The right to assistive technology.

In this paper, I argue that disabled people have a right to assistive technology (AT), but this right cannot be grounded simply in a broader right to health care or in a more comprehensive view like the capabilities approach to justice. Both of these options are plagued by issues that I refer to as the problem of constriction, where the theory does not justify enough of the AT that disabled people should have access to, and the problem of overextension, where the theory cannot adequately identify an upper limit on the AT that people have a right to. As an alternative to these justificatory frameworks, I argue that disabled people are owed access to AT at the expense of nondisabled people as a matter of compensatory justice. That is, I defend the position that disabled people are owed AT as part of due compensation for the harms they experience from being disadvantaged by society's dominant cooperative scheme and the violation of their right to equality of opportunity that such disadvantage entails. I also propose a method for identifying an upper limit to what this right to AT requires. In this way, I argue that compensatory justice avoids both the problem of constriction and the problem of overextension.

Precision QALYs, Precisely Unjust.

Warwick Heale has recently defended the notion of individualized and personalized Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) in connection with health care resource allocation decisions. Ordinarily, QALYs are used to make allocation decisions at the population level. If a health care intervention costs £100,000 and generally yields only two years of survival, the cost per QALY gained will be £50,000, far in excess of the £30,000 limit per QALY judged an acceptable use of resources within the National Health Service in the United Kingdom. However, if we know with medical certainty that a patient will gain four extra years of life from that intervention, the cost per QALY will be £25,000. Heale argues fairness and social utility require such a patient to receive that treatment, even though all others in the cohort of that patient might be denied that treatment (and lose two years of potential life). Likewise, Heale argues that personal commitments of an individual (religious or otherwise), that determine how they value a life-year with some medical intervention, ought to be used to determine the value of a QALY for them. I argue that if Heale's proposals were put into practice, the result would often be greater injustice. In brief, requirements for the just allocation of health care resources are more complex than pure cost-effectiveness analysis would allow.

Making Fair Choices on the Path to Universal Health Coverage: Applying Principles to Difficult Cases.

Abstract-Progress toward universal health coverage (UHC) requires making difficult trade-offs. In this journal, Dr. Margaret Chan, the World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General, has endorsed the principles for making such decisions put forward by the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and UHC. These principles include maximizing population health, priority for the worse off, and shielding people from health-related financial risks. But how should one apply these principles in particular cases, and how should one adjudicate between them when their demands conflict? This article by some members of the Consultative Group and a diverse group of health policy professionals addresses these questions. It considers three stylized versions of actual policy dilemmas. Each of these cases pertains to one of the three key dimensions of progress toward UHC: which services to cover first, which populations to prioritize for coverage, and how to move from out-of-pocket expenditures to prepayment with pooling of funds. Our cases are simplified to highlight common trade-offs. Though we make specific recommendations, our primary aim is to demonstrate both the form and substance of the reasoning involved in striking a fair balance between competing interests on the road to UHC.

Health care justice and its implications for current policy of a mandatory waiting period for elective tubal sterilization.

Tubal sterilization during the immediate postpartum period is 1 of the most common forms of contraception in the United States. This time of the procedure has the advantage of 1-time hospitalization, which results in ease and convenience for the woman. The US Collaborative Review of Sterilization Study indicates the high efficacy and effectiveness of postpartum tubal sterilization. Oral and written informed consent is the ethical and legal standard for the performance of elective tubal sterilization for permanent contraception for all patients, regardless of source of payment. Current health care policy and practice regarding elective tubal sterilization for Medicaid beneficiaries places a unique requirement on these patients and their obstetricians: a mandatory waiting period. This requirement originates in decades-old legislation, which we briefly describe. We then introduce the concept of health care justice in professional obstetric ethics and explain how it originates in the ethical concepts of medicine as a profession and of being a patient and its deontologic and consequentialist dimensions. We next identify the implications of health care justice for the current policy of a mandatory 30-day waiting period. We conclude that Medicaid policy allocates access to elective tubal sterilization differently, based on source of payment and gender, which violates health care justice in both its deontologic and consequentialist dimensions. Obstetricians should invoke health care justice in women's health care as the basis for advocacy for needed change in law and health policy, to eliminate health care injustice in women's access to elective tubal sterilization.

Just caring: assessing the ethical and economic costs of personalized medicine.

Personalized medicine has been touted as a revolutionary form of cancer care. It has been portrayed as precision medicine, targeting with deadly accuracy cancer cells and sparing patients the debilitating broad-spectrum side effects of more traditional forms of cancer therapy. But personalized medicine still has its costs to patients and society, both moral and economic costs. How to recognize and address those issues will be the focus of this essay. We start with these questions: Does everyone faced with cancer have a moral right to the most effective cancer care available, no matter what the cost, no matter whether a particular individual has the personal ability to pay for that care or not? Or are there limits to the cancer care that anyone has a right to at social expense? If so, what are those limits and how are those limits to be determined? Are those limits a matter of both morality and economics? I will answer this last question in the affirmative. This is what I refer to as the "Just Caring" problem in health care.