25.8%, even though it increased the agent's travel distance by 8.2%. Also, the agent controlled with the proposed method behaved more socially when it was surrounded by altruistic others but less socially when it was surrounded by selfish others.

Incremental Learning of Goal-Directed Actions in a Dynamic Environment by a Robot Using Active Inference.

This study investigated how a physical robot can adapt goal-directed actions in dynamically changing environments, in real-time, using an active inference-based approach with incremental learning from human tutoring examples. Using our active inference-based model, while good generalization can be achieved with appropriate parameters, when faced with sudden, large changes in the environment, a human may have to intervene to correct actions of the robot in order to reach the goal, as a caregiver might guide the hands of a child performing an unfamiliar task. In order for the robot to learn from the human tutor, we propose a new scheme to accomplish incremental learning from these proprioceptive-exteroceptive experiences combined with mental rehearsal of past experiences. Our experimental results demonstrate that using only a few tutoring examples, the robot using our model was able to significantly improve its performance on new tasks without catastrophic forgetting of previously learned tasks.

Myth of objectivity and the origin of symbols.

An age-old challenge in epistemology and moral philosophy is whether objectivity exists independent of subjective perspective. Alfred North Whitehead labeled it a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"; after all, knowledge is represented elusively in symbols. I employ the free energy principle (FEP) to argue that the belief in moral objectivity, although perhaps fallacious, amounts to an ancient and universal human myth that is essential for our symbolic capacity. To perceive any object in a world of non-diminishing (perhaps irreducible) uncertainty, according to the FEP, its constituent parts must display common probabilistic tendencies, known as statistical beliefs, prior to its interpretation, or active inference, as a stable entity. Behavioral bias, subjective emotions, and social norms scale the scope of identity by coalescing agents with otherwise disparate goals and aligning their perspectives into a coherent structure. I argue that by declaring belief in norms as objective, e.g., expressing that a particular theft or infidelity was generally wrong, our ancestors psychologically constructed a type of identity bound only by shared faith in a perspective that technically transcended individual subjectivity. Signaling explicit belief in what were previously non-symbolic norms, as seen in many non-human animals, simulates a top-down point of view of our social interactions and thereby constructs our cultural niche and symbolic capacity. I demonstrate that, largely by contrasting with overly reductive analytical models that assume individual rational pursuit of extrinsic rewards, shared belief in moral conceptions, i.e., what amounts to a religious faith, remains a motivational cornerstone of our language, economic and civic institutions, stories, and psychology. Finally, I hypothesize that our bias for familiar accents (shibboleth), plausibly represents the phylogenetic and ontogenetic contextual origins of our impulse to minimize social surprise by declaring belief in the myth of objectivity.

Playing Brains: The Ethical Challenges Posed by Silicon Sentience and Hybrid Intelligence in DishBrain.

The convergence of human and artificial intelligence is currently receiving considerable scholarly attention. Much debate about the resulting Hybrid Minds focuses on the integration of artificial intelligence into the human brain through intelligent brain-computer interfaces as they enter clinical use. In this contribution we discuss a complementary development: the integration of a functional in vitro network of human neurons into an in silico computing environment.To do so, we draw on a recent experiment reporting the creation of silico-biological intelligence as a case study (Kagan et al., 2022b). In this experiment, multielectrode arrays were plated with stem cell-derived human neurons, creating a system which the authors call DishBrain. By embedding the system into a virtual game-world, neural clusters were able to receive electrical input signals from the game-world and to respond appropriately with output signals from pre-assigned motor regions. Using this design, the authors demonstrate how the DishBrain self-organises and successfully learns to play the computer game 'Pong', exhibiting 'sentient' and intelligent behaviour in its virtual environment.The creation of such hybrid, silico-biological intelligence raises numerous ethical challenges. Following the neuroscientific framework embraced by the authors themselves, we discuss the arising ethical challenges in the context of Karl Friston's Free Energy Principle, focusing on the risk of creating synthetic phenomenology. Following the DishBrain's creator's neuroscientific assumptions, we highlight how DishBrain's design may risk bringing about artificial suffering and argue for a congruently cautious approach to such synthetic biological intelligence.