The Unified Brain-Based Determination of Death Conceptually Justifies Death Determination in DCDD and NRP Protocols.

Organ donation after the circulatory determination of death requires the permanent cessation of circulation while organ donation after the brain determination of death requires the irreversible cessation of brain functions. The unified brain-based determination of death connects the brain and circulatory death criteria for circulatory death determination in organ donation as follows: permanent cessation of systemic circulation causes permanent cessation of brain circulation which causes permanent cessation of brain perfusion which causes permanent cessation of brain function. The relevant circulation that must cease in circulatory death determination is that to the brain. Eliminating brain circulation from the donor ECMO organ perfusion circuit in thoracoabdominal NRP protocols satisfies the unified brain-based determination of death but only if the complete cessation of brain circulation can be proved. Despite its medical and physiologic rationale, the unified brain-based determination of death remains inconsistent with the Uniform Determination of Death Act.

The Morality of Kidney Sales: When Caring for the Seller's Dignity Has Moral Costs.

Kidney markets are prohibited in principle because they are assumed to undermine the seller's dignity. Considering the trade-off between saving more lives by introducing regulated kidney markets and preserving the seller's dignity, we argue that it is advisable to demand that citizens restrain their own moral judgements and not interfere with the judgements of those who are willing to sell a kidney. We also argue that it is advisable not only to limit the political implications of the moral argument of dignity concerns toward a market-based solution but also to re-evaluate the dignity argument itself. First, if the dignity argument is to be given normative force, it must also consider the dignity violation of the potential transplant recipient. Second, there seems to be no compelling notion of dignity that demonstrates why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell a kidney.

Donating a Kidney to a Stranger: A Review of the Benefits and Controversies of Unspecified Kidney Donation.

OF BACKGROUND DATA: Unspecified kidney donation (UKD) describes living donation of a kidney to a stranger. The practice is playing an increasingly important role within the transplant programme in the United Kingdom, where these donors are commonly used to trigger a chain of transplants; thereby amplifying the benefit derived from their donation. The initial reluctance to accept UKD was in part due to uncertainty about donor motivations and whether the practice was morally and ethically acceptable. OBJECTIVES: This article provides an overview of UKD and answers common questions regarding the ethical considerations, clinical assessment, and how UKD kidneys are used to maximize utility. Existing literature on outcomes after UKD is also discussed, along with current controversies. CONCLUSIONS: We believe UKD is an ethically acceptable practice which should continue to grow, despite its controversies. In our experience, these donors are primarily motivated by a desire to help others and utilization of their kidney as part of a sharing scheme means that many more people seek to benefit from their very generous donation.

Ethical Issues in Organ Transplantation at End of Life: Defining Death.

End-of-life vital organ transplantation involves singular ethical issues, because survival of the donor is impossible, and organ retrieval is ideally as close to the death of the donor as possible to minimize organ ischemic time. Historical efforts to define death have been met with confusion and discord. Fifty years on, the Harvard criteria for brain death continue to be problematic and now face significant legislative efforts to limit their authority.

Where do these cadavers come from?

Cadaveric surgical courses are highly useful in developing operative skills, however, the provenance of the cadavers themselves remains opaque. Trade in cadaveric parts is an important source of material for courses, and this has spawned the unique service of body brokerage. Body brokers, however, operate in an unregulated market and obtain bodies by exploiting family members' altruistic instincts and financial concerns. Unethical and illegal sale of body parts has been well-documented, while the use of cadavers for uses other than that consented by donors is also a key concern. Undoubtedly, cadaveric surgical courses would have used bodies sourced from brokers, and questions remain about the moral and ethical implications of this. We discuss this issue using an ethical and historical context as well as offering solutions to ensure the ethical sourcing of cadavers for surgical training.

When are you dead enough to be a donor? Can any feasible protocol for the determination of death on circulatory criteria respect the dead donor rule?

The basic question concerning the compatibility of donation after circulatory death (DCD) protocols with the dead donor rule is whether such protocols can guarantee that the loss of relevant biological functions is truly irreversible. Which functions are the relevant ones? I argue that the answer to this question can be derived neither from a proper understanding of the meaning of the term "death" nor from a proper understanding of the nature of death as a biological phenomenon. The concept of death can be made fully determinate only by stipulation. I propose to focus on the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness and the capacity for spontaneous breathing. Having accepted that proposal, the meaning of "irreversibility" need not be twisted in order to claim that DCD protocols can guarantee that the loss of these functions is irreversible. And this guarantee does not mean that reversing that loss is either conceptually impossible or known to be impossible with absolute certainty.

Organ Donation After Circulatory Death and Before Death: Ethical Questions and Nursing Implications.

Scientific advances have enabled thousands of individuals to extend their lives through organ donation. Yet, shortfalls of available organs persist, and individuals in the United States die daily before they receive what might have been lifesaving organs. For years, the legal foundation of organ donation in the United States has been known as the Dead Donor Rule, requiring death to be defined for organ donation purposes by either a cardiac standard (termination of the heartbeat) or a neurological one (cessation of all brain function). In this context, one solution used by an increasing number of health care facilities since 2006 is donation after circulatory death, generally defined as when care is withdrawn from individuals who have known residual brain function. Despite its increased use, donation after circulatory death remains ethically controversial. In addition, some ethicists have advocated forgoing the Dead Donor Rule altogether and allowing donation before or near death in certain circumstances. However, nurses and other health professionals must carefully consider the practical and ethical implications of broadening the Dead Donor Rule-as may be already occurring-or removing it entirely. Such changes could harm both the integrity of the health care system as well as efforts to secure organ donation commitments from the public and are outweighed by the moral and pragmatic cost. Nurses should be prepared to confront the challenge posed by the ongoing scarcity of organs and advocate for ethical alternatives including research on effective care pathways and education regarding organ donation.

Bioethics and activism: A natural fit?

Bioethics is a practically oriented discipline that developed to address pressing ethical issues arising from developments in the life sciences. Given this inherent practical bent, some form of advocacy or activism seems inherent to the nature of bioethics. However, there are potential tensions between being a bioethics activist, and academic ideals. In academic bioethics, scholarship involves reflection, rigour and the embrace of complexity and uncertainty. These values of scholarship seem to be in tension with being an activist, which requires pragmatism, simplicity, certainty and, above all, action. In this paper I explore this apparent dichotomy, using the case example of my own involvement in international efforts to end forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience in China. I conclude that these tensions can be managed and that academic bioethics requires a willingness to be activist.

Beecher Dépassé: Fifty Years of Determining Death, Legally.

Five decades ago, Henry Knowles Beecher, a renowned professor of research anesthesiology, sought to solve a problem created by modern medicine. The solution proposed by Beecher and his colleagues on the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death proved very influential.1 Indeed, other contemporaneous medical developments magnified its significance yet also made the solution it offered somewhat problematic. As we mark this fiftieth anniversary, at a time when concerns about the conceptual model on which its recommendations rested are being voiced by critics from medicine as well as philosophy, it is worthwhile to view the committee's report in relation to the problem that prompted its existence as well as the one to which it was quickly applied.

A Defense of the Dead Donor Rule.

Discussion of the "dead donor rule" is challenging because it implicates views about a wide range of issues, including whether and when patients are appropriately declared dead, the validity of the doctrine of double effect, and the moral difference between or equivalence of active euthanasia and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. The DDR will be defined here as the prohibition against removal of organs necessary for the life of the patient-that is, the prohibition of intentionally ending the life of a patient through organ removal. At a minimum, it is difficult not to see the DDR as grounded in a set of laws, norms, values, and practices that are firmly entrenched and have a great deal of philosophical, religious, and legal support. Obviously, the primary argument against the DDR is that it is highly desirable that we continue to procure organs for transplantation, combined with the belief that those from whom we often and possibly typically procure organs are not "really" dead. If donors are not really dead, then we are left with a dilemma: either we abandon organ procurement, or we abandon the DDR. Such a move should be taken only if the way we currently delineate the dead (those from whom it is acceptable to remove organs) cannot be maintained or defended. I will suggest that this is not the case.

A Path Not Taken: Beecher, Brain Death, and the Aims of Medicine.

It has been fifty years since a report by an ad hoc committee of Harvard Medical School ushered in the widespread adoption of brain death as a definition of death. Yet brain death remains disputed as an acceptable definition within bioethics. The continuous debate among bioethicists has had three key recurring features: first and foremost, argument over alleged flaws in the conceptual logic and consistency of the "whole-brain" approach as a description of the meaning of death; second, efforts to fix perceived limitations of brain death-based practices to optimize transplantation, especially given that transplantation was the presumed original intended purpose of the definition; and third, a basic unease provoked by the experience of using the criteria and managing a body in this state of "irreversible coma." The third feature is the one I find the most compelling, though it is less explored, and it persists because of the failures of the prior two. Brain death remains strange-to medical personnel, families, philosophers. That is not because it hasn't yet been logically argued well enough or conceptually framed adequately, but because those things don't matter as much to resolving this strangeness as the bioethical approach to brain death over the last fifty years has assumed it does. It is necessary to look to other things that can anchor the aims of medicine in the midst of this strangeness.

Uncontrolled DCD: When Should We Stop Trying to Save the Patient and Focus on Saving the Organs?

Uncontrolled donation after circulatory death, which occurs when an individual has experienced unexpected cardiac arrest, usually not in a hospital, generates both excitement and concern. On the one hand, uDCD programs have the capacity to significantly increase organ donation rates, with good transplant outcomes-mainly for kidneys, but also for livers and lungs. On the other hand, uDCD raises a number of ethical challenges. In this essay, we focus on an issue that is central to all uDCD protocols: When should we cease resuscitation and shift to organ preservation? Do current uDCD protocols prematurely consider as potential donors patients who could still have some chances of meaningful survival? Can the best interest of patients be fostered once they are considered and treated as potential donors?

Uterus Transplantation: The Ethics of Using Deceased Versus Living Donors.

Research teams have made considerable progress in treating absolute uterine factor infertility through uterus transplantation, though studies have differed on the choice of either deceased or living donors. While researchers continue to analyze the medical feasibility of both approaches, little attention has been paid to the ethics of using deceased versus living donors as well as the protections that must be in place for each. Both types of uterus donation also pose unique regulatory challenges, including how to allocate donated organs; whether the donor / donor's family has any rights to the uterus and resulting child; how to manage contact between the donor / donor's family, recipient, and resulting child; and how to track outcomes moving forward.

Should Trauma Physicians Treat a Severely Injured Patient for the Sake of Elucidating Preferences about Organ Donation?

Organ donation potential is not a motivator of care in the trauma bay, and it is ethically problematic to consider organ donor potential during the active resuscitation of a trauma patient. Despite organ donation being a public good, the role of the trauma physician is to maintain focus on the patient as an individual and to respect a patient's right to life and autonomy. This tenet of medicine is the foundation of the trust that a community and individuals must have in order for the health care system to function. Fortunately, there are guidelines and systems in place to allow physicians to care for the patient in front of them while simultaneously making morally sound decisions regarding donation in the setting of the current organ shortage.

Empathy, social media, and directed altruistic living organ donation.

In this article we explore some of the ethical dimensions of using social media to increase the number of living kidney donors. Social media provides a platform for changing non-identifiable 'statistical victims' into 'real people' with whom we can identify and feel empathy: the so-called 'identifiable victim effect', which prompts charitable action. We examine three approaches to promoting kidney donation using social media which could take advantages of the identifiable victim effect: (a) institutionally organized campaigns based on historical cases aimed at promoting non-directed altruistic donation; (b) personal case-based campaigns organized by individuals aimed at promoting themselves/or someone with whom they are in a relationship as a recipient of directed donation; (c) institutionally organized personal case-based campaigns aimed at promoting specific recipients for directed donation. We will highlight the key ethical issues raised by these approaches, and will argue that the third option, despite raising ethical concerns, is preferable to the other two.