Being a Woman Is 100% Significant to My Experiences of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Autism: Exploring the Gendered Implications of an Adulthood Combined Autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Diagnosis.

This article provides original insight into women's experiences of adulthood diagnoses of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism. Research exploring experiences of adulthood diagnoses of these conditions is emerging. Yet, there is no research about the gendered experiences of an adulthood combined ADHD and autism (AuDHD) diagnosis. This article addresses this gap through interpretative phenomenological analysis of email interviews with six late-diagnosed AuDHD women revealing the complex interplay between late diagnosis, being a woman, and combined diagnoses of ADHD and autism. It underscores how gender norms and stereotypes contribute to the oversight and dismissal of women's neurodivergence. Interpretative phenomenological analysis reveals the inextricability of femininity and neurotypicality, the gendered burden, discomfort, and adverse consequences of masking, along with the adverse outcomes of insufficient masking. Being an undiagnosed AuDHD woman is a confusing and traumatising experience with profound and enduring repercussions. The impact of female hormones exacerbated participants' struggles with (peri)menopause often being a catalyst for seeking diagnosis after decades of trauma. The epistemic injustice of not knowing they were neurodivergent compounded this trauma. Diagnosis enabled participants to overcome epistemic injustice and moved them into a feminist standpoint from which they challenge gendered inequalities relating to neurodiversity. This article aims to increase understanding and representation of late-diagnosed AuDHD women's lived experiences. The findings advocate for trauma-informed pre- and post-diagnosis support which addresses the gendered dimension of women's experiences of being missed and dismissed as neurodivergent. There needs to be better clinical and public understanding of how AuDHD presents in women to prevent epistemic injustice.

Covid- 19 and gender inequality: A critique of the working woman's struggle.

There has been a dramatic change in everyday life due to COVID-19 around the world. The lockdowns, closure of schools and universities, and the loss of jobs has placed a lot of pressure on the family, particularly women. One of the main outcomes of the pandemic in Jordan has been the increase in the workload of women outside and inside the home. Despite the efforts made to empower women throughout the years, they continue to struggle and gender inequality remains overlooked and even normalized in Jordanian society. The aim of the study is to unfold the way Covid- 19 has disrupted women's lives and made gender equality less achievable, and explore the challenges they have faced in terms of the added paid and unpaid work they have been forced to do during the pandemic and to this end, in-depth interviews were carried out with 20 working mothers who were selected using purposive sampling. The study is largely informed by feminist standpoint theory whose main concern is the female voice and making it a valuable instrument in the process of knowledge production. The findings show that most women suffered from traditionally prescribed gender roles imposed by society, pressure and discrimination at work, and a lack of understanding and empathy at home and the workplace. Very few shared responsibilities with their husbands and their burdens with coworkers and employers, and an even smaller number was able to use the pandemic to their advantage and found ways to regain female power and self-assertion. The findings indicate that serious changes in policies need to be made to protect women's rights at work and in the domestic world, and the institution of marriage reconstructed within the Jordanian imaginary, and gender roles redefined.

Standpoint theory and middle-range theorizing in International Sociology.

This paper responds to Julian Go's Lecture "Thinking against Empire. Anti-colonial Thought and Social Theory." It proceeds in two parts: I first follow Go's invitation to read and reread Mabel Dove Danquah and Frantz Fanon and explore what their work contributes to our understanding of state-forms. I then examine the terms of Go's invitation more closely. I contrast Go's juxtaposition of imperial sociology on the one hand and anti-colonial sociology on the other hand, with the broader range of theoretical traditions and methods, which a practice-oriented sociology of sociology and an international history of sociology would highlight. I raise the question what "standpoint" adds to the authors Go discusses and the broader range of scholars who have engaged with post-colonial contexts in their research at this point in time. Calling for consideration of the anti-colonial standpoint is a particular choice, which has a distinctive heritage in Hegelian-Marxian projections of the social whole and is in tension with either deep exploration of particular thinkers or the middle-range theorizing that Go also seems to endorse. Defined at a level of abstraction that is "above" (or underneath) actual conversations in a range of fields and subfields, it can appear as a "test" for scholars who have long engaged with post-colonial contexts, which can have unintended consequences when coupled with the institutional power and asymmetric insularity of Anglo-American academia.

Being, Knowing, and Doing: Importing Theoretical Toolboxes for Autism Studies.

The aim of this article was to think with and elaborate on theories developed outside of autism research and the autistic community, and through this support the production of new autistic-led theories: theories and concepts based on autistic people's own embodied experiences and the social worlds we inhabit. The article consists of three different sections all of part of the overall umbrella, Being, knowing, and doing: Importing theoretical toolboxes for autism studies. In each section, we import useful concepts from elsewhere and tailor them to autism studies. Throughout, we mingle our own autoethnographic accounts and shared discourse in relation to research accounts and theories. Illustrating being, we explore and discuss the possibilities of critical realism in autism studies. Illustrating knowing, we explore and discuss the possibilities of standpoint theory in autism studies. Finally, illustrating doing, we explore and discuss the possibilities of neurocosmopolitics including epistemic (in)justice in autism studies. Our proposal here is for an epistemic shift toward neurodiverse collaboration. We are inviting nonautistic people to work with, not on, us, aiming at to make autism research more ethical, breaking down bureaucratic structures, and questioning poor theory and shoddy methodology. Acknowledging intersecting axes of oppression in which an individual seeks to renegotiate and reimagine what it means to belong also means to understand what needs changing in society, as it is and how we might do things differently.

Why is this topic important: People are starting to realize that good autism research should include autistic people (as researchers, participants, co-designers, for example), which means working in neurodiverse teams (teams that include autistic and non-autistic people). So far, a lot of ideas that researchers have had about autistic people have said that they (we) are impaired, which is hurtful and can make it hard to work together. If we are going to create better research, and better spaces to do research in, we need to find new ideas and ways to work. It is important that these new ideas are based on how autistic people see themselves and the world around them (us). What is the purpose of this article?: In this article, we (a group of neurodivergent researchers) look at how we can apply ideas about how knowledge is made, how we use knowledge, and how knowledge impacts people, to creating better autism research. We use ideas from philosophy and think about how they can help us to share our experiences with each other. What do the authors suggest?: We start by exploring how a theory called 'critical realism' can be used to understand differing autistic experiences, by taking into account how our identities and experiences are shaped by different social environments and affect we think about the world. Next we apply standpoint theory, which looks at the importance of acknowledging the impact of a researchers own identity in research. Finally, we explore 'neurocosmopolitanism', which hopes for a future where our differences can be celebrated and accepted. We also think about 'epistemic injustice', where research that is done 'on' instead of 'with' leads to inaccurate or harmful knowledge about us. We argue that by applying ideas such as these to autism studies, we can create spaces where fair and just autism research is created. We argue that these ideas will help both autistic and non-autistic researchers to understand each other better, because they are based on what it is like to be autistic, and not what being autistic looks like to non-autistic people. What do the authors think should happen in the future?: The authors think that more researchers should think about what they say about autistic people. Autistic people should be recognized as the people with the most knowledge about what it is like to be autistic. We think that this will create a kinder way of working for both autistic and non-autistic people and research will be more useful and ethical. How will this study help autistic people now and in future?: This research will help autistic people in two ways. First, it will make sure that autistic people's ideas and experiences will be taken more seriously by non-autistic colleagues. Second, it will lead to better autism research, benefitting autistic people who are not just researchers. This is because the ideas will be more closely related to the experiences of autistic people, instead of outside interpretations of what it is like to be autistic.

Expert identification for ethics expertise informed by feminist epistemology-Using awareness of biases and situated ignorance as an indicator of trustworthiness.

The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision.

Feminist Social Vision: Seeing Through the Lens of Marginalized Perceivers.

Social vision research, which examines, in part, how humans visually perceive social stimuli, is well-positioned to improve understandings of social inequality. However, social vision research has rarely prioritized the perspectives of marginalized group members. We offer a theoretical argument for diversifying understandings of social perceptual processes by centering marginalized perspectives. We examine (a) how social vision researchers frame their research questions and who these framings prioritize and (b) how perceptual processes (person perception; people perception; perception of social objects) are linked to group membership and thus comprehensively understanding these processes necessitates attention to marginalized perceivers. We discuss how social vision research translates into theoretical advances and to action for reducing negative intergroup consequences (e.g., prejudice). The purpose of this article is to delineate how prioritizing marginalized perspectives in social vision research could develop novel questions, bridge theoretical gaps, and elevate social vision's translational impact to improve outcomes for marginalized groups.

Indigenous standpoint theory as a theoretical framework for decolonizing social science health research with American Indian communities.

Theoretical frameworks rooted in Western knowledge claims utilized for public health research in the social sciences are not inclusive of American Indian communities. Developed by Indigenous researchers, Indigenous standpoint theory builds from and moves beyond Western theoretical frameworks. We argue that using Indigenous standpoint theory in partnership with American Indian communities works to decolonize research related to American Indian health in the social sciences and combats the effects of colonization in three ways. First, Indigenous standpoint theory aids in interpreting how the intersections unique to American Indians including the effects of colonization, tribal and other identities, and cultural context are linked to structural inequalities for American Indian communities. Second, Indigenous standpoint theory integrates Indigenous ways of knowing with Western research orientations and methodologies in a collaborative process that works to decolonize social science research for American Indians. Third, Indigenous standpoint theory promotes direct application of research benefits to American Indian communities.

Visionary evaluation: Approaching Aboriginal ontological equity in water management evaluation.

The 2017 Traditional Owner evaluation of the implementation of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan developed an approach to evaluation that tested the use of Standpoint Theory in the field of natural resource management. This methodological choice was intended to enable First Nation approaches to data generation and use in equal measure to non-indigenous approaches. The method is implemented as a nested, up-hierarchy of scale, enabling a pan-optican dimension of vision from "below" and "above". The paper does not present the evaluative results regarding the implementation of the Plan because that information is co-owned by the participating Nations for their uses. Instead, and in respect of that arrangement, the paper presents the evaluation practices funded by the Murray-Darling Basin Authority. The methodology was negotiated and implemented with the Nations in the pilot study as a co-production across cultural boundaries. The approach was then evaluated by the participants, and these results are reported. All those reviewing the methodology were directly involved in some aspect of the evaluation, 64 % of whom identified as Traditional Owners, 67 % of whom were involved in high level decision-making about the evaluation approach. Traditional Owners rated cultural competence of the tested approach at 68 %, the benefits of the approach at 75 %, satisfaction with the standard of the evaluation at 72 %, and satisfaction with complying with the Basin Plan's requirements for evaluation at 78 %. Recommendations for broader engagement and better science communication are made.

What is "the patient perspective" in patient engagement programs? Implicit logics and parallels to feminist theories.

Public and patient involvement (PPI) in health care may refer to many different processes, ranging from participating in decision-making about one's own care to participating in health services research, health policy development, or organizational reforms. Across these many forms of public and patient involvement, the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings remain poorly articulated. Instead, most public and patient involvement programs rely on policy initiatives as their conceptual frameworks. This lack of conceptual clarity participates in dilemmas of program design, implementation, and evaluation. This study contributes to the development of theoretical understandings of public and patient involvement. In particular, we focus on the deployment of patient engagement programs within health service organizations. To develop a deeper understanding of the conceptual underpinnings of these programs, we examined the concept of "the patient perspective" as used by patient engagement practitioners and participants. Specifically, we focused on the way this phrase was used in the singular: "the" patient perspective or "the" patient voice. From qualitative analysis of interviews with 20 patient advisers and 6 staff members within a large urban health network in Canada, we argue that "the patient perspective" is referred to as a particular kind of situated knowledge, specifically an embodied knowledge of vulnerability. We draw parallels between this logic of patient perspective and the logic of early feminist theory, including the concepts of standpoint theory and strong objectivity. We suggest that champions of patient engagement may learn much from the way feminist theorists have constructed their arguments and addressed critique.

Overlapping ontologies and Indigenous knowledge. From integration to ontological self-determination.

Current controversies about knowledge integration reflect conflicting ideas of what it means to "take Indigenous knowledge seriously". While there is increased interest in integrating Indigenous and Western scientific knowledge in various disciplines such as anthropology and ethnobiology, integration projects are often accused of recognizing Indigenous knowledge only insofar as it is useful for Western scientists. The aim of this article is to use tools from philosophy of science to develop a model of both successful integration and integration failures. On the one hand, I argue that cross-cultural recognition of property clusters leads to an ontological overlap that makes knowledge integration often epistemically productive and socially useful. On the other hand, I argue that knowledge integration is limited by ontological divergence. Adequate models of Indigenous knowledge will therefore have to take integration failures seriously and I argue that integration efforts need to be complemented by a political notion of ontological self-determination.

Values, standpoints, and scientific/intellectual movements.

Feminist standpoint empiricism contributes to the criticism of the value-free ideal by offering a unique analysis of how non-epistemic values can play not only a legitimate but also an epistemically productive role in science. While the inductive risk argument focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the acceptance of hypotheses, standpoint empiricism focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the production of evidence. And while many other analyses of values in science focus on the role of non-epistemic values either in an individual scientist's decision making or in the distribution of research efforts in scientific communities, standpoint empiricism focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the building of scientific/intellectual movements.