Differences in perceptual representations in multilinguals' first, second, and third language.

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the differences in perceptual representations among multilingual individuals. In Experiment 1, the immediate sentence-picture verification paradigm was used to investigate perceptual representations in the working memory stage. The results suggest a match effect within the first language (Cantonese), but not within the second language (Mandarin) or the third language (English), showing perceptual representations only in first language comprehension. In Experiment 2, the delayed sentence-picture verification paradigm was used to investigate perceptual representations in long-term memory. Similarly, the results suggest a match effect within the first language (Mandarin), but not within the second language (English). The findings of both experiments suggest that the first language was perceptually represented, regardless of whether it was Cantonese or Mandarin, regardless of the processing in working memory or long-term memory. No evidence was found for perceptual representations in the later-learned languages, regardless of high or low proficiency. Our study has implications for theories of language comprehension and embodied cognition.

Fundamentally different representations of color and motion revealed by individual differences in perceptual scaling.

The coordinate frames for color and motion are often defined by three dimensions (e.g., responses from the three types of human cone photoreceptors for color and the three dimensions of space for motion). Does this common dimensionality lead to similar perceptual representations? Here we show that the organizational principles for the representation of hue and motion direction are instead profoundly different. We compared observers' judgments of hue and motion direction using functionally equivalent stimulus metrics, behavioral tasks, and computational analyses, and used the pattern of individual differences to decode the underlying representational structure for these features. Hue judgments were assessed using a standard "hue-scaling" task (i.e., judging the proportion of red/green and blue/yellow in each hue). Motion judgments were measured using a "motion-scaling" task (i.e., judging the proportion of left/right and up/down motion in moving dots). Analyses of the interobserver variability in hue scaling revealed multiple independent factors limited to different local regions of color space. This is inconsistent with the influences across a broad range of hues predicted by conventional color-opponent models. In contrast, variations in motion scaling were characterized by more global factors plausibly related to variation in the relative weightings of the cardinal spatial axes. These results suggest that although the coordinate frames for specifying color and motion share a common dimensional structure, the perceptual coding principles for hue and motion direction are distinct. These differences might reflect a distinction between the computational strategies required for the visual analysis of spatial vs. nonspatial attributes of the world.

What do we see in pictures? The sensory individuals of picture perception.

When I am looking at an apple, I perceptually attribute certain properties to certain entities. Two questions arise: what are these entities (what is it that I perceptually represent as having properties) and what are these properties (what properties I perceive this entity as having)? This paper is about the former, less widely explored, question: what does our perceptual system attribute properties to? In other words, what are these 'sensory individuals'. There have been important debates in philosophy of perception about what sensory individuals would be the most plausible candidates for which sense modalities. The aim of this paper is to ask a related question about picture perception: what is the sensory individual of picture perception? When we look at a picture and see an apple depicted in it, what kind of entity do we see? What do we perceptually attribute properties to? I argue that the most straightforward candidates (ordinary objects, sui generis sensory individuals, no sensory individuals) are all problematic and that the most plausible candidate for the sensory individuals of picture perception are spatiotemporal regions.

Amodal completion and relationalism.

Amodal completion is usually characterized as the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. In the case of the visual sense modality, for example, amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of objects we see. I argue that relationalism about perception, the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the relation to the perceived object, cannot give a coherent account of amodal completion. The relationalist has two options: construe the perceptual relation as the relation to the entire perceived object or as the relation to the unoccluded parts of the perceived object. I argue that neither of these options are viable.

Change deafness, dual-task performance, and domain-specific expertise.

In a change deafness manipulation using radio broadcasts of sporting events, we show that change deafness to a switch in talker increases when listeners are asked to monitor both lexical and indexical information for change. We held semantic content constant and demonstrated a change deafness rate of 85% when participants listened to the home team broadcast of a hockey game that switched midway to the away team broadcast with a different announcer. In Study 2, participants were asked to monitor either the indexical characteristics ( listen for a change in announcer) or both the indexical and semantic components ( listen for a change in announcer or a goal scored). Monitoring both components led to significantly greater change deafness even though both groups were alerted to the possibility of a change in announcer. In Study 3, we changed both the indexical and the semantic components when the broadcast switched from a hockey game to a basketball game. We found a negative correlation between sports expertise and change deafness. The results are discussed in terms of the nature of perceptual representation and the influence of expertise and evolution on attention allocation.

Scaling measurements of the effect of surface slant on perceived lightness.

The light reflected from an object depends on its reflectance, the illumination, and the pose of the object within the scene. An observer is called lightness constant if the perceived reflectance (lightness) of achromatic objects stays the same despite variation in object-extrinsic factors such as illumination and pose. Here, we used a dissimilarity scaling task to measure lightness constancy as the intensity of the illuminant and the slant of test surfaces were varied. Across two experiments, we had observers rate the dissimilarity of flat grayscale test stimulus pairs. The test stimuli were real illuminated surfaces, not computer simulations. Each test stimulus was seen in its own illuminated chamber, with the two chambers viewed side by side. We varied test surface reflectance, chamber illumination intensity, and the slant of the test in relation to the single light source in each chamber. Data were analyzed using nonmetric multidimensional scaling. The data were well-described by a one-dimensional perceptual representation. This representation was consistent across observers, revealed partial lightness constancy with respect to a change in illumination intensity, and no lightness constancy with respect to changes in surface slant. An additional experiment using a matching procedure and the same stimulus set, however, revealed moderate constancy with respect to changes in surface slant. The difference in results between the two methods is interesting, but not understood.

Sweet reward increases implicit discrimination of similar odors.

Stimuli associated with emotional events signal the presence of potentially relevant situations, thus learning to rapidly identify this kind of stimuli can be highly beneficial. It has been demonstrated that individuals acquire a better perceptual representation of stimuli associated with negative and threatening emotional events. Here we investigated whether the same process occurs for stimuli associated with positive and rewarding emotional events. We used an appetitive Pavlovian conditioning paradigm during which one of two perceptually non-distinguishable odors was associated with a rewarding taste (i.e., chocolate). We investigated whether appetitive conditioning could improve the recognition of the odor associated with the reward, rendering it discriminable from its similar version that was never associated with the reward. Results revealed a dissociation between explicit perception and physiological reactions. Although participants were not able to explicitly perceive a difference, they reacted faster, inhaled more and had higher skin conductance responses when confronted with the reward-associated odor compared to its similar version that was never associated with the reward. Our findings have demonstrated that positive emotional associations can improve the implicit perceptual representation of odors, by triggering different physiological responses to odors that do not seem to be otherwise distinguishable.