To meme or not to meme? Political social media posts and ideologically motivated aggression in job recommendations.

This study tested the notion of ideological asymmetry, which proposes that conservatives are more prejudiced than liberals. It involved 682 self-identified conservative (n = 383) and liberal (n = 299) perceivers (MTurk workers; 54% female) who evaluated a target person's professional attributes, personal character, and job suitability based on the target's social media posts. The results did not support ideological asymmetry as both conservative and liberal participants negatively evaluated an ideologically opposite target. Interestingly, liberals showed three times more bias than conservatives. This study better supports a worldview conflict hypothesis, an alternative to ideological asymmetry, with both sides showing indirect aggression in an apolitical setting.

Revisiting the political biases of ChatGPT.

Although ChatGPT promises wide-ranging applications, there is a concern that it is politically biased; in particular, that it has a left-libertarian orientation. Nevertheless, following recent trends in attempts to reduce such biases, this study re-evaluated the political biases of ChatGPT using political orientation tests and the application programming interface. The effects of the languages used in the system as well as gender and race settings were evaluated. The results indicate that ChatGPT manifests less political bias than previously assumed; however, they did not entirely dismiss the political bias. The languages used in the system, and the gender and race settings may induce political biases. These findings enhance our understanding of the political biases of ChatGPT and may be useful for bias evaluation and designing the operational strategy of ChatGPT.

Political bias indicators and perceptions of news.

Introduction: Recently, a variety of political bias indicators for social and news media have come to market to alert news consumers to the credibility and political bias of their sources. However, the effects of political bias indicators on how people consume news is unknown. Creators of bias indicators assume people will use the apps and extensions to become less biased news-consumers; however, it is also possible that people would use bias indicators to confirm their previous worldview and become more biased in their perceptions of news. Methods: Across two studies, we tested how political bias indicators influence perceptions of news articles without partisan bias (Study 1, N = 394) and articles with partisan bias (Study 2, N = 616). Participants read news articles with or without political bias indicators present and rated the articles on their perceived political bias and credibility. Results: Overall, we found no consistent evidence that bias indicators influence perceptions of credibility or bias in news. However, in Study 2, there was some evidence that participants planned to use bias indicators in the future to become more biased in their future news article selection. Discussion: These data shed light on the (in) effectiveness of interventions against blindly consuming biased news and media.

Moralization and extremism robustly amplify myside sharing.

We explored whether moralization and attitude extremity may amplify a preference to share politically congruent ("myside") partisan news and what types of targeted interventions may reduce this tendency. Across 12 online experiments (N = 6,989), we examined decisions to share news touching on the divisive issues of gun control, abortion, gender and racial equality, and immigration. Myside sharing was systematically observed and was consistently amplified when participants (i) moralized and (ii) were attitudinally extreme on the issue. The amplification of myside sharing by moralization also frequently occurred above and beyond that of attitude extremity. These effects generalized to both true and fake partisan news. We then examined a number of interventions meant to curb myside sharing by manipulating (i) the audience to which people imagined sharing partisan news (political friends vs. foes), (ii) the anonymity of the account used (anonymous vs. personal), (iii) a message warning against the myside bias, and (iv) a message warning against the reputational costs of sharing "mysided" fake news coupled with an interactive rating task. While some of those manipulations slightly decreased sharing in general and/or the size of myside sharing, the amplification of myside sharing by moral attitudes was consistently robust to these interventions. Our findings regarding the robust exaggeration of selective communication by morality and extremism offer important insights into belief polarization and the spread of partisan and false information online.

Reinforcing Science and Policy, With Suggestions for Future Research Comment on "Evidence-Informed Deliberative Processes for Health Benefit Package Design - Part II: A Practical Guide".

Oortwijn et al continue their guide to good practice in the use of deliberative processes in health technology assessment (HTA) based on a survey of international practice. This is useful, and I applaud their care in maintaining objectivity, especially regarding the treatment of moral and politically controversial issues, in reporting how jurisdictions have handled such matters in designing HTA procedures and in their execution. To their suggestions for future research, I add: the historical development of deliberation in healthcare decision-making and in other fields of public choice, with comparisons of methods, successes and failures; development of guidance on the design and use of deliberative processes that enhance decision-making when there is no consensus amongst the decision-makers; ways of identifying and managing context-free and context-sensitive evidence; and a review of high-level capacity building to raise awareness of HTA and the use of knowledge translation and exchange (KTE) and deliberation amongst policy makers, especially in low and middle-income countries.

A review of the internationalization of state-owned firms and sovereign wealth funds: Governments' nonbusiness objectives and discreet power.

We review and bridge the literature on the internationalization of state-owned firms and sovereign wealth funds to provide a novel understanding of how government ownership affects foreign investments in three ways. First, we explain how state-owned firms and funds behave differently from private ones because they need to balance governments' nonbusiness objectives and firms' business goals. This results in competing predictions on whether government ownership helps or hinders internationalization due to particular nonbusiness objectives. Second, building on the review, we provide suggestions on how to extend research topics and theories of the firm by incorporating these nonbusiness objectives in the internationalization decisions in four areas: home government's endowments, characteristics, and attitudes; host-country expansion's support, influence, and impact; home- and host-country relationship conflicts, mediation, and disguising; and management's orientation, opacity, and arbitrage. Third, we capture how governments may use state-owned multinationals and sovereign wealth funds to nudge host-country governments by introducing the concept of discreet power and the use of four strategies (recognition, values, development, and supremacy) to achieve it. This helps to outline the beginning of a unified approach to how governments use their foreign investments to achieve nonbusiness goals. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41267-022-00522-w.

Nous passons en revue et rapprochons la littérature de l'internationalisation des entreprises publiques et celle des fonds souverains afin d'apporter une nouvelle compréhension de la façon dont la propriété gouvernementale influence les investissements étrangers. Cette contribution se concrétise de trois manières. Premièrement, nous expliquons comment les entreprises et les fonds publics se comportent différemment des entreprises privées, parce qu'ils doivent trouver un équilibre entre les objectifs non commerciaux des gouvernements et les objectifs commerciaux des entreprises. Ce qui génère les prédictions opposées sur le rôle que joue la propriété gouvernementale: est-ce qu'elle aide ou entrave l'internationalisation en raison d'objectifs non commerciaux particuliers? Deuxièmement, nous appuyant sur la revue des littératures, nous élaborons les suggestions sur la manière d'étendre, via l'incorporation des objectifs non commerciaux aux décisions d'internationalisation, les thèmes de recherche et les théories de l'entreprise dans quatre domaines: les dotations, les caractéristiques et les attitudes du gouvernement du pays d'origine; le soutien, l'influence et l'impact de l'expansion du pays d'accueil; les conflits, la médiation et le déguisement dans les relations entre pays d'origine et pays d'accueil; et l'orientation, l'opacité et l'arbitrage de la direction. Troisièmement, nous essayons de saisir la manière dont les gouvernements peuvent utiliser les multinationales publiques et les fonds souverains pour influencer les gouvernements des pays d'accueil, et ce en introduisant le concept de pouvoir discret et l'utilisation de quatre stratégies (reconnaissance, valeurs, développement et suprématie) pour y parvenir. Cela permet d'esquisser le début d'une approche unifiée de la manière dont les gouvernements utilisent leurs investissements étrangers pour atteindre des objectifs non commerciaux.

Revisamos y unimos la literatura sobre la internacionalización de las empresas de propiedad estatal y los fondos soberanos para proporcionar una comprensión novedosa de cómo la propiedad gubernamental afecta las inversiones extranjeras de tres maneras. Primero, explicamos cómo las empresas y los fondos estatales se comportan de manera diferente a los privados porque necesitan equilibrar los objetivos no comerciales de los gobiernos y los objetivos comerciales de las empresas. Esto da lugar a predicciones contradictorias sobre si la propiedad gubernamental ayuda o dificulta la internacionalización debido a objetivos particulares no comerciales. En segundo lugar, sobre la base de la revisión, proporcionamos sugerencias sobre cómo ampliar los temas de investigación y las teorías de la empresa mediante la incorporación de estos objetivos no comerciales en las decisiones de internacionalización en cuatro áreas: recursos, características y actitudes del gobierno local; el apoyo, la influencia y el impacto de la expansión del país anfitrión; conflictos, mediación y encubrimiento de las relaciones entre el país de origen y el país anfitrión; y la orientación, opacidad y arbitraje de la gestión. En tercer lugar, capturamos cómo los gobiernos pueden usar multinacionales estatales y fondos soberanos para empujar a los gobiernos de los países anfitriones mediante la introducción del concepto de poder discreto y el uso de cuatro estrategias (reconocimiento, valores, desarrollo y supremacía) para lograrlo. Esto ayuda a delinear el comienzo de un enfoque unificado sobre cómo los gobiernos utilizan sus inversiones extranjeras para lograr objetivos no comerciales.

Revisamos e ligamos a literatura sobre a internacionalização de empresas estatais e fundos soberanos para fornecer uma nova compreensão de como a propriedade do governo afeta investimentos estrangeiros de três formas. Em primeiro lugar, explicamos como empresas e fundos estatais se comportam de maneira diferente de entidades privadas porque precisam equilibrar objetivos não comerciais de governos e metas de negócios das empresas. Isso resulta em previsões antagônicas sobre se a propriedade do governo ajuda ou atrapalha a internacionalização devido a certos objetivos não comerciais. Em segundo lugar, com base na revisão, fornecemos sugestões sobre como estender tópicos de pesquisa e teorias da firma incorporando esses objetivos não comerciais nas decisões de internacionalização em quatro áreas: dotações, características e atitudes do governo local; apoio, influência e impacto da expansão do país anfitrião; conflitos, mediação e disfarce nas relações entre país de origem e anfitrião; e orientação, opacidade e arbitragem da administração. Em terceiro lugar, capturamos como governos podem usar multinacionais e fundos soberanos estatais para estimular governos de países anfitriões, introduzindo o conceito de poder discreto e o uso de quatro estratégias (reconhecimento, valores, desenvolvimento e supremacia) para alcançá-lo. Isso ajuda a delinear o início de uma abordagem unificada de como governos usam seus investimentos estrangeiros para atingir objetivos não comerciais.

Algorithmic Political Bias in Artificial Intelligence Systems.

Some artificial intelligence (AI) systems can display algorithmic bias, i.e. they may produce outputs that unfairly discriminate against people based on their social identity. Much research on this topic focuses on algorithmic bias that disadvantages people based on their gender or racial identity. The related ethical problems are significant and well known. Algorithmic bias against other aspects of people's social identity, for instance, their political orientation, remains largely unexplored. This paper argues that algorithmic bias against people's political orientation can arise in some of the same ways in which algorithmic gender and racial biases emerge. However, it differs importantly from them because there are (in a democratic society) strong social norms against gender and racial biases. This does not hold to the same extent for political biases. Political biases can thus more powerfully influence people, which increases the chances that these biases become embedded in algorithms and makes algorithmic political biases harder to detect and eradicate than gender and racial biases even though they all can produce similar harm. Since some algorithms can now also easily identify people's political orientations against their will, these problems are exacerbated. Algorithmic political bias thus raises substantial and distinctive risks that the AI community should be aware of and examine.

Algorithmic amplification of politics on Twitter.

Content on Twitter's home timeline is selected and ordered by personalization algorithms. By consistently ranking certain content higher, these algorithms may amplify some messages while reducing the visibility of others. There's been intense public and scholarly debate about the possibility that some political groups benefit more from algorithmic amplification than others. We provide quantitative evidence from a long-running, massive-scale randomized experiment on the Twitter platform that committed a randomized control group including nearly 2 million daily active accounts to a reverse-chronological content feed free of algorithmic personalization. We present two sets of findings. First, we studied tweets by elected legislators from major political parties in seven countries. Our results reveal a remarkably consistent trend: In six out of seven countries studied, the mainstream political right enjoys higher algorithmic amplification than the mainstream political left. Consistent with this overall trend, our second set of findings studying the US media landscape revealed that algorithmic amplification favors right-leaning news sources. We further looked at whether algorithms amplify far-left and far-right political groups more than moderate ones; contrary to prevailing public belief, we did not find evidence to support this hypothesis. We hope our findings will contribute to an evidence-based debate on the role personalization algorithms play in shaping political content consumption.

Unfavorable hydroxychloroquine COVID-19 research associated with authors having a history of political party donations.

We explored the degree to which political bias in medicine and study authors could explain the stark variation in Hydroxychloroquine (HCQ)/Chloroquine (CQ) study favorability in the US compared to the rest of the world. COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2 preprint and published papers between January 1, 2020-July 26, 2020 with Hydroxychloroquine and/or Chloroquine; 267 met study criteria, 68 from the US. A control subset was selected. HCQ/CQ study result favorability (favorable, unfavorable, or neutral) was noted. First and last main authors of each US study were entered into FollowTheMoney.org Website, extracting any history of political party donation. Of all US studies (68 total), 39/68 (57.4%) were unfavorable, with only 7/68 (10.3%) of US studies yielding favorable results-compared to 199 non-US studies, 66/199 (33.2%) unfavorable, 69/199 (34.7%) favorable, and 64/199 (32.2%) neutral. Studies with at least one US main author were 20.4% (SE 0.053, P < 0.05) more likely to report unfavorable results than non-US studies. US Studies with at least one main author donating to any political party were 25.6% (SE 0.085, P < 0.01) more likely to have unfavorable results. US studies with at least one author donating to the Democratic party were 20.4% (SE 0.045, P < 0.05) more likely to have unfavorable results. US authors were more likely to publish studies with medically harmful conclusions than non-US authors. Cardiology-specific HCQ/CQ studies were 44.2% more likely to yield harmful conclusions (P < 0.01). Inaccurate propagation of HCQ/CQ cardiac adverse effects with individual scientific author political bias has contributed to unfavorable US HCQ/CQ publication patterns and political polarization of the medications.

Presenting or Spinning Facts? Deconstructing the U.S. Centers for Disease Control Statement on the Importance of Reopening Schools Under COVID-19.

Credible, reliable and consistent information to the public, as well as health professionals and decision makers, is crucial to help navigate uncertainty and risk in times of crisis and concern. Traditionally, information and health communications issued by respected and established government agencies have been regarded as factual, unbiased and credible. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is such an agency that addresses all aspects of health and public health on behalf of the U.S Government for the benefit of its citizens. In July 2020, the CDC issued guidelines on reopening schools which resulted in open criticism by the U.S. President and others, prompting a review and publication of revised guidelines together with a special "Statement on the Importance of Reopening Schools under COVID-19." We hypothesize that this statement introduced bias with the intention to shift the public perception and media narrative in favor of reopening of schools. Using a mixed methods approach, including an online text analysis tool, we demonstrate that document title and structure, word frequencies, word choice, and website presentation did not provide a balanced account of the complexity and uncertainty surrounding school reopening during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite available scientific guidance and practical evidence-based advice on how to manage infection risks when reopening schools, the CDC Statement was intentionally overriding possible parent and public health concerns. The CDC Statement provides an example of how political influence is exercised over the presentation of science in the context of a major pandemic. It was withdrawn by the CDC in November 2020.

The Curious Case of Left-Wing Authoritarianism: When Authoritarian Persons Meet Anti-Authoritarian Norms.

Left-Wing Authoritarianism (LWA) has a controversial history in psychology. Some researchers have expressed skepticism about the existence of LWA, whereas others have argued that LWA is a valid construct. In the present article, we offer a framework to reconcile these two perspectives by proposing that ideologically-based authoritarian norms are sometimes in conflict with the processes that create authoritarian individuals. In Western political contexts, authoritarian norms are more likely to occur on the conservative side of the political spectrum; but authoritarian attributes can occur in both conservatives and liberals. In our model, left-wing authoritarians thus often occupy the space where forces influencing authoritarianism are in conflict. We review existing evidence related to the model, present novel evidence related to the model, derive four hypotheses from the model, and discuss criteria for falsifying the model. We conclude by considering the model's place in current research on the complexities of ideology.

An initial accuracy focus reduces the effect of prior exposure on perceived accuracy of news headlines.

The illusory truth effect occurs when the repetition of a claim increases its perceived truth. Previous studies have demonstrated the illusory truth effect with true and false news headlines. The present study examined the effects that different ratings made during initial exposure have on the illusory truth effect with news headlines. In two experiments, participants (total N = 575) rated a set of news headlines in one of two conditions. Some participants rated how interesting they were, and others rated how truthful they were. Participants later rated the perceived accuracy of a larger set of headlines that included previously rated and new headlines. In both experiments, prior exposure increased perceived accuracy for participants who made initial interest ratings, but not for participants who made initial truthfulness ratings. The increase in perceived accuracy that accompanies repeated exposure was attenuated when participants considered the accuracy of the headlines at initial exposure. Experiment 2 also found evidence for a political bias: participants rated politically concordant headlines as more accurate than politically discordant headlines. The magnitude of this bias was related to performance on a cognitive reflection test; more analytic participants demonstrated greater political bias. These results highlight challenges that fake news presents and suggest that initially encoding headlines' perceived truth can serve to combat the illusion that a familiar headline is a truthful one.

Populism and health inequality in high-income countries.

The rise of populist parties and movements in general and right-wing populist parties in particular has been noted also in the public health literature. While economic and other factors behind the populist surge have been systematically analyzed in the political and social science literature, the understanding of this political phenomenon seems weak in important parts of the public health literature. The lack of analysis of economic effects on health inequity of immigration of people with low levels of work skills to many high-income countries is given with the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health report as an example. Public health scholars should be able to fully analyze all effects on health inequity within countries. Public health scholars and professionals may lose credibility if they do not fully assess all relevant determinants, and the investigation of health inequity within countries should consider all systemic roots. Health inequity between countries is a crucial issue and should be addressed through international cooperation between countries, regions and international organizations. The approach from political science and social science should be adopted.

Bound to the group and blinded by the leader: ideological leader-follower dynamics in a trust economic game.

Understanding the dynamics of trustworthiness in ideological contexts could influence human societies, affect electoral campaigns and ultimately impact democracy. We tested trust behaviour towards political leaders in a sample of 121 opposing/supporting voters assigned as trustors in an iterative trust game (TG). In two experiments, a famous Italian conservative leader (i.e. Silvio Berlusconi) or a famous non-politician were used as trustees in a predefined un/trustworthy TG, while trustors believed that mathematical algorithms reproduced trustee's real behaviour. Results revealed that depending on the group, voters either relied on the situation and adjusted to the behaviour of the out-group leader (in our case left-wing voters), or on their disposition for group-loyalty with respect for authority, thus failing to adjust to the behaviour of the in-group leader (in our case right-wing voters). Our findings suggest that: (i) complex voter-leader relations in politics are reflected in the simple trustor-trustee financial interactions from behavioural economics, and (ii) being bound to one's group and one's leader may affect the trust economic decisions of the followers.

Larregue's Critique of Cofnas et al. (2017): A Rejoinder.

Data from the General Social Survey indicate that conservatives' self-reported trust in scientists has steadily decreased since 1974. In Cofnas et al. (The American Sociologist, 2017), we suggested that this trend may have been partly driven by the increasing tendency of scientific institutions, and the representatives of such institutions, to distort social science for the sake of liberal activism. Larregue (The American Sociologist, 2017) makes three opposing arguments: (1) It is "very hard" to establish the charge of bias, especially since we did "not state what [we] mean by 'bias.'" (2) We did not establish a causal relationship between scientists' (alleged) liberal activism and conservatives' distrust of science, and we ignored activism by conservative scientists. (3) We were wrong to advocate "affirmative action" for conservatives in academia. We address these arguments in turn: (1) Larregue does not engage with our main arguments that liberal bias exists in social science. (2) In recent years, prominent scientific organizations have, with great publicity, intervened in policy debates, always supporting the liberal side without exception. It is not unreasonable to assume that this would diminish conservatives' trust in these organizations. Contra Larregue, in Cofnas et al. (The American Sociologist, 2017) we explicitly acknowledged that conservative scientists can also be biased. (3) We never advocated "affirmative action" for conservatives, and in fact we object to such a proposal.