Laboratory-acquired infections and pathogen escapes worldwide between 2000 and 2021: a scoping review.

Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) and accidental pathogen escape from laboratory settings (APELS) are major concerns for the community. A risk-based approach for pathogen research management within a standard biosafety management framework is recommended but is challenging due to reasons such as inconsistency in risk tolerance and perception. Here, we performed a scoping review using publicly available, peer-reviewed journal and media reports of LAIs and instances of APELS between 2000 and 2021. We identified LAIs in 309 individuals in 94 reports for 51 pathogens. Eight fatalities (2·6% of all LAIs) were caused by infection with Neisseria meningitidis (n=3, 37·5%), Yersinia pestis (n=2, 25%), Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium (S Typhimurium; n=1, 12·5%), or Ebola virus (n=1, 12·5%) or were due to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (n=1, 12·5%). The top five LAI pathogens were S Typhimurium (n=154, 49·8%), Salmonella enteritidis (n=21, 6·8%), vaccinia virus (n=13, 4·2%), Brucella spp (n=12, 3·9%), and Brucella melitensis (n=11, 3·6%). 16 APELS were reported, including those for Bacillus anthracis, SARS-CoV, and poliovirus (n=3 each, 18·8%); Brucella spp and foot and mouth disease virus (n=2 each, 12·5%); and variola virus, Burkholderia pseudomallei, and influenza virus H5N1 (n=1 each, 6·3%). Continual improvement in LAI and APELS management via their root cause analysis and thorough investigation of such incidents is essential to prevent future occurrences. The results are biased due to the reliance on publicly available information, which emphasises the need for formalised global LAIs and APELS reporting to better understand the frequency of and circumstances surrounding these incidents.

Trachymyrmex septentrionalis ants promote fungus garden hygiene using Trichoderma-derived metabolite cues.

Fungus-growing ants depend on a fungal mutualist that can fall prey to fungal pathogens. This mutualist is cultivated by these ants in structures called fungus gardens. Ants exhibit weeding behaviors that keep their fungus gardens healthy by physically removing compromised pieces. However, how ants detect diseases of their fungus gardens is unknown. Here, we applied the logic of Koch's postulates using environmental fungal community gene sequencing, fungal isolation, and laboratory infection experiments to establish that Trichoderma spp. can act as previously unrecognized pathogens of Trachymyrmex septentrionalis fungus gardens. Our environmental data showed that Trichoderma are the most abundant noncultivar fungi in wild T. septentrionalis fungus gardens. We further determined that metabolites produced by Trichoderma induce an ant weeding response that mirrors their response to live Trichoderma. Combining ant behavioral experiments with bioactivity-guided fractionation and statistical prioritization of metabolites in Trichoderma extracts demonstrated that T. septentrionalis ants weed in response to peptaibols, a specific class of secondary metabolites known to be produced by Trichoderma fungi. Similar assays conducted using purified peptaibols, including the two previously undescribed peptaibols trichokindins VIII and IX, suggested that weeding is likely induced by peptaibols as a class rather than by a single peptaibol metabolite. In addition to their presence in laboratory experiments, we detected peptaibols in wild fungus gardens. Our combination of environmental data and laboratory infection experiments strongly support that peptaibols act as chemical cues of Trichoderma pathogenesis in T. septentrionalis fungus gardens.

Vaccination effects on post-infection outcomes in the Omicron BA.2 outbreak in Shanghai.

Omicron and its sublineages are currently predominant and have triggered epidemiological waves of SARS-CoV-2 around the world due to their high transmissibility and strong immune escape ability. Vaccines are key measures to control the COVID-19 burden. Omicron BA.2 caused a large-scale outbreak in Shanghai since March 2022 and resulted in over 0.6 million laboratory-confirmed infections. The vaccine coverage of primary immunization among residents aged 3 years and older in Shanghai exceeded 90%, and inactivated COVID-19 vaccines were mainly delivered. In the context of high vaccine coverage, we conducted a cohort study to assess vaccine effects on reducing the probability of developing symptoms or severity of disease in infections or nonsevere cases. A total of 48,243 eligible participants were included in this study, the majority of whom had asymptomatic infections (31.0%) and mild-to-moderate illness (67.9%). Domestically developed COVID-19 vaccines provide limited protection to prevent asymptomatic infection from developing into mild-to-moderate illness and durable protection to prevent nonsevere illness from progressing to severe illness caused by Omicron BA.2. Partial vaccination fails to provide effective protection in any situation. The level of vaccine effects on disease progression in the elderly over 80 years old was relatively lower compared with other age groups. Our study results added robust evidence for the vaccine performance against Omicron infection and could improve vaccine confidence.

Trends in Cases, Hospitalizations, and Mortality Related to the Omicron BA.4/BA.5 Subvariants in South Africa.

BACKGROUND: In this study, we compared admission incidence risk and the risk of mortality in the Omicron BA.4/BA.5 wave to previous waves. METHODS: Data from South Africa's SARS-CoV-2 case linelist, national COVID-19 hospital surveillance system, and Electronic Vaccine Data System were linked and analyzed. Wave periods were defined when the country passed a weekly incidence of 30 cases/100 000 population. In-hospital case fatality ratios (CFRs) during the Delta, Omicron BA.1/BA.2, and Omicron BA.4/BA.5 waves were compared using post-imputation random effect multivariable logistic regression models. RESULTS: The CFR was 25.9% (N = 37 538 of 144 778), 10.9% (N = 6123 of 56 384), and 8.2% (N = 1212 of 14 879) in the Delta, Omicron BA.1/BA.2, and Omicron BA.4/BA.5 waves, respectively. After adjusting for age, sex, race, comorbidities, health sector, and province, compared with the Omicron BA.4/BA.5 wave, patients had higher risk of mortality in the Omicron BA.1/BA.2 wave (adjusted odds ratio [aOR], 1.3; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.2-1.4) and Delta wave (aOR, 3.0; 95% CI: 2.8-3.2). Being partially vaccinated (aOR, 0.9; 95% CI: .9-.9), fully vaccinated (aOR, 0.6; 95% CI: .6-.7), and boosted (aOR, 0.4; 95% CI: .4-.5) and having prior laboratory-confirmed infection (aOR, 0.4; 95% CI: .3-.4) were associated with reduced risks of mortality. CONCLUSIONS: Overall, admission incidence risk and in-hospital mortality, which had increased progressively in South Africa's first 3 waves, decreased in the fourth Omicron BA.1/BA.2 wave and declined even further in the fifth Omicron BA.4/BA.5 wave. Mortality risk was lower in those with natural infection and vaccination, declining further as the number of vaccine doses increased.

Evaluating the Clinical and Immune Responses to Spotted Fever Rickettsioses in the Guinea Pig-Tick-Rickettsia System.

The guinea pig was the original animal model developed for investigating spotted fever rickettsiosis (SFR). This model system has persisted on account of the guinea pig's conduciveness to tick transmission of SFR agents and ability to recapitulate SFR in humans through clinical signs that include fever, unthriftiness, and in some cases the development of an eschar. The guinea pig is the smallest animal model for SFR that allows the collection of multiple blood and skin samples antemortem for longitudinal studies. This unit provides the basic protocols necessary to establish, maintain, and utilize a guinea pig-tick-Rickettsia model for monitoring the course of infection and immune response to an infection by spotted fever group Rickettsia (SFGR) that can be studied at biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) and arthropod containment level 2 (ACL-2); adaptations must be made for BSL-3 agents. The protocols cover methods for tick feeding and colony development, laboratory infection of ticks, tick transmission of Rickettsia to guinea pigs, and monitoring of the course of infection through clinical signs, rickettsial burden, and immune response. It should be feasible to adapt these methods to study other tick-borne pathogens. © 2022 The Authors. Current Protocols published by Wiley Periodicals LLC. Basic Protocol 1: Tick transmission of SFGR to guinea pigs Support Protocol 1: Laboratory infection of ticks by injection Alternate Protocol 1: Needle inoculation of SFGR to guinea pigs Basic Protocol 2: Monitoring the course of guinea pig rickettsial infection: clinical signs Basic Protocol 3: Monitoring the course of guinea pig rickettsial infection: collection of biological specimens Support Protocol 2: Guinea pig anesthesia Basic Protocol 4: Monitoring rickettsial burden in guinea pigs by multiplex qPCR Basic Protocol 5: Monitoring guinea pig immune response to infection: blood leukocytes by flow cytometry Basic Protocol 6: Monitoring immune response to guinea pig rickettsial infection: leukocyte infiltration of skin at the tick bite site by flow cytometry Basic Protocol 7: Monitoring the immune response to guinea pig rickettsial infection: antibody titer by ELISA Support Protocol 4: Coating ELISA Plates Alternate Protocol 2: Monitoring immune response to guinea pig rickettsial infection: antibody titer by immunofluorescence assay.

Biosafety of personnel of microbiological laboratories in the context of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation № 492-FZ of December 30, 2020 «On the biological safety of the Russian Federation¼.

One of the most important requirements for the personnel of microbiological laboratories working with pathogenic and infectious agents is the observance of precautionary measures and the implementation of a set of preventive measures, collectively interpreted as biological safety (biosafety). To a large extent, biosafety problems are also relevant for all clinical laboratories working with biosubstrates, with the potential threat of containing pathogens of bloodborne infections in them. On December 30, 2020, the President of the Russian Federation signed Federal Law № 492 «On the Biological Safety of the Russian Federation¼ (№ 492-FZ), which regulates the basic legal norms and regulation of biosafety issues, as well as a list of measures to prevent the risks of the spread of infections due to accidents, bioterrorist acts and sabotage. The current pandemic of the coronavirus infection COVID-19 has demonstrated, on the one hand, the epidemiological vulnerability of the single world space, and on the other hand, the decisive influence of biological emergencies on the emergence of negative political and economic processes in the world community. In this regard, the issues of ensuring biosafety in the work of microbiological laboratories in the context of protecting personnel and the environment from accidental or unintentional spread of infections are relevant. Working with pathogenic biological agents in microbiological laboratories is constantly associated with the risk of accidents and possible laboratory infection (laboratory-acquired infections) of employees, environmental pollution if the requirements of regulatory documents on biological safety are not met. In accordance with the requirements of № 492-FZ, in order to prevent biological threats, it is necessary to create a system for monitoring biological risks in microbiological laboratories when working with any infected material.

Genome Sequence Analysis and Characterization of Shiga Toxin 2 Production by Escherichia coli O157:H7 Strains Associated With a Laboratory Infection.

A laboratory-acquired E. coli O157:H7 infection with associated severe sequelae including hemolytic uremic syndrome occurred in an individual working in the laboratory with a mixture of nalidixic acid-resistant (NalR) O157:H7 mutant strains in a soil-biochar blend. The patient was hospitalized and treated with an intravenous combination of metronidazole and levofloxacin. The present study investigated the source of this severe laboratory acquired infection and further examined the influence of the antibiotics used during treatment on the expression and production of Shiga toxin. Genomes of two Stx2a-and eae-positive O157:H7 strains isolated from the patient's stool were sequenced along with two pairs of the wt strains and their derived NalR mutants used in the laboratory experiments. High-resolution SNP typing determined the strains' individual genetic relatedness and unambiguously identified the two laboratory-derived NalR mutant strains as the source of the researcher's life-threatening disease, rather than a conceivable ingestion of unrelated O157:H7 isolates circulating at the same time. It was further confirmed that in sublethal doses, the antibiotics increased toxin expression and production. Our results support a simultaneous co-infection with clinical strains in the laboratory, which were the causative agents of previous O157:H7 outbreaks, and further that the administration of antibiotics may have impacted the outcome of the infection.

The Lanzhou Brucella Leak: The Largest Laboratory Accident in the History of Infectious Diseases?

An inadequacy in sanitizing processes in a biopharmaceutical plant in Lanzhou, China, during July and August 2019, led to the aerosolization of Brucella that was subsequently spread through wind to nearby settlements and academic institutes, resulting in >10 000 human brucellosis cases, as of November 2020. The leak, possibly the largest laboratory accident in the history of infectious diseases, underlines the particular characteristics of Brucella that have made the pathogen a historical entity in biodefense research and a major cause of laboratory-associated infections. It further underlines the need for enhanced vigilance and strict regulatory interventions in similar facilities.

Analysis of Bio-Risk Management System Implementation in Indonesian Higher Education Laboratory.

Developing countries face various challenges in implementing bio-risk management systems in the laboratory. In addition, educational settings are considered as workplaces with biohazard risks. Every activity in a laboratory facility carries many potential hazards that can impact human health and the environment and may cause laboratory incidents, including Laboratory Acquired Infections (LAIs). In an effort to minimize the impact and occurrence of these incidents, it is necessary to evaluate the implementation of a bio-risk management system in every activity that involves handling biological agents. This study was conducted in an Indonesian higher-education institution, herein coded as University Y. This is a descriptive, semi-quantitative study aimed at analysing and evaluating the implementation of the bio-risk management systems used in laboratories by analysing the achievements obtained by each laboratory. The study used primary data that were collected using a checklist which referred to ISO 35001:2019 on Laboratory Bio-risk Management. The checklist consisted of 202 items forming seven main elements. In addition, secondary data obtained from literature and document review were also used. The results show that out of 11 laboratories examined, only 2 laboratories met 50% of the requirements, which were Laboratory A and B, achieving good performance. Regarding the clauses of standards, a gap analysis identified leadership, performance evaluation, and support as elements with the lowest achievement. Therefore, corrective action should be developed by enhancing the commitment from management as well as improving documentation, policy, education and training.

A SHORT HISTORY OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: 1. LABORATORY-ACQUIRED INFECTIONS.

Laboratory-acquired infections are as old as laboratories themselves. As soon as the culture of microorganisms was introduced, so too was their transfer to laboratory workers. It is only in relatively recent history that such infections have been fully understood, and methods of spread and their prevention or avoidance developed. This paper endeavours to provide an overview of the history of laboratory-acquired infection and the steps taken, particularly in the UK, for its prevention.

Cellular pathology in the COVID-19 era: a European perspective on maintaining quality and safety.

COVID-19 is a zoonotic viral infection that originated in Wuhan, China, in late 2019. WHO classified the resulting pandemic as a 'global health emergency' due to its virulence and propensity to cause acute respiratory distress syndrome. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a major impact on diagnostic laboratories, particularly those handling cell and tissue specimens. This development carries serious implications for laboratory practice in that safety of personnel has to be balanced against high-quality analysis and timely reporting of results. The aim of this article is to present some recommendations for the handling of such specimens in the preanalytical, analytical and postanalytical phases of laboratory testing and analysis in an era of high COVID-19 prevalence, such as that seen, for example, in the UK, Spain, Italy and France.

Laboratory Infection of Novel Akhmeta Virus in CAST/EiJ Mice.

Akhmeta virus is a zoonotic Orthopoxvirus first identified in 2013 in the country of Georgia. Subsequent ecological investigations in Georgia have found evidence that this virus is widespread in its geographic distribution within the country and in its host-range, with rodents likely involved in its circulation in the wild. Yet, little is known about the pathogenicity of this virus in rodents. We conducted the first laboratory infection of Akhmeta virus in CAST/EiJ Mus musculus to further characterize this novel virus. We found a dose-dependent effect on mortality and weight loss (p < 0.05). Anti-orthopoxvirus antibodies were detected in the second- and third-highest dose groups (5 × 104 pfu and 3 × 102 pfu) at euthanasia by day 10, and day 14 post-infection, respectively. Anti-orthopoxvirus antibodies were not detected in the highest dose group (3 × 106 pfu), which were euthanized at day 7 post-infection and had high viral load in tissues, suggesting they succumbed to disease prior to mounting an effective immune response. In order of highest burden, viable virus was detected in the nostril, lung, tail, liver and spleen. All individuals tested in the highest dose groups were DNAemic. Akhmeta virus was highly pathogenic in CAST/EiJ Mus musculus, causing 100% mortality when ≥3 × 102 pfu was administered.

Laboratory Biosafety Considerations of SARS-CoV-2 at Biosafety Level 2.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the pathogen that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), which was first detected in Wuhan, China. Recent studies have updated the epidemiologic and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 continuously. In China, diagnostic tests and laboratory tests of specimens from persons under investigation are usually performed in a biosafety level 2 environment. Laboratory staff may be at greater risk of exposure due to a higher concentration and invasiveness of emerging pathogens. Current infection prevention strategies are based on lessons learned from severe acute respiratory syndrome, expert judgments, and related regulations. This article summarizes biosafety prevention and control measures performed in severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 testing activities and provides practical suggestions for laboratory staff to avoid laboratory-acquired infections in dealing with public health emergencies.

A Forgotten Episode of Marburg Virus Disease: Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 1967.

In 1967, several workers involved in poliomyelitis vaccine development and production fell ill at three different locations in Europe with a severe and often lethal novel disease associated with grivets (Chlorocebus aethiops) imported from Uganda. This disease was named Marburg virus disease (MVD) after the West German town of Marburg an der Lahn, where most human infections and deaths had been recorded. Consequently, the Marburg episode received the most scientific and media attention. Cases that occurred in Frankfurt am Main, West Germany, were also described in commonly accessible scientific literature, although they were less frequently cited than those pertaining to the Marburg infections. However, two infections occurring in a third location, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, have seemingly been all but forgotten. Due in part to their absence in commonly used databases and in part to the fact that they were written in languages other than English, the important articles describing this part of the outbreak are very rarely cited. Here, we summarize this literature and correct published inaccuracies to remind a younger generation of scientists focusing on Marburg virus and its closest filoviral relatives of this important historical context. Importantly, and unfortunately, the three episodes of infection of 1967 still represent the best in-depth clinical look at MVD in general and in the context of "modern" medicine (fully resourced versus less-resourced capacity) in particular. Hence, each individual case of these episodes holds crucial information for health care providers who may be confronted with MVD today.

Molecular investigation of infection sources and transmission chains of brucellosis in Zhejiang, China.

In the present study, a total of 7793 samples from 5 different types of hosts were collected and tested, with a seroprevalence of 2.4% (184/7793). Although the seroprevalence of human and animal brucellosis is relatively low, numbers of human brucellosis cases reported have increased continuously from 2004 to 2018. A total of 118 Brucella strains containing 4 biotypes were obtained, including Brucella melitensis bv.1 (n = 8) and bv.3 (n = 106), Brucella abortus bv.3 (n = 3) and bv.7 (n = 1). Twenty-one shared MLVA-16 genotypes, each composed of 2 to 19 strains obtained from different hosts, suggest the occurrence of a brucellosis outbreak epidemic with multiple source points and laboratory infection events. Moreover, 30 shared MLVA-16 genotypes were observed among 59.6% (68/114) B. melitensis isolates from Zhejiang and strains from other 21 different provinces, especially northern provinces, China. The analysis highlighted the imported nature of the strains from all over the northern provinces with a dominant part from the developed areas of animal husbandry. These data revealed a potential transmission pattern of brucellosis in this region, due to introduced infected sheep leading to a brucellosis outbreak epidemic, and eventually causing multiple laboratory infection events. It is urgent to strengthen the inspection and quarantine of the introduced animals.

Brucella Exposure Risk Events in 10 Clinical Laboratories, New York City, USA, 2015 to 2017.

From 2015 to 2017, 11 confirmed brucellosis cases were reported in New York City, leading to 10 Brucella exposure risk events (Brucella events) in 7 clinical laboratories (CLs). Most patients had traveled to countries where brucellosis is endemic and presented with histories and findings consistent with brucellosis. CLs were not notified that specimens might yield a hazardous organism, as the clinicians did not consider brucellosis until they were notified that bacteremia with Brucella was suspected. In 3 Brucella events, the CLs did not suspect that slow-growing, small Gram-negative bacteria might be harmful. Matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization-time of flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS), which has a limited capacity to identify biological threat agents (BTAs), was used during 4 Brucella events, which accounted for 84% of exposures. In 3 of these incidents, initial staining of liquid media showed Gram-positive rods or cocci, including some cocci in chains, suggesting streptococci. Over 200 occupational exposures occurred when the unknown isolates were manipulated and/or tested on open benches, including by procedures that could generate infectious aerosols. During 3 Brucella events, the CLs examined and/or manipulated isolates in a biological safety cabinet (BSC); in each CL, the CL had previously isolated Brucella Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations to prevent laboratory-acquired brucellosis (LAB) were followed; no seroconversions or LAB cases occurred. Laboratory assessments were conducted after the Brucella events to identify facility-specific risks and mitigations. With increasing MALDI-TOF MS use, CLs are well-advised to adhere strictly to safe work practices, such as handling and manipulating all slow-growing organisms in BSCs and not using MALDI-TOF MS for identification until BTAs have been ruled out.

Survey of Suspected Laboratory-Acquired Infections and Biosafety Practices in Research, Clinical, and Veterinary Laboratories in Karachi, Pakistan.

Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs), an occupational illness, are defined as all infections acquired through laboratory or laboratory-related activities. A report published in 1898 described an LAI resulting from Corynebacterium diphtheriae being transmitted through mouth pipetting. Despite all efforts, LAIs continue, especially in developing countries like Pakistan, which has been fighting to curb many infectious diseases. As reflected in the published literature, the biosafety culture is severely lacking in many laboratories, and there are no data available from Pakistan on LAIs. Our objective was to ascertain the frequency and rate of LAIs in various labs with versatile portfolios in relation to biosafety and biosecurity practices in Karachi. Ours is a descriptive multicenter cross-sectional study conducted in 30 laboratories located in Karachi from November 2017 to April 2018. Data were collected from laboratories including the university hospital labs, research labs, animal labs, and biomedical labs. Out of 30 facilities, half (n = 15) were clinical/biomedical laboratories, 16.6% (n = 5) were university hospital laboratories, 26.6% (n = 8) were R&D laboratories, and 6.6% (n = 2) were animal laboratories. Needle stick was found to be the most common injury, followed by animal bite/scratch, cut on mucous membrane, falling of personnel, and burn injury.