New York State Creates New Governance of Commercial Gestational Surrogacy.

United States law recognizes adult reproductive liberty and many states view surrogacy services through that lens. During the COVID-19 pandemic in March, 2020, New York State enacted the Child-Parent Surrogacy Act (CPSA) into law, after feminists and their allies had caused its defeat in 2019. Just before approval of the CPSA, a group of legislators introduced the Alternative Surrogacy Bill (ASB). This article is a case study that examines how the CPSA and not the ASB became law, examining surrogate rights, the best interests of the child, and the ethical issues related to adult donor-conceived and surrogacy born children's rights to information about their ancestry.

The Boundaries of Embryo Research: Extending the Fourteen-Day Rule : Australasian Association of Bioethics and Health Law John McPhee (Law) Student Essay Prize 2018.

The disciplines of ethics, science, and the law often conflict when it comes to determining the limits and boundaries of embryo research. Under current Australian law and regulations, and in various other jurisdictions, research conducted on the embryo in vitro is permitted up until day fourteen, after which, the embryo must be destroyed. Reproductive technology and associated research is rapidly advancing at a rate that contests current societal and ethical limits surrounding the treatment of the embryo. This has brought about the question of the adequacy of the fourteen-day rule and whether it is necessary for it be reconsidered and reformed. This paper will highlight some of the tensions that exist in ethics, science, and the law in relation to the extension of the rule. It will be concluded that any move to extend the rule must be accompanied by close consultation with the public as the ultimate stakeholders in how the future of reproductive technology is created, constructed, and contested.

[The beginning of human life: ethical and legal perspectives in the context of biotechnological progress]. / O marco inicial da vida humana: perspectivas ético-jurídicas no contexto dos avanços biotecnológicos.

Questions concerning the beginning of human life have pervaded society since antiquity. In the post-modern world, scientific and technological advances have fueled discussions on the issue, such that debates previously concentrated on abortion now also focus on biotechnological interventions. The article addresses the latter, reflecting on the extent to which human dignity can be considered a (hermeneutic) reference in establishing ethical and legal parameters for biotechnological advances in the definition of the beginning of human life. The study's method was critical hermeneutic ethics, with ethics at the center of the process of understanding and interpretation, observing the contours of facticity. No consensus was found on the beginning of human life, so it is essential to engage in dialogue with the new reality resulting from biotechnological advances in the process of defining ethical and legal principles for protecting the embryo and human nature, with human dignity as the reference.

O marco inicial da vida humana: perspectivas ético-jurídicas no contexto dos avanços biotecnológicos / The beginning of human life: ethical and legal perspectives in the context of biotechnological progress / El marco inicial de la vida humana: perspectivas ético-jurídicas en el contexto de los avances biotecnológicos

Resumo: As indagações com relação ao termo inicial da vida humana perpassam a sociedade desde a antiguidade. No mundo pós-moderno, os avanços da ciência e da técnica potencializam as discussões acerca do tema, de modo que os debates que anteriormente se concentravam em torno do aborto, também passaram a ter como objeto as intervenções da biotecnologia. O presente artigo trata do último aspecto, a saber, refletir em que medida a dignidade humana pode ser considerada um referencial (hermenêutico) na construção de parâmetros ético-jurídicos para os avanços biotecnológicos na definição do marco inicial da vida humana. Para desenvolver a pesquisa, utilizou-se como método de abordagem a ética hermenêutica crítica, mediante a qual a ética encontra-se no centro do processo de compreensão e interpretação, observando-se os contornos da facticidade. Constatou-se que não há consenso no que diz respeito ao termo inicial da vida, de forma que é fundamental dialogar com a nova realidade decorrente dos avanços biotecnológicos, no processo de construção de preceitos éticos e jurídicos de proteção do embrião e da natureza humana, tendo como referencial a dignidade humana.

Abstract: Questions concerning the beginning of human life have pervaded society since antiquity. In the post-modern world, scientific and technological advances have fueled discussions on the issue, such that debates previously concentrated on abortion now also focus on biotechnological interventions. The article addresses the latter, reflecting on the extent to which human dignity can be considered a (hermeneutic) reference in establishing ethical and legal parameters for biotechnological advances in the definition of the beginning of human life. The study's method was critical hermeneutic ethics, with ethics at the center of the process of understanding and interpretation, observing the contours of facticity. No consensus was found on the beginning of human life, so it is essential to engage in dialogue with the new reality resulting from biotechnological advances in the process of defining ethical and legal principles for protecting the embryo and human nature, with human dignity as the reference.

Resumen: Las investigaciones relacionadas con el inicio de la vida humana han acompañado a la sociedad desde la antigüedad. En el mundo posmoderno, los avances de la ciencia y de la técnica potencian las discusiones sobre este tema, de modo que los debates que anteriormente se concentraban en torno al aborto, también pasaron a ser objeto por las intervenciones de la biotecnología. El presente artículo trata acerca de este último aspecto, a saber, reflexionar en qué medida la dignidad humana puede ser considerada una referencia (hermenéutica) en la construcción de parámetros ético-jurídicos para los avances biotecnológicos, en la definición del marco inicial de la vida humana. Para desarrollar la investigación, se utilizó como método de enfoque la ética hermenéutica crítica, mediante la cual la ética se encuentra en el centro del proceso de comprensión e interpretación, observándose los contornos de la facticidad. Se constató que no existe consenso en lo que se refiere al término inicial de la vida, de forma que es fundamental dialogar con la nueva realidad, derivada de los avances biotecnológicos, en el proceso de construcción de preceptos éticos y jurídicos de protección del embrión y de la naturaleza humana, teniendo como referente la dignidad humana.

Estudo comparativo das regulamentações de reprodução assistida e das leis de abortamento de Brasil, Alemanha, Colômbia e França / Comparative study of regulations of assisted reproduction and abortion laws between Brazil, Germany, Colombia and France

OBJETIVO: Descrever as regulamentacões de Reprodução Humana Assistida (RHA) e as leis de abortamento do Brasil, Alemanha, Colômbia e Franc¸a. MÉTODO: Foi feito estudo qualitativo transversal das regulamentações referentes à reproducão humana assistida e ao abortamento no Brasil, na Colômbia, Alemanha e Franca entre agosto de 2014 e março de 2015. RESULTADOS: Para a RHA o Brasil tem a resolucão do Conselho Federal de Medicina 2.013/2013, a Colômbia o decreto 1.546/1998 para a doacão de gametas, a Alemanha e Franc¸a leis específicas. Em relacão à lei do abortamento, os quatro países têm leis específicas. CONCLUSÃO: Considerando todas as regulamentacões de RHA e leis de abortamento, verificamos que os países encontram-se em situacões distintas em relacão à RHA e que todos têm leis específicas para o abortamento.

OBJECTIVE: This study aims to describe the regulations of Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR) and the abortion laws of Brazil, Germany, Colombia and France. METHOD: A cross-sectional qualitative study of regulations relating to assisted human reproduction and abortion in Brazil, Colombia, Germany and France between august 2014 and March 2015. RESULTS: For the AHR Brazil has the resolution of the Federal Council of Medicine 2013/2013, Colombia has the 1546/1998 decree for the donation of gametes, Germany and France have specific laws. Regarding the abortion law, the four countries have specific laws. CONCLUSION: Considering all the regulations of AHR and abortion laws, we found that these countries are in different situations regarding the AHR and that they all have specific laws for abortion.

What is the harm in harmful conception? On threshold harms in non-identity cases.

Has the time come to put to bed the concept of a harm threshold when discussing the ethics of reproductive decision making and the legal limits that should be placed upon it? In this commentary, we defend the claim that there exist good moral reasons, despite the conclusions of the non-identity problem, based on the interests of those we might create, to refrain from bringing to birth individuals whose lives are often described in the philosophical literature as 'less than worth living'.

How useful is the concept of the 'harm threshold' in reproductive ethics and law?

In his book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit suggests that people are not harmed by being conceived with a disease or disability if they could not have existed without suffering that particular condition. He nevertheless contends that entities can be harmed if the suffering they experience is sufficiently severe. By implication, there is a threshold which divides harmful from non-harmful conceptions. The assumption that such a threshold exists has come to play a part in UK policy making. I argue that Parfit's distinction between harmful and non-harmful conceptions is untenable. Drawing on Kant's refutation of the ontological argument for God's existence, I suggest that the act of creation cannot be identical with the act of harming-nor indeed of benefiting-however great the offspring's suffering may be. I suggest that Parfit is right that bringing children into existence does not usually harm them, but I argue that this must be applied to all conceptions, since Parfit cannot show how the harm threshold can be operationalised. If we think certain conceptions are unethical or should be illegal, this must be on other grounds than that the child is harmed by them. I show that a Millian approach in this context fails to exemplify the empirical and epistemological advantages which are commonly associated with it, and that harm-based legislation would need to be based on broader harm considerations than those relating to the child who is conceived.

Recommendations for gamete and embryo donation: a committee opinion.

This document provides the latest recommendations for evaluation of potential sperm, oocyte, and embryo donors, incorporating recent information about optimal screening and testing for sexually transmitted infections, genetic diseases, and psychological assessments. This revised document incorporates recent information from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the US Food and Drug Administration, and the American Association of Tissue Banks, with which all programs offering gamete and embryo donation services must be thoroughly familiar, and replaces the document titled, "2008 Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo Donation: A Practice Committee Report," last published in Fertil Steril 2008;90:S30-44.

Socializing the public: invoking Hannah Arendt's critique of modernity to evaluate reproductive technologies.

The article examines the writings of one of the most influential political philosophers, Hannah Arendt, and specifically focuses on her views regarding the distinction between the private and the public and the transformation of the public to the social by modernity. Arendt's theory of human activity and critique of modernity are explored to critically evaluate the social contributions and implications of reproductive technologies especially where the use of such technologies is most dominant within Western societies. Focusing on empirical studies on new reproductive technologies in Israel, it is argued, powerfully demonstrates Arendt's theory, and broadens the perspectives through which society should evaluate these new technologies towards a more reflective understanding of its current laws and policies and their affect on women more generally.

[Significance of reproductive medicine in regard to judicial and ethical concerns in Germany]. / Gesellschaftlicher Stellenwert und juristische Aspekte der Reproduktionsmedizin in Deutschland.

Reproductive medicine becomes more and more important due to demographic changes and an increased demand. Since the German "Embryonenschutzgesetz" was set in 1991 many medical improvements could be achieved which are not covered by law. Health can be improved avoiding multiple pregnancy rates. In Germany we are facing an insufficient law concerning reproductive medicine. Therefore, it is very important to renew the law in order to create a better health supply clearing crucial medical questions.

Conscientious objection and the nurse: a right or a privilege?

This article examines to what extent nurses can at present opt out of clinical procedures on the basis of conscience in English law. It considers the current rights to opt out on the basis of conscience contained in section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 and section 38 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. It examines how through codes of practice and guidance, there is recognition of the ability to opt out beyond theses statutes. It suggests that rather than let practice evolve to enable persons to opt out, the fundamental issues as to whether it should be a right or a privilege needs careful consideration across healthcare professions as a whole and a broader public debate.